JUDGMENT R.C. Mitter, J. - The Rule has been obtained by the Plaintiff whose suit to recover a sum of money advanced to the Defendant by his predecessor-in-title, J. C. Banerjee, deceased, has been dismissed by the Small Cause Court Judge of Sealdah. The point for consideration is one of limitation. In the plaint which was filed on the 31st July, 1934, the Plaintiff stated that a sum of Rs. 450 was borrowed by the Defendant on the lat August, 1931, from J. C. Banerjee, and on that date " as evidence of the loan a document was executed." The said statement was made as the said document is a promissory note stamped with a stamp of one anna and hence stamped deficiently. Hence the suit as framed is on the original consideration. The document was attached to the plaint. No statement was made in the plaint as to whether any acknowledgment in writing had been made and no such statement was necessary if the statement made in the plaint that the loan was taken by the Defendant on the 1st August, 1931, was true as the suit was instituted just within three years of the said date. 2. In the evidence, however, it transpired that J. C. Banerjee had advanced the said sum of Rs. 450 to the Defendant by way of loan about a year and half before the 1st August, 1931. The Plaintiff felt the difficulty that the suit being based on the original consideration would be barred unless there was an acknowledgment in writing within the period of limitation. He accordingly sought to use the promissory note as an acknowledgment in writing. If the rules of pleading are to be strictly enforced, the suit ought to be dismissed as soon as it is held that the money was advanced to the Defendant before the 31st July, 1931, there being no allegations in the plaint to save limitation in that case. 3. The Court below, however, instead of dismissing the suit on that ground, has considered the question as to whether the document executed by the Defendant in favour of J. C. Banerjee on the 1st August, 1931, could be used as an acknowledgment in writing within the meaning of sec. 19 of the Limitation Act. The said document runs as follows:- On Demand I promiso to pay to Mr. 19 of the Limitation Act. The said document runs as follows:- On Demand I promiso to pay to Mr. J. C. Banerjee of 17, Kalimuddi Lane, Beadon Street P. O. Calcutta, the sum of Rs. 450 bearing interest at six pies per rupee per month. Value received in cash. Dated 1st August, 1931. 4. There cannot be any doubt that the document is a promissory note. 5. The lower Court held that this document cannot be admitted in evidence even as an acknowledgment as it is stamped with an one anna stamp and so stamped insufficiently. It was con-tended by the Plaintiff in the lower Court that the document regarded as an acknowledgment is stamped properly, that is, in accordance with Art. 1 of Schedule I of the Stamp Act. The lower Court has rightly pointed out in its judgment that Art. 1 of Schedule 1 of the Stamp Act does not apply as the document in question contains an express" promise to pay and contains also a stipulation to pay interest. The lower Court accordingly ruled out the said document from evidence and having arrived at the finding that the money had been advanced about a year and half before the 1st August. 1931, has dismissed the suit as being barred by time. 6. Before me two points have been urged by the learned Advocate of the Plaintiff, namely, (i) that said document, which is only sought to be used as an acknowledgment in writing for saving limitation does not require any stamp duty, and, (ii) even if it requires stamp duty if it is to be used as an acknowledgment in writing, it comes within Art. 5 of Schedule I and that it ought to have been admitted in evidence after being impounded under sec. 33 of the Stamp Act, cl. (a) of the proviso to sec. 35 being not applicable, as the instrument is sought to be used not as a promissory note. 7. I will take up the first point pressed before me. It is no doubt a well-established proposition that the mere fact that a document is an acknowledgment of a debt would not make it liable to stamp duty. 35 being not applicable, as the instrument is sought to be used not as a promissory note. 7. I will take up the first point pressed before me. It is no doubt a well-established proposition that the mere fact that a document is an acknowledgment of a debt would not make it liable to stamp duty. To bring it within Art. 1 of Schedule I of the Stamp Act, it must be written or signed by the debtor in order to supply evidence of a debt, that is to say, the document must be given by the debtor to the creditor with the intention of supplying evidence of the debt. In such a case, the instrument of acknowledgment must be carefully examined in connection with circumstances to ascertain whether it had been signed to supply evidence of a debt, and if the conclusion arrived at is that it was, then and then only would it come within Art. 1 of Schedule I [Mulji Lala v. Lingu Makaji ILR 21 Bom. 901 (F. B.) (1806), Ambicu Dat Vyas v. Nityananda Singh ILR 30 Cal. 687 (1903). Galstaun v. Hutchinson ILR 39 Cal. 78(sic); S.C. (sic)6 C.W.N. 945 (1912) and Surjimull Murlidhar Chandick v. Ananta Lal Damani ILR 46 Mad. 948 (1923)]. To bring a document under Art. 5 of Schedule I, the document must be an agreement or a memorandum of an agreement. Thus, where there is a series of transactions between two parties and in books of the creditor the advances made from time to time are entered on the debit side and the payments made from time to time are entered on credit side, and six monthly balances struck therein and signed by the debtor and the balances carried over, although the entries in those books signed by the debtor can be used as acknowledgments under sec. 19 of the Limitation Act, they would require no stamp duty either under Art. 1 or Art. 5 of Schedule I. This, in my judgment, is the effect of a series of decisions of this Court, beginning with the case of Brojendra Coomar v. Bromomoyee Choudhurani ILR 4 Cal. 885 (1878), [see Brojo Govinda Shaha v. Goluck Chunder Shaha ILR 9 Cal. 127(1882), Nund Kumar Shaha v. Shumomoyee ILR 15 Cal. 162 (1887) and Galstaun v. Hutchinson ILR 39 Cal. 789 : S.C. 16 C.W.N. 945 (1912)]. 8. 885 (1878), [see Brojo Govinda Shaha v. Goluck Chunder Shaha ILR 9 Cal. 127(1882), Nund Kumar Shaha v. Shumomoyee ILR 15 Cal. 162 (1887) and Galstaun v. Hutchinson ILR 39 Cal. 789 : S.C. 16 C.W.N. 945 (1912)]. 8. But in my judgment this does not clear the path of the Plaintiff; for, in my judgment, a defectively stamped promissory note cannot be used in evidence as an acknowledgment of a debt. This leads me to the consideration of the second point urged on behalf of the Plaintiff. The Allahabad and the Madras High Courts have held that a defectively stamped promissory note can be used as an acknowledgment under sec. 19 of the Limitation Act. I cannot agree, because in my judgment it nullifies sec. 35 of the Stamp Act, and is moreover against the principle formulated in some decision of this Court passed under the Stamp Act of 1879. The cases of the Allahabad and Madras High Courts directly in point are Kanhayalal v. Stowell ILR 3 All. 581 (F. B.) (1881), Gopala Padayachi v. Rajagopal Naidu [1926] M. W. N. 757, Rakkappan Ambalam v. Suppiah Ambalam 32 Mad. L. W. 691 (1929) and Randhir Singh v. Thaman Lal [1935) All. L.R. 28: 4 All. W. R. 657 (1934). The cases of Gobind Singh v. Bejoy Bahadur [1929J All. L. J. 1279 and Kesavaramayya v. Visamsetti 50 Mad. L. J. 36 (1925) do not directly deal with the question now be-fore me. In the first-mentioned case a receipt and a defectively stamped pramissory note were executed on the same date. The receipt was admitted as an acknowledgment, but the promissory note was excluded and in the last-mentioned case the promissory note which was used as acknowledgment had not been defectively stamped but being made payable to bearer was hit by the sec. 26 of The Indian Paper Currency Act (Act II of 1910). The decision of the majority of Judges in Kanhayalal's case ILR 3 All. 581 (F. B.) (1881) in my judgment cannot be of any assistance. The document there in question was executed while the Stamp Act of 1869 was in force. Art. 5 of that Act corresponds with Art. 1 of the present Act and sec. 18 of that Act with sec. 35 of the present Act. The terms of sec. 18 were different from the terms of sec. The document there in question was executed while the Stamp Act of 1869 was in force. Art. 5 of that Act corresponds with Art. 1 of the present Act and sec. 18 of that Act with sec. 35 of the present Act. The terms of sec. 18 were different from the terms of sec. 35 of the present Act, the words "for any purpose" after the phrase " be admitted in evidence " were not there, being first introduced in the Stamp Act of 1879. The proviso (a) to sec. 33 does not authorise the Court to impound a promissory note defectively stamped. The opening words of sec. 35 are perfectly general and a document defectively stamped cannot be admitted in evidence for any purpose. Where a defectively stamped document can be impounded, it can be used in evidence after the requisite stamp has been levied, but where it cannot be impounded, e.g., a promissory note or other documents excepted in proviso (a) to sec. 35, and the deficiency in Stamps cannot be made up by that process, it cannot be admitted in any evidence for any purpose, even for a collateral one. This, in my view, is the effect of the decisions in the case of Manik Chand v. Jumoona Dass ILR 8 Cal. 645 (1880) and Mulji Lala v. Lingu Makaji ILR 21 Bom. 201 (F.B.) (1896) which decisions, though given under the Act of 1879, I have no hesitation in following. I accordingly hold that the document sought to be used in this case as an acknowledgment cannot be impounded and being a defectively stamped promissory note cannot be used in evidence as an acknowledgment. For the aforesaid reasons, I discharge the Rule with costs, hearing fee one gold mohur.