JUDGMENT Panckridge, J. - This application is made in somewhat peculiar circumstances. It appears that there were two businesses, called Badarmull Hargobind Mathuradas. After the death of Badarmull these businesses belonged to his two sons Hargobindroy and Mathuradas. Both these persons are now dead and the interest of Mathuradas has passed to his son Shedmull. Shedmull is also the executor of the Will of Hargobindroy and under that Will the present applicant, Satnarain, has an interest in both businesses. By a consent decree which was made as recently as July 5th, 1935, Satnarain's interest in this business and in other joint family assets was decreed to be a one-fourth share. I understand that since the death of Hargobindroy, who survived Mathuradas, for a period of 7 years, Shedmull has managed the business both in his capacity as partner and in his capacity as Hargobindroy's executor. The present suit was recently instituted by the mother of Shedmull and it is for a sum of Rs. 50,644-12 which re-presents the alleged deposit of money with the two firms of Badarmull Hargobind and Hargobind Mathuradas. These two firma have been made Defendants in their respective firm names under Or. 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On the 24th July, 1935, a firm of solicitors wrote a letter to the present applicant on behalf of their client Rai Bahadur Shedmull Dalmia, informing the applicant that their client had been served with the writ of summons in the suit and giving a description of the nature of the Plaintiff's claim. The letter concludes with a statement that Rai Bahadur Shedmull Dalmia does not propose to take any steps in the matter. The applicant states that a situation has thus been brought about in which his rights are seriously prejudiced. He says that although he is interested in both firms by virtue of the provisions of Hargobindroy's will and by virtue of the decree of the 5th July 1935, he is not a partner in either of them. 2. The applicant states that a situation has thus been brought about in which his rights are seriously prejudiced. He says that although he is interested in both firms by virtue of the provisions of Hargobindroy's will and by virtue of the decree of the 5th July 1935, he is not a partner in either of them. 2. As the law stands, it appears that it is not possible for a person who apprehends that at some future time an attempt will be made to hold him liable in execution proceedings in a suit brought against a firm in its firm name, to have the issue of partnership tried as a preliminary issue, and if such issue be determined adversely to him, to defend the suit upon the merits. The only exception is that such a course is open to an alleged partner if the Plaintiff has served him with a writ of summons. The Court of Appeal in England decided in Weir and Co. v. Mc Vicar and Co. ILR 50 Mad. 34 at p. 38 (1926), that even where the alleged partner had been served with a writ of summons he could not defend the suit upon the merits unless he admitted that he was in fact a partner. If he denied partnership, he could enter appearance under protest and the issue of partnership would be determined at a subsequent stage. This meant that the alleged. partner was deprived of the opportunity of defending the suit upon the merits. In the course of his judgment Scrutton, L. J., dealt with the case of a person who has not been served with a writ but apprehends that the Plaintiff will eventually seek to hold him liable in execution proceedings on the basis of partnership. It need hardly be said that the principles by which a person served with a writ is precluded from raising a defence on the merits unless he admits partnership apply a fortiori to a person not served. A person who is served with a writ is now in a better position both in England and in a snit on the Original Side of this Court since the law applicable to such a person as, laid down in Weir and Co. v. Mc Vicar and Co. (1) has been modified in England by Or. XLVIIIA, r. 7 and in this Court by Rule 20A of Ch. v. Mc Vicar and Co. (1) has been modified in England by Or. XLVIIIA, r. 7 and in this Court by Rule 20A of Ch. VIII of the Rules and Orders which came into effect on the 1st July, 1933. These rules however do not touch a person in the position of the. present applicant, and as far as Or. XXX is concerned, the law with regard to him remains as it is stated to be in Weir and Co. v. Mc Vicar and Co. (1). The question then arises whether the applicant has shown that this is a proper case for the Court to make him a party under the provisions of Or. I., r. 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. I agree that the occasions on which the Court will add a person as a party to a suit on his own application and in opposition to the wishes of the parties already on the record, must necessarily be infrequent and I think that I fully appreciate the argument that the Court will be reluctant to force a Plaintiff to sue somebody whom he has decided not to sue. At the same time the fact that it is the case of both parties that the applicant is interested in some way or other in the assets of the Defendant firms' business, seems to me to be a matter of considerable weight. There are possibly other ways open to the applicant to protect himself against the danger of a collusive decree being enforced against him, but I cannot at the moment think of any particular way in which this can be done except by bringing him upon the record. In these circumstances I think that I am justified in making the somewhat exceptional order asked for and I therefore accede to Satnarain's application to be made a party Defendant. The costs of the present application will be reserved. Certified for Counsel.