JUDGMENT D.N. Mitter, J. - The Plaintiff who is a young man inexperienced in wordly affairs instituted a suit in which this appeal arises to set aside a transaction, namely, a deed of sale which was entered into between him and the Defendants on the 12th December, 1925. The case as made in the plaint is that this transaction was induced by misrepresentation on the part of the Defendants or their agents. The gist of the cause of action is to be found in paragraph No. 3 of the plaint. It states as follows: In Monza Tarapasha on the land appertaining to Taluk No. 11566 of which the Plaintiff is a partial owner in possession and other taluks of the other maliks near the Kishoreganj Railway Station has an Akra house of the deity Radha Damodar. The principal Defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 4 being ready to take possession of the lands of the said Akra by virtue of a kabala quarrel arose with the superior maliks of the Akra and the Hindu public of Kishoreganj. At last proceedings having been drawn up under sec. 145, Cr. P. Code, the principal Defendants being unsuccessful up to the Hon'ble High Court, were passing their time in extreme grief. Some of the superior malika having executed a certain deed in favour of Sj. Promode Chandra Roy Choudhury, Zamindar of Atarabari in respect of their interest in the lands of the said Akra, the principal Defendants became more aggrieved. The principal Defendants were not able to acquire any interest in the Akra after much effort. Under these circumstances when the other properties of the Plaintiff were owned and possessed by the trustee the Defendants gave out to the Plaintiff that they were willing to purchase even for a very high price, if available, the share of the malik interest of the lands of the said Akra owned and possessed by the Plaintiff. The officers etc. of the Defendants began to tempt the Plaintiff with the offer that he would get an unexpectedly high price for it if he could do it secretly, because in this matter the Zamindar had a zid. Afterwards an offer on behalf of the principal Defendants to purchase the aforesaid maliki interest owned and possessed by the Plaintiff in the Akra for Rs. Afterwards an offer on behalf of the principal Defendants to purchase the aforesaid maliki interest owned and possessed by the Plaintiff in the Akra for Rs. 625 having been made, the Defendant No. 4 agreeing to pay a very high price, for the same settled to purchase by a kabala he said interest of the Akra from the Plaintiff. In paragraph No. 4 the Plaintiff states this: Later on the principal Defendants in collusion with some wicked people Krishna Chandra Bhattachrjea and others of Ja(sic) who belonged to their party and who were their creatures keeping the Plaintiff out of his senses by giving him intoxicants and with the help of their own man got a kabala prepared in the absence of the Plaintiff and on the 28th Aurahayan, 1332, bringing the Plaintiff to the ey(sic) shop near (sic) Defendants residence at Kishoreganj, asked the Plaintiff to put his signature to the document, and the Plaintiff in good faith under the directions of the Defendants signed his name. The said document was caused to be registered by the Plaintiff at once taking the Plaintiff to the Registration Office by telling him that the time of registration would he over and that he would be paid the consideration as soon as the registration is finished. The Plaintiff did not read the said sale deed, nor was it read over to him by anybody nor was he given any time or opportunity either to read or understand it at that time, nor had the Plaintiff the power and capacity to do so. 2. The substance of the plaint is that he did not understand the nature of the transaction and that he put his signature to the document in question under the impression that he was only selling the Akra property. He now discovers that by this document he has sold his entire interest in the five Taluks mentioned in the schedules to the document which is to be found printed at page 45 of the second part of the paper book. He also says that consideration did not pass. On these facts, the Plaintiff has asked for a declaration that the deed was void and inoperative as it was without consideration and executed under undue influence on fraudulent misrepresentation at the time when the Plaintiff was not in a sober state of mind. He also says that consideration did not pass. On these facts, the Plaintiff has asked for a declaration that the deed was void and inoperative as it was without consideration and executed under undue influence on fraudulent misrepresentation at the time when the Plaintiff was not in a sober state of mind. He further asked that it might be declared (that the principal Defendants had acquired no interest in the properties mentioned in the kobala. The principal Defendants to the suit are some of the rich land-owners of Gangatiya in the District of Mymensingh. They challenge all the allegations made in the plaint in very long written statements. The substance of the de-fence is that the Plaintiff understood what he was doing when he was executing the deed of the sale in question and that knowing full well the circumstances of the case he put his signature to the document and received full consideration for the sale. 3. On this state of pleadings several issues were framed by the Subordinate Judge of Mymensingh and the opposing allegations of the Defendants in their written statements also led to the framing of several issues. All these issues are to be found printed at page 115 of the first part of the paper-book. The issue which is material for the purpose of the present appeal is issue No. 7 which runs as follows: Whether the kabala in question is a valid document or whether it was brought about by Defendants or any of them by fraud, undue influence and misrepresentation and by taking advantage of Plaintiff's unsound mind? 4. As a corollary to this issue, issue No. 9 was also framed in these words: Have the Defendants acquired any title to the kobala properties by their alleged purchase? 5. An issue was raised with regard to the valuation of the properties for the purposes of jurisdiction. That is issue No. 3 which will have to be referred to in the course of the judgment. It is in the following words: Has the suit been properly valued and proper Court fees paid thereon ? 6. The Subordinate Judge after examining volumes of oral and documentary evidence which have been given in this case, came to the following conclusion. It is in the following words: Has the suit been properly valued and proper Court fees paid thereon ? 6. The Subordinate Judge after examining volumes of oral and documentary evidence which have been given in this case, came to the following conclusion. He states thus: There is thus no doubt that the Plaintiff did not obtain a fair price for the properties and this is about the only major point that is in Plaintiff's favour. But I do not think this is sufficient to raise a presumption of fraud. It can be sufficiently explained by the fact that Plaintiff does not seem to have made any serious attempt to puff up the price by approaching the open market 7. With regard to the passing of consideration the Subordinate Judge came to the conclusion. that the sum of Ra. 625 was paid although he notices the circumstance that the passing of consideration has not been proved by the Defendants by production of the best evidence in the case, namely, by the production of the books of accounts of the Defendants. With regard to issues Nos. 3 and 4, he thinks that if the omitted khatians are taken into consideration the price of the properties would be much higher than in the other case. So, he says, he cannot hold that the suit was overvalued and that the Court of the Additional Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction. The suit, it may be mentioned, was valued at Rs. 6,000. The sale deed, it may be mentioned, unfortunately passes the right, title and interest of the present Plaintiff in the five taluks which are mentioned in the Schedule. These taluks appertain to several khatians prepared under Chap. X of the Bengal Tenancy Act. All the khatians are not named and the Subordinate Judge seems to think and so expresses in one part of his judgment that possibly the Defendants did not know. that they were purchasing the lands of the omitted khatians. At the same time he seems to think as he expresses in his judgment that if the omitted khatians are all taken into consideration, the price would be considerably higher and if Defendant No. 4 had known this, he might have offered much higher value. Again in dealing with issues Nos. 8 and 4 he holds that the price of the properties would be about Rs. 6000. Again in dealing with issues Nos. 8 and 4 he holds that the price of the properties would be about Rs. 6000. In so far as the case made by the Plaintiff as to not understanding the transaction which he was entering into is concerned the decision of the Subordinate Judge is against the present Plaintiff. On these findings the Subordinate Judge has dismissed the suit. 8. It is against this decree that the present appeal has been brought and it has been contended that the Subordinate Judge has gone wrong in not accepting the evidence of the Appellant with reference to the circumstance under which the deed of sale in question was executed and has not given effect to the presumption which arises in favour of the Plaintiff from the gross inadequacy of price. Taking the view of the Subordinate Judge it is clear that if the deed is interpreted according to the ordinary rules of interpretation, the deed of sale passes the entire interest in the several taluka mentioned in the schedule in favour of the Defendants. If that is so. the price for which the properties have been sold can in these circumstances be regarded as grossly inadequate. The contention on behalf of the Defendants is that the fact that the price is grossly inadequate is no evidence of fraud on the part of the purchaser. 9. In order to consider the soundness or propriety of this contention it is necessary to advert to some circumstances under which the deed of sale was executed. It appears clear from the deed itself which is printed at page 45 of the second part of the paper-book that it was executed in very great hurry. Indeed the purchaser made no enquiry whatsoever as regards the title to the properties. This in our opinion is itself a circumstance of grave suspicion. This is what the deed recites: Without making any enquiry about the said properties you have purchased the same. 10. It appears that a short time after the execution of the deed in 1926, proceedings were taken on behalf of the Defendants Respondents for mutation of the name of the owners under Land Registration Act, sec. This is what the deed recites: Without making any enquiry about the said properties you have purchased the same. 10. It appears that a short time after the execution of the deed in 1926, proceedings were taken on behalf of the Defendants Respondents for mutation of the name of the owners under Land Registration Act, sec. 76 and that as soon as these proceedings were started, objections were taken on behalf of the Plaintiff that the deed was not a genuine deed, that no consideration passed and that the real fact was that the Plaintiff thought that he was selling only the Akra which was proposed for sale and was given a price of Rs. 625 for the sale. It is stated by the present Plaintiff who was Defendant in mutation case No. 1175 of 1926-27 that the market value of the land comprised in the kabala even assessed at a minimum value, should be Rs. 8,000 and he pointed out that the homestead land was included in the said kabala. See page 68 of the second part of the paper-book. It is pointed out that there is no reason to sell any such property by the kobala under any circumstance. Certain difficulties have arisen by reason of the said objections having been withdrawn by the Plaintiff at a subsequent date in the Land Registration Court. The Plaintiff is said to have put in affidavit and a petition on the 27th July, 1926, withdrawing us objections to mutation proceedings. Those documents are to be found printed at pages 52 and 54 respectively of the second part of the paper-book and are marked as Exts. B and C. The circumstances under which this application withdrawing the objections to the land registration proceedings were made have been examined by us and the entire evidence has been placed be-fore us with great thoroughness by the learned Advocate for the Respondents. We have no doubt having regard to the circumstances under which this application was made that the Plaintiff was not a free agent in the matter but he was merely acting under the advice and instruction of Debendra Kishore Roy, who is an officer of the Defendants. He filed the applications through different pleaders. We have no doubt having regard to the circumstances under which this application was made that the Plaintiff was not a free agent in the matter but he was merely acting under the advice and instruction of Debendra Kishore Roy, who is an officer of the Defendants. He filed the applications through different pleaders. The petition of objections to mutation was filed in the first instance by one Abinash Chandra Roy but the application withdrawing the objections was made through another pleader Upendra Chandra Dey whose conduct was somewhat unusual in this matter. Upendra Chandra Dey stated that the present Plaintiff was introduced to him through one Sarat Babu who is shown to be a pleader living in the basa of the Defendants. This pleader Upen Babu states that he did not draft the petition withdrawing objections to the land registration proceedings. It was not drafted in his place and he did not read it. As far as he could re-collect, he said, he had accepted the vakalatnama and signed the petition at Court. It is a somewhat suspicious circumstance that on the day when the Plaintiff was examined before the land registration officer, he was examined in chief not only by Upendra Dey but also by Jotindra Babu. 11. These are circumstances which give rise to a just suspicion that his petition withdrawing the objection to the land registration proceedings was not a free act of the present Plaintiff. Even if the Plaintiff were acting as a free agent, still, as there is no question of estoppel, there is nothing to prevent him from withdrawing the admissions made and of showing the circumstances under which the admission was made and of showing that such admissions are not binding on him by such evidence which was before the trial Court. The evidence of the Plaintiff has been placed before us by the learned Advocates on both sides and we have no doubt after having scanned this evidence as well as the evidence given by the Defendants that the Plaintiff was imposed upon either by the Defendant or by Defendant's agent Debendra who introduced the Plaintiff to one of the Defendants in the suit. Having regard to the gross inadequacy of price--the price being Rs. Having regard to the gross inadequacy of price--the price being Rs. 6,000 as the learned Subordinate Judge has found on issue No. 3--the Court is led at once to enquire as to whether this gross inadequacy in price is in itself an evidence of fraud on a young person who had just come of age, and as the Subordinate Judge himself finds, was a man of somewhat dissolute habits and inexperienced in wordly affairs. 12. With regard to the effect of gross inadequacy of price in a transaction, the law lays down that where inadequacy is not so great as to shock the conscience or to shock the moral sense, such inadequacy by itself is no evidence of fraud but it is otherwise v/hen the inadequacy is so great as to shock the conscience. We can do no better than quote what has been said in the well-known book of Mr. Justice Story on Equity Jurisprudence, 18th American Edition, paragraph 355. The paragraph runs in these words: Still however there may be such an unconsoionableness or inadequacy in a bargain as to demonstrate some gross imposition or some undue it (sic)uence, and in such cases Courts of equity ought to interfere upon the satisfactory ground of fraud. But then such unconsoionableness or such inadequacy should be made out as would (to use on expressive phrase) shock the conscience and amount in itself to be conclusive and decisive evidence of fraud. And where there are other ingredient B in the case of a suspicious nature or peculiar relations between the parties, gross inadequacy of price must necessarily furnish the most vehement presumption of fraud. 13. In support of this legal proposition Mr. Justice Story refers to a very early case where the law on the subject was laid down so far back as 1804. That case is the case of Coies v. Trecothick [1801] 9 Ves. 234, 246 and is reported in 9 Ves. 246. The observations of Lord Eldon in that case have stood the test of time and they have been taken to embody the rule adopted by the Courts administering equity, justice and good conscience. Against this we are referred to by Mr. Moitra to the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of Administrator-General of Bengal v. Juggeswar Roy ILR 3 Cal. Against this we are referred to by Mr. Moitra to the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of Administrator-General of Bengal v. Juggeswar Roy ILR 3 Cal. 102 (P. C.) (1877) and our attention has been drawn to a passage where the learned Judges quote from an observation of Lord Westbury made in the case of Tennent v. Tennents L.R. 2 Sc. & Div. 6 (1870), Lord Westbury says this: The transaction having been clearly a real one, it is impugned by the Appellant on the ground that he parted with valuable property for a most inadequate consideration. It is true that there is an equity which may be founded upon gross inadequacy of consideration, but it can only be where the inadequacy is such as to involve the conclusion that the party either did not understand what he was about, or was the victim of some imposition. 14. The rule laid down by Lord Westbury was in no way different from what was laid down in 1804 in the case which we have just cited. That this is the true position is made clear from another passage at page 197 of the report. That passage is: Independently, however, of the consideration, it cannot be said that the purchase money was so grossly inadequate that its inadequacy amounts to proof of an imposition upon the Plaintiff. 15. We have no doubt, having regard to all these circumstances that in this case, the Plaintiff was imposed upon and that he was really made to execute the kobala only for the Akra and not the share of the 5 Taluks. 16. A question might arise as to the terms on which this transaction should be set aside. The Court of first instance has come to the conclusion that the consideration of Rs. 625 did pass although the account books were not produced. We see no reason to dissent from the decision of that Court, on this part of the case. The result is that the decree of the Subordinate Judge is set aside and the Plaintiff--suit is decreed and the deed of sale is set aside and possession must be restored to the present Plaintiff on condition that the Plaintiff do pay to the Defendant the sum of rupees six hundred and twenty five. The result is that the decree of the Subordinate Judge is set aside and the Plaintiff--suit is decreed and the deed of sale is set aside and possession must be restored to the present Plaintiff on condition that the Plaintiff do pay to the Defendant the sum of rupees six hundred and twenty five. The Plaintiff is entitled to half the costs he has incurred in this Court and in the Court below. This sum of Rs. 625 will be set off as against costs recoverable by the Plaintiff from the Defendants and the balance if any will be paid by the Plaintiff. Patterson, J. I agree.