Judgement Appeal (No. 100 of 1932) from a decree of the High Court (July 21, 1931) reversing a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Muzaffarnagar (May 27, 1930). On May 14, 1929, the plaintiff brought the present action against the defendant, a widow of his deceased brother Seth Baldeo Sahai, alleging that she had been guilty of misconduct with one Tara Chand or had married him, and claiming that in consequence she had no right in Hindu law to be benefited by a settlement as to profits from the joint Hindu family property made on her by the plaintiff and his brother, members of an undivided joint family, in a deed of agreement by way of a will, dated June 5, 1915. He asked (inter alia) for a declaration that under the above document executed by his brother and himself the defendant had now no right in certain specified scheduled property valued at Rs. 1,21,930. The defendant denied that she was either unchaste or remarried, and further claimed that the terms of the agreement entitled her to her share of the profit irrespective of the question of unchastity or remarriage. The facts and the material provision of the agreement of June 5, 1915, appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The trial judge held that the defendant had not married Tara Chand, but that misconduct with him was proved, and he decreed that the defendant had no right in the property and made a declaration as prayed by the plaintiff. Upon appeal the High Court held that there had been no remarriage and that the charge of unchastity was false. They were further of opinion that " the estate was one of a special nature and it was not liable to divestment upon the ground of subsequent unchastity, because the instrument creating the right did not provide for this contingency." I935- June 27. J. C. Durai and G. E. Miles for the appellant. There was an issue of fact whether unchastity was proved, and an issue of law whether unchastity could invalidate the agreement of June 5, 1915. A widow should reside in the family house if the husband had chosen to make it a condition that she should continue to reside there. Such a direction was binding, and the continuance of maintenance depended on the widows obedience Mayne on Hindu Law, 9th ed., para. 457. A widow should reside in the family house if the husband had chosen to make it a condition that she should continue to reside there. Such a direction was binding, and the continuance of maintenance depended on the widows obedience Mayne on Hindu Law, 9th ed., para. 457. The sentence in the agreement, "The wife of the deceased party shall live in any house of her selection in residential enclosure No. 65," was a command. [Cossinaut By sack and Another v. Hurroosoondry Dossee and Another (Morley’s Digest, vol. ii., 198.) referred to.] There was authority for the proposition that a widow lost her right to maintenance on account of subsequent unchastity even when the amount due was fixed by agreement. What the widow was to receive under the agreement of June 5, 1915, was a kind of maintenance. There were different kinds of maintenance Mayne on Hindu Law, 9th ed., para. 456. [SIR SHADI LAL. The contract does not mention mainten ance. Counsel referred to Sreemutty Rabutty Dossee v. Sibchundar Mullick. (6 Moore’s I. A. 1.)] Jayaswal for the respondent was not called upon. July 15. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR SHADI LAL. On June 5, 1915, two brothers, Baldeo Sahai and Seth Lakshmi Chand, who constituted a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara school of Hindu law, executed a document providing for the disposal of their estate. It was presented for registration on June 8, at the office of the sub-registrar, and was duly registered on June 9. This document, which has been variously described as an agreement, or a joint will, of the two brothers, stated (inter alia) that, in the event of one brother dying without leaving a male issue, his widows name should be substituted for that of the deceased husband in the public records relating to the estate. Her interest in the estate was defined in the eighth paragraph of the instrument, and, as there is a controversy between the parties about the interpretation to be placed upon it, it is necessary to set it out in extenso — 14 (8.) We, both the parties, have, up to this time, been jointly managing all the estate affairs and shall continue to manage it in the same way, provided no partition takes place. After the death of one party all managements relating to the estate shall be made by the surviving party. The wife of a deceased party shall have no right to get the property partitioned in the life of the other party, but shall continue to get her share of the profit from the other party after deducting the expenses relating to the estate. If the other party evades the payment of the profit, she shall be entitled to seek remedy in court only for recovery of profit." Before discussing the question raised on this appeal, it is desirable to state the circumstances which have led to the present litigation. It is common ground that Baldeo Sahai died on June 10, 1915, without leaving male issue ; and that the name of his widow, Musammat Anandi, was entered, instead of the name of the deceased, in the relevant revenue records. Lakshmi Chand did not, however, give her the profits to which she was entitled under the paragraph quoted above, and brought, in 1918, an action for a declaration that the transaction embodied in the document amounted to a testamentary disposition of the co-parcenary estate and could not take effect, as on the death of Baldeo Sahai, his brother became the sole owner of the entire joint estate by the rule of survivorship. This claim was rejected, not only by the trial Court, but also by the High Court Lakshmi Chand v. Musammat Anandi and Others. (( 1923) I. L. R. 45 A. 245.) The plaintiff then preferred an appeal to His Majesty in Council, but that appeal too was dismissed on March 15, 1926 Lakshmi Chand v. Anandi and Others. (( 1926) L. R. 53 I. A.123.) In the meanwhile, Musammat Anandi, who had not received any profits from her brother-in-law, had commenced, in 1920, a suit to recover her share of the profits for the period of five years, from June 11, 1915, to June 10, 1920. The progress of the suit was considerably delayed, and it was not until March, 1928, that the trial Court granted her a decree for Rs. 81,423-12. The appeal brought by Lakshmi Chand against this decree was dismissed by the High Court in February, 1929. The progress of the suit was considerably delayed, and it was not until March, 1928, that the trial Court granted her a decree for Rs. 81,423-12. The appeal brought by Lakshmi Chand against this decree was dismissed by the High Court in February, 1929. Though defeated in his suit to impeach the validity of the deed of June 5, 1915, Lakshmi Chand made no payment of the profits even after the judgment pronounced by the Privy Council, with the result that Musammat Anandi had to bring, in August, 1926, another suit for profits for the period from June 15, 1920, to July 30, 1926. In this suit she obtained a decree for a sum exceeding one lakh of rupees. The above narrative does not, however, exhaust the list of the cases between Lakshmi Chand and his sister-in-law. In May, 1929, he instituted the present suit to defeat her right to recover profits, and the ground of attack put forward this time was that she had forfeited her right by reason of her remarriage and unchastity with one Tara Chand. The trial Court and the High Court have concurred in holding that there was no remarriage, and that point cannot be, and has not been, re-agitated before their Lordships. On the question of unchastity, the Subordinate Judge found in favour of the plaintiff, but the High Court, after a survey of all the relevant circumstances, felt no hesitation in deciding that the charge of unchastity was false. The learned judges rightly held that the onus of proving unchastity rested upon the plaintiff, and they observed that the trial judge "in dealing with this issue has not always kept this fact in view that the onus in the matter lay upon Lakshmi Chand and not upon Musammat Anandi.” The High Court also decided that Musammat Anandi could not, by reason of unchastity, be divested of the estate which was conferred upon her by the document executed by both the brothers. On this appeal against the judgment and the decree pronounced by the High Court, the plaintiff again repeats the charge of unchastity and maintains that her misconduct has deprived her of the right to recover the profits. On this appeal against the judgment and the decree pronounced by the High Court, the plaintiff again repeats the charge of unchastity and maintains that her misconduct has deprived her of the right to recover the profits. Their Lordships do not think that it is necessary to discuss the evidence on the issue of unchastity, as they are clear that the appeal must fail on the ground that the charge of unchastity, even if it were established, would not cause a forfeiture of the estate she had got under the document. It is true that the right of a Hindu widow to maintenance is conditional upon her leading a life of chastity, and that she loses that right if she becomes unchaste. The argument advanced for the appellant, proceeding as it does upon this rule of the Hindu law, is, however, irrelevant to the question before their Lordships. What the widow has been given in the present case is not maintenance but the income of an estate specially created for her by the two brothers. The nature of that estate has already been determined by this Board in the previous case between the parties, and it is sufficient to say that it was then decided finally that the instrument in question contained an agreement between the two brothers that (( 1926) L. R. 53 I. A. 133.) — “Musammat Anandi should, on the death of Baldeo Singh, have and enjoy for her life an interest in a moiety of the joint property equivalent to the interest which the widow of a sonless and separated Hindu would have in her deceased husbands estate, and that the interest which she obtained by the mutual agreement of Baldeo Sahai and Lakshmi Chand should continue for her benefit for her life, notwithstanding the birth, if it should happen, of male issue to Lakshmi Chand." This is the estate she took under the instrument, and it is clear that the right to receive maintenance is very different from a vested estate in property. Under the Hindu law a widow having inherited a widows estate is not liable to forfeit it by reason of her subsequent unchastity, and there is no provision in the document making chastity a condition of the enjoyment by her of the estate bestowed upon her. Under the Hindu law a widow having inherited a widows estate is not liable to forfeit it by reason of her subsequent unchastity, and there is no provision in the document making chastity a condition of the enjoyment by her of the estate bestowed upon her. The learned counsel for the appellant urges another ground for terminating Musammat Anandis estate, which was not mentioned in the Courts below. He maintains that, while the deed required her to live in a dwelling house in Khatauli, she gave up her residence there and migrated to a place called Paswara in order to prosecute her intrigue with her paramour ; and that this circumstance should operate as a forfeiture of her estate. The deed no doubt allowed her to live " in any house she might choose " situated in a specified enclosure at Khatauli, and enjoined Lakshmi Chand not " to turn her out of it." But this was a right given to her, not an obligation imposed upon her. She was not bound always to live in the house in question. She, however, lived in it continuously for more than eleven years after the death of her husband, and left it only when she apprehended violence from the appellant. Moreover, there is no provision in the document which would warrant a forfeiture of her estate on that ground. The appellant has, in their Lordships opinion, failed to show any reason for avoiding his liability to pay the income of a moiety of the entire estate to the respondent. They will, therefore, humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal be dismissed with costs.