Judgement Four petitions for special leave to appeal. The respondents in the first petition, Phiroz Rustomji Bharucha and Kaikhushru Bomanji Bharucha, barristers-at-law and advocates, were convicted before the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, on January 12, 1933, on charges of being members of, and of assisting and managing the operations of, the Bombay Provincial Congress Committee Emergency Council and the Bombay Provincial Congress Committee Emergency Council (Propaganda Department) and other allied associations which had been declared unlawful under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908. Each of the respondents was sentenced to eighteen months rigorous imprisonment, and to pay a fine. The respondent in the second petition, Minocher Rustomji Masani, also a barrister-at-law and an advocate, was convicted on January 5, 1933, before a Bombay Magistrate, of managing or assisting in the management of an unlawful assembly— namely, an Emergency War Council of the Bombay Provincial Congress Committee, and was sentenced to eighteen months Law Rep. 62 Ind. App. 235 ( 1934- 1935) Advocate General of Bombay V. Phiroz Rustomji Bharucha 105 rigorous imprisonment, and to pay a fine. The respondent in the third petition, Pitamberdas Gokuldas Mehta, a District Pleader, was convicted on June 23, 1932, before the Magistrate, Kolaba, under s, 21 of the Emergency Powers Ordinance, No. II. of 1932, of disobeying an order to 11 abstain from any act in furtherance of the Civil Disobedience Movement," and was sentenced to one years rigorous imprisonment, and to pay a fine. The respondent in the fourth petition, Motilal Hargovandas Vin, a District Pleader, was convicted before a Magistrate in Broach on April 7, 1932, under s. 17, sub-s. 1, of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, of assisting the operations of an unlawful association—the Congress Working Committee—and was sentenced to six months rigorous imprisonment, and to pay a fine. The petitioner in the first two petitions, the Advocate General of Bombay, on December 11, 1933, presented petitions to the High Court, one in regard to each of the respondents who were barristers and advocates, submitting that each in the circumstances had been guilty of misconduct and praying for an inquiry in each case and that each should be suspended and removed from practice or otherwise dealt with as the High Court might deem fit. Those petitions were presented under the provisions of s. 10 of the Bar Councils Act, 1926, which provides — " 10 (1.). Those petitions were presented under the provisions of s. 10 of the Bar Councils Act, 1926, which provides — " 10 (1.). The High Court may, in the manner hereinafter provided, reprimand, suspend or remove from practice any advocate of the High Court whom it finds guilty of professional or other misconduct. " (2.) Upon receipt of a complaint made to it by any Court or by the Bar Council or by any other person that any such advocate has been guilty of misconduct, the High Court shall, if it does not summarily reject the complaint, refer the case for inquiry either to the Bar Council or, after consultation with the Bar Council, to the Court of a District Judge and may of its own motion so refer any case in which it has otherwise reason to believe that any such advocate has been so guilty." In accordance with the provisions of the Bar Councils Act the cases were referred for inquiry to the Bar Council and were inquired into by a committee of three. Two of the committee reported that the respondents had not been guilty of "misconduct " within the meaning of s. 10, sub-s. 1, of the Act, the third (the President) reported that each of the respondents was so guilty. The petitioner in the third petition, the District Government Pleader and Public Prosecutor, Kolaba, presented a petition, dated October 25, 1932, to the District Judge at Thana praying that an inquiry might be held regarding the respondents conduct under the provisions of s. 26 of the Bombay Pleaders Act, 1920. On September 29, 1933, the District Judge reported that the respondent "deserved to be reported to the High Court for disciplinary action." The petitioner in the fourth petition, the District Government Pleader, Broach, by a petition to the District and Sessions Judge of Broach and Panch Mahals, dated May 1, 1933, prayed that an inquiry might be held regarding the conduct of the respondent M. H. Vin. After the inquiry the District Judge reported that the respondent had taken an active part in the Civil Disobedience Movement, and under the ruling in In re Jivanlal Varajray Desai and Others (I. L. R. 44 B. 418.) had made himself liable to be dealt with under s. 26 of the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879. After the inquiry the District Judge reported that the respondent had taken an active part in the Civil Disobedience Movement, and under the ruling in In re Jivanlal Varajray Desai and Others (I. L. R. 44 B. 418.) had made himself liable to be dealt with under s. 26 of the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879. The cases of all the respondents, the three advocates and the two pleaders, came before the High Court (Beaumont C.J., Rangnekar and Divatia JJ.) who, on September 17, 1934, delivered one judgment in all the cases. The learned judges came to the conclusion that (in the case of the advocates) the convictions were evidence of misconduct within the meaning of s. 10 of the Bar Law Rep. 62 Ind. App. 235 ( 1934- 1935) Advocate General of Bombay V. Phiroz Rustomji Bharucha 106 Councils Act, 1926, and that they had jurisdiction to take disciplinary action against the respondents. In deciding to take no action the judgment of the Court stated " We cannot go behind the convictions, but we are entitled to consider the grounds on which such convictions were based, in order to determine whether they involve any conduct implying unfitness on the part of the barristers for the exercise of their profession. No evidence of this nature has however been adduced by Government..... Nor is there any reliable evidence as to what the particular activities of these barristers were in relation to the association..... It is enough to say that in our opinion merely having been members, or assisted the operations, or managed the affairs, of an unlawful association does not render the advocate unfit for the exercise of his profession. Such conduct does not necessarily involve moral turpitude, or any attack upon the system of which this Court forms part, or embarrass in any way the administration of justice by the Courts of this Presidency." The High Court also held that, exercising their jurisdiction upon the above mentioned principles, no action was called for in the case of the District Pleaders. 1935, June 27. Dunne K.C. and Sir T. J. Strangman for the petitioners in all four petitions. 1935, June 27. Dunne K.C. and Sir T. J. Strangman for the petitioners in all four petitions. The High Court, in stating that the test was whether the " misconduct " would interfere in any way with the respondents professional life on behalf of their clients and render them unfit for the exercise of their profession, had approached the matter on the wrong principle. The learned judges exercised their discretion erroneously upon a misconception of the position and a misapprehension of the facts, and upon a wrong principle, and there was in reality no foundation upon which that discretion could properly repose. The High Court of Bombay and other High Courts in India [as set out in the present petitions] had in effect expressed the view that an advocate, being part of the machinery of the Court for the administration of justice, was guilty of a dereliction of his duties, deserving of censure, if he engaged in such a movement as the Civil Disobedience Movement. The present were cases for further consideration. Pritt K.C. and Wallach for the respondents in the first two petitions. There was a doubt whether anybody had a right to present the petitions at all. There was no adverse litigant to his clients. An informant had no right to be heard. The Advocate General had a right to be heard, but he need not be the informant he presented his petition to the High Court as an individual informant, he presented it before the Judicial Committee as the Advocate General. It was not proved below that Congress was a revolutionary organization. Practically nothing was proved as to the particular activities of the respondents, apart from membership, or as to what the real activities were of the associations of which they were members. The principles referred to in the judgment of the High Court were correct. In Shankar Ganesh Dabir v. Secretary of State for India in Council (L. R. 49 I. A. 319.) the same course was taken see observations of Lord Buckmaster at p. 322. The respondent pleaders did not appear and were not represented. July 8. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD BLANESBURGH. In Shankar Ganesh Dabir v. Secretary of State for India in Council (L. R. 49 I. A. 319.) the same course was taken see observations of Lord Buckmaster at p. 322. The respondent pleaders did not appear and were not represented. July 8. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD BLANESBURGH. Their Lordships, after hearing these petitions, came to the conclusion that in none of them were the circumstances such as to justify them in advising His Majesty to grant special leave to appeal, and they gave expression to that conclusion. Their Lordships now propose to state in a few words certain considerations which were present to their minds in reaching their decision. It is plain that the learned judges of the High Court held that the fact that the advocates concerned had been convicted of a criminal offence was evidence of their misconduct within the meaning of s. 10, Law Rep. 62 Ind. App. 235 ( 1934- 1935) Advocate General of Bombay V. Phiroz Rustomji Bharucha 107 sub-s. 1, of the Bar Councils Act, and that this misconduct, though not committed in their professional capacity, entitled the Court to take disciplinary action against them. With this view their Lordships agree. The learned judges, in the exercise of their statutory discretion, then proceeded to consider whether in the circumstances the misconduct so proved called for any disciplinary action whether in the nature of reprimand, suspension, or removal from practice. The learned judges decided that it did not. So interpreted, the action of the High Court in thus exercising their discretion is not such as His Majesty can be advised further to consider. But to avoid all misapprehension their Lordships think it right to add that in so advising His Majesty they must not be taken to endorse all the views which are expressed in the judgment of the learned Chief Justice and his colleagues. In particular, their Lordships do not think that it was incumbent on the Advocate General to adduce evidence of the grounds on which the convictions were based. In particular, their Lordships do not think that it was incumbent on the Advocate General to adduce evidence of the grounds on which the convictions were based. It was for the Court to decide whether conviction of having been a member, and having assisted and managed the operations, of an unlawful association having for its object interference with the administration of the law, or with the maintenance of law and order, and constituting a danger to the public peace, was evidence of such misconduct on the part of an advocate as to render him unfit for the exercise of his profession, or to call for the Courts censure. It was for the impugned advocate to adduce any considerations which might induce the Court to refrain from taking disciplinary action. Their Lordships do not however find that the learned judges misdirected themselves in law as to their powers in the exercise of their discretion and, that being so, it would not be fitting to express any opinion by way of agreement or otherwise on the considerations upon which they proceeded in deciding to refrain from any disciplinary action. These observations apply equally to the case of the pleaders.