JUDGMENT Jack, J. - In this case, a Rule was issued on the Opposite Party to show cause why an order directing a receiver of an estate to pay Rs. 188 odd on account of decrees which he had negligently allowed to be time-barred should not be set aside on the ground that the Courts below acted without jurisdiction in making the Petitioner liable on a finding of willful neglect at the time of passing his accounts and secondly, that the Court below ought to have held that the application to take accounts against the receiver on a footing of willful default and neglect must be made by a suit and cannot be entertained when the receiver is passing his accounts. The point that has been urged in this case is that although at the time of passing the accounts under Or. 40, rr. 3 and 4, the Court can direct the receiver to make good any loss which he has caused by his willful negligence, that procedure cannot be taken after the receiver has been discharged. In this case, the matter was brought to the notice of the Court by the subsequent receiver who found that certain decrees had become time-barred through the gross negligence of his predecessor-in-office and it is urged that in such a case the proper procedure for the Court to adopt would be merely to direct that the accounts should not be passed and that a suit should be brought, Reference has been made to the case in Coomar Sattya Sankar v. Ranee Golapmonee Dehee 6 C.W.N. 223 (1900). In that case it was held that where there is a question of the receiver's liability to render accounts, the proper course is either to postpone the passing of the accounts until the question of the receiver's liability is established by a suit, or to pass the accounts reserving the rights of the parties to establish any claim that may be made against the receiver. But that case was decided in the year 1900, that is, before the introduction of r. 4 of Or. 40 which came into force in 1908. 2. Another case to which reference was made was the case of Subal Chandra Kar v. Jatindra Mohun Ghose ILR 53 Cal. But that case was decided in the year 1900, that is, before the introduction of r. 4 of Or. 40 which came into force in 1908. 2. Another case to which reference was made was the case of Subal Chandra Kar v. Jatindra Mohun Ghose ILR 53 Cal. 881 (1926) in which it was held that in an application against a receiver for accounts to be taken on the basis of willful default and neglect, the proper procedure would be by a suit. In that case, His Lordship Mr. Justice Rankin, (as he then was), held that if a suit had to be brought, it was much better that it should be brought in the ordinary way, the question before him being whether in that particular case the learned Judge's order should be interfered with. He held merely that it was a good general rule that cases of any complication should not be decided without a properly framed plaint and without a suit being brought in a regular manner. But he did not lay down that in every case the procedure should be by a suit and that a summary procedure should never be adopted. Moreover, in that case there was an application by a party whereas in the present case the matter was brought to the notice of the Court by the receiver. In the case of K. B. Dutta v. Samadhon Dutta ILR 41 Cal. 92 (1913), it is laid down that no suit can be maintained by subsequent receivers against former receivers of an estate for what amounts to a breach of their duty as officers of the Court. In that case owing to a breach of their duty the Defendants failed to recover from the solicitors the sum of Rs. 6000. It was not a matter directly of accounts but of a failure of duty. So. in the present case there was a failure of duty in allowing the decrees to become time-barred. It seems, therefore, clear that the Court did not act out of jurisdiction in holding that the receiver was liable under R. 4 of Or. 40 for the amount of the loss which he caused to the estate by his willful neglect. 3. This Rule is, accordingly, discharged with costs--hearing fee two gold mohurs. Henderson, J. 4. I agree. The case reported in Subal Chandra v. Jatindra ILR 63 Cal. 40 for the amount of the loss which he caused to the estate by his willful neglect. 3. This Rule is, accordingly, discharged with costs--hearing fee two gold mohurs. Henderson, J. 4. I agree. The case reported in Subal Chandra v. Jatindra ILR 63 Cal. 881 (1926) on which the learned Advocate for the Petitioner relies does not really support him in the present case. In that case, Mr. Justice Rankin, as he then was, who delivered the judgment of the Court, was hearing an appeal and considering whether an order made on the Original Side of this Court should be interfered with or not. But he did not say that the learned Judge had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter in a summary way. In the second place, as my learned brother has pointed out, in that case there was an application by some of the parties to the suit. In the present case the learned Judge who was acting of his own motion had a report from the present receiver as to the account submitted by his predecessor. Neither the learned Judge nor the present receiver could have brought a suit against the Petitioners and in my opinion the learned Judge was acting with jurisdiction.