JUDGMENT Panckridge, J. - This is an application on behalf of some of the Defendants to set aside an ex parte order made by me on August 15th, 1935, for the appointment of a receiver in execution. The decree was made on July 11th, 1935, the suit being a suit on a mortgage and the plaint containing a prayer for personal decree against the Defendants. At the hearing the Defendants drew my attention to the provisions of sec. 68 of the Transfer of Property Act. I need not set out at any length the way in which I dealt with the submissions of the Defendants with regard to that section, but the upshot of the matter was that this aspect of the case was concluded by an expression on the part of the Plaintiff of his willingness to abandon his mortgage security. 2. From the wording of the decree it appears that the Plaintiff not only abandoned his mortgage security, but undertook at his own costs to execute and register a deed of release in respect of the mortgaged property in favour of the Defendants, and return to them the documents relating to the security. On these terms a money decree was passed for a sum of Rs. 24,634-5-6 pies. 3. On August 15th, 1935, an application was made for the appointment of a receiver in execution of certain immovable properties in the Districts of Manbhum and Ranchi. I am informed that some of these properties had been comprised in the mortgaged security and that others had not. I made the order and appointed the Official Receiver, receiver of the properties. 4. On August 23rd, the Defendants gave notice of the present application, and pending the hearing, the execution of my order has been stayed by consent of parties. 5. Mr. Majumdar has raised several points of interest on behalf of the Defendants; for example, he points out that the Plaintiff has not as yet executed the deed of release contemplated by the decree, and he submits that the execution of that deed is a condition precedent to any form of execution whatever. The answer to that argument appears to me to be that the decree does not specifically make execution of the deed a condition precedent to enforcing the decree, and I see no justification for reading such a provision into the decree. The answer to that argument appears to me to be that the decree does not specifically make execution of the deed a condition precedent to enforcing the decree, and I see no justification for reading such a provision into the decree. If the Defendants desire to compel execution of the deed there are appropriate means by which they can attain their object. 6. Mr. Majumdar has also suggested that there are various technical defects in the application for execution, but I do not feel called upon to deal with his submissions with regard to such alleged defects, because the main grounds on which the application is based are the judgments of this Court in Pramathanath Malia v. H. V. Low & Co. ILR 57 Cal. 964: S.C. 34 C.W.N. 238 (1929) and Hemendranath Ray Chaudhury v. Prakashchandra Ghosh ILR 59 Cal. 205: S.C. 35 C.W.N. 1066 (1931). These judgments contain observations regarding the general principles by which the Court should be guided in exercising its discretion in appointing receivers in execution of immovable property outside the jurisdiction. 7. Mr. Khaitan has addressed an ingenious argument to me, in which he submits that the language of Or. 21, r. 24, sub-r. (1), following upon the language Or. 21, r. 17, sub-r. 4, makes it obligatory upon the Court to assist the decree-holder by ordering execution in the manner which the decree-holder finds most satisfactory, unless either there is a cause to the contrary within the meaning of rule 24, by which, he says, is meant matters which the Code itself mentions as being causes to the contrary, or unless, in the case of a receiver, there is something, in the particular circumstarces of the case, as for example, a very great disparity between the value of a property, of which the Receiver is sought, and the amount of the decree, which it is desired to execute, which renders such a mode of execution unduly harsh. 8. I am not concerned to say whether, apart from the authorities, I should be disposed to assent to the various restrictions which the reported cases impose upon the appointment of receivers in execution. But at the same time I cannot lose sight of the fact that under Or. 40, r. 1 the Court is only entitled to appoint a receiver at al', when it is just and convenient. 9. But at the same time I cannot lose sight of the fact that under Or. 40, r. 1 the Court is only entitled to appoint a receiver at al', when it is just and convenient. 9. The case of Pramathanath Malia v. H. V. Low & Co. ILR 57 Cal. 964: S.C. 34 C.W.N. 238 (1929) recognises that this Court has jurisdiction to appoint receivers in execution of property outside the jurisdiction, but it lays down that when a receiver is sought for the purposes of sale, the ordinary course to be followed is to make an application in execution to the Court, within whose jurisdiction the property is situate. The learned Judges. Rankin, C. J. and C. C. Ghose, J., also emphasise that it is the duty of the Court on the Original Side to be both careful and sparing in the exercise of its powers to make such appointments. In Hemen-dranath Ray Chaudhury v. Prakash Chandra Ghose ILR 59 Cal. 205: S.C. 35 C.W.N. 1066 (1931), which is a judgment on the Appellate Side by Mukerji and Guha, JJ., the Court appeared to be disposed, in considering what is just and convenient, to apply the principles formerly applied in England. The Court further held that the cases decided under the old Code are not to be disregarded, because they lay down principles of equity which may be regarded as principles of universal application. 10. In my opinion, it may fairly be deduced from these cases that if the judgment-debtor objects to the appointment of a receiver in execution, and if there is a reasonable chance of the decree-holder being able to satisfy the decree by means of attachment and sale, he should be relegated to that remedy. 11. Now, with regard to the circumstances of the present case the question which of the two modes of execution is the more desirable, depends to my mind on the chances which the judgment-creditor has of realising his decree if the properties of which the receiver has been appointed are attached and sold in the ordinary way. 12. 11. Now, with regard to the circumstances of the present case the question which of the two modes of execution is the more desirable, depends to my mind on the chances which the judgment-creditor has of realising his decree if the properties of which the receiver has been appointed are attached and sold in the ordinary way. 12. With regard to nine of these properties there is an agreement between the parties of July 22nd, 1933, wherein it is admitted by the Defendants that these 9 properties have proved to be unsaleable, and therefore the creditors who were at one time intended to be paid out of the sale proceeds of these properties still remain unpaid. 13. There are no materials before me which lead me to think that the situation has changed in any way since the date of the agreement. Accordingly, the appointment of a receiver with regard to those properties still holds good and he will take possession in terms of my order of the 15th of August. 14. With regard to the remaining 24 properties, I think that the parties should have an opportunity of showing what the situation with regard to them is. I, therefore, adjourn this application as regards those properties until the 3rd Monday after the Christmas Vacation. The parties have undertaken to give inspection of the title deeds in their possession of the various properties and I have directed the Defendants to file their affidavits by the 1st Monday after the vacation and the Plaintiffs will file their affidavits in opposition by the 2nd Monday after the vacation. If the Defendants wish to file affidavits in reply they will do so by the Friday before the day to which I have adjourned the application. The interim order with regard to the properties in the hands of Mr. Majumdars clients will continue. Costs of application are reserved.