Sarbaranjan Basak v. Secretary of State for India in Council
1935-02-14
body1935
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT 1. The Plaintiff in the suit in which the appeal has arisen prayed for cancellation of a certificate issued under the Public Demands Recovery Act, on the ground that it was illegal and ultra viree. The Court of first instance passed a decree in favour of the Plaintiff; that decree was reversed by the Court of appeal below, and the Plaintiff's suit was dismissed. The Plaintiff appealed to this Court. The facts of the case giving rise to this appeal are within a narrow compass. The Secretary of State for India in Council instituted a suit against the Plaintiff Appellant in the year 1921, Suit No. 144 of 1921, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Alipur, for recovery of khas possession of the lands appertaining to holding No. 110, Sub-Division 14, Division 1 of the Panchannagram khas Mahal. The claim for khas possession as made in the suit was disallowed; the Plaintiff's title to 5 cottas 15 1/2 chattaks of land as proprietor was declared. The Plaintiff was held entitled to get possession of the land through the tenants-Defendants; the Plaintiff was further held entitled to get fair and equitable rent for the land, to be determined in a suit properly framed for the purpose. The aforesaid decree passed by the trial Court on the 26th March, 1924, was affirmed in appeal, on the 4th February, 1927. According to the Additional District Judge, the Plaintiff in the suit was entitled to recover rent for holding No. 140. It appears that rent payable for the land was assessed in the year 1928, and the Plaintiff in this suit was given notice of the assessment of rent by the khas Mahal Deputy Collector. The rent assessed by the Revenue authorities was not accepted by the Plaintiff, and it was necessary for having recourse to the certificate procedure for the realisation of rent. The certificate issued for recovery of arrears of rent due was challenged on the ground that the Collector had no jurisdiction to assess the amount of rent payable, under Regulation VII of 1882 and Regulation IX of 1825, as the provisions contained in those Regulations were not applicable to the case. The objections raised to the issue of certificate were rejected, and the suit giving rise to this appeal was instituted for cancellation of the certificate and for other incidental reliefs. 2.
The objections raised to the issue of certificate were rejected, and the suit giving rise to this appeal was instituted for cancellation of the certificate and for other incidental reliefs. 2. The questions raised for determination in the suit were many and various, but for the purposes of this appeal we are concerned with those indicated by issues Nos. 3 and 6 n the suit. Had the Collector jurisdiction, authority or power to assess rent in the present case? What was the effect of the decree in Suit No. 144 of 1921, in the 2nd Court of the Subordinate Judge, Alipur, with regard to assessment or fixing of fair and equitable rent? 3. It may be stated at the outset that in view of the decision in the previous litigation started in the year 1921, the liability of the Plaintiff Appellant so far as payment of rent to the Government was finally and conclusively established. The question of assess ability of rent was however left open. The point urged in support of the appeal in the first place was that in view of the direction of the Court of first instance in the suit of 1921, the rent payable by the Plaintiff had to be fixed by a suit properly constituted, and recourse could not be had to any other procedure except by consent of parties concerned. The trial Court in the suit of 1921 no doubt expressed the opinion that rent payable by the Plaintiff was to be determined in a suit properly frame-d for the purpose. This direction contained in the judgment and in the decree was not expressly affirmed on appeal; the Court of appeal confining itself to the decision that the Plaintiff in that suit was entitled to recover rent for holding No. 140. The direction contained in the judgment and the decree could not be held to be res judicata between the parties concerned, and it could not operate as a bar to assessment of rent in accordance with law. There could be no estoppel against statute, and against statutory rights exercisable by the Secretary of State in the matter of assessment of rent payable in respect of khas mahal lands. In our judgment it was open to the Collector to assess rent in the case before us, without having recourse to a suit.
There could be no estoppel against statute, and against statutory rights exercisable by the Secretary of State in the matter of assessment of rent payable in respect of khas mahal lands. In our judgment it was open to the Collector to assess rent in the case before us, without having recourse to a suit. The point raised before us in this part of the case, was not however discussed in any of the Courts below. 4. The question arising for consideration is whether the provisions of Regulation VII of 1822, and Regulation IX of 1825, were applicable to this case. It was contended before us in support of this appeal, that the right of resumption having gone, by virtue of the decision in the suit of 1921, the Regulations could not be applied for the purpose of assessment of rent, as was done by the Revenue authorities. It is to be noticed that the right of the Government to get khas possession was gone, but the liability of the person held to be a tenant under the Government was clearly established; and in such circumstances, there could not be any bar to the application of the Regulations with reference to the provisions in which rent was payable by tenants in khas mahals. 5. The provisions of Regulation VII of 1822 by express enactment, as contained in sec. 2 of Regulation IX of 1825, have been made applicable to lands of the description with which we are concerned in the case before us in the khas Mahal. In our judgment the conjoint effect of sec. 2 of Regulation IX of 1825 and the provisions of Regulation VII of 1822 referred to in that section, was that assessment of rent under Regulation VII of 1822 made in the case before us was legal. The assessment as validly made under the law, was not accepted by the tenant concerned; rent so assessed was allowed to fall into arrears, necessitating the issue of certificate under the Public Demands Recovery Act. It could not therefore be held that the issue of certificate for realisation of arrears of rent was ultra vires or without jurisdiction in any way. 6. It was suggested in the course of argument that the rent assessed by the Revenue authorities under Regulation VII of 1822, wad not fair and equitable.
It could not therefore be held that the issue of certificate for realisation of arrears of rent was ultra vires or without jurisdiction in any way. 6. It was suggested in the course of argument that the rent assessed by the Revenue authorities under Regulation VII of 1822, wad not fair and equitable. The question of fairness of the rent settled was not before the Courts below, and we are unable to go into that question in second appeal. The result of the conclusions we have arrived at, as indicated above, is that the appeal fails, and it is dismissed with costs.