JUDGMENT R.C. Mitter, J. - This Rule has been obtained by the Defendant and is directed against the decree of the Small Causes Court Judge, Chandpur, in the District of Tipperah. Two questions were raised in the lower Court by the Petitioner, viz., (1) that the claim is barred by limitation and (2) that the learned Munsif had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 2. At the date of the suit the Defendant was residing at a place called Chaparmukh in Assam. The promissory note on which the suit has been brought was also executed at the aforesaid place. The Plaintiff, however, gave evidence to the fact that the Defendant had promised to repay him at Chandpur. This evidence has been accepted. I do not see, accordingly, how the question of jurisdiction can be successfully raised by the Defendant. 3. What is called the question of limitation arises in this way: the Defendant admittedly borrowed Rs. 150 from the Plaintiff on the 26th November, 1927. On that date he executed a promissory note in favour of the Plaintiff. On the 25th November, 1981, the Defendant executed another promissory note in favour of the Plaintiff. It is admitted that the last-mentioned promissory note was executed not for cash consideration but for the loan which the Defendant took from the Plaintiff on the 26th November, 1927. The suit was instituted on the 24th November, 1934, i.e., within three years, or just within three years of the last promissory note. But the last promissory note was executed just four years after the previous promissory note. 4. Mr. Dutt contends that the second promissory note is not a contract within the meaning of sec. 25 of the Indian Contract Act; that at the date of the execution the claim for the money lent had already become barred' by limitation, and that inasmuch there is no express promise to pay a barred debt by the document dated the 25th November, 1931, the agreement made therein is not a contract and cannot be enforced in law. 5. The learned Small Causes Court Judge, in overruling this plea, relied on the case of Prahlad Prasad v. Bhagwan Das ILR 49 All. 496 (1927). In that case the Allahabad High Court held that there need not be an express promise for the purpose of attracting the provisions of sec. 25, sub-sec. (3) of the Indian Contract Act. Mr. 5. The learned Small Causes Court Judge, in overruling this plea, relied on the case of Prahlad Prasad v. Bhagwan Das ILR 49 All. 496 (1927). In that case the Allahabad High Court held that there need not be an express promise for the purpose of attracting the provisions of sec. 25, sub-sec. (3) of the Indian Contract Act. Mr. Dutt says that that decision is not correct and is against a series of decisions of this Court. Sub-sec. (3) is in these terms:- An agreement made without consideration is void unless it is a promise, made in writing and signed by the person to be charged therewith, or by his agent generally or specially authorised in that behalf, to pay wholly or in part a debt of which the creditor might hare enforced payment but for the law of limitation of suits. 6. The matter was fully considered by Mr. Justice Suhrawardy and Mr. Justice Jack in the case of Sashi Kanta Acharya, Chowdhury v. Sonaulla Munshi ILR 57 Cal. 394: S.C. 33 C.W.N. 965 (1929). In that case Mr. Justice Suhrawardy pointed out that there is a clear distinction between " an acknowledgment" as defined in sec. 19 of the Limitation Act and " a promise to pay " as mentioned in sec. 25 (3) of the Contract Act. He says that if a document is made beyond the period of limitation, that document would amount to a contract if there is an express promise to pay. A similar view has been taken by Mr. Justice Buckland in the case of Satya Ketu Dutt v. Ramesh Chandra Sen 37 C.W.N. 326 (1932). In view of these decisions of this Court, I am bound to hold that in order that sec. 25 (3) of the Contract Act may be invoked, there must be in the document itself an express promise to pay. A loan no doubt implies a promise to repay, and if in a document there is an admission of a loan, it may be that there is an implied promise to repay. But the document which contains mere admission of a loan is not a document which comes within sec. 25 (3) of the Contract Act. In the above mentioned cases which came up before this Court, the documents which were sued upon contained no express promise. But the document which contains mere admission of a loan is not a document which comes within sec. 25 (3) of the Contract Act. In the above mentioned cases which came up before this Court, the documents which were sued upon contained no express promise. In the case of Sashi Kanta v. Sonaulla Munshi ILR 67 Cal. 394: S.C. 33 C.W.N. 965 (1929) an account was signed and the debtor made an endorsement to this effect:- I remain liable to the Sarkar (meaning thereby the Plaintiff) for the sum of RB. 412-7-3. 7. In the case of Satya Ketu Dutt v. Ramesh Chandra Sen 37 C.W.N. 326 (1932) the letter by the debtor was in these terms:- I have been expecting yon for some time, I am quite willing to renew the note. Come and see me with it either to-morrow or on Monday. Phone me beforehand. 8. In the documents which the Court had to consider in these cases, there was no express promise to pay the Plaintiff, but there was a mere acknowledgment of a debt. 9. In the case, however, which I have before me, there is an express promise to pay in the document. The only defect in the document is that there is no clear reference to the previous loan of 1927. But by oral evidence the said loan has been connected with the document dated the 25th November, 1931. 10. Mr. Dutt has argued before me that in order that a document may come within the provisions of sec. 25 (3), it must recite the details of the loan and must state that the promise is to pay a debt which was already barred. In my judgment that is not necessary. If there is an express promise to pay a sum of money which is connected with the barred debt by evidence dehors the document, that is quite sufficient. Oral evidence is admissible for the purpose of connecting the express promise to pay with the previous loan. 11. In this view of the mater and inasmuch as there is a finding of the Court below that the promissory note of the 25th November, 1931, related to the loan which the Defendant had taken from the Plaintiff on the 25th November, 1927, I hold that the document sued upon is a contract and can be enforced. 11. In this view of the mater and inasmuch as there is a finding of the Court below that the promissory note of the 25th November, 1931, related to the loan which the Defendant had taken from the Plaintiff on the 25th November, 1927, I hold that the document sued upon is a contract and can be enforced. The Rule is, therefore, discharged with costs, hearing fee one gold mohur follows: