JUDGMENT R.C. Mitter, J. - This is an appeal on behalf of the decree-holders, whose application for execution against the Respondent Renu Pada Shah made on the 7th February, 1933 has been dismissed by the lower Appellate Court. The learned Munsif had allowed the said application. The position is this: the Appellants before me instituted a suit for recovery of money against a person of the name of Mihir Lal Mallick and applied for attachment before judgment of a quantity of paddy which was accordingly brought into the custody of the Court and threshed. Later on, Mihir Lal Mallick made an application to that Court for permission to take away his paddy, but he was asked to furnish security. On that Renupada Shaha stood as surety. In the surety-bond which he executed, he stated that he would be liable for the decretal amount if eventually a decree was passed in favour of the present Appellants and against Mihir Lal Mallick. On the 29th May, 1930, a decree was, in fact, passed against Mihir Lal Mallick. In 1932 the Appellants before me started execution proceedings against the surety, Renu Pada Shaha. The execution case was numbered 12 of 1932 of the first Court of the Subordinate Judge at Howrah. Or. No. 23 in that execution case, which is dated the 29th November, 1932, is in these terms:-- Register the application for execution against surety, filed by the decree-holders to day. Issue notice upon the surety to show cause why the execution should not be allowed to proceed against him, fixing 13-12-32 for orders. Decree-holder is to file requisite written notices in three days positively. On the 13th December, 1932, Renu Pada Shaha, the surety, appeared and on that day the following order was recovered over signature of the Subordinate Judge:-- Surety appears and prays for time for objection, (it must be for filing objection). Decree-holder files requisites for issue of notice under Or. 21, rule 37. Put up on 19th December, 1932. Surety must file objection by that date fixed, otherwise notice will be issued on that date under Or. 21, rule 37. 2. On the 19th December, 1932, the following order was recorded by the Subordinate Judge:-- No steps taken by the/ surety. Issue notice upon him under Or, 21, rule 87, fixing 18-1-33 for return of order. 3. Surety must file objection by that date fixed, otherwise notice will be issued on that date under Or. 21, rule 37. 2. On the 19th December, 1932, the following order was recorded by the Subordinate Judge:-- No steps taken by the/ surety. Issue notice upon him under Or, 21, rule 87, fixing 18-1-33 for return of order. 3. Nothing came out of these execution proceedings with the result that the present execution proceedings were started against the surety on the 7th February, 1933. The finding of the learned Additional District Judge is that the decree-holders did not take out any execution proceeding against the principal judgment-debtor and an application for execution against the principal judgment-debtor would be now barred by limitation. 4. The two contentions of the surety which have been given effect to by the learned Additional District Judge are: First that no notice under sec. 145 of the CPC has been served on the surety at all, the order-sheet recording that such notice had been served being no evidence of service of the said notice. He accordingly held that execution proceedings against the surety were not maintainable. There are certain passages in that judgment which indicate that the learned Additional District Judge was of opinion that on every occasion when execution proceedings are started against surety, notice under sec. 145 is necessary. It would not be necessary for me to decide in this case the last-mentioned proposition of law laid down by the learned Additional District Judge for reasons which I shall state hereafter. But my own view is that law requires one notice to be served on the surety under sec. 145 and if such a notice has been served, other execution proceedings are maintainable against the surety without fresh service of such a notice. The second ground which found favour with the learned Additional District Judge is this: Inasmuch as the execution against the principal judgment-debtor is barred by limitation, the surety has been discharged from his liability. 5. I shall deal with the first point now. It may be quite correct that a mere record in the order-sheet that a notice has been served on a particular person is 110 evidence of service of such notice. To prove service upon him it is necessary to prove the return of service or to examine persons who can speak to the factual service. It may be quite correct that a mere record in the order-sheet that a notice has been served on a particular person is 110 evidence of service of such notice. To prove service upon him it is necessary to prove the return of service or to examine persons who can speak to the factual service. But in this case the position is different. There is an order in the order-sheet, the order being dated 13th December, 1932, which records that the surety did appear in Court in pursuance of a notice under sec. 145 served upon him and he prayed for time to file objections. The fact that a person appeared in Court can be proved by the order recorded in the order-sheet noting appearance. This order the learned Additional District Judge has entirely overlooked and the effect of this order is that the surety had, in fact, been served with a notice under sec. 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure. I do, therefore, reverse the finding of the learned Additional District. Judge that the notice under sec. 145 had not been served upon the surety. 6. On the second point, my judgment is that if the creditor allows his remedy against the principal debtor to be barred by limitation, the surety is not re-leased. Sec. 134 of the Contract Act as also sec. 137 have been interpreted by decisions of this Court as also of other High Courts. The view of this Court as also of High Courts of Bombay and Madras is that in these circumstances the surety is not discharged. No doubt, the Allahabad High Court has taken a different view, but that view has never been accepted by this Court. The barring of remedy by action on account of the lapse of time in respect of a claim to a debt does not extinguish the debt, for the debtor is still under liability to pay the debt. The only thing is that it cannot be enforced by action against him. To take an illustration:--If the debtor pays to the creditor the money due on account of the debt, after the period of limitation on the belief that the period of limitation had not expired, he cannot recover the amount so paid. The only thing is that it cannot be enforced by action against him. To take an illustration:--If the debtor pays to the creditor the money due on account of the debt, after the period of limitation on the belief that the period of limitation had not expired, he cannot recover the amount so paid. The decisions of this Court, as also of the Bombay and Madras High Courts, have the support of a high authority on the law of contract, namely, Sir Frederick Pollock. In his commentary on the Indian Contract Act, he summarises the law at pages 578 and 579 and says that decisions of the Allahabad High Court are wrong and those of the Bombay, Calcutta and Madras High Courts are right and they are supported by the great weight of the English Court of Appeal. In this connection, I would only refer to one judgment of this Court, namely the judgment of Sir Arthur Wilson and Mr. Justice Ghose, in the case of Krishto Kishori Choudhurani v. Radha Romun Munshi ILR 12 Cal. 330 (1885). I accordingly hold that the mere fact that an execution against the principal judgment-debtor has been allowed to be barred by lapse of time is no ground for the release of the surety. The result is that I allow this appeal, set aside the order passed by the learned Additional District Judge, and restore the order passed by the learned Munsif. The net result is that the execution proceedings started against the surety, Renu Pada Shaha, must proceed. The Appellants would have their costs in this Court, as also of the lower Appellate Court, the hearing-fee in this Court being assessed at one gold mohur.