JUDGMENT Allsop, J. - This is an appeal against a decree of the learned Subordinate Judge of Aligarh. It appears that one Net Ram died in the year 1886 leaving him surviving two daughters Mst. Tejo and Mst. Hukum Kunwar and a widow Mst. Mendu. After his death his property, now in suit was shown in the register as being in the possession of his widow and of his two brothers Sewa Ram and Hira Singh. Then on the 5th October, 1S87, the widow died and the two brothers continued in possession. Mst. Hukum Kunwar and Mst. Tejo it is said were not sufficiently well off to institute a suit for possession against the two brothers. However, eventually some money was borrowed from Khem Singh and a suit was instituted within limitation on the 30th September, 1899. As a result of that suit Mst. Tejo and Mst. Hukum Kunwar came into possession, of Jthe property. We have mentioned that money was borrowed for the purposes of the suit. We refer to a mortgage executed by Mst. Tejo alone in favour of Khem Singh. It was to secure a debt of Rs. 1000 and hypothecated Mst. Tejo's half share in the property. A suit was instituted on the basis of the mortgage. A decree was obtained and Mst. Tejo's half share was put to sale and purchased by the mortgagee himself and by Chhattar Singh and Kewal Singh. The purchasers, having obtained a share in the property, then instituted a suit for partition in the revenue Court. In the course of that suit Mst. Hukum Kunwar objected that they had no share because Mst. Tejo was not entitled to alienate the property. Mst. Hukum Kunwar was directed to institute a suit in the Civil Court within a certain period, but she failed to do so and consequently her objection was disallowed and the partition was effected. Sometime latter Mst. Tejo died and Mst. Hukum Kunwar then instituted the suit which has given rise to this appeal in order to obtain possession of Mst. Tejo's half share in the property on the allegation that it had come to her by right of survivorship. The suit has been decreed by the lower Court and consequently this appeal is before us. 2. It will be convenient before we go any further to consider one point which has been raised namely, whether Mst. Tejo's half share in the property on the allegation that it had come to her by right of survivorship. The suit has been decreed by the lower Court and consequently this appeal is before us. 2. It will be convenient before we go any further to consider one point which has been raised namely, whether Mst. Hukum Kunwar was a consenting party to the mortgage by Mst. Tejo. We have been referred to some evidence, but have no hesitation in saying that it is of little value. One of the Defendants Chhattar Singh said that Mst. Hukum Kunwar was present at the time of the execution of the bond and that she was a consenting party to the same. As he is so deeply interested in the result of the suit we do not feel that we can place much reliance upon him Then there is a witness produced by the Defendants called Tika Ram. He has said that Mst. Hukum Kunwar and Mst. Tejo were both in a curtained cart at the time when the deed was executed and when it was registered. There is no corroborative evidence by way of documents or otherwise to show that Mst. Hukum Kunwar was present at the time, but even if we are to accept the evidence of the witness it does not at all show that Mst. Hukum Kunwar was a consenting party to the alienation by her sister. The mere fact that she may have been present when the deed was executed or when it was registered does not. show that she had agreed to any alienation or that she had understood anything about the matter. We are consequently not prepared to hold that Mst. Hukum Kunwar was a consenting party to the alienation. As a matter of fact, it was never pleaded in the written statement that her consent had been obtained and when at a later stage of the case an application was made by the Defendants for amendment of the written statement so that they might raise the point this application was rejected. 3. Having held that Mst. Hukum Kunwar was not a consenting party, we now have to consider a proposition of law upon which the Plaintiff has relied. 3. Having held that Mst. Hukum Kunwar was not a consenting party, we now have to consider a proposition of law upon which the Plaintiff has relied. She says that one of the two daughters holding the estate jointly was not entitled whether there was necessity or not to make an alienation of any part of that estate so as to bind her sister or the other reversioners. We are satisfied that this is a true proposition of law and that the matter is concluded by authority. In the case of Gauri Nath Makaji v. Gaya Kuar (1928) 26 ALJ 1174 (P.C.), their Lordships of the Privy Council said: The general law is so well settled that it scarcely requires restatement, If a Hindu dies leaving two widows, they succeed as joint tenants with a right of survivorship. They are entitled to obtain a partition of separate portions of the property so that each may enjoy her equal share of the income accruing therefrom. Each can deal as she pleases with her own life-interest, but she cannot alienate any part of the corpus of the estate by gift or will so as to prejudice the rights of the survivor or a future reversioner. It they act together they can burden the reversioner with any debts contracted owing to legal necessity, but one of them acting without the authority of the other, cannot prejudice the right of survivorship by burdening or alienating any part of the estate. 4. It has been suggested in arguments that one of two widows cannot alienate her share until she has obtained a partition of the property. This argument is based on the analogy of a Hindu joint family. We do not consider that the analogy is a true one. There is nothing in the statement of the law which we have quoted to justify the conclusion that the right of dealing with a share of the property arises only after partition and there is no reason why any such distinction should be made. In a Hindu joint family the shares are fluctuating just as members of the family may fluctuate. In a Hindu joint family the shares are fluctuating just as members of the family may fluctuate. In a joint estate such as that held by two or more widows there can be no question of fluctuation except in so far as if some one of the joint tenants dies her share will go by survivorship to the others and may increase their shares. The shares cannot at any time be decreased during the lives of the persons holding them. 5. There has also been a suggestion that the law in respect of daughters is not the same as that in respect of widows. In the case of Aumirtolal Bose v. Rajoneekant Mitter (1875) 2 Ind. App 113 (at p. 127) (P.C.), their Lordships of the Privy Council have quoted with approval a proposition laid down by Mr. Justice Morgan namely, "that like widows, the two daughters collectively were, in a legal sense, one heir to their father." 6. The reference was to daughters holding a Hindu father's estate seems to us that this is quite conclusive upon the question whether there is any difference between the position of widows and the position of daughters in this respect. We are satisfied that the position is the same and. consequently that one of the daughters in this case could not alienate any; part of the joint estate to the prejudice of the other. 7. There are certain subsidiary, arguments raised by the Appellant. In the first place it is suggested that whatever other reasons there may be for dismissing the appeal, yet in this particular case the Plaintiff was not entitled to succeed because she had benefitted by the loan taken by her sister and that consequently she could not question the validity of the mortgage by which the loan was secured. We cannot see that there is any force in this argument. There is absolutely no reason for saying that Mst. Hukura Kunwar was in any way estopped from raising the question which she did raise that she was entitled to the property. It is not shown that she attempted to deceive or did deceive anybody, so as to induce him to change his legal position. There is absolutely no reason for saying that Mst. Hukura Kunwar was in any way estopped from raising the question which she did raise that she was entitled to the property. It is not shown that she attempted to deceive or did deceive anybody, so as to induce him to change his legal position. The mere fact that she may in some measure have benefitted from the loan taken by her sister in that she obtained her share in the course of litigation which may have been partly financed from the money so borrowed is no reason for preventing her from questioning the transaction. 8. Another argument is that the Plaintiff's claim was barred by the provisions of Section 233k of the United Provinces Land Revenue Act. We have already mentioned that Mst. Huknm Kunwar at the time of the partition raised the question whether Mst. Tejo was entitled to transfer her share of the property to Khem Singh. It is true that she did not institute a suit in the Civil Court as she was directed to do, but we do not see what suit she could have instituted. At that time her sister" Mat. Tejo was alive and consequently she was entitled to deal with her own share of the property and it would not have been possible for Mst. Hukum Kunwar to obtain any relief against that share. The position was quite different after Mst. Tejo died. The most that we, can hold in respect of the decision u/s 111 of the Land Revenufe Act is that it might be res-judicata that Mst. Hukum Kunwar was not entitled to recover the share of Mst. Tejo during Mst. Tejo's lifetime. It is certainly not justifiable to say that the decision in the partition suit prevented Mst. Hukum Kunwar from recovering the share after Mst. Tejo's death. 9. This concludes all the questions which have been raised by the Appellant. We are satisfied that there is no force in this appeal and we dismiss it with costs.