JUDGMENT Panckridge, J. - In this suit the Plaintiff seeks to recover a sum of Rs. 27,999 being the amount due at the date of suit for principal and interest on a promissory note executed by the Defendants on June 6th, 1931, for Rs. 20,000 in favour of the Plaintiff. The Defendants originally executed a promissory note for Rs. 20,000 in the Plaintiff's favour on June 6th, 1925. That promissory note was renewed on June 5th, 1928, and on the same date certain shares in the New Jinagorah Coal Co., Ltd., the details of which are set out in paragraph 2 of the plaint, were deposited with the Plaintiff as security in terms of a memorandum of that date signed by the Defendants. 2. The Plaintiff is one of the three sons of a deceased gentleman named Motilal. Motilal had a brother of the name of Chunilal who is now dead. Chunilal left two sons who are the Plaintiff's first cousins and are named Sewnarain and Sagarmal. All the five cousins had dealings with the Defendants and advanced them sums of money on the security of promissory notes and the deposit of share scrip very much on the lines of the transaction between the Plaintiff and the Defendants. 3. In October, 1930, the cousins appear to have fallen out among themselves, and in November of that year a partition suit was filed in Dhanbad, in which the representatives of Chunilal's branch were the Plaintiffs and the representatives of Motilal's branch were the Defendants. 4. This litigation has importance with reference to the present case only be-cause, by arrangement, while that suit was pending, the various promissory notes and securities held by the respective parties to the partition suit, including the promissory notes executed by the Defendants and the share scrip deposited by them as security, were kept under joint lock and key of the parties. 5. When the period of limitation in respect of the promissory note of June 5th, 1928, was about to expire, the Plaintiff says that he wrote a letter to the Defendants asking them to renew the promissory note and explaining the circumstances which prevented him from producing the note and making it over to the Defendants in exchange for the note which he wished the Defendants to execute in super session of the note of June, 1928. 6. 6. Undoubtedly the Plaintiff did write to the Defendants, for he has produced their reply which is dated June 4th, 1931. The reply is as follows:- Dear Sir, Received your letter. We have consulted our attorney. We have no objection to renew the hand note for Rs. 20,000 in your favour. But please write us a letter like the one signed by Baiju Babu if yon are not in a position to show us the previous hand note at present. We shall renew the hand note and send the same to you on receipt of your letter. 7. It appears that the Plaintiff's brother Baijnath, who was also the holder of one of the Defendants' promissory notes, had previously found himself in a similar difficulty with regard to the production of his note, and the Defendants had consented to renew that note without it being produced, provided that Baijnath gave them a letter surrendering any claims he might have in respect of the old note. 8. Baijnath and the Plaintiff say that they came to Calcutta and that the Plaintiff wrote a letter in terms suggested by the Defendants who thereupon executed the note in suit. 9. Having regard to the correspondence and the fact that although called upon to do so the Defendants have not produced the Plaintiffs letter to which the Defendants' letter of June 4th is a reply, I do not hesitate to accept the Plain-tiff's evidence as to the contents of the former document. 10. The promissory note in suit was executed on June 6th, 1931, by which date the period of limitation in respect of the note of June 5th, 1928, had expired. The note is in the following terms:- On demand we promise to pay to Babu Bangsidhar Gopalka or order the sum of Rs. 20,000 only with interest at 15 per cent. per annum for value received in renewal of promissory note dated 6th June, 1928. 11. The fact that the date of the former note is given as June 6th in the document in suit whereas it was in fact executed on June 5th has encouraged the Defendants to make a case in the written statement that there was misrepresentation on the Plaintiffs part as to the date of the note, and that they would not have executed the note in suit but for such misrepresentation. 12. 12. No evidence had been called to support this contention and it has not been pressed. 13. It has, however, been suggested that the claim on the note of June 5th, 1928, was in fact barred on June, 6th 1931, when the note in suit was executed. In my opinion the claim was not barred because I take the view that the Defendants letter of June 4th, 1931, constituted an unequivocal admission of liability in writing and a new period of limitation began to run from the date of the admission. 14. It is also suggested that there was no consideration for the note in suit, because it is submitted by learned Counsel that there can be no consideration for a promissory note given in renewal of a former note unless that former note is delivered up to the maker or cancelled in some way or other. 15. In my opinion, that is not so, at any rate in cases where the maker dispenses with delivery or where it is made clear that the parties understand that the claim on the former note is extinguished. In this case it is plain that physical delivery was dispensed with by the Defendants, and even without the letter which the Plaintiff says he gave to the Defendants the fact that the note in suit is expressed to be in renewal of the former note to my mind sufficiently indicates that the parties agreed that the subsequent note should take the place of the former note, which in consequence became an instrument conferring no rights to the holder. 16. Even if I am wrong and the Defendants' letter of June 4th, 1931, is not an admission of liability, and if the note of June 5th, 1928, had become barred at the date of the note in suit, I am still of opinion that the Defendants would be liable on the note, because it is a promise in writing to pay a debt of which the creditor might have enforced payment but for the law of limitation within the meaning of sec. 25, sub-sec. 3, of the Indian Contract Act. 17. Mr. 25, sub-sec. 3, of the Indian Contract Act. 17. Mr. Roy argues from the fact that in the plaint the date of the note of 1928 is given as June 6th, and from the fact that June 6th, 1928, is mentioned as the date of the renewed note in the note in suit, that the promisors did not know at the time when the subsequent note was executed that the claim on the former note had become barred. 18. In my opinion their knowledge or Want of knowledge has nothing to do with the matter. To make the knowledge of the promisor a condition of liability under sec. 25, sub-sec. 3, is in my opinion to read into the words of the statute something which is not there and which the legislature would have expressly inserted had it been the intention of the legislature that such should be the law. There is strong authority for this view and I need only refer to Mati Sheikh v. Baikantha Nath Kar 18 C.L.J. 269 (1913) and Bhowani Misser v. Peari Jha 18 C.L.J. 329 (1913). Those decisions are both decisions of this Court and I think are very much to be preferred to the contrary decision, which is the decision of a single Judge of the Madras High Court exercising revisional jurisdiction under sec. 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act [Ramaswami Pillai v. Kuppuswami Pillai (3)]. In these circumstances the defences which have been put forward fail, and there will be a decree for the amount claimed with interest at the rate provided by the note on the principal amount from the date of suit until today, interest on decree at six per cent. and costs. There will also be an order for sale of the shares in the possession of the Plaintiff.