JUDGMENT Ameer Ali, J. - The facts which it is necessary to state are as follows :-- The Plaintiff was employed by the Port Commissioners as an assistant permanent way inspector on or about the 1st October, 1915. The terms of his contract of service appear from the document, which is a copy of the service register. He was apparently suspended on the 9th December, 1931, by the Chief Engineer, and on the 23rd December, he received a letter signed by the Chief Engineer, (to the following effect):-- I have to inform you that your services are dispensed with with effect from the 24th December, 1031 with one month's pay in lien of notice. The month's pay was received by the Plaintiff. His salary was then Rs. 550 a month. On the 1st February, 1932, there was a meeting of the Port Commissioners, and a resolution was passed. This purports to sanction the act of dispensing with the Plaintiff's services as from the 24th December, 1981. Subsequent to that resolution the balance, or a sum representing the balance of the Plaintiff's pay for the month of January, was handed to him, and I gather that it has been received by his solicitor, as I am informed by the Plaintiff, in some manner without prejudice to his claim. The Plaintiff has received the amount due to him from his provident fund, but he has not received any gratuity or bonus or any sum representing the salary he might have drawn during the period of leave which, according to the Plaintiff, was due to him at the date his services were dispensed with. 2. He filed his plaint on the 17th June, 1933. The pleas contained in the plaint may be summarised as follows. In paragraph 1 the plea is that his contract of service was of a quasi-permanent nature. I need not refer to paragraph 5 for the moment. Paragraph 6. The plea that by the letter of the 23rd December, 1931, written by the Chief Engineer the "Plaintiff's services were wrongfully and illegally dispensed with," and that as the result of such wrongful determination of his contract he has suffered the damage set out in paragraph 7. Paragraph 7. Paragraph 6. The plea that by the letter of the 23rd December, 1931, written by the Chief Engineer the "Plaintiff's services were wrongfully and illegally dispensed with," and that as the result of such wrongful determination of his contract he has suffered the damage set out in paragraph 7. Paragraph 7. The items of damage set out in this paragraph indicate that the Plaintiff is claiming damages on the basis that he is still in the service or entitled to be in the service of the Port Commissioners ; in other words, he is claiming the benefits which under the contract he would have received if the contract had not been determined. 3. The pleas in the written statement to which I refer are as follows. The plea of time-bar under sec. 142 of the Calcutta Port Act. The contention that the Plaintiff's services under his contract were determinable upon one month's notice, with of course the alternative of one month's salary. That an the circumstances the Plaintiff is not entitled to any general damages for wrongful determination of his contract, and alternatively that he is not entitled to any of what I might call the special or peculiar damages itemised in paragraph 7 of the plaint. On this point the Defendants rely on the rules which are referred to in the written statement. Lastly, the Defendants put forward the plea that in any event they were entitled at the date of the determination of the Plaintiff's contract to dismiss him, particulars of the grounds being contained in the written statement and in the amendment which was allowed by me. [His Lordship then proceeded to consider the various issues that might arise and proceeded.] 4. Arising out of this, Mr. Ormond put before me the point which at first I did not fully appreciate. It is this. Mr. Ormond was not prepared to accept the issue of damages on the basis of wrongful dismissal, his point being in this suit, as I understood it, as follow:--On a finding that the Plaintiff's services may be dispensed with in the manner I have indicated, there has been no breach of the contract of service as between the contracting parties, and therefore, there is no cause of action for a breach of the contract of service. Next, that this suit is not a suit for breach of any statutory obligation, and lastly that if it can be so regarded, the Plaintiff can have suffered no damages. Roughly speaking, the point is that his contract was not terminated wrongly ; it was at most terminated by a wrong method. On this basis he formulated the preliminary issues which I took down. 5. Before dealing with the point I might say at once that I find that the Plaintiff's contract was determinable as indicated, that is to say, upon notice plus one month's salary and that he has received that salary. That I do not think is disputed. 6. In support of his point Mr. Ormond cited to me two recent cases, one in Madras T. R. Rangachari v. Secretary of State for India in Council, I. L. R. 57 Mad 857 (1934) : and one in Rangoon Secretary of State. D'Attaidas, I. L. R. 12 Rang. 556 (1934). The references are to--. Without having read these cases with as much care as is desirable, it appears to me that they deal with the following points. The Madras case deals with the appeals of two different persons, and in one of those the point taken was that under the Government of India Act, sec. 96 (b) the Appellant could not be dismissed or his contract terminated by an officer subordinate to the officer appointing him, the words of that section being set out in the second judgment at page 883. Now, the Court held that rules had been framed delegating the power to an officer subordinate to the officer making the appointment and that such rules govern the rest of the section. The Judges were there not called upon to decide what the effect would have been under the section as it stands and they did not do so. The main point decided in the case was that the contract of service between the Crown and the subject being one which the Crown is entitled to determine at pleasure, the officer whose services are so dispensed with has no right of action for wrongful dismissal. The main point decided in the case was that the contract of service between the Crown and the subject being one which the Crown is entitled to determine at pleasure, the officer whose services are so dispensed with has no right of action for wrongful dismissal. Further, that when under rules framed in pursuance of the statute or otherwise, a certain procedure has to be followed by the authority concerned before the subjects services are dispensed with, and that procedure has not been followed this does not give the subject a right to sue for damages for wrongful dismissal. It may give him a right to sue for a breach of an independent contract or failure to comply with a statutory duty or something of that kind (pages 872, 877 and 885). 7. In the Rangoon case it was admitted oh behalf of the Secretary of State that there had been no enquiry as provided by the rules applicable [Rule 55 framed under I think sec. 96 (b)]. In substance, the Court again held that there was no right to sue for damages for wrongful dismissal. There was a right to sue because the rules had not been complied with, and it was treated as such a suit. The Court, however, investigated the facts in order to see what damages, if any, the Plaintiff could obtain by reason of the rules not having been followed, and on the fact came to the conclusion that the Plaintiff in that case could have suffered none or purely nominal damages. In addition to rule 55 there was a certain Government Circular directing the method of the enquiry. Something to that effect. The Court held that with regard to the circular no action for non-compliance with the directions contained in the circular could be brought. That, roughly, is the effect of the cases so far as I have been able to consider them. 8. The position appears to me as follows. You can have a suit for what is called wrongful dismissal. Breach of contract of service--by breaking one of its substantive terms ; in other words, if you tell your servant to go when he is entitled either to stay for the rest of the contract or to so many months' notice. 8. The position appears to me as follows. You can have a suit for what is called wrongful dismissal. Breach of contract of service--by breaking one of its substantive terms ; in other words, if you tell your servant to go when he is entitled either to stay for the rest of the contract or to so many months' notice. On the other hand, the contract may be determined in accordance with the substantive terms of service but by a method contrary to that prescribed by rule or regulation. That gives rise to an independent cause of action upon the contract. It appears to me, again, that there may be a third position, which is probably the position here, and that is where the contract itself, besides the substantive terms of service, either contains or has read into it a term that the services of the employee are to be determined by a particular authority or in a particular manner. It may be a different cause of action, as is suggested in the two authorities cited. On the other hand, it may be, and I think it is, in such a case a cause of action in respect of the contract of service and would entitle the Plaintiff to sue on that contract for such damages as he has incurred for a wrongful determination of his contract ; wrongful in the sense that it has been determined by a person or in a manner not provided for in his contract. From a practical point of view it seems to me to make very little difference. The question in each case is, what damages has he suffered by the wrong method having been employed or by the determination having been made by the wrong authority? In this case, unlike the Rangoon case, it is not a question of examining the reasons for the determination of the service or the justification for the determination of the service. In this case, on the facts put before me, I have found great difficulty in discovering what damages the Plaintiff has incurred by reason of the fact that his contract was terminated by the Chief Engineer without the previous resolution of the Port authorities. On this point I should have been very glad of the assistance of Counsel on behalf of the Plaintiff. On this point I should have been very glad of the assistance of Counsel on behalf of the Plaintiff. I have tried to see the other side of the question, but I have been unable to see, legally that he has incurred any damage by reason of the fact that his services were wrongfully dispensed with in the manner which he has pleaded, that is to say, to repeat the point, that his contract was terminated by an authority which is not the authority specified by sec. 33 of the Act. 9. With regard to damages, the Plaintiff, as I have already indicated, claims on the basis of the notice being a nullity, and so far as at present advised, I think notice was given by the Wrong authority. The Plaintiff might have treated it as a nullity. He might have said: "I do not recognise the determination of my services by the Chief Engineer." He might possibly, if his services had not then been terminated by the Commissioners, claim still to be technically in the service of the Commissioners and entitled to his salary. He did not do that. He treated the notice as a breach, a repudiation. He sued for damages for that breach, and it is those damages which I have to determine. I have already indicated that I cannot see that he has suffered any general damages or Ordinary damages by the breach in, Question. [His Lordship then proceeds to state, that the Plaintiff is not entitled to any of the particular damages as claimed, they being in the discretion of the Commissioners ; that he sees no answer to the plea of time-bar ; that he at this stage need not go into the other questions at all ; and in the result dismissed the suit with costs.]