JUDGMENT 1. This is an appeal in a suit for enforcement of a mortgage executed by the Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 in favour of the Plaintiff in the suit, on the 20th of December, 1924. From the tenor of the mortgage deed, it is manifest that the Defendant No. 1, was the real mortgagor and that the Defendant No. 2 acknowledged liability for the mortgage debt as a joint mortgagor and hypothecated the property covered by the mortgage as a widow in possession of her husband's estate and in respect of which the Defendant No. 1 was the next reversioner. The covenants contained in the mortgage clearly indicated that the mortgagee had the right to sell the movable and immovable properties belonging to the Defendant No. 1 and his brother's widow, the Defendant No. 2. It may be mentioned that there was recital in the mortgage deed to the effect that the consideration of the mortgage was received by both the Defendants in the suit. The claim in suit was resisted by the Defendant No. 2, and on the pleadings of the parties, the issues raised for determination in the case, were to the following effect: Was the bond in suit executed by the Defendant No. 2? Was it duly attested ? Did the Defendant No. 2 receive any consideration for the bond ? Is the Plaintiff entitled to a decree as against the Defendant No. 2's moiety of the plaint property? 2. On the evidence on the record, there can be no doubt that the mortgage was executed by the Defendant No. 2 with full knowledge of the contents of the mortgage deed and that it was properly attested. The materials on the record placed before us are not however sufficient for the purpose of establishing that the Defendant No. 2 received any part of the money advanced on the mortgage executed by her jointly with the Defendant No. 1, in favour of the Plaintiff, on the 20th December, 1924. It was in a manner conceded before us on behalf of the Plaintiff -Respondent that the Defendant No. 2 did not receive any part of the consideration money. 3. It was in a manner conceded before us on behalf of the Plaintiff -Respondent that the Defendant No. 2 did not receive any part of the consideration money. 3. The position, therefore, so far as the Defendant No. 2 was concerned, was this, that she undertook liability jointly with the Defendant No. 1; and that was a consideration under the law: [see in this connection, Fanindra Narain Roy v. Kacheman Bibi ILR 45 Cal. 774 (1917) and Sornalinga Mudali v. Pachai Naickan ILR 38 Mad. 680 (1913)]. If the acknowledgment of liability was a valid consideration for the mortgage, as it must be held to be the case, the Defendant No. 2 could not escape liability in the matter of satisfaction of the mortgage decree. 4. The question for consideration next was what the extent of that liability was under the law, on the footing that the mortgage in question was jointly executed by the Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 for the benefit of Defendant No. 1. In this connection the position of the Defendant No. 2 as a person in possession of the moiety of mortgaged property, as a Hindu widow, comes in for consideration. On the recitals in the mortgage deed and on the other materials before us, although the next reversioner was the person who derived benefit from the mortgage, the Defendant No. 2 could not bind the entire estate of her husband in her possession by her acknowledgment of liability for the mortgage debt. It was admitted by the learned Advocate for the Plaintiff-Respondent that a decree on the footing of the mortgage in suit, could bind the life-interest of the Defendant No. 2 only and not the interest of the reversioners. 5. The question of legal necessity was sought to be argued before us in connection with the case of the Defendant No. 2, Appellant in this Court. That question was not raised in the written statement of the Defendant No. 2, and was not indicated by any issues in the case. 5. The question of legal necessity was sought to be argued before us in connection with the case of the Defendant No. 2, Appellant in this Court. That question was not raised in the written statement of the Defendant No. 2, and was not indicated by any issues in the case. The interest of the Defendant No. 2 in the property mortgaged by her was that of a Hindu widow with res-iricted powers, of alienation; and on the materials before us, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that by acknowledging liability, so far as the mortgage debt was concerned, the Defendant No. 2 had rendered the mortgaged property liable for satisfaction of the mortgage money to this extent that her widow's estate or her life-estate in the same could be sold in execution of a mortgage decree passed on the footing of the mortgage executed by Defendant No. 1 and herself jointly in favour of the Plaintiff. 6. In the above view of the case before us, the appeal must be allowed in part. The decree passed by the Court below is modified by the addition of a clause in addition to the three mentioned therein, making it clear that it is only the life-interest of the Defendant No. 2 in the suit in the mortgaged property, that is to be sold for the realisation of the mortgage money with interest and costs. The decree for costs in the Court below also requires variation; in the circumstances of the case, the Defendant No. 2 is entitled to get half the costs in the trial Court from the Plaintiff. The Defendant No. 2 Appellant is also entitled to get half the costs in this appeal from the Plaintiff-Respondent.