JUDGMENT 1. These three appeals have arisen out of three suits which were tried along with one other suit, all instituted by some riparian proprietors. for declaration that certain lands which had formed by recess of the river Jellinghee and which as the result of Cadastral Survey and Settlement operations were resumed by Government and assessed to revenue were not liable to be so resumed or assessed, as they belonged to their permanently settled estates. The defence of the Secretary of State for India in Council, so far as it is relevant for the appeals, was that the lands did not appertain to the permanently settled estates but are additions thereto and so they have been rightly resumed and assessed. The quantities of lands and the mouzahs to which they are said to have been alluvial accretions are the following:- Appeal No. 10-- 116.35 acres to monzahShambhunagar 246.43 acres Parmed's 1.77 acres AsliRaipukar Total 364.55 acres. Appeal No. 11-- 103.14 acres to mauzahBhadurpur 10.66 acres Mayakoli Total 113.80 acres Mayakoli Total 30.38 acres to monzahHaranagar. The Plaintiffs claimed the lands of these suits as appertaining to their permanently-settled mouzahs of the same names, their case being that the lands were dry at the time of the Decennial Settlement and had been then assessed to revenue as included in the said mouzahs. The case of the Secretary of State was that it was not true that the lands were dry lands within the ambit of the mouzahs at the time of the Decennial Settlement; that the course of the river Jellinghee within whose bed the lands were shown at the time of the Revenue Survey had not changed from what it was at the time of the Permanent Settlement; and that in as much as in the course of the Cadastral Survey operations the Settlement Officer surveyed lands on the banks of the river under Act IX of 1847 and prepared a comparative map from which he ascertained that the lands hart been added to the revenue-paying estates since the date of the Revenue Survey, the resumption of the lands and assessment thereof as new estates was quite regular and proper. 2. 2. A pleader Commissioner with considerable knowledge and experience of survey was deputed to prepare a congregated map depicting therein the course of the river Jellinghee relatively to the lands in suit, as shown in the Cadastral Survey map, the Revenue Survey map, May's map, Colebrooke's map and Rennell's map. He prepared one such map f or the suit out of which Appeal No. 14 has arisen, and another for the other three suits, two of which have given rise to Appeals Nos. 10 and 11. The Cadastral Survey operations were dated 1917 to 1924; the Revenue Survey maps of different mouzahs were of 1853-55; May's map is dated 1828; Colebrooke's map is of 179G and Rennell's map of 1780. The results which the Commissioner obtained on comparison of May's, Colebrooke's and Rennell's maps respectively with the Revenue Survey maps were different in the case of each of the three maps. He prepared and submitted a report giving a full account of the methods he followed, the work that he did and the results which he obtained. The congregated maps prepared by him appear to have been scrutinised by the Government Pleader who was assisted by Mr. Isaac Newton of the Survey Department and the Commissioner was also examined as a witness for the Plaintiffs and cross-examined on three different days on behalf of the Government. 3. The learned Judge has observed in his judgment that no defect or inaccuracy in the relaying of the Cadastral Survey and Revenue Survey maps or in their actual plotting had been pointed out to him, but the accuracy of relaying May's, Colebrooke's and Rennell's maps on the congregated map had been impeached before him on behalf of the Crown. He considered the report of the Commissioner in great detail and examined his conclusion at length. He eventually arrived at the conclusion that the relaying of May's and Rennell's maps should be rejected and that it was only the relaying of Colebrooke's map that was substantially correct and should be acted upon. 4. " The result" he said, was that so mach of the disputed lands as falls outside the river course of Colebrooke's map as delineated by the Commissioner must be regarded as dry lands in 1793 and consequently within the limits of the permanently settled area. 5. The practical result of this conclusion has been that the suits corresponding to Appeals Nos. 5. The practical result of this conclusion has been that the suits corresponding to Appeals Nos. 10 land 11 were decreed in part, and the suit corresponding to Appeal No. 14 was dismissed in its entirety. The Secretary of State for India in Council has therefore preferred Appeals Nos. 10 and 11 and to these appeals there are cross-objections filed on behalf of the Plaintiff. And appeal No. 14 has been preferred by the Plaintiff who has been unsuccessful altogether. We take up Appeals Nos. 10 and 11 first. ***** [Their Lordships dismissed the appeals and proceeded.] Appeal No. 14. 6. Colebrooke's survey did not extend to the area concerned in this case. On such relaying of Rennell's map as the Commissioner was able to do he showed a part of the lands cut across by the river in Rennell's time. The Commissioner said enough in his report to justify the conclusion that his relaying of Rennell's map could not be relied upon. The learned Judge considered this report in detail and came to the conclusion that the relaying was of a make-shift nature and could not be relied upon as scientifically accurate. On that view, he held that the Plaintiff had failed to prove that the lands or any part of them had been already assessed to revenue or were dry lands at the time of the Permanent Settlement, and he accordingly dismissed the suit. 7. Mr. Mukerji on behalf of the Plaintiff has contended that the onus was wrongly placed on his client and he relies upon the decisions in Secretary of State v. Upendra Narain 36 C.L.J. 336 (1922) and Raja Sreenath Roy v. Secretary of State 30 C.L.J. 345 (1922). He has also drawn our attention to Reg. II of 1819 and the reasons given by Mookerjee, J., in the aforesaid two decisions in support of the view that it is only in respect of lands not already assessed to revenue that the right to assess exists in the Crown, and that, therefore, when in a Civil Court that right is challenged it is for the Crown to establish that such right exists. He has also read out to us the observations of Lord Herschell in Secretary of State v. Fahamidannessa Begum L.R. 17 I. A 40 : S.C. ILR 17 Cal. He has also read out to us the observations of Lord Herschell in Secretary of State v. Fahamidannessa Begum L.R. 17 I. A 40 : S.C. ILR 17 Cal. 50 (1889) which plainly indicate that the object of Act IX of 1847 was merely to change the mode of assessment in the case of land already liable to be assessed under legislation in force when that Act became law and that it was not the object of that Act to bring under assessment land which had been assessed at the time of the permanent settlement and which had since been lost and has reformed in situ. In our opinion, it is too late now to put forward this contention. The Regulation deals with the rights of the Crown in this respect and Fahamidunnessa's case L.R. 17 I. A 40 : S.C. ILR 17 Cal. 50 (1889) is not a decision on the question of onus. In Jagadindra Nath Rai v. Secretary of State ILR 30 Cal. 291: S.C. 7 C.W.N. 193 (P. C.) (1902) their Lordships expressly laid down:-- The onus of proving that any particular lands were included in the permanent settlement of 1793, in other words, of proving that the Government revenue then fixed was assessed upon any particular lands, is clearly on those who affirm that such was the case. 7. The proposition has since then been repeatedly affirmed by their Lordships and in this Court. And in the recent decision of Judicial Committee in Tarakdas Acharyya Chaudhury v. Secretary of State 39 C.W.N. 994 (P. C.) (1935), their Lordships have observed:-- In order to provide for the assessment of such lands to land revenue the Government of Bengal is empowered by Act IX of 1847 to direct the local revenue authorities to make a revenue survey of the alluvial lands and to determine the revenue which they are liable to pay to Government. If any land is thrown up by a large and navigable river and appears to be the property of Government, the revenue officers are required to take immediate possession of the same on behalf of the Government and to assess and settle it according to the rules in force in that behalf. It is however open to the person who claims to be the proprietor thereof to establish his right by bringing a suit in a competent Court of law: 8. Mr. It is however open to the person who claims to be the proprietor thereof to establish his right by bringing a suit in a competent Court of law: 8. Mr. Mukerji has next contended that the fact that the river has been constantly changing makes a difference justifying his contention that the onus as regards this matter lay on the Crown. It would be sufficient to point out that the above observations of the Judicial Committee were made in respect of a river, the Ganges, of which such frequent change is a characteristic. Their Lordships have said:-- The river Ganges in its course through the district of Dacca and the neighboring districts frequently changes its channel and throws up large plots of land which give rise to conflicting claims 9. It is quite true, as Mr. Mukerji has pointed out, that the learned Judge has not been wholly correct in his appreciation of the value of Renuell's map. But the point on which he has really decided against the Plaintiff is that he was not prepared to rely upon its relaying. It has been argued that even making every conceivable allowance for the errors it would seem that Renuell's river would not coincide with the lands concerned in, the snit. Of this we cannot be sure, for even as it is now the river cuts across the land. Mr. Mukerji has also asked us to apply to this case the decision in the case of Haradas Acharyya Chowdhury v. The Secretary of State 26 C.L.J. 590 (P. C.) (1917). In Tarakdas Acharyya, Chowdhury's case 39 C.W.N. 994 (P. C.) (1935), their Lordships of the Judicial Committee have explained the true import of that decision. In our opinion that case cannot help the Plaintiff. 10. The result is that we must affirm the view which the Court below has taken and this appeal also must, therefore, be dismissed with costs. The hearing-fee in the appeals and the cross-objections will be assessed as follows: In Appeal No. 10, hearing-fee will be according to scale, in Appeal No. 11, fifteen gold mohurs, in Appeal No. 14, ten gold mohurs, in the cross-objection to Appeal No. 10, ten gold mohurs, and in the cross-objection, to Appeal No. 11, five gold mohurs.