JUDGMENT Panckridge, J. - This is an application on behalf of the Plaintiff's attorney that he may be declared to have a first charge on the sum of Rs. 1,389-15 annas now in Court to the credit of this suit and that he be at liberty to with-draw that sum in satisfaction of his costs. It appears that the Plaintiff was successful in an ejectment suit instituted by him. The Defendant Kaluram Bhowsingka was directed to pay the taxed costs of the suit. These costs have now been taxed and they amount to Rs. 1,389-15 annas. The circumstances in which they are now in Court are as follows:-- When it was sought to execute the decree for costs as against the Defendant, he set up a case that he had obtained an order for costs against the Plaintiff in another suit. I understand the costs had not, at that time, been taxed. The order made by the learned Judge dealing with the execution matter was that the application for execution should be adjourned, on the Defendant paying the amount of the taxed costs into Court. The Defendant fulfilled this condition, and I am told if the costs, which the Defendant was awarded in the other suit, and which have now been taxed are set-off against the costs awarded to the Plaintiff in this suit, the balance in the Plaintiff's favour will be comparatively a trifling sum. 2. The Plaintiff's attorney, however, contends that the sum paid into Court by the Defendant in the circumstances which I have mentioned is property re-covered by his exertions, and he is en-titled to exercise his lien over it irrespective of any claim to set-off which the Defendant may have against the Plaintiff. In my opinion, the attorney's contention is correct and must follow from the provisions of Or. 3, r. 6 of the CPC which lays down that no set-off shall affect the lien upon the amount decreed of any pleader in respect of the costs payable to him under the decree. In my opinion, the attorney's contention is correct and must follow from the provisions of Or. 3, r. 6 of the CPC which lays down that no set-off shall affect the lien upon the amount decreed of any pleader in respect of the costs payable to him under the decree. I have come to this conclusion with some reluctance, because I do not think it is in conformity with equity that the attorney should be in a position to disregard the set-off which would be operative against his client; but at the same time it must not be forgotten that there is a claim for costs against the Defendant, and he has satisfied that claim by paying the amount of it into Court. The situation might be different if the money had been paid into Court as security for a potential claim for costs and if such potential claim had never become an actual claim under an order of the Court. The situation of which I am thinking is one similar to that In re Wadsworth (Rhodes v. Sugden) L.R. 29 Ch. Div. 517 (1885). There the Plaintiff, being resident out-side the jurisdiction, had been ordered to pay 100 into Court as security for such costs as he might thereafter be directed to pay. The Plaintiff, however, was successful in his suit, and the Defendant was ordered to pay the costs. In these circumstances, it was held that the solicitor's lien did not attach to the 100 paid by the Plaintiff into Court as security or costs. It is obvious how widely that case differs from the case before me, because here there has been an order for costs against the Defendant, the costs have been taxed and the precise amount of the taxed costs have been paid into Court, and the only answer which the Defendant has got to the attorney's claim is that he is entitled to a set-off against the Plaintiff. In my opinion, both under the common law governing the relationship of the attorney and the client and under Or. 8, r. 6, sub-r. (2), the Defendant is not entitled to the set-off claimed by him in answer to the attorney's claim to exercise his right of lien. In these circumstances, the application succeeds. The attorney is entitled to the cost of this application as against the Plaintiff.