JUDGMENT Sulaiman C.J. and Bennet, J. - This is a Plaintiff's appeal arising out of a suit for sale on the basis of a mortgage-deed, dated the 17th August, 1924, executed by Bhagvvan Singh and Jaswant Singh in favour of Khetpal and Baru Ram for Rs. 44,000 payable in six years, carrying interest at 7 annas per cent, per mensem compoundable every year. The Plaintiff has purchased the rights of the mortgagees under a sale-deed, dated the 30th September, 1932. The defendants to the suit are Bhagwan Singh, Bisheshar Singh alias Bishambhar Singh and Partap Singh, sons of Jaswant Singh deceased. The vendor of the Plaintiff as well as two other persons, one of whom was said to have been a subsequent transferee but who claimed to be a prior mortgagee, were also impleaded. The Plaintiff merely alleged that this amount had been taken by the mortgagors and that the Defendant No. 1 is himself liable to pay the amount, and that Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 are the heirs of Jaswant Singh deceased and are in possession of the property and liable to pay the amount. The ages of the two minor Defendants were given in the plaint which suggested that they were at the most 11 or 12 years of age. Bhagwan Singh, the executant, filed a separate written statement in which he alleged that two items of the money which formed the original consideration were entirely fictitious and were never paid at the time of the registration. In paragraph 5 of his written statement he asserted that Rs. 6,221-8-0 said to have been paid in 1892 was not paid at all. There was no specific mention of any sum of Rs. 2,000 which was borrowed under a bond in the same year. The minor Defendants filed a separate written statement through a Vakil who was their guardian ad litem and simply denied the execution of the document and its consideration. As the pleadings were vague the Plaintiff filed several applications for further particulars and after some delay the pleader for Bhagwan Singh made a statement on the 25th February, 1923, that his client's signature had been made on a blank stamped paper and that he did not get the document registered though he had signed the bond before the Registrar. As the pleadings were vague the Plaintiff filed several applications for further particulars and after some delay the pleader for Bhagwan Singh made a statement on the 25th February, 1923, that his client's signature had been made on a blank stamped paper and that he did not get the document registered though he had signed the bond before the Registrar. He also admitted that Bhagwan Singh had given notice till then to the Plaintiff as regards the want of consideration, but stated that out of the bond in suit not a single pice had been paid to his client and that his client had also executed the document of 1910 but executed the bond without consideration. 2. The learned Subordinate Judge has decreed the claim in part and has disallowed part of the claim holding that the two items in dispute had not been proved to have been actually paid. 3. The evidence which the Plaintiff led in support of his claim was as follows: 4. On the 22nd July, 1892, there was the original mortgage deed executed by Durjan Sal, who was the father of Bhagwan Singh and the great-grandfather of the contesting Defendants Nos. 2 and 3, their father being Jaswant Singh. In this document there was a clear recital that the full consideration had been received. The sum of Rs. 6,221-8 was admitted before the Sub-Registrar as having been received under two promissory notes which were returned to the executant in his presence. A sum of Rs. 18,778-8 was paid in cash before the Sub-Registrar. On the same date another bond was registered under which the whole sum of Rs. 2,000 was paid in cash in the presence of the Sub-Registrar who made an endorsement oh the deed to that effect. 5. On the 26th April, 1895, Durjan Singh, the mortgagor, executed a fresh document for a sum of Rs. 30,000 in favour of Khetpal, son of the previous mortgagee who had died by that time. In this there was a clear recital that he had allowed credit to the mortgagee on account of the principal and interest due under the bond, dated the 22nd July, 1892, executed by him, of which the principal amounted to Rs. 25,000 and interest was Rs. 3,785. In this there was a clear recital that he had allowed credit to the mortgagee on account of the principal and interest due under the bond, dated the 22nd July, 1892, executed by him, of which the principal amounted to Rs. 25,000 and interest was Rs. 3,785. There was a further admission that he had allowed credit towards the amount Of the simple bond, dated the 22nd July, 1892, executed by him, amounting to Rs. 1,215. There was no suggestion whatsoever that any part of the amounts due under the mortgage deed and the bond of 1892 was fictitious or had not been paid to the executant. Before the Sub-Registrar also Durjan Sal admitted the execution and completion of the bond and acknowledged receipt of the entire amount entered therein. The two previous bonds were completely set off by virtue of this second mortgage deed and the original mortgage deed and the bonds were returned by the mortgagee to the executant in the presence of the Sub-Registrar and the Sub-Registrar has made a note in the endorsement to that effect. It is therefore quite clear that Durjan Sal again admitted that he had borrowed the sums of money under the two previous documents, that they were due, that he hid renewed his liability by executing a fresh bond, and he took back the previous documents. 'After this 'Durjan Sal died. We find that on the 29th July, 1910, Durjan Sal's son Bhagwan Singh and his grandson Jaswant Singh (the father of Jaswant Singh namely Sheobaran Singh being admittedly dead by that time) executed a fresh bond for Rs. 65,000 in favour of Khetpal. In this both Bhagwan Singh and Jaswant Singh admitted the validity of the document executed by Durjan Sal on the 26th April, 1895, for Rs. 30,000 and also admitted their liability to pay the whole amount and even mentioned that the mortgagee was making a pressing demand for the payment of the money and that they were at that time unable to make any arrangement for it. They accordingly agreed to get the document renewed by them. The old document was therefore renewed. It may also be mentioned that by that time the new Limitation Act had come into force and under it the 10th August, 1910, had been fixed as the last date for the institution of suits for sale on a mortgage. They accordingly agreed to get the document renewed by them. The old document was therefore renewed. It may also be mentioned that by that time the new Limitation Act had come into force and under it the 10th August, 1910, had been fixed as the last date for the institution of suits for sale on a mortgage. While that date was about to expire the renewal of the old mortgage deed was made and the hypothecation bond was executed on the 29th July, 1910. It is quite obvious that if Bhagwan Singh and Jaswant Singh had any apprehension in their minds that any part of the previous mortgage debt was not due they would not have readily agreed to renew the deed and thereby admitted their liability to pay the whole amount with interest. 6. Thereafter we find that on numerous occasions on behalf of the Defendants* family part payments of the mortgage debt were made and registered receipts obtained without any protest and without any suggestion that any part of the mortgage debts was fictitious or that consideration had not passed. On the 9th August, 1912, there was a receipt for Rs. 6,000 executed by Khetpal in favour of Bhagwan Singh and Jaswant Singh. Rs. 6,000 were paid in cash by the mortgagee in the presence of the Sub-Registrar to the general attorney of the mortgagors and an endorsement to that effect was made by the Sub-Registrar. There was a recital in the receipt that the Rs. 6,000 formed part of the interest and compound interest due under the hypothecation bond for Rs. 65,000 dated 29th July, 1910. 7. Again on the 28th January, 1913, a sum of Rs. 18,479-14-6 was paid to Khetpal by Bhagwan Singh through his general attorney Dongar Singh and a receipt was obtained from Khetpal. This receipt also recited that this sum of money formed part of the amount due under the document for Rs. 65,000. There was a clear specification of the receipt of the amount and it was specifically mentioned that Rs. 17,000 was "out of Rs. 65,000 the principal due under the document aforesaid" and there was interest which remained outstanding amounting to Rs. 1,004-2-6. The amount was paid in cash before the Sub-Registrar and an endorsement was made to that effect. 65,000. There was a clear specification of the receipt of the amount and it was specifically mentioned that Rs. 17,000 was "out of Rs. 65,000 the principal due under the document aforesaid" and there was interest which remained outstanding amounting to Rs. 1,004-2-6. The amount was paid in cash before the Sub-Registrar and an endorsement was made to that effect. There was no suggestion in this that any amount was fictitious and indeed it looks as if the interest had been calculated on the footing that the whole amount had been due. 8. We then have another receipt, dated the 19th of May, 1915, under which a sum of Rs. 14,413-5 0 was paid to Khetpal and a receipt taken from him. The amount was paid by Bhagwan Singh through his general attorney Sheobans Rai. In this also there is a recital that Rs. 7,000 principal were "out of Rs. 48,000 principal." The balance was paid on account of interest from 29th July, 1912, to 18th May, 1915. A simple calculation would show that this would be the interest on the entire amount of Rs. 48,000 which had remained outstanding. There was again no suggestion that any part of this had been fictitious. 9. Lastly we come to another receipt, dated the 15th January, 1917, under which Rs. 7,398-9-6 were paid by Bhagwan Singh through his karinda Misri Lal and a receipt was obtained from Khetpal. Here again there was a clear recital that Rs. 5,000 was paid "out of Rs. 41,000, the remaining amount of principal." In addition there was interest paid from the 19th May, 1915, to the 18th May, 1916, on the remaining km of Rs. 41,000 amounting to Rs. 2,152-8-0 and also compound interest and interest for a later payment. Again the interest was calculated on the whole amount outstanding without the least suggestion that any part of it was fictitious. These receipts were in the form of registered documents and were obtained at the time when cash was actually paid on behalf of Bhagwan Singh by his general attorneys and karindas. It is impossible to believe that the karindas and the general attorneys would not have examined the contents of these receipts before accepting them. 10. These receipts were in the form of registered documents and were obtained at the time when cash was actually paid on behalf of Bhagwan Singh by his general attorneys and karindas. It is impossible to believe that the karindas and the general attorneys would not have examined the contents of these receipts before accepting them. 10. The Plaintiff was therefore able to show that not only was there an acknowledgment of the receipt of consideration by Durjan Sal in 1892 but that there was a further acknowledgment and a renewal of the mortgage-deed in 1895 by Durjan Sal and that again his son Bhagwan Singh and his grandson Jaswant Singh renewed the mortgage in 1910, and Bhagwan Singh on numerous occasions made payments in part towards the mortgage-debt due without any protest. One would have thought that the evidence of this kind when produced for the Plaintiff would be considered overwhelming and no further evidence would be necessary to establish the Plaintiff's claim. 11. The learned Subordinate Judge however has discarded the previous acknowledgments as being wholly inadmissible against the minor Defendants and has also not attached any weight (o the certificates of the Sub-Registrar on the back of these documents. 12. Now u/s 58(c) of the Registration Act it is the duty of the registering officer to endorse any payment of money or delivery of goods made in his presence, and any admission of receipt of consideration in whole or in part made in his presence. S. 60(2) provides that such certificate shall be admissible for the purpose of proving that the facts mentioned in the endorsements referred to in Section 59 occurred as therein mentioned. There can, therefore, be no doubt that the certificates of the Sub-Registrar that Durjan Sal had acknowledged the receipt of the consideration and that in his presence the previous promissory notes on which the sum of Rs. 6,221-tf-0 was said to have been due were returned to the mortgagor and also that Rs. 2,000 were actually paid in cash under the second bond were admissible to prove these facts. They are admissible not only against the original executant but also against the present Defendants and the certificates dispense with the necessity of producing the Sub-Registrar as a witness even if he be alive now. 2,000 were actually paid in cash under the second bond were admissible to prove these facts. They are admissible not only against the original executant but also against the present Defendants and the certificates dispense with the necessity of producing the Sub-Registrar as a witness even if he be alive now. Similarly all the other endorsements on the subsequent bonds and registered receipts are equally admissible and should not have been summarily ignored. 13. We now come to the question whether the acknowledgments made by the great-grandfather, grand-uncle and the father of the Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 are admissible. It may be conceded at once that so far as recitals as to the existence of legal necessity contained in a mortgage-deed executed by adult members who borrow the money are concerned, the other members should not be held to be bound by them when they are contesting the validity of the mortgage-deed itself. In such a case the interest of the mortgagors and the contesting members cannot be regarded as identical. But where a managing member is not himself raising any loan, but is renewing an older bond, particularly if that was executed by an ancestor, his acknowledgment is obviously made on behalf of the entire family, as their interest is identical. Taking the entire series of the previous documents extending for over a period of 40 years it is impossible to reject all the admissions made by the great grandfather, the grand-uncle as well as the father of the Defendants Nos. 2 and 3. As distinct from the existence of legal necessity, the question of the passing of consideration is one which would be best known to the persons concerned, or at any rate would be known better during the period shortly following the execution of the document rather than now. We find that Durjan Sal admitted the receipt of consideration and he received back two promissory notes before the Sub-Registrar. Prima faice there would be no need for the Plaintiff to prove anything further than the certificate of the Sub-Registrar which would be sufficient to establish that Durjan Sal had received a sum of Rs. 6,221-8-0 and also Rs. 2,000 from Bhojraj in 1892. Similarly his further admission in 1895 before the Sub-Registrar when he renewed the document would in our opinion be admissible against his great-grand-children who are now disputing the passing of the consideration itself. 6,221-8-0 and also Rs. 2,000 from Bhojraj in 1892. Similarly his further admission in 1895 before the Sub-Registrar when he renewed the document would in our opinion be admissible against his great-grand-children who are now disputing the passing of the consideration itself. Bhagwan Singh himself was in the best position to know whether he had received the entire consideration and we are entitled to presume that he would never have renewed the old mortgages for the full amount unless he had received the full consideration. He did not protest and did not contest his having received the full amount. The admissions made by Bhagwan Singh, his son, and Jaswant Singh, his grandson, stand in our opinion on a strong footing. By this time a long period had elapsed and if these persons had the slightest suspicion that any part of the amount previously admitted by Durjan Sal was fictitious they would have been the last persons to admit liability for the same and in our opinion would have immediately repudiated their liability. They were at that time in a position to know better whether the debts were in fact due and having acknowledged their liability to pay the same we think that their admissions are admissible against the Defendants minors because at the time when they made the acknowledgments their interest was not in any way adverse to that of their grand-nephews and grandsons. It: is very significant that Bhagwan Singh and Jaswant Singh when they were renewing the previous mortgage-deed executed by Durjan Sal did not receive a single pie as any fresh consideration. They merely renewed the document because if they had not done so it was almost certain that the mortgagee would bring a suit on the bond before the limitation expired on the 10th August, 1910. In renewing the mortgage-deed and admitting liability they were obviously acting in the interest of the whole family and were making an admission on their own behalf and on behalf of the other members of the family including any minor sons even if one were in existence at the time and against whom they had no adverse interest whatsoever. We think that an acknowledgment of such a kind in the form of a renewal of a mortgage-deed so as to postpone the institution of the suit is admissible in evidence against the minor Defendants particularly if they were born subsequently. We think that an acknowledgment of such a kind in the form of a renewal of a mortgage-deed so as to postpone the institution of the suit is admissible in evidence against the minor Defendants particularly if they were born subsequently. Furthermore, the subsequent conduct of Bhagwan Singh in making part payments towards the debts and obtaining registration receipts would also go to show that he being the head and the manager of the family had been admitting the validity of the mortgages and had been making payments from time to time in order to reduce the mortgage debt. So far as the third parties are concerned the head of a joint Hindu family is the agent of the family and must be deemed to have acted on behalf of the whole family. Bhagwan Singh's acknowledgment was not in respect of any debt contracted by himself. He was acknowledging a debt which had been incurred by his father Durjan Sal. He as well as his sons and other members of the family were on the same footing and were all equally entitled to challenge and repudiate that debt which Bhagwan Singh as head of the family failed to do but rather accepted and acknowledged it. 14. The learned Subordinate Judge has been considerably influenced by certian rulings which were cited before him and were obviously distinguishable. The case of AIR 1930 130 (Lahore) had followed an earlier Full Bench ruling of that Court in AIR 1929 397 (Lahore) which had relied on a ruling of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Kir pal Singh v. Bulwant Singh (1913) 40 Cal. 283 (P. C.). It would however be obvious that before their Lordships the point urged at the bar was as to whether the alienation was governed by the customary law of the Punjab or by the strict Hindu Law, and at page 295 their Lordships pointed out that the payment of a just debt by the male proprietor of lands to which the custom applied is a necessity for which he can validly as against the reversioners alienate ancestral lands. These cases proceeded on the customary law of the Punjab under which certain conditions are laid down before an alienation of a land by an agriculturist can validly take place. These cases proceeded on the customary law of the Punjab under which certain conditions are laid down before an alienation of a land by an agriculturist can validly take place. In the case governed by the strict Hindu Law it is not incumbent on the Plaintiff to prove anything more than that there was in fact an antecedent debt which was paid off. It is not necessary to show that that debt was reasonable or for legal necessity. The burden is on the minor sons impugning this debt to show that it was unjust, being either illegal or immoral. The case of Janki Das v. Ahmad Husain Khan (1902) 25 All. 159, was a case where the sons were parties to the suit brought on the foot of the original mortgage deed itself and it was held that they were entitled to put the Plaintiff to the proof of the passing of the consideration and that a finding against the Plaintiff could be availed of by the mortgagor also though he was only a pro forma Defendant. That case is obviously distinguishable. Similarly the case of Tirbeni Pershad v. Ram Narain (1913) A L J 71, was a case where the recital had been made by the very person who had wrongfully made the transfer and it was held by a learned Judge of this Court that the recitals in such a document executed by the very man who according to the other Defendants had been attempting to defraud them could not be used as evidence against the latter. In the case of Arjun v. Chhagan Lal (1923) 72 Ind. Oas. 1044 (Nag.), it was merely held that in a suit on a mortgage brought against the father the sons cannot reopen a decree against him except on the ground that the debt for which the mortgage was given was not binding on them under the Hindu Law, that is to say, had been either illegal or immoral. It was of course laid down that if there was no consideration then it would not be binding on the sons. It was of course laid down that if there was no consideration then it would not be binding on the sons. Thus the cases relied upon by the learned Subordinate Judge do not entitle us to hold that all the previous recitals and acknowledgments as well as the admissions made before the Sub-Registrar extending over a period of nearly forty years are altogether inadmissible against the Defendants who were born in 1917 or thereafter. We would emphasise again that the acknowledgments and admissions made by Bhagwan Singh and Jaswant Singh are not admissions made by persons who had borrowed the money and were themselves responsible for the original alienation but they were made by persons who were on the same footing as the contesting Defendants, having a common interest with them. We see no reason why Bhagwan Singh as the head of the family should not make an admission which would be evidence against the other members of the family in respect of a transaction for which he himself had not been responsible. 15. It seems to us that in view of this evidence the burden lay heavily on the Defendants to establish that in point of fact part of the consideration had not passed. The learned Counsel for the Respondents has to concede that the only direct evidence of the return of the consideration is that of the witness Ganesh Prasad who stated that Bhojraj had obtained the two documents from Durjan Sal, one for Ks. 2,000 and the other for Ks. 24,000 or Rs. 25,000 and that "the money paid in registration remained with Bhray Bhojraj for the litigation of Ishri Prasad." He stated that Rs. 2,000 were given by the Sub Registrar to Thakur Sahib who admitted having received the money in full, contained in two bags which were placed on the board by Bhojraj. It is important to note that Ganesh Prasad's statement was not only in regard to the sum of Rs. 2,000 but was in regard to the entire sum paid on account of these two bonds in 1892 before the Sub-Registrar. The learned Subordinate Judge has himself found that Rs. 18,000 and odd were paid and they were not returned. In that way he has disbelieved Ganesh Prasad's evidence. 2,000 but was in regard to the entire sum paid on account of these two bonds in 1892 before the Sub-Registrar. The learned Subordinate Judge has himself found that Rs. 18,000 and odd were paid and they were not returned. In that way he has disbelieved Ganesh Prasad's evidence. We may also mention that Ganesh Prasad came out with the story that this money had remained with Bhojraj on account of the litigation of Ishri Prasad. This was not the case put forward in the written statement by Bhagwan Singh or any of the Defendants and it was a case which was developed later in the evidence and which was rejected by the learned Subordinate Judge himself. As to the litigation he has remarked that in his view the Defendants' contention fails not only because there was no such plea taken in the written statement about Ishri Prasad's litigation and Bhagwan Singh's financing him and that this was quite a new element very likely due to the later developments in the evidence, but also because the plaint as originally filed had been returned for presentation at Mainpuri and was filed again in 1894 and the suit was decided in 1898 whereas Bhojraj had died long before that time, viz., in 1893. It is on these grounds that he rejected the plea of speculative litigation altogether as being quite fantastical. We may also note that he has similarly rejected the Defendants' theory of there being prostitutes, drinking and the holding of jalsas and he did not accept such a story on the laboured evidence of the Defendants' own old attachees. He has altogether rejected the Defendant's theory in so far as the bulk of the sum of Rs. 18,778 is concerned. His findings as regards the other points are based on certain suspicious circumstances on which he had placed great reliance. His first ground is that it is highly improbable that two documents one for Rs. 25,000 and the other for Rs. 2,000 should have been executed separately and not as one document. The obvious explanation was that the document for Rs. 25,000 was a mortgage-deed payable in seven years under which immoveable property was hypothecated whereas the bond was a simple money bond for Rs, 2,000 which was payable in two years. It was therefore not necessary that both transactions should have been embodied in one document. The obvious explanation was that the document for Rs. 25,000 was a mortgage-deed payable in seven years under which immoveable property was hypothecated whereas the bond was a simple money bond for Rs, 2,000 which was payable in two years. It was therefore not necessary that both transactions should have been embodied in one document. Indeed, they could not be if there was to be security for one and not for the other and if the periods for payment of the two were quite different. No doubt Khetpal the vendor of the Plaintiff when examined put forward two explanations which cannot be accepted and have been rejected by the Court below. His explanation was that there was no talk about the borrowing of the additional sum of Rs. 2,000 when the mortgage-deed was executed but a message was sent later and the mortgagee took with him the additional amount and paid it when the second deed was executed. The learned Subordinate Judge has pointed out that both these documents were executed and registered on the same day. Accordingly unless Khetpal meant to say that there was no talk about the advance of Rs. 2,000 when the transaction of the mortgage-debt was settled he must be wrong. It may be noted that Khetpal is an old man who gave his age as 60 and yet in his examination he stated that he attained discretion 20 or 22 years, again said 24 or 25 years before 1933, that is to say, about 1908. If this were the fact he would not remember what happened in 1892. Khetpal was a "person who was described in para. 5 of the Defendants' written statement as one who had been a victim to many bad habits and had ruined himself. His daughter-in-law Mst. Gopi Kuar said that it was on account of sorrow and grief that he had become so otherwise he was all right and that he could not recognise men and that on account of grief he was not in a sound state of mind. Khetpal himself has said that he had become blind and was not able to read having lost his sight three or four years before. The Plaintiff therefore cannot be held responsible for the puerile explanation offered by Khetpal which cannot be accepted. Khetpal himself has said that he had become blind and was not able to read having lost his sight three or four years before. The Plaintiff therefore cannot be held responsible for the puerile explanation offered by Khetpal which cannot be accepted. Admittedly the deed was executed in favour of Khetpal's father Bhojraj and it was Bhojraj who was carrying on money-lending business at the time. 16. The second point on which great emphasis has been laid is that the Plaintiff has failed to produce Khetpal's account books. A presumption is accordingly drawn that the entries in them must be against the Plaintiff. It has been assumed that as Bhojraj was carrying on money-lending business account books must have existed in 1892 and also in 1933, and that it was the duty of the Plaintiff to produce them and that not having done so every presumption should be raised against the Plaintiff. 17. The learned Counsel for the Respondents has relied strongly on the case of Murugesan Pillai v. Manickavasaka Desika Gnana Sambandha Pandara Sanadhi (1917) 40 Mad. 402 (p. C.), and Rameshwar Singh v. Bajit Lal Pathak (1929) 1929 A L J 261 (p. c.). In both these cases their Lordships of the Privy Council were dealing with a case where the Plaintiff had not produced documentary evidence which was in his possession. They were not cases where documentary evidence was in the possession of a third party who could only be summoned as a witness and called upon to produce account books. It may also be pointed out that in the case of Bilas Kuar v. Desraj Ranjit Singh (1915) 37 ALL 557 (p c.), their Lordships pointed out that it is open to a litigant to refrain from producing any documents which he considers irrelevant; and if the opposing litigant is dissatisfied it is for him to apply for an affidavit of documents, and he can so obtain inspection and production of all that appear to him in such affidavit to be relevant and proper. In the present case it was open to the Defendants just as much as to the Plaintiffs to summon the account books from Khetpal if they had been withheld. As a matter of fact Khetpal was examined as a witness and he stated on oath that he had not got any account books at all. In the present case it was open to the Defendants just as much as to the Plaintiffs to summon the account books from Khetpal if they had been withheld. As a matter of fact Khetpal was examined as a witness and he stated on oath that he had not got any account books at all. There was therefore no point in the Plaintiff's omitting to summon these account books from Khetpal when Khetpal was not prepared to admit in the witness box. that the account books existed. These books were not in the possession of the Plaintiffs and they were not to be held responsible for their non-production. The learned Subordinate Judge had some suspicion that probably they were withheld in collusion with the Plaintiffs. Now, no doubt, he was entitled to infer that such account books existed in 189^ in the time of Bhojraj as Bhojraj was carrying on money-lending business. But there was no presumption that the books which existed in 1892 would remain in existence in 1933. The presumption has to be drawn u/s 114, illustrations (d) and (g) and the Court can only presume the existence of a set of things within a period shorter than the period within which such things usually cease to exist. It is impossible to say that usually account books would be preserved for anything like a period of 40 years. One would on the other hand imagine that after the lapse of a decade or two such account books would not be preserved. They may as a matter of fact get destroyed. We are therefore not prepared to draw the presumption against the plaintiffs that Khetpal is telling a deliberate lie in stating that no such books are in existence, and we cannot infer that the books which existed in 1892 are still in existence and have been deliberately withheld not only by Khetpal but by the Plaintiffs, with knowledge of their existence. Khetpal's statement merely was that he did not remember whether his father Bhojraj used to maintain account books. He has said that he does not maintain any account books now because no money-lending business is carried on. On this point he is contradicted by his daughter-in-law who however was born only about 1912 and of course would not be in a position to depose anything as regards the existence of old books in 1892. He has said that he does not maintain any account books now because no money-lending business is carried on. On this point he is contradicted by his daughter-in-law who however was born only about 1912 and of course would not be in a position to depose anything as regards the existence of old books in 1892. We are of opinion that the burden of showing that consideration had passed under the mortgage of 1892 had been discharged by the Plaintiffs and the Defendants did not produce any satisfactory evidence to show that the money was returned to the mortgagee. 18. The learned Judge has remarked that there has been a great delay in the institution of this suit which raised in his mind a suspicion that part of the amount was fictitious and the mortgagee's family were not prepared to file a suit promptly. There seems to be no justification for this suspicion because as pointed out above the mortgages were continuously renewed. The last one was executed in 1924 and was for a period of six years expiring in August, 1930. The mortgagee could not have sued before that date. Soon after he transferred his rights to the present Plaintiffs who filed their suit in November, 1932. We do not think that there has been any such unreasonable delay in the institution of the suit as would raise a suspicion that paid of the mortgage money was fictitious. We have been very much impressed by the circumstance that even alter the death of Durjan Sal who had raised the money the members of his family who were in no way responsible for that loan consistently admitted their liability for this amount and renewed mortgages and made payments towards it. There is absolutely no direct evidence that any part of the consideration was returned except that of Ganesh Prasad already referred to above and there are no circumstances which in our opinion would show that the money was a fictitious item. 19. It has been contended on behalf of the plaintiffs that the Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 not having been born till 19; 7 are not entitled to challenge the alienations made by the members of their family long before their birth. 19. It has been contended on behalf of the plaintiffs that the Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 not having been born till 19; 7 are not entitled to challenge the alienations made by the members of their family long before their birth. No doubt it is well settled that if at the time of an alienation there is a member of a joint Hindu family alive who is entitled to challenge it not being a party to the transaction, then even the subsequently born son would have the same right and would be entitled to challenge the alienation. The learned Subordinate Judge has held that a son of Jaswant Singh was alive in 1910 who was a minor at the time and who was entitled to challenge the mortgage deed of the 29th July, 1910. It may first be pointed out that the mortgige deed of the 29th July, 1910, did not embody any loan transaction at all but was merely a renewal of an earlier mortgage in order to prevent the immediate filing of the suit. Not a single pice was borrowed by the head of the family when this mortgage was renewed. The Defendants therefore are not trying to challenge the mortgage-deed of 29th July, 1910, when one of the members of the family might have been alive, but in substance they are seeking to challenge, the alienation of 1895. 20. We do not consider it necessary to go into the question whether Jaswant singh had a son alive in 1910. The finding of the learned Subordinate Judge is based on vague statements of about six witnesses who stated generally that Jaswant Singh had a son from ten to twelve years of age who died about 10 or 12 years age>. The majority of the witnesses fixed the birth of this son at a time shortly before 1910. It may be pointed out that in the pleadings there had been no indication of the existence of such a son. The Plaintiffs merely gave the ages of the Defendants in the plaint without alleging that they were not entitled to challenge the mortgage-deed. It may be pointed out that in the pleadings there had been no indication of the existence of such a son. The Plaintiffs merely gave the ages of the Defendants in the plaint without alleging that they were not entitled to challenge the mortgage-deed. The Defendants in their written statement put forward various pleas challenging the alienation, but never suggested that there was a son of Jaswant Singh who was alive in 1910 who would be entitled to challenge the alienation, with the result that the Defendants would have the same rights. There was accordingly no issue framed by the Court below as regards the existence of any son in 1910. The Plaintiffs led no evidence on the point and in the cross-examination of their witnesses no question was put in regard to the Defendants' suggestion that there was such a son. After the Plaintiffs' evidence had closed and the Defendants' began, evidence was given to the effect that there was such a son. The very next day the Plaintiffs filed an application objecting to the production of such evidence, but the Court below allowed such evidence to be produced. The result is that the evidence is entirely one-sided. We may however point out that a great many witnesses are not residents of the ancestral village of the Defendants, namely, Jarklii. Not a single witness has been produced to prove the birth of such a son, nor has any birth register or death register been produced, nor have any account-books of the estate been produced to show expenses in connection with birth or death, etc., of such a son. The name of this boy also has not been Durjan Sal for his own benefit caused one Ishri Singh to file a suit and himself bore the expenses, but that although the case was a true one Ishri Singh lost it. The witness said that he had heard that Durjan Sal was to b? a partner in the litigation and was to get a benefit if the suit succeeded. The evidence was purely hearsay, but if true it would only prove that the debt obtained by Durjin Sal was not for any family necessity. It would not establish the case that the object was so illegal and immoral as to vitiate it or make it impossible to constitute an antecedent debt fur a subeequent alienation made by Durjan Sal in 1895. It would not establish the case that the object was so illegal and immoral as to vitiate it or make it impossible to constitute an antecedent debt fur a subeequent alienation made by Durjan Sal in 1895. The other witness relied on is Ganesh Prasad who stated that he was employed in Jarkhi Estate before 1908. His statement was that the entire money showed before the Sub-Registrar had remained with the mortgagee Bhojraj. We have already commented on this evidence. The witness's name does not appear as One of the attesting or identifying witnesses and it cannot be certain that he really was present at the time when the mortgage was executed. His name also does not appear on any of the numerous subsequent occasions when there were renewals or execution of receipts. His statement has already been disbelieved by the Court below as regards the bulk of the amount constituting Rs. 18,000. As regards the Kotla case the learned Subordinate Judge has pointed out that the story appears to be a myth inasmuch as the suit was not refiled till 1891 and not actually started till 1897 and not decided till 1898, Bhojraj had in fact died in 18f3 long before the suit was filed. We may also mention that several documents of the years 1884, 1885, 1886 and 1893 are printed which show that Durjan Sal had been borrowing money for many years. We are accordingly of opinion that the Defendants have failed to prove that the antecedent debt of Durjan Sal was in any way tainted with immorality or illegality. 21. The result is that F. A. No. 460 of 1933 is dismissed with costs and F. A. No. 279 of 1933 is allowed, and modifying the decree of the Court below we decree the Plaintiffs' claim for the entire amount with interest subject to the prior claim of Tula Ram already mentioned. A preliminary decree under Order 34, Rule 4 will be prepared fixing six months from to-day as the time for payment. The Plaintiffs will be entitled to the contractual rate of interest till the date fixed for payment and thereafter simple interest at 6 per cent, till realization. 22. The cross-objection of Tula Ram is allowed in part as regards costs. We direct that the Plaintiffs should be entitled to recover their costs from Defendants Nos. The Plaintiffs will be entitled to the contractual rate of interest till the date fixed for payment and thereafter simple interest at 6 per cent, till realization. 22. The cross-objection of Tula Ram is allowed in part as regards costs. We direct that the Plaintiffs should be entitled to recover their costs from Defendants Nos. 1 to 3, who shall bear their own costs. Tula Ram Defendant shall recover costs on the scale of Rs. 13,000 from the Plaintiffs. The costs will include costs in both Courts. 23. The Court below when dismissing the claim against the contesting Defendants granted a decree for the balance of the amount against Khetpal. Inasmuch as the Plaintiffs are now granted a decree against the mortgagors, we direct that there should be no decree against Khetpal, who will however bear his own costs.