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1935 DIGILAW 33 (CAL)

M. E. Moses v. Shaik Bakridhone Chowdhury

1935-01-21

body1935
JUDGMENT Ameer Ali, J. - The Plaintiff on the 24th August, 1933, was knocked down by a motor lorry belonging to the Defendant and his leg was broken. This occurrence took place in a narrow lane called Chattawalla Gully which is a narrow lane running north to south at right angles to another narrow lane running out of Tiretta Bazar Street. It took place at about 8-30 in the evening. The condition of the road has not been spoken to and nothing turns upon it. Between 25 to 35 ft. from the corner is the gateway on the west side of the gully which is the gate of the Tiretta Bazar market. The place is ill-lighted, and on each side of the gully there is a narrow kerbstone a few inches high and a few inches wide. The lorry is a one-and-a-half ton Chevrolet lorry some years old, it has since been sold. The driver of the lorry at the time was one Shamsuddin. The lorry was coming from south to north. The Plaintiff was severely injured and lay in hospital for some six months, and again returned to hospital for further operation and remained there another month and a half when he was discharged. It is stated that he is still likely to suffer some pain. The lorry-driver was taken to the police station immediately after the accident, and he and certain of the bystanders made statements. Those statements I shall refer to again. The lorry-driver was prosecuted and has absconded. It was proved that he was at some stage of the trial in the Court premises but he was not called. * * * * * I now come to what is to my mind the most important and amazing part of the case and one which has led to the discussion on a somewhat interesting point on the law of evidence. Early in the case I became interested in the production of the statements made on the night of the occurrence at the time by the driver and by other persons and I asked for their production. Mr. Clough told me his instructions were that they would not be of very great assistance. Counsel for the Plaintiff does not agree with my recollection on that point, and I do not propose to rely on it. Mr. Clough told me his instructions were that they would not be of very great assistance. Counsel for the Plaintiff does not agree with my recollection on that point, and I do not propose to rely on it. However, I was going to send for these records at some stage or other, and Mr. Clough in addressing me informed me that he had also insisted upon their production, and ultimately I take it, by reason of Mr. Clough's efforts, they were produced on behalf of the Plaintiff. That was almost at the close of the Defendant's evidence--the end of the second day's hearing. Now, I can see many reasons why the Defendant's attorney did not produce these documents or have them produced. I cannot conceive why the Plaintiff's attorney did not have these records produced in order to make as much use as is possible of them. My impression (it may be quite wrong) is that they were left where they were because the result of them does not coincide with the case as originally pleaded. Anyhow, they were not produced until the point I have mentioned. In the first place it was necessary for me to see these records to determine how far each of them is admissible in evidence and for what purpose. There is, first of all, the statement by the lorry-driver, Shamsuddin. * * * * * 2. The statement of the lorry-driver is of course the most important thing of all, and the question arises as to its admissibility. I have had to read it, and unless I state the substance of it I shall not be able to explain how far I consider it admissible. The "jamming" (of the Plaintiff against the wall) is admitted in it. The reason of it is stated to be that the lorry stopped at the turning, was re-started and that the lorry shot forward and struck the injured man and "jammed" him against the wall. The question is whether this statement is admissible for any purpose under our Act. Mr. Clough has referred me to secs. 18 and 20 under these circumstances, that the lorry-driver made the statement as I find, in the presence of the owner. In my opinion, however, the circumstances fall short of those which would entitle me to hold this; statement admissible under secs. 18 and 20. There remains sec. 19. Mr. Clough has referred me to secs. 18 and 20 under these circumstances, that the lorry-driver made the statement as I find, in the presence of the owner. In my opinion, however, the circumstances fall short of those which would entitle me to hold this; statement admissible under secs. 18 and 20. There remains sec. 19. Under the English law there can be no doubt that such statements are inadmissible, it being considered that it is no part of the servant's duty to make admissions, on behalf of his master. The question is whether sec. 19, apart from secs. 18 and 20, makes the law in India different. Speaking for myself, I would be glad if it did. These statements may have the utmost bearing and I should desire to see them allowed in evidence, subject of course to a careful estimate of their value in each case being made by the Judge. The wording of sec. 19 is somewhat peculiar, and when it was first read to me by Mr. Clough I was inclined to disregard the words throughout the section "or liability" and confine my attention to the word "position." The difficulty which then occurred to me was to decide whether a statement by the servant that he had committed any negligence was a statement "in relation to his position," and secondly, whether it could be said that when making such statement he "occupied the position" of a servant. I am inclined to agree with Mr. Clough that occupying the position of a servant does not involve as an essential ingredient acting in the course of his employment, that he occupied the position of a servant until he ceased to be a servant. I still doubt whether a statement as to his conduct as a servant would be a statement in "relation to his position "--as a servant. On this point Mr. Clough called my attention to the illustration to show that the statement which was there admitted was not a statement as to the position of the person making it but a statement as to the duty or liability of such a person. 3. Now, that brings me to the words "or liability," and I am inclined to think that the illustration of the section applies to the question of liability. 3. Now, that brings me to the words "or liability," and I am inclined to think that the illustration of the section applies to the question of liability. Now, there is no doubt that it was necessary in this case to prove the liability of the servant for negligence as against the Defendant. There is no doubt also that such statement would be relevant as against the servant in relation to his liability. The question is whether at the time of making the statement the servant was "subject to the liability." I say at once that I do not think the section contemplated a case of this kind, but at the same time I agree if the wording of the section covers a case of this kind, Mr. Clough is entitled to ask me to hold that such a statement is admissible. Now, I doubted whether the words "subject to such liability" can apply to a person who has done an act which may or may not be found to be negligence. Mr. Clough points out quite rightly that the duty to take care is also a quasi-contractual duty, and he asks me to regard liability under a contract as in the illustration and liability for tort in the same light and to regard the servant as subject to liability notwithstanding the tort-feasance not being yet established. I see difficulties in so holding, but on the whole I propose to hold that the statement is admissible under this section for both purposes, first in relation to his position if there is any such statement to be found in the document, that is to say, whether he was a servant, and secondly in relation to his liability as the driver of the lorry. This last point is one of considerable doubt, but that is my present view. I, therefore, allow this statement in evidence. * * * * *