JUDGMENT Sir Boyd Merriman, J. - This appeal raises a very difficult point, but I have come to the conclusion that the appeal ought to be dismissed. The summons was a summons by the wife for desertion, and for nothing else. In fact, the wife left the home. It was, therefore, necessary for her to show that it was her husband's conduct which had driven her out and thus to make him guilty of what is sometimes called constructive desertion. 2. In showing, or attempting to show, that it was the husband's conduct which had driven her out she relied on two things. The first I can dismiss in a sentence. She said that at the very moment when she left her home her husband told her to clear out and offered physical violence. Of course, it would plainly have been' open to the justices, if they thought that was the real cause of her leaving, to dispose of the matter then and there upon that ground, but it is perfectly obvious from the form which their judgment took that they really paid very little attention, as matter of weight of evidence, to that part of the case, and probably because the wife herself said that the real cause of complaint was that over a considerable time her husband had been guilty of unclean practices with her. It is obvious that in such circumstances, and on proper evidence, it would be fully open to the justices to hold that such treatment would justify the wife in leaving and, indeed, would justify them in finding substantive cruelty, if such were charged, provided in the latter case, at any rate, that it was coupled with evidence that the health of the wife had suffered. But as the substance of the matter, though not the actual form of the charge was that, it was acts of this sort which were said to be the cruelty of the husband and-to have driven her away, I think that the justices were right in demanding some corroboration on the part of the wife. 3. The Court demands that when a matrimonial offence, whatever it is,' is charged, the evidence of the. 3. The Court demands that when a matrimonial offence, whatever it is,' is charged, the evidence of the. spouse making the charge should if possible be corroborated, and not least with regard to matters about which, if there was not a reasonably strict rule in this respect, one spouse would be so easily at the mercy of the other in relation to things which in their nature must happen in private. But the necessity for corroboration is not an absolute matter of law. Justices should direct themselves, just as a judge should direct a jury, that it is safer to have corroboration, if possible, but when the warning has been given, and given in the fullest form, then there is no rule of law which prevents the tribunal from finding the matter proved in the absence of corroboration. 4. In tins case at first sight, the reasons for the justices' decision do look as if they had said that corroboration is required as a matter of law, but on a very full consideration of the note and the arguments on both sides I have come to the conclusion that that is not what they mean. 5. The proposition up to which they were leading is: Are we satisfied, or are we not satisfied, that it was the conduct of the husband that compelled the wife to leave him so as to constitute desertion by him ? They must be assumed-because the wife herself paid very little attention to it-to have considered and discounted the evidence of physical violence and to have realised correctly that the case depended entirely on this question of these alleged perverse acts. It is true that, strictly speaking, Statham v. Statham (Supra), is no direct authority for this case, but, once it is conceded that some corroboration should be looked for, whatever is the form of cruelty alleged, the reasoning underlying the judgment in Statham v. Statham (1), applies very strongly to this class of case, though; the, decision itself does not directly apply. The line of reasoning which is applied throughout the whole of Greer L.J.'s and Russell L.J.'s judgments is this If the conduct complained of can only have happened with the assent of the wife, one ought really to look for some corroboration, or alternatively, she ought not to be able to make it a matter of complaint, or to come to the Court to complain of something to which she herself has submitted. Whichever way the thing is put, it is made plain that the closest scrutiny ought to be given by justices to an allegation of cruelty which is based upon acts of this sort which in turn cannot have occurred without at least the assent of the wife. In that state of things I think the justices were perfectly right on the material before them, before they were prepared to find cruelty, or the equivalent of cruelty, for the purposes of constructive desertion, on directing themselves that they ought to be very careful not to find it unless they could see some corroboration, not merely that certain things had occurred, but that those things, gave rise to a legitimate matrimonial complaint. 6. I do not think there was corroboration. The only thing apart from the physical violence with which I have already dealt which can be said in my opinion to be corroboration of the wife's evidence is the doctor's evidence. The doctor undoubtedly does prove that when she was away from her husband she was better than when she was with him, and he also proved that some complaint, which is entirely undefined, was made, and that her nervous condition at the time when that was made was consistent with the nature of the complaint. That certainly is evidence which provides a necessary step in proving the allegation of cruelty in so far as this case depends on cruelty generally, but as corroboration of the wife's evidence that the husband was guilty of the grosser sort of conduct, in my opinion, it comes no where near corroboration. I am not going to discuss now the interesting question of whether or not a statement made to the doctor that the husband had done this, that or the other would have been admissible as corroboration. It is sufficient to say in this case that no such evidence was tendered or given. I am not going to discuss now the interesting question of whether or not a statement made to the doctor that the husband had done this, that or the other would have been admissible as corroboration. It is sufficient to say in this case that no such evidence was tendered or given. We are told nothing whatever about what the nature of the complaint was, and, therefore, though the doctor's evidence is relevant on the question of health and injury to health it is no evidence whatever implicating the husband in relation to the alleged grosser acts. Therefore, if corroboration was necessary, I think the justices were right in saying that there was none. They do not in fact found their judgment on that but on what I think is the even stronger alternative ground, that there is no real evidence that it was this sort of conduct which so affected the wife as to drive her from home. Although I admit, as I have already said, that at first sight their judgment may appear to contain a misdirection of themselves, I am satisfied that in substance they have not misdirected, themselves at all. I think they approached this case with full consideration of what the real points were, and, having heard both the husband and the wife, they came to the conclusion, as I think rigidly, that the wife had not made out a case that the husband had deserted her. Bucknill, J. 7. I agree. If I construed this decision of the justices as meaning that they thought they were bound to dismiss the summons because there was no corroboration, I should certainly think that the case should be remitted to them, but I do not read it in such a way, for two reasons. First of all they refer to the case of Statham v. Statham (Supra). 1 presume that they or the clerk were well acquainted with the reasoning in that case, and, as far as I read it, I cannot find anywhere in the judgments of the Lords Justices that, there is a legal or statutory necessity for corroboration, even in the case of sodomy and so far as the sexual acts which' are' referred to there, I do not think' the matter of corroboration is even referred' to. Furthermore, the justices say that they are not satisfied that the conduct of the husband compelled the wife to leave him. If they dismissed this Simmons because they felt that they were bound to dismiss it as a matter of law for want of corroboration, I do not think they would have used the word "satisfied." In my view they weighed all the evidence, they saw the two witnesses, the husband and the wife, and they came to the conclusion that it would be unsafe in the absence of corroboration to find that these acts had been committed. 8. For these reasons I agree with the President that this appeal should be dismissed.