JUDGMENT Kendall, J. - The appellant, Mohan Lal, has been convicted by the learned Sessions Judge of Cawnpore of an offence u/s 395, Penal Code, and sentenced to seven years' rigorous imprisonment. The dacoity in question took place on the night between 24th and 25th May 1933, and a number of those who took part in it have been tried and convicted. The present appellant however was not arrested until about a year after the dacoity, and he was put up for identification in jail about a month after his arrest. These details are of some importance. The fact that a dacoity had taken place having been proved as a result of the former case, nothing remained in the present case, but to show that the appellant had been present at it, and that the evidence of identification was beyond suspicion. There was an approver in the case a man named Sadasukh and he named the present appellant as one of the dacoits. The learned Judge however though he appears to have believed the statement of this approver, has preferred not to rely on him. After pointing out that his statement does; not agree with that of some of the witnesses for the prosecution, Tie comes to the conclusion that those other witnesses are probably unreliable and that: the approver is telling the truth. The reason why he has decided not to rely on the statement of the approver is that he has discussed the value of the evidence of an accomplice elaborately in other cases, and has come to the conclusion that: It is a waste of time, because the High Court invariably disposes of the whole contention; in one single sentence the man is an accomplice. That is all. It is enough. 2. This is not a correct statement of what the High Court does. The state merit of the accomplice is. of course, subject to suspicion, but in certain cases it is of great value in evidence. But the Court is have held that such a statement unless supported by reliable evidence of another kind to corroborate it is not sufficient in itself to form the basis of a conviction. The matter has been discussed very recently by a Bench of this Court in the case of Nazir v. Emperor 1931 All. But the Court is have held that such a statement unless supported by reliable evidence of another kind to corroborate it is not sufficient in itself to form the basis of a conviction. The matter has been discussed very recently by a Bench of this Court in the case of Nazir v. Emperor 1931 All. 31, and the extent to which corroboration is necessary is clearly set forth in the words of Lord Reading in Rex v. Baskerville (1916) 2 K.B. 658, in which his Lordship remarked: We hold that the evidence of corroboration must be independent testimony which affects the accused by connecting or tending to connect him with the crime. In other words, it must be evidence which implicates him, that is, which confirms in some material particular not only the evidence that the crime has been committed, but also that the prisoner committed it The corroboration need not be direct evidence that the accused committed the crime; it is sufficient if it is merely circumstantial evidence of his connexion with the crime. 3. Mr. Hunter the learned Sessions Judge will find that the law as set forth by Lord Reading in this judgment has been followed not only by this Court, but by other High Courts in India. He must in future regard the evidence of an accomplice as evidence that must be considered in certain circumstances, as of the existence of which he must himself be the Judge, and it is not to be completely discarded merely because he may have an apprehension that the High Court may take a different view from his, or that the High Court would utterly refuse to consider it at all merely on the ground that it is the evidence of an accomplice. 4. As the learned Judge has not relied on the statement of the approver however it is not necessary to go into this matter further in connexion with the present case. The Judge has relied on the fact that the dacoity was committed, which cannot now be controverted, and the evidence of three witnesses, Ghasita, Sheoraj and Jhuria, who identified the appellant as having been one of the dacoits. Mr. Saila Nath Mukerji. The Judge has relied on the fact that the dacoity was committed, which cannot now be controverted, and the evidence of three witnesses, Ghasita, Sheoraj and Jhuria, who identified the appellant as having been one of the dacoits. Mr. Saila Nath Mukerji. who appears for the present appellant in this Court has of course laid stress on the fact that the identification proceedings took place more than a year after the dacoity, and that the task of the witnesses in identifying the appellant was therefore mare difficult than it is in most cases. There were in fact nine persons who were brought forward as witnesses for the prosecution to identify the appellant. The appellant was mixed with five other under-trial prisoners, so that the chances of any one of the witnesses picking out the right man - supposing that he was not really in a position to identify him - were five to one. Three of these witnesses identified the wrong man, three failed to identify anybody at all and the three whom I have named above identified the present appellant correctly. It is suggested that the trustworthiness of these three should be considerably reduced by the consideration that six other witnesses were called to identify the appellant at the same proceeding and failed to do so. But I know of no authority for gauging the trustworthiness of any individual witness in this way. Each of these three had five chances in six of picking out a wrong man, and each of the three stood the test satisfactorily. The mathematical standard that is to be observed by a Court of appeal in testing the trustworthiness of such witnesses is by no means perfect. But it is the only general standard that can be applied, and in the present case undoubtedly it gives us the result that these three witnesses were very good identifying witnesses. 5. Part of the defence was devoted to showing that, the appellant might have been shown to these witnesses before the identification parade, or that some information might have been given to them which would enable them to pick out the appellant from among the other persons at the parade. 5. Part of the defence was devoted to showing that, the appellant might have been shown to these witnesses before the identification parade, or that some information might have been given to them which would enable them to pick out the appellant from among the other persons at the parade. The Judge has considered this in some detail, and the conclusion that, he has come to is that it was not impossible that the witnesses should have seen the appellant before the parade or that the prosecuting; authorities should have given to them, some illegitimate means of identifying, the appellant but that it is very unlikely that any such action was taken and it was never suggested by the appellant himself that such action was, taken. In the nature of things there must be some opportunities for foul play of this kind in some cases; but unless it is to be presumed that the prosecuting authorities are invariably dishonest, there is no reason for presuming so in this particular case. 6. To take the three witnesses who have, been relied on individually, Ghasite deposed that he was awakened by the daeoits who were beating Din Dayal. who was sleeping by the side of the witness near the doorway, that although it was a dark night, there was a lamp, and that he was able to identify four or five daeoits including the present appellant who, he said, was going in and out of the house during: the dacoity. Sheoraj and Jhuria, the other witnesses, deposed that they were sleeping on the roof when the dacoity began, and that the dacoits took them from the roof and made them sit by the door. Jhuria stated, that the present appellant was wearing a dhoti and had no beard, but otherwise not one of the three witnesses gives in evidence any reason for remembering the appearance of the appellant. All three denied having seen him before the dacoity, and a good deal of stress has been laid on this by Mr. Saila Nath Mukerji, who contends that there is plenty of evidence to prove that the appellant had been a member of the Congress and had frequently been present at Congress meetings in the neighbourhood of the village in which these three witnesses reside. Saila Nath Mukerji, who contends that there is plenty of evidence to prove that the appellant had been a member of the Congress and had frequently been present at Congress meetings in the neighbourhood of the village in which these three witnesses reside. It is argued that they must have had opportunities of seeing the appellant at these meetings that their statements that they had never seen him before must be untrue or even if they are true to this extent that they did not know who the appellant was that they must have nevertheless been familiar with his appearance and that this would enable them to pick him out from among the other persons in the parade, if they had been informed beforehand that the person whom they were required to identify was the man who had been present at the Congress meetings. All this is of course quite possible, but I can find no justification whatever for presuming that it actually did happen. The only reason and it is a very small one for disbelieving the evidence of anyone of these witnesses is that Sheoraj stated in cross-examination that he had never been to Sheorajpur, whereas Jhuria stated that he himself had been to Sheoirajpur where he had stayed with Beni Ram, and that Sheoraj sometimes went, to the same place. It is possible that Sheoraj was going too far when he said that he had never been to Sheorajpur, but it is also possible that Jhuria was mistaken in saying that he (Sheoraj) had been there, for he does not say that he had ever seen him there. The statement is certainly not sufficient to justify a pourt in discarding the whole of the evidence of Sheoraj on the ground that he was lying. These witnesses having been believed, and no sufnciently strong reason having been shown to me why the decision of the learned Sessions Judge should be reversed, I must hold that the case has been fully proved against the appellant and that there is no force in the appeal. It is therefore dismissed.