JUDGMENT 1. This appeal has arisen out of a suit for annulment of a revenue sale. The suit was instituted by the deity Sree Sree Hangseswari Thakuram represented by three persons as shebaits, namely Dhirendra Deb Roy, Jnanendra Deb Roy and Somendra Deb Roy. The principal Defendants in the suit were Munindra Deb Roy and Subodh Chandra Basu. Five other persons were impleaded as pro forma Defendants. Shortly put, the allegations contained in the plaint are the following: The deity is the proprietor of Touzi No. 1064 of the 24-Parganas Collectorate; and the shebaits had opened several separate accounts in their own names in respect of the shares in the Touzi to which they were entitled as such shebaits. Of these separate accounts, that in respect of the share re-presented by Touzi No. 1064/1 stood in the names of the three shebaits through whom the present suit has been laid and who will hereafter be called Plaintiff's and the separate accounts in the name of the Defendant No. 1 Munindra Deb Roy was in respect of Touzi No. 1064/4. Touzi No. 1064/1 fell into arrear's for June kist of 1931, the arrears amounting to Rs. 156-13-10gds. and the said Tauzi was advertised for a sale to take place on the 23rd September, 1931. The Plaintiffs applied for and obtained permission to pay up the arrears with penalty by the date so fixed. As the said date was subsequently declared a public holiday. the sale was adjourned to the 25th September, 1931. The Plaintiffs, being young and inexperienced, were in difficulty to secure cash money, and the Defendant Mo. 1 who is their uncle advised them to bring a cheque on the Imperial Bank of India on the sale date and assured them that the same would be accepted by the Collector. On the 25th September, 1931, the Plaintiffs acting upon this advice made over a cheque for Rs. 800 to the Defendant No. 1 to save the said Tauzi as also certain other properties from sale but the Defendant No. 1 after making considerable delay saw the Treasury Officer and eventually re-turned the cheque to the Plaintiffs and asked them to bring cash money and promised to see that the Touzi be not put up to sale in the meantime. The Plaintiffs had very little time at their disposal to cash the cheque and though they did cash it, they were not able to reach the Collectorate in time to prevent the sale. In the meantime and in the absence of the Plaintiffs, the Touzi was put up to sale and as there was no bidder the Collector declared, in accordance with the provisions of sec. 14 of the Act, that the entire estate, Touzi No. 1064 would be put up to sale at a future date unless the other re-corded sharer or sharers purchased the share in arrears within ten days by paying the whole arrears due for such share. On the 28th September, 1931, the Defendant No. 1 as such sharer, applied to make the purchase and on the 30th September, 1931, deposited the arrears. The Plaintiffs applied on the 29th September, 1931, for permission to pay up the arrears with penalty, but no permission was granted. Touzi No. 1064/1 was eventually sold to the Defendant No. 1 for Rs. 1230. The Plaintiffs preferred an appeal to the Commissioner, but it was dismissed. 2. The prayers in the plaint were that a decree might be passed declaring that the sale was null and void, and ordering that possession of the Tauzi might be given to the Plaintiffs; and in the alternative, that a decree might be passed for Rs. 10880 or such further sum or sums as might be deemed fit and fair against the Defendant No. 1, or that the two Defendants (the first Defendant having since his purchase settled the Touzi with the second Defendant on a palm lease) be directed to reconvey the Tauzi to the Plaintiffs. 3. Besides the allegations of fraud made in the plaint, which have been already noticed and which, it may be stated by the way, were contained in its paras. 4, 5 and 6, there were set out in para. 11 thereof a number of particulars detailed in cls. (a) to (), upon which it was alleged that the sale had been held contrary to the provisions of Act XI of 1859. 4, 5 and 6, there were set out in para. 11 thereof a number of particulars detailed in cls. (a) to (), upon which it was alleged that the sale had been held contrary to the provisions of Act XI of 1859. The Subordinate Judge held that the evidence by which the charge of fraud was sought to be established was highly unsatisfactory and on considering such materials on the record as bore upon that charge he has observed,-- I find from the evidence on the record that Defendant (meaning the first Defendant) did not practise any fraud on the Plaintiff's and did not prevent them from depositing the amount on the sale day. It further appears that though there were various allegations of fraud in paras. 4, 5 and 6 of the plaint, these were not made grounds of appeal before the Commissioner. Plaintiffs therefore are debarred from raising these questions in this suit (vide sec. 33 of Act XI of 1859). 4. And as regards the particulars detailed in cls. (a) to () of para. 11 of the plaint he overruled them all, some on the merits and all on the ground that the Plaintiffs are precluded from raising these objections by reason of sec. 8 of Act VII of 1868, observing that-- As a sale certificate has been issued to Defendant No. 1 his title cannot be impeached by reason of any omission, informality or irregularity as regards the serving or posting any notice in the sale proceeding. 5. There was one other matter which arose upon the statements contained in paras. 8 and 9 of the plaint. It was alleged in para. 8 that the application which the Defendant No. 1 made to the Collector on the 28th September, 1931, was one made by him in his personal capacity and not as a shebait. In para. 9 it was stated that the Defendant No. 1 was only a trustee and a shebait, and having made the purchase of property belonging to the deity as such trustee and shebait was in Jaw bound to reconvey the same to the deity. In para. 9 it was stated that the Defendant No. 1 was only a trustee and a shebait, and having made the purchase of property belonging to the deity as such trustee and shebait was in Jaw bound to reconvey the same to the deity. The Subordinate Judge did not consider it necessary to enter into the question of reconveyance which formed the subject-matter of one of the issues, viz., issue No. 10, but he found, on the basis of the allegation that the Defendant No. 1 had applied in his personal capacity to make the purchase but in such capacity he was not a sharer in the entire Tauzi No. 1064, that the sale to him was illegal, ultra vires, null and void. The learned Judge, therefore, decreed the suit. 6. From the aforesaid decree the Defendant No. 1 has appealed. And the only ground on which the decree is based being what has just been stated, it has been urged on his behalf that that ground has no substance. From the reasons given by the Subordinate Judge and from the arguments that have been addressed to us in support of his judgment, the Plaintiffs' contention, put in a nutshell, seems to be that sec. 14 of the Act enables a recorded sharer or sharers or one or more of them to make the purchase, but the Defendant No. 1 is not a person who comes within that category and so the Collector had no jurisdiction to sell the Tauzi to him. It has been argued that the Tauzi belongs to the deity and as the Plaintiffs and the Defendant No. 1 are not proprietors of the Tauzi but only trustees or shebaits they are not co-sharers of each other or of the deity in respect of the Tauzi; and that, in point of fact, the Defendant No. 1 had applied for permission to make the purchase not even as trustee or a shebait but only in his personal capacity, and it must be taken that he made the purchase in that capacity and in no other; but in his personal capacity he was not a co-sharer at all but only a stranger having no connection whatsoever with the Tauzi. To support these arguments the Plaintiffs have been forced to advance the contention that though under the provisions of the Act, Tauzi No. 1064/1, such as it was, was liable to sale for its arrears, the opening of such separate account was ultra vires inasmuch as the entire property, namely Tauzi No. 1064, is the property of the deity and the proprietary right of the deity, which is indivisible, could not be split up. Now the copies of extracts from the D Register (Ex. 2 and Ex. F) show that these separate accounts have stood in it since 1881-2, and in three columns there-of the " Names of Proprietor " (Col. 2), " Character of interest, whether Proprietor, manager or mortgagee." (Col. 3) and " Specification of interest" (Col. 4) are given. Reading together the entries in these columns, it is clear that the register purports to regard these shebaits of the deity Sree Sree Hangseswari Thakurani as " Proprietors," and it is also clear that there is no distinction meant in this Register as between a "proprietor" and a " manager" or a " mortgagee," the share or interest of each such person in the Tauzi being treated on one and the same footing. These extracts show that they are Pargana Registers of revenue-paying lands. 7. Ever since the days of the Regulations, there were provisions for compulsory registration of possessory titles, such provisions being contained in Regulations XLVIII of 1793 and XIX of 1795 in respect of revenue-paying estates, and Regulations XIX and XXXVII of 1793 and Regulations XLI and XLII of 1795 in respect of lands held exempt from the payment of revenue. There were also other Regulations containing provisions bearing-upon the matter. These provisions were not duly or regularly complied with and eventually a more comprehensive Regulation was passed, being Regulation VIII of 1800, for, preparing a general Pargannah Register of lands and for making certain alterations in the prescribed Registers of estates paying revenue and of lands held exempt from the payment of revenue. From time to time during the next seventy-five years proposals were put forward for improvement of the system that obtained and eventually Act VII (B. C.) of 1876 was passed to make better provisions for the preparation and maintenance of these Registers. From time to time during the next seventy-five years proposals were put forward for improvement of the system that obtained and eventually Act VII (B. C.) of 1876 was passed to make better provisions for the preparation and maintenance of these Registers. The whole object of the system has always been to keep a proper record of possessory titles in landed properties so as to have a knowledge of the persons who are in actual possession and are responsible for the discharge of their duties. The object has never been to make an inquisition into titles either in revenue-paying or revenue-free properties but to identify the individuals on whom the legislature has imposed duties and obligations in virtue of their being in possession of the land as proprietors. The proprietors are not always persons who have the proprietary title in them in the sense in which that expression is understood, but are those who have to be regarded as such solely in their capacity as revenue-payers, and whose names are shown as of persons responsible for the payment of Government revenue and nothing more. This has all along been so and has been made clear in the definition of the term "proprietor" given in sec. 3, cl. (8) of Act VII (B. C.) of 1876 which speaks of every per-son being in possession of any interest in an estate as owner thereof. In the present case the debuttar was created by Rani Sankari Dasi in 1852 (Vide Ex. 7), who certainly was the proprietor responsible for payment of the revenue. The Register of her time has not been produced, but it stands to reason that she must have been recorded as such in the Register. Whether an absolute debutter or a mere charge for the sheba of the deity was created makes no difference for our present purposes, because the only question we are considering is who was to remain responsible for the payment of the revenue. It cannot be suggested that by creating an absolute debutter, the Rani could have shifted the liability on the deity unless the deity was represented by some human agency who was to remain liable. And as the shebaits are the earthly representatives of the deity, they are the persons who were taken as having possessory title to the Tauzi, or an interest in the Tauzi as its owners in their capacity as revenue-payers. And as the shebaits are the earthly representatives of the deity, they are the persons who were taken as having possessory title to the Tauzi, or an interest in the Tauzi as its owners in their capacity as revenue-payers. The shebaits, presumably for their own convenience, had their interest split up into certain shares, and got their liabilities apportioned in accordance therewith. This splitting up and apportionment was assented to by the Collector, and it is difficult to see why it should be held or how it can with propriety be urged that the opening of separate accounts was ultra vires. The title of the deity does not come into the picture at all, and nothing that is entered in the Register as regards the separate estates can prejudice the deity in the least; the shares so entered merely regulate the relations amongst the shebaits inter se and the relation in which they stand to the Government and only as far as their revenue-paying aspect is concerned. The Plaintiffs and the Defendant No. 1 to the extent of the shares respectively entered in their favour are recorded sharers within the meaning of Act XI of 1859. 8. But it has been argued next that the shebaits being trustees must act jointly and that therefore they cannot be permitted to represent the deity in part or get themselves recorded as shebaits in respect of shares or either undertake or discharge any liability to pay the revenue in portions. This contention, in our Judgment, is of no substance. For one thing, if the contention prevails the Plaintiffs' suit itself will fail, for the Plaintiffs themselves, though they are only factional co-sharer shebaits, have instituted this suit as representing the deity. This matter, however, need not be stressed because the suit is not really one in the interest or for the benefit of the deity who has suffered nothing by the sale, the effect of which has, so far as the deity is concerned, been not that the property has been lost but only the burden of payment of revenue in future has been shifted from the Plaintiffs to the Defendant No. 1. By the sale, the Plaintiffs' shebaiti right has not been interfered with, and only the property in which they had a beneficial interest as shebaits has passed from them to the Defendant No. 1, another skebait. By the sale, the Plaintiffs' shebaiti right has not been interfered with, and only the property in which they had a beneficial interest as shebaits has passed from them to the Defendant No. 1, another skebait. The suit in its true character, therefore, is a suit which the Plaintiffs have instituted in their own interest and for their own benefit and to get back for themselves the property in which they had a beneficial interest as shebaits. The introduction of the deity's name in the suit is only a camouflage. But the contention has been endeavoured to be supported by the decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of Barabani Coal Company v. Gokulananda Mohomta Thakur L.R. 61 IndAp 35 : B. C. 38 C.W.N. 325 (1933), a decision which is often very much misunderstood. In that case, there was a mining lease executed by four shebaits of a family deity in respect of the deity's interest in a mouzah and one of the shebaits had instituted a suit for recovery of his own share of the rent, and it was held that there having been a joint demise for contract, a suit for recovery of an aliquot part of the whole rent, with or without the consent of the other co-shebaits, was not maintainable. But their Lordships referred with approval to the case of Narendra Nath Kumar v. Atul Chandra Banerji 27 C.L.J. 605 (1917), in which a shebait was treated as indistinguishable from an executor or a trustee and observed thus,-- The Respondents are merely interested in it the mine) as shebaits. In these circumstance, it is prima facie difficult to see how one of them can competently sue for his share in the idol's interest. 9. It is difficult to conceive that their Lordships by making this observation intended to override the long string of decisions of the Judicial Committee in which it has been laid down that a shebait is not a trustee in the sense in which that word is known in English Law. But be, that as it may, the observation cannot possibly affect an arrangement which the shebaits themselves have chosen to make not for enforcing a liability as against others but for discharging their own liability as payers of revenue. The contention, therefore, has to be overruled. 10. But be, that as it may, the observation cannot possibly affect an arrangement which the shebaits themselves have chosen to make not for enforcing a liability as against others but for discharging their own liability as payers of revenue. The contention, therefore, has to be overruled. 10. In our opinion, therefore, the opening of the separate accounts was not ultra vires, and the Defendant No. 1 was a recorded sharer who was entitled to come in and purchase the estate in arrears by complying with the conditions laid down in sec. 14 of Act XI of 1859. But the view, upon which it has been held that the sale to the Defendant No. 1 was illegal and ultra vires and so null and void, is that the Defendant No. 1, in the petition [Ex. 4 (b)] that he made to the Collector on the 28th September, 1931, asking to be permitted to purchase the share in arrear in accordance with the provisions of sec. 14 of the Act, did not describe himself as shebait of the deity, and that the said Defendant in his personal capacity was not a co-sharer in the estate entitled to make the purchase. The sale certificate has not been produced and the explanation that has been offered for its non-production has not been considered to be satisfactory by the learned Judge; and from such non-production the learned Judge has presumed that if produced it would have shown that the purchase was not made by the Defendant No. 1 in his character as shebait. On the other hand, several other materials have been brought to out notice on behalf of the Defendant No. 1 in order to show that in those materials which are all of dates subsequent to the purchase, the Defendant No. 1 acted with reference to the purchased estate in his capacity as shebait. We are of opinion that while the subsequent acts of the Defendant No. 1 are immaterial for the determination of the present question, and even though it may be taken that the Defendant No. 1 took the sale certificate in his own name and not in his capacity as shebait, and although he did not state in the petition aforesaid that he war a shebait, the purchase that he made cannot be impugned. He is in fact a recorded sharer of the Touzi and he expressly stated that fact in the said petition. The sale must be taken to have been made to him in his capacity as such recorded sharer, and is not in any way affected by anything that the Defendant No. 1 has done or omitted to do in this connection. He is, in fact, a co-sharer shebait and the title that he has acquired by the purchase can only be valid under the law on the footing of a purchase made in that character. In our judgment, the ground on which the learned Judge has condemned the sale cannot be supported. 11. The Plaintiffs, as Respondents, have sought to support the decree of the Court below upon some of the grounds which were decided against them in the said Court. This they are entitled to do upon the plain meaning of Or. 41, r. 22 of the Code. But as negativing their right in this connection, the decision in the case of Sri Ranga v. Srini vasa ILR 50 Mad. 866 (1927) has been cited on behalf of the Appellant. That decision is only an authority for. the proposition that the Respondent cannot support the quantum of the decree of the Court below by making out a case for a decree for the same amount by questioning some adjudication as to right found against him and with regard to which no appeal or cross-objection has been taken by him. These grounds, there-fore, will have now to be considered. 12. The first of these grounds is that there were no arrears for which the sale could be held. One contention on this head is that the 28th of June could not be the latest date for payment of arrears for what is described as the June kist, because the latest date must be a date after the expiry of the month of June before which the instalment would not be due. Another contention in this connection is that the 28th of June was not the latest date for the payment of arrears but only a kist day, that is to say, the date fixed for the payment of the instalment. Neither of these contentions is correct. In the Doul kabuliyat (Ex. 4) the 28th of June is the latest date fixed under sec. Neither of these contentions is correct. In the Doul kabuliyat (Ex. 4) the 28th of June is the latest date fixed under sec. 3 of the Act for payment of an instalment for May or Jaistha after it had become an arrear within the meaning of sec. 2 of the Act. What the precise date was on which this kist fell into arrears is a matter regulated by the settlement and kistibundi of the mehal and is not known, because no evidence on this point has been produced on behalf of the Plaintiffs. In the absence of any such evidence the contentious must be rejected. 13. The next ground taken is that the sale should have been held on the 23rd September, 1931, the date for which it was notified under sec. 6 of the Act. It would be sufficient to say that this objection was not taken as a ground in the appeal to the Commissioner and is, therefore, not a ground on which the sale may be annulled, having regard to the provisions of sec. 33 of the Act. 14. The third ground taken is that the Plaintiffs were entitled to make the purchase under sec. 14 of the Act and inasmuch as they had applied for per-mission to do so on the 29th September. 1931, before the Defendant No. 1 made the deposit under that section which he did on the 30th, the Collector was wrong in not granting them the permission they had asked for. This contention is based upon the decision in the case of Bahuria Sambho Koer v. Harihar Prasad ILR 41 Cal. 1092: S.C. 18 C.W.N. 1071 (1914). In that case a doubt was expressed on the question whether the legislature intended to exclude the defaulting co-sharer from a sale under sec. 14 of the Act; but it was held nevertheless that the expression "other recorded sharer " appearing in the section must mean " a recorded sharer of a share other than the share exposed for sale." Upon the plain words of the section that is the only view possible. It has been argued, however, that the legislature could never have any justification for excluding the defaulting co-sharer from the sale. It has been argued, however, that the legislature could never have any justification for excluding the defaulting co-sharer from the sale. An interpretation based upon a supposed intention on the part of the legislature on a matter with respect to which the language of the statute admits of no doubt is not permissible. And in any case, it may well have been intended by the legislature that the defaulting co-sharer who already had ample opportunity of paying in the arrears--for the Collector has the widest possible discretion in receiving the arrears, if tendered,--but had failed to respond and had put the entire estate in jeopardy was not to be given a further chance. However that may be, the words of the section are, in our opinion, perfectly clear, and upon their plain meaning the Plaintiffs had no such right as they contend for. 15. The next ground taken is that there was no notification issued under sec. 5 of the Act. It appears that there was an attachment issued by a Civil Court in respect of an undivided 2;3rds share of Tauzi No. 1064/1 in execution of a decree obtained by one Bipin Bihari Laha against two of the Plaintiffs, namely, Dhirendra and Somendra, and this attachment was effected on the 4th May, 1931. This has been sufficiently proved by evidence, documentary (vide Exs. 8 and 9) and oral (vide the deposition of P. W. 1, Somendra). It is contended on behalf of the Defendant No. 1 that the attachment was wrongly issued inasmuch as the decree against the said two Plaintiffs was in their personal capacity and not in their capacity as shebaits. In our opinion, the propriety of the attachment is not a matter on which the Court in the present suit is permitted to adjudicate and having regard to the terms of sec. 5 it is only the fact of the attachment that, in our opinion, matters. Having regard to the date on which the attachment was effected and the date fixed for payment under sec. 3 of the Act, there can be no question that the conditions requisite for the issue of a special notification under sec. 5 of the Act were present. That being so, such special notification was necessary. And it is an admitted fact that this special notification was not issued. The question to be considered is the effect of this omission. 16. 5 of the Act were present. That being so, such special notification was necessary. And it is an admitted fact that this special notification was not issued. The question to be considered is the effect of this omission. 16. The ground was taken on behalf of the Plaintiffs in their appeal to the Commissioner and he disposed of it in these words:-- In this connection I have called for a report from the Collector and the latter states that no notice of such attachment was received or has till now been received by him. This being so, it is clear that there was no irregularity committed in the Collector's office in failing to issue a notice under sec. 5 of the Sale Law. 17. We are unable to agree in the view which the Collector has expressed as above, because the issuing of a notification is most positively imperative, irrespective of any question of knowledge or want of knowledge on the part of the Collector. Sec. 5 is worded in a prohibitory form and says nothing which may even remotely suggest that the element of knowledge on the part of the Collector plays any part at all in the application of its provision. If it is the duty of any body to inform the Collector about the attachment, as we shall presently see that it is, and if there has been a failure to discharge that duty. such delinquency cannot override the imperative provisions of the section or affect the rights of the parties for whose protection and benefit the section was enacted. 18. The ground was pressed in the Court below, being the subject-matter of cls. (a) and (b) of para. 11 of the plaint. The learned Judge has overruled it in these words:-- I think under sec. 8 of Act VII of 1868 the Plaintiffs are precluded from raising these objections now. As sale certificate has been issued to Defendant No. 1 his title cannot be impeached by reason of any omission, informality or irregularity as regards the serving or posting any notice in the sale proceeding. 19. This view of the learned Judge cannot possibly be supported. It is against the uniform current of authorities in this Court in which it has been laid down that sec. 19. This view of the learned Judge cannot possibly be supported. It is against the uniform current of authorities in this Court in which it has been laid down that sec. 8 of Act VII of 1868 cures only the defects, if there be any, in the procedure to be observed regarding the service and posting of the notices required to be served or posted under that Act or under Act XI of 1859; in other words, that it enacts an irrebuttable presumption that such notices have been duly served and posted. Amongst the cases that may be referred to in this connection are the following:--Balmokund Lall v. Jirjodhan Roy ILR 9 Cal. 271 (1882), Lala Mobarak Lal v. Secretary of State ILR 11 Cal. 200 (F. B.) (1885), Sheorattum Singh v. Net Lall Sahu ILR 30 Cal. 1: S.C. 6 C.W.N. 688 (1902), Jahnavi Chowdhurani v. Secretary of State 7 C.W.N. 377 (1903), Ganesh Prasad v. Pandey Brij Bihari 1 C.L.J. 565 (1905) and Bhawani Koer v. Afzal Hussain ILR 34 Cal. 381; S.C. 5 C.L.J. 425 (1907). In one of these cases just cited, namely, the case of Ganesh Prasad v. Pandey Brij Bihari 1 C.L.J. 565 (1905), which was a case of non-issue of a notice under sec. 5 of the Act it was observed,-- Sec. 8 of Act VII (R. C.) of 1863 might be invoked if objections were made to the due service and posting of all or any of the notices required to be served by Act XI of 1859 including the notices under sec. 5, but the section has no application when no order was passed for the issuing of such notices and none were actually issued. 20. This view has never been questioned. 21. We have now to consider the effect of the omission. In the case of Raveneshwar Prasad Singh v. Baijnath Ram Goenka L.R. 42 IndAp 79: S.C. ILR 42 Cal. 897, 19 C.W.N. 481 (1915), their Lordships of the Judicial Committee have observed,-- Act XI of 1859 is a (sic) enactment for the realisation of arrears of revenue : at the same time it provides certain safe-guards for the protection of the interests of the defaulter so that he may not be unnecessarily prejudiced. Among these safe-guards are the provisions of sec. Among these safe-guards are the provisions of sec. 5 and 6 for the issue of notification of sales, specifying the properties to be sold and their due publication in accordance with the law. 22. Sec. 5 is a proviso to secs. 2 and 3 [Jahnavi Chowdhurani v. Secretary of State 7 C.W.N. 377 (1903)]. The distinction between secs. 5 and 6 is that the notice under the former section is in the nature of a warning notice giving intimation about the latest date of payment, and under the latter section it is a notification of sale issued after the latest day of payment' is over. There are four descriptions of arrears to which the section applies, the present case being the third of the four classes,--the arrears being of an estate under attachment by a judicial authority. The object of the notice under sec. 5 in respect of the different classes is obviously not the same, and to this we shall return hereafter. The section begins with the words,-- Provided always that no estate and no share or interest in any estate, shall be sold otherwise than after a notification " etc. 23. The words, such as they are, leave ample room for the contention that a sale held without the issuing of a notice under sec. 5, where that section comes into play, is a sale held in contravention of an express provision of the law. It is, therefore, an illegality; and of this there can be no question. But the question to be considered in whether the omission by itself makes the sale null and void? 24. Two other sections of the Act have to be noticed here in order to follow the decisions which will now be discussed: secs. 17 and 33. The former section exempts from liability to sale under the sale laws estates of disqualified proprietors and estates under attachment or management by revenue authorities. Under the latter section, No sale shall be annulled by a Court of Justice except upon the ground of its having been made contrary to the provisions of this Act, and then only on proof that the Plaintiff has sustained substantial injury by reason of the irregularity complained of. 25. In support of the contention that the omission to issue a notice under sec. 25. In support of the contention that the omission to issue a notice under sec. 5 is fatal and makes the sale a nullity, the authority most strongly relied upon on behalf of the Plaintiffs is the decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of Bunwaree Lall Sahoo v. Mahabeer Prasad L.R. 1 IndAp 89 (1873) in which secs. 5 and 33 of the Act came in for consideration. It is necessary to look into the history of this case in order to appreciate what exactly was decided in it. The questions which arose in the case were whether, when an estate or a share in an estate which had not been severed for the purposes of revenue but had been attached by a Civil Court in execution of a decree, such estate or share could be sold for arrears of revenue without a notice required by sec. 5 of the Act; and whether, in order to come under the protection of the third clause of that section, it is not necessary that an estate under attachment by order of a judicial authority must also be managed by some revenue authority. A share of an estate had been sold, and the sections which came up for consideration were secs. 5 and 17. The High Court (per Markby, J., Bayley, J., agreeing) answered the first question in the affirmative and the second question in the negative. [See Mohabir Prasad Singh v. The Collector of Tirhoot 13 W. R. 423 (1870)]. It was observed:-- It is urged that difficulty would arise in the Collector knowing whether or not any attachment had taken place. If there is any difficulty at all in obtaining that information, probably the Civil Court could be induced to give notice to the Revenue Court when estates are attached, but we do not think that in this case we should be justified in proceeding on the mere suggestion of this difficulty, contrary to the plain words of the legislature. 26. If there is any difficulty at all in obtaining that information, probably the Civil Court could be induced to give notice to the Revenue Court when estates are attached, but we do not think that in this case we should be justified in proceeding on the mere suggestion of this difficulty, contrary to the plain words of the legislature. 26. It may be observed here that to remove this difficulty a circular order was soon after issued by the High Court, being No. 2 of the 10th January, 1871, directing that all orders by Civil Courts for the attachment of estates and shares of estates shall be immediately notified to the Collector of the District within which such estates or shares are situate and also directing that Collectors should invariably bring the matter to the notice of the Judges, if the Civil Court did not give formal and immediate information of such attachment. It may also be pointed out that one of the points which have to be specifically noticed in the note that has to be made of inspection of Civil Courts is whether this particular circular has been strictly complied with or not. Having observed as above, Markby, J., went on to say,-- The Respondents rely on the provisions of sec. 33 and argue correctly enough that it is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of that section merely to prove an irregularity in the sale..... Again, it was contended truly that under sec. 33 in order to the setting aside of a sale it is necessary that the Plaintiffs should prove that they have sustained substantial injury by reason of the irregularity complained of and it is very strongly contended by the Respondents that that fact has not been proved in this case, and not having been found in Plaintiffs' favour, that alone is fatal to their case. 27. As the finding was wanting, the case was remanded to try the issue which was framed thus,-- Whether or not the Plaintiffs have sustained substantial injury by reason of the irregularity which we find existing in this case, that is to say that no notice was issued under sec. 5 of Act XI of 1859. 28. The Court below then returned a finding. The case, as dealt with next, is reported in Mahabeer Prasad Singh v. The Collector of Tirhoot 15 W. R. 137 (1871). 5 of Act XI of 1859. 28. The Court below then returned a finding. The case, as dealt with next, is reported in Mahabeer Prasad Singh v. The Collector of Tirhoot 15 W. R. 137 (1871). Ainslie, J. said,-- The lower Court has submitted a finding which is by no means clearly expressed but may be taken to be that the sale by the Collector of the property in suit was effected at a very inadequate price, and that this lowness of price was the consequence of an irregularity in the Collector's proceedings, such irregularity being the one noticed in the order of this Court" (viz., omission to issue the notice under sec 5 of the Act). 29. Examining the evidence that was in the case, Ainslie, J., held that the irregularity did operate to make intending bidders unwilling to bid. 30. Having come to that finding the learned Judge proceeded to say,-- When the law says that a certain party's estate shall not be sold for arrears without public notice of the existence of the arrear, the non-issue of notice would naturally induce a belief that the estate is in no danger. A man who lives 50 miles from the Collector's Tressury and 1 mile from the Munsiff's Court may not think it worth while to go all the way to the former, when he knows that he can in the ordinary course of business ascertain at the latter whether there is any danger to his estate; and if when the proper time comes he makes in queries at the Munsiff's Court and ascertains that no notice has come from the Collector, surely he may rest at home in peace and take it for granted that the manager of the attached share or some co-sharer has made the estate safe and that there is no arrear due. To sell a man's estate for arrears after balling him into a false sense of security, by failure to give him a notice which the law prescribes as a condition precedent to a sale, is an injury by itself, wholly irrespective of the amount of purchase-money, and in my opinion a very material injury and one amply sufficient, to warrant a Court in annulling a sale under sec. 33, Act XI 1859; that such an injury flows directly from the irregularity will hardly be denied. 31. 33, Act XI 1859; that such an injury flows directly from the irregularity will hardly be denied. 31. It may be stated, by the way, that the passage just quoted, is the one most strongly relied upon on behalf of the Plaintiffs in the case before us. 32. The learned Judge found that it had not been shown in the case that the Plaintiffs were actually misled by the want of a proper notice under sec. 5 but he thought he was justified in drawing an inference to that effect in their favour. Jackson, J., expressed no decided opinion on the contention that it was not requisite to connect the injury to the Plaintiffs with the precise irregularity established, as the evidence in his opinion was sufficient to entitle the Plaintiffs to a verdict even if this necessity was conceded. 33. When the case went before the Judicial Committee the only questions argued were the two questions set out before and the finding on the question of substantial injury was not sought to be re-opened. Their Lordships were not asked to consider the case as one in which substantial injury was not found; and the decision of their Lordships was concerned only with the meaning and intendment of sec. 5 and Incidentally of sec. 17. [See Bunwaree hall Sahoo v. Mahabeer Prasad Singh L.R. 1 IndAp 89 (1873)]. The remarks of Ainslie, J., upon which the Plaintiffs rely are, therefore, mere obiter and it is not correct to say that they have received the approval of the Judicial Committee. At best they mean that pecuniary loss is not the only injury contemplated. 34. The next case to which we need refer is the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Lala Mobaruk Lall v. The Secretary of State ILR 11 Cal. 200 (F. B.) (1885). The case was one in which the irregularity complained of was in respect of the sale notification to be issued under sec. 6 of the Act. For our present purposes it is not necessary to go into the question of the precise nature of this irregularity and it would be sufficient to state that upon the particular nature of the irregularity the majority of the Court (Garth, C. J., and Prinsep. Pigot and Mitter, JJ.) held that the sale was null and void. For our present purposes it is not necessary to go into the question of the precise nature of this irregularity and it would be sufficient to state that upon the particular nature of the irregularity the majority of the Court (Garth, C. J., and Prinsep. Pigot and Mitter, JJ.) held that the sale was null and void. Amongst these learned Judges Mitter, J., referring to the question of substantial injury, quoted with approval a portion of the passage cited above from Ainslie, J.'s judgment and observed as follows:-- This judgment was upheld by the Judicial Committee. In this case also if sec. 33 of Act XI of 1859 applies, it may be reasonably said that to sell a man's property when you have no power to sell it is an injury of itself wholly irrespective of the amount of purchase money; and if this injury is a substantial injury within the meaning of sec. 83 of the Act it is clear also in this case that it flowed from the Collector's non-compliance with the provisions of sec. 6. 35. Tottenham, J., who was in the minority, observed thus:-- I assent, therefore, to the finding that the sale was made contrary to the provisions of the Act. But I say that the sale was not ipso facto void. It was a sale for arrears of revenue, and by sec. 38 is liable to be annulled only on proof that the Plaintiff has sustained substantial injury by reason of the informality in the Notification. 36. It is important to note that Mitter, J., in one portion of his judgment, referring to Bunwaree Lall Sahoo's case L.R. 1 IndAp 89 (1873), observed thus,-- In that case it was found by the High Court that the required notice had not been given. But there was no finding in favour of the Plaintiff that he had sustained any pecuniary loss by the sale. 37. This remark overlooks the f act that substantial injury flowing from the irregularity was found as a fact and that that finding was not challenged. 38. The next case to be noticed is that of Raja Gabind Lal Roy v. Biprodas Roy ILR 17 Cal. 398 (1889). It was the case of a sale held in contravention of secs. 5 and 17. The sale was set aside. 38. The next case to be noticed is that of Raja Gabind Lal Roy v. Biprodas Roy ILR 17 Cal. 398 (1889). It was the case of a sale held in contravention of secs. 5 and 17. The sale was set aside. On the question of substantial injury the learned Judges were referred to Ainslie, J.'s judgment in Mahabeer Prasad Singh's case 15 W. R. 137 (1871), but they observed that it was not necessary for them to express any decided opinion on the point because there was the Full Bench decision in Lala Mobarek Lal's case ILR 11 Cal. 200 (F. B.) (1885) which stood good and had to be applied. The case went up to the Judicial Committee. Raja Gobind Lal Roy v. Ramjanan Messer L.R. 20 IndAp 165: S.C. ILR 21 Cal 701(1893). Their Lordships held that the sale was in contravention of sec. 17; and as regards sec. 5 their Lordships said-- Whether it can also contrary to the provisions of sec. 5 is a more difficult question, and as the decision of that question is not necessary for the determination of this appeal their Lordships think it better not to express an opinion on it. 39. It is necessary to note that this re-mark obviously means that it was the question whether sec. 5 had been contravened or not on which their Lordships did not express an opinion, and not that the provisions of that section had, as a matter of fact, been contravened and their Lordships reserved their opinion on the question of the effect of such contravention. Their Lordships found that the sale was held contrary to sec. 17 of the Act. And then turning to sec. 33, which had next to be considered, their Lordships held that that section applies not merely to cases where the sale has been irregularly conducted but also where the sale has been illegal in consequence of some express provision for exemption having been directly contravened. Lord Macnaghten expressed himself thus,-- And then only on proof that the Plaintiff has sustained substantial injury by reason of the irregularity complained of"... It seems to have been borrowed without sufficient consideration from the Code of Civil Procedure, Act VIII of 1859...... It is difficult to suppose that the introduction of this sentence into the Act of 1859 could have the effect of excluding from sec. It seems to have been borrowed without sufficient consideration from the Code of Civil Procedure, Act VIII of 1859...... It is difficult to suppose that the introduction of this sentence into the Act of 1859 could have the effect of excluding from sec. 33 all cases of illegality as distinguished from irregularity. 40. Illegality as well as irregularity, there-fore, for the purposes of sec. 33 of the Act, must be treated as on one and the same footing. And, in our judgment, there is no warrant for the view which has been sought to be propounded before us that the above-quoted remarks of Lord Macnaghten should be taken as meaning that a distinction should be made between different grades of illegality, and some kinds of illegality were intended to be excluded from sec. 33. Of course, sales of estates which are not at the time in arrear of Government revenue are sales held without jurisdiction and stand on quite a different footing. In the case of Balkishen Das v. Simpson L.R. 25 I.A. 151: S.C. 2 C.W.N. 513 (1898), in which a sale was held of an estate which was not in arrears at the time, Lord Watson observed,-- The Act does not sanction, and by plain implication forbids the sale of any estate which is not at the time in arrear of government revenue. The whole clauses of the Act of 1859, in so far as they relate to sales or to their challenge at the instance of the proprietor, as well as the provisions of sec. 3 of Act VII of 1878 (Bengal) are framed upon the express footing that they are to be applicable to the sale of estates which are in arrear of duty. The enactments of 1859 and 1868 are obviously intended to apply to cases in which, if the irregularity or illegality of the sale proceedings alleged by the objector be negatived, the sale will remain valid, But the chief and substantial objection upon which the Appellant's plaint is based is that, at the time when their 5 annas share of the village Shahsadpore Anderkilla was sold, there were no arrears of revenue due by them in respect of it. It does not appear to their Lordships to admit of dispute that the objection is founded in fact... It does not appear to their Lordships to admit of dispute that the objection is founded in fact... The result is that the whole proceedings of the Collector, with a view to the sale of the 5 annas share, were beyond his jurisdiction, and are not entitled to the protection given him by the Act in cases where the sale is authorised, though it may be attended with some irregularity or illegality. Their Lordships are accordingly of opinion that it was rightly held by the Subordinate Judge that he had jurisdiction to entertain the objection to which he gave effect, though the point bad not been considered and disposed of by the Commissioner. 41. This then was another clear pronouncement of the Judicial Committee as regards the meaning of the word " irregularity " used in sec. 33 of the Act. It was held in this case that the word includes illegality as well, as distinguished from the holding of a sale which was in respect of an estate not in arrears and which therefore was in excess of the Collector's jurisdiction under the Act. 42. The case that may be referred next is the case of Bageswari Prasad Singh v. Mahomed Gowaher Ali L.R. 31 IndAp 52 : S.C. ILR 31 Cal, 256, 8 C.W.N. 649 (1903). In this case the complaint was as regards the non-issue of a notice under sec. 5 and it was held that no notice was necessary. But in one portion of their judgment the High Court had observed that the point was not taken before the Commissioner and so, under sec. 33 of the Act, could not be agitated afterwards. This clearly indicates that in the judgment of the High Court the non-issue of a notice under sec. 5 was an irregularity, within the meaning of sec. 33 and nothing more. This judgment was approved in its entirety and adopted by Lord Macnaghten in the Judicial Committee. 43. In Deonandan Singh v. Manbodh Singh ILR 32 Cal. 111: S.C. 8 C.W.N. 757 (1904), it was held that the non-issue of a notice under sec. 5 is merely an irregularity which does not make the sale a nullity. 33 and nothing more. This judgment was approved in its entirety and adopted by Lord Macnaghten in the Judicial Committee. 43. In Deonandan Singh v. Manbodh Singh ILR 32 Cal. 111: S.C. 8 C.W.N. 757 (1904), it was held that the non-issue of a notice under sec. 5 is merely an irregularity which does not make the sale a nullity. Rampini, J., observed that the opinion to the contrary effect expressed in Mahbeer Prasad Singh v. The Collector of Tirhoot 15 W. R. 137 (1871), is an obiter dictum and would seem to be at variance with the views of the Judicial Committee as expressed in Raja Gabind Lal Roy's case (16). The same view was taken in Ganesh Prasad v. Pandey Brij Bihari 1 C.L.J. 565 (1905) and in Maharaja Sir Jatindra Mohan Tagore v. Jogendra Nath Roy 11 C.W.N. 1107: S.C. 6 C.L.J. 99 (1907). 44. In the case of Hari Dasi Debi v. Dhiraj Chandra Bose 15 C.W.N. 38 (1910) the learned Judges of this Court found on the facts that the embankment charges for non-payment of which the sale was held were not arrears to recover which any intimation had been given to the defaulter and that there were no arrears of revenue due for the estate that was sold. But in their judgment the learned Judges referred to the case of Raja Gobinda Lal Roy v. Ramjanan Messer L.R. 20 IndAp 165 : S.C. ILR 21 Cal. 70 (1893) and observed that it was not laid down by the Lordships of the Judicial Committee in that case that the omission to proceed under sec. 5 is a mere irregularity. And referring to the case of Deonandan Singh v. Manbodh Singh ILR 32 Cal. 111: S.C. 8 C.W.N. 757 (1904), observed that that case merely says that the non-issue of a notice order sec. 5 is an irregularity which does not make a sale a nullity unless the ground has been specified in the appeal to the Commissioner 45. We would respectfully say that in Haridasi Debi's case 15 C.W.N. 38 (1910) the decision of the Judicial Committee in Raja Gobinda Lal Roy's case (16) and of this Court in Deonandan Singh v. Manbodh Singh I. L R. 32 Cal. 111 : S.C. 8 C.W.N. 767 (1904) were entirely misunderstood. 46. We would respectfully say that in Haridasi Debi's case 15 C.W.N. 38 (1910) the decision of the Judicial Committee in Raja Gobinda Lal Roy's case (16) and of this Court in Deonandan Singh v. Manbodh Singh I. L R. 32 Cal. 111 : S.C. 8 C.W.N. 767 (1904) were entirely misunderstood. 46. That the decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of Raja Gobinda Lall v. Ramjanan Messer L.R. 20 IndAp 165 S.C. ILR 21 Cal. 70 (1893) purported to sweep away the foundation of the Full Bench decision in Lala Mobarak Lall's case ILR 11 Cal. 200 (F. B.) (1885) by laying down that a sale marred by an irregularity of this nature is none the less a sale under the Act which the Collector has jurisdiction to make if there are arrears due and that all illegalities and irregularities as distinct from absence of jurisdiction are covered by the language of sec. 33, has been held in a number of decisions amongst which reference may be made to Gangadhar Das v. Bhikari Charan Das 16 C.W.N. 227 (1911) and Radha Charan Das v. Shorfuddin Hossein ILR 41 Cal. 276: S.C. 17 C.W.N. 1035 (1913). This last-mentioned case went up to the Judicial Committee [see Sharfuddin Hossein v. Radha Charan Das ILR 46 Cal. 255: S.C. 23 C.W.N. 360 (P. C.) (1918)] and Lord Shaw in delivering the judgment of the Board used language plainly indicating that a sale held in contravention of the provisions of the Act was an irregularity to which a substantial injury must be attributable in order that it might justify the setting aside of the sale. The case, no doubt, was one of an alleged contravention of sec. 6 of the Act. 47. In Lal Bihari Maity v. Rajendra Nath Maity 30 C.W.N. 618 (1926), it has been pointed out that under sec. 33 of the Act what is meant by irregularity is the fact of the sale having been contrary to the provisions of the Act; that there is no distinction between illegality and irregularity; and that the authorities show that when the Collector has jurisdiction to hold the sale, non-compliance with any of the provisions of the Act will render the sale liable to be set aside only on the ground that a party has sustained substantial injury by reason of the illegality or irregularity complained of. 48. 48. We are entirely of the same opinion. We have, therefore, to consider the question of substantial injury. In this connection it is permissible to refer to the CPC from which, as pointed out by Lord Macnaghten in Raja Gobind Lal Roy's case L.R. 20 IndAp 165 at p. 169 : S.C. ILR 21 Cal. 70 (1893), the relevant sentence in sec. 33 of Act XI of 1859 seems to have been borrowed and as his Lordship observed, " without perhaps sufficient consideration." In explaining the words of the sentence in Tasaduk Rasul Khan v. Ahmed Hussain L.R. 20 IndAp 176 (1893), Lord Morris said that loss was not to be inferred from the mere fact of non-compliance with statutory provisions and that direct evidence was necessary. The words used by his Lordship have given rise to a good deal of controversy, but we think it is now well settled that it is sufficient if the evidence, though not direct evidence, shows that the injury was a necessary result of the irregularity complained of, fair, reasonable and legitimate inferences being permitted to be drawn as in cases of all other facts that may have to be proved. Pecuniary loss is not the only kind of injury contemplated by the words, though inadequacy of the price fetched at the sale is the most common form of injury that is asserted. 49. In the present case, it has been alleged that Touzi No. 1064/1 is worth Rs. 10,000 or Rs. 12,000 and its annual profit is about Rs. 2,500 to Rs. 3,000; and that substantial loss has resulted from the omission to issue the notice under sec. 5 because the Plaintiffs have got nothing as its price, the Defendant No. 1 having purchased it on payment of its arrears as laid down in sec. 14. On behalf of the Defendant No. 1 two mortgages have been put in in evidence (Exs. M and Ml) showing that Touzi No. 1064/1 and some other properties of the Plaintiffs are heavily encumbered. The fact that the irregularity has resulted in substantial injury is a fact which the Plaintiffs have to make out, but they have hardly made any real endeavour in this direction. It is not possible to make out what the market-value of the Touzi was in its encumbered estate at the date of the sale. The fact that the irregularity has resulted in substantial injury is a fact which the Plaintiffs have to make out, but they have hardly made any real endeavour in this direction. It is not possible to make out what the market-value of the Touzi was in its encumbered estate at the date of the sale. But it is highly probable that it had in spite of the mortgages some appreciable value. And if we were satisfied that the absence of the notice under sec. 5 had anything to do with the absence of any bidders at the sale on the 25th September, 1931, we would have been inclined to give the Plaintiffs a further opportunity of giving evidence on the question of the market-value of the Touzi in order to ascertain whether there has been any substantial injury. But we are unable to see that there was any connection between the omission to issue a notice under sec. 5 in the present case and the absence of bidders on the date of the sale. No direct evidence to establish such connection has been endeavoured to be given, and there are no circumstances present from which such connection may possibly be inferred. It has not been suggested that the notification of sale under sec. 6 of the Act was not duly published. The evidence of P. W. 2, Mr. Suresh Chandra Bose, the solicitor, which has been referred to on (behalf of the Plaintiffs for the purpose of showing that if the mortgagee had known of the fact that the Touzi was in arrears he would have paid up the arrears and averted the sale, does not go anywhere near the contention. The solicitor advanced Rs. 800 by a cheque on the 25th September and afterwards when it was returned to him he cancelled that cheque and drawing Rs. 800 for self on a fresh cheque on the 29th made over the amount to the Plaintiffs [Exs. 6 and 6 (a)]. The Plaintiffs approached the solicitor and the latter as solicitor for the mortgagee accommodated them; but there is no evidence that the mortgagee or the attaching creditor, if he had known of any notice under sec. 5, would have cared to put in the arrears and avert the sale. After all, Touzi 1064/1 was a share of an entire Touzi held on a separate account. 5, would have cared to put in the arrears and avert the sale. After all, Touzi 1064/1 was a share of an entire Touzi held on a separate account. It should also be noted that no complaint has been made by the Plaintiffs anywhere that owing to shortness of notice or anything of that description they could not approach the mortgagee or the attaching creditor to come to their aid. 50. As regards the object of a notice under sec. 5 and the effect that its omission is likely to lead to, they are not quite the same in all cases. In Mahabeer Prasad Singh v. The Collector of Tirhoot 13 W. R. 423 (1870), Markby, J., said-- Now, it may be fairly taken that the object of the Legislature in making the provisions contained in this section was to give special protection in cases where the circumstances are such as that, without any omission on the part of the 'person interested in protecting the estate there might be delay in the payment of the revenue; and it is perfectly obvious that this difficulty occurs in all cases where any portion of the estate liable for Government revenue is under attachment. If any portion of an estate is under attachment for debt, the owner of that portion is not always the person really interested in the payment of revenue, bat either the person who has attached it or the co-sharer. Where it has been pat under the control of a manager appointed by the Civil Court the owner of the share, though in that case he is probably interested in the payment of the revenue, has not the means of paying it, the whole rents and profits being taken out of his control and handed over to another person; and that difficulty arises that as much whether the estate is under the management of a person appointed by and wholly responsible to the Civil Court or whether it is under the management of a Collector or other Revenue Officer. 51. Ainslie, J.'s remarks in Mahabeer Prosad Singh v. The Collector of Tirhoot 15 W. B. 137 (1871) have already been quoted above. 52. 51. Ainslie, J.'s remarks in Mahabeer Prosad Singh v. The Collector of Tirhoot 15 W. B. 137 (1871) have already been quoted above. 52. The Judicial Committee in Bunwari Lal Saha v. Mahabeer Prasad Singh L.R. 1 IndAp 89 (1873) observed,-- A creditor obtaining an attachment under Act VIII had an inchoate interest in the land; his debtor could not alienate it and no judgment creditor, even if his judgment were prior, who obtained subsequent execution, would have any rights against him. That being as, the judgment-creditor had an obvious interest in knowing whether the revenue was paid; in other words, in knowing whether or not the estate in which he had an interest was forfeited. It may well be that the legislature may have thought that, under those circumstances, he was entitled to be informed whether the estate was or was not liable to forfeiture in order that he might step in, as he might under sec. 9 of the same Act, and pay the revenue and prevent the forfeiture. 53. It has been held by this Court that when the object of the notification is to protect the interest of an attaching creditor, omission to issue the notice under sec. 5 would not by itself mean that an inadequacy in the price which the sale fetched is the result of that omission. Ganesh Prasad v. Pandey Brij Behari 1 C.L.J. 585 (1905). In that case Mitra, J., in delivering the judgment of the Court said,-- The property was sold at Rs. 675 only, but as was hold by the Subordinate Judge its value was undoubtedly over Rs. 6000. At the same time we do not see how the non-service of the notice under sec. 5 could necessarily affect the price at the sale. The notification under sec. 5 of the Act is not one for sale on a specified day or at a specified hour inviting bidders, but is one to be affixed at least 15 days before the date fixed for payment of the revenue. The object of the notification is, as was held in Bunwari Lal Saha v. Mahabeer Prasad Singh L.R. 1 IndAp 89 (1873), to protect the interest of the attaching creditors. It is very difficult to connect, without direct evidence, an irregularity of this description with inadequacy of price, when the formalities required by sec. 6 of the Act were duly complied with. It is very difficult to connect, without direct evidence, an irregularity of this description with inadequacy of price, when the formalities required by sec. 6 of the Act were duly complied with. 54. We are of opinion that the Plaintiffs have failed to prove that they have suffered substantial injury by reason of the irregularity. As the only ground on which the learned Judge has set aside the sale cannot be supported and as the other grounds on which the Plaintiffs have sought to support the decree do not appear to us to be well-founded, we must allow the appeal and, setting aside the decree of the Court below, order that the suit be dismissed with costs in both the Courts.