JUDGMENT R.C. Mitter, J. - This appeal arises out of a suit for possession of six plots of land on declaration of the Plaintiffs title. The lower Appellate Court found that the Plaintiff had title to three of the plots only, and that her claim thereto is not barred by time. It has accordingly decreed her suit for these plots and has dismissed her claim to the remaining three plots. The Defendants have accordingly preferred this appeal in respect of the three plots decreed to the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff has preferred cross-objection with regard to the three plots in respect of which her claim has been negatived. In my judgment the findings on the question of title are findings of fact and are binding on me in second appeal. This disposes of the cross-objection. The Defendants Appellants, however, raise two questions. They say that (i) that the suit is not maintainable in law and (ii) that the question of limitation has been wrongly decided. 2. In 1911 Soshi Sundari Debi, the mother of the Defendants, instituted a suit for possession against some third persons and recovered a decree. She then went into possession and remained in possession up to the year 1919. In that year the Plaintiffs husband dispossessed her. She sued the Plaintiffs husband (not the Plaintiff) and again got possession sometime after 1920. The suit has been brought in 1931. that is, within twelve years from the date when Soshi Sundari got possession for the second time. 3. The finding in this case is that the three plots of land, in respect of which the Plaintiff has been given a decree, never belonged to her husband but was her property, and that she exercised acts of possession in 1919 and 1920 through her husband. The position then is that Soshi Sundary had not acquired a title by adverse possession by remaining in possession from 1911 to 1919, and before the title of the rightful owner was extinguished, the rightful owner, the Plaintiff, regained possession, but she was again dispossessed and kept out of possession for less than twelve years. The position then is that Soshi Sundary had not acquired a title by adverse possession by remaining in possession from 1911 to 1919, and before the title of the rightful owner was extinguished, the rightful owner, the Plaintiff, regained possession, but she was again dispossessed and kept out of possession for less than twelve years. In my judgment Art. 142 of the Limitation Act applies and the suit is in time, as it has been brought within twelve years of the last act of dispossession by the wrong-doer, the wrong-doer's previous possession before the rightful owner gained possession not being for sufficient length of time to extinguish the title of the rightful owner. I accordingly overrule the second point. 4. The facts hearing upon the first point are as follows:-- In 1930, the Plaintiff sued Soshi Sundari for possession (Title Suit No. 8 of 1930). Soshi Sundari died during the pendency of that suit and three persons Romesh, Jogendra and Suresh, were substituted in her place as her legal representatives on the allegation that they were her sons. She in fact left three sons and Romesh was one of them bat Jogendra and Suresh were not so. Romesh appeared in the suit and stated in his written statement that Jogendra and Suresh were not the sons of Soshi Sundari. The Plaintiff there-upon made an application, more than ninety days after Soshi Sundari's death, in which she admitted that Jogendra and Suresh were not Soshi Sundari's sons, but Dinesh and Srish were, and that she had been misled by an officer of Soshi Sundari when she made the application for substitution. She accordingly prayed for amending the record by putting in the names of Dinesh and Srish in the place of Jogendra and Suresh. This application of the Plaintiff for amendment was refused by the Court. She then made an application for withdrawal of the suit with liberty to bring a fresh suit on the same cause of action. The Court by an order dated the 28th February, 1931, granted the said prayer. This order was made in the presence of Romesh but not in the presence of Dinesh and Srish, who had not been brought on the record. On the strength of this order this suit (Title Suit No. 1114 of 1931) has been brought against Romesh, Dinesh and Srish. 5. This order was made in the presence of Romesh but not in the presence of Dinesh and Srish, who had not been brought on the record. On the strength of this order this suit (Title Suit No. 1114 of 1931) has been brought against Romesh, Dinesh and Srish. 5. The question is whether the order granting the Plaintiff leave to institute a fresh suit is an order made with jurisdiction. If it was, it cannot be attacked in the present suit, however bad it was, or however irregularly made. The Court had jurisdiction if the suit at the date of the order was a live one. 6. It is equally clear that if the suit was at its date a dead suit, the order was without jurisdiction and can be attacked in this suit. In the case of Hridoy Nath Roy v. Ram Chandra Barua Sarma ILR 48 Cal. 138: S.C. 24 C.W.N. 723 (F. B.) (1920). Mookerjee, A. C. J., drew the distinction between existence of jurisdiction in a Court and exercise of jurisdiction by it and pointed out that where there was "jurisdiction of the person and the subject-matter," an order granting leave to institute a fresh suit on the same cause of action cannot be attacked in other independent suits or proceedings. In my judgment in the case before me the Court had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter at the time when the order granting leave to sue again was made. 7. The sole Defendant Soshi Sundary had died and only one of her sons, Romesh, had been brought on the record in time. It was pointed out to the Plaintiff that there were two other sons, namely, Dinesh and Srish, who had not been substituted in her place. The Plaintiff made an attempt to bring them on the record but failed. If there are more than one legal representative of a deceased defendant, the plaintiff must bring all of them on the record by making an application under Or. 22, r. 4, and unless all are brought on the record the deceased cannot be said to be represented. There may be a possible exception when all of them are not known to the Plaintiff. 22, r. 4, and unless all are brought on the record the deceased cannot be said to be represented. There may be a possible exception when all of them are not known to the Plaintiff. As the Plaintiff in this case knew from the beginning that Soshi Sundari had three sons surviving her and ultimately came to know their correct names, she was bound to put all of them on the record of the case by taking appropriate proceedings. When she came to know that Dinesh and Srish were also the legal representatives of Shoshi Sundary, she ought to have applied for setting aside the abatement. She made an attempt to bring Dinesh and Srish on the record but failed and thereafter applied under Or. 23, r. 1 of the Code for withdrawal of her snit with liberty to bring a fresh suit on the same cause of action. At the time when she made the said application for withdrawal, the suit had abated. The effect of abatement is that no new suit can be instituted against the legal representatives of the deceased Defendant on the same cause of action. On abatement the Plaintiff's claim is disposed of as effectually and completely as if his suit had been dismissed by a decree. At the time when the order granting leave to withdraw was made, there was in the eye of law no suit pending in the Court and the order was accordingly made without jurisdiction. I prefer to base my judgment on this ground, namely, of jurisdiction, rather than on the grounds on which a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Seshamma v. Suryanarayan ILR 38 Mad. 613 (1913) based its decision. The order granting the Plaintiff leave to institute a fresh suit on the same cause of action cannot, in my judgment, take away from the Defendants of this suit the valuable rights that had already accrued to them under Or. 22, r. 9 of the Code before the said order granting the Plaintiff leave was passed. I hold accordingly that this suit is not maintainable and ought to have been dismissed on the preliminary point. 8. 22, r. 9 of the Code before the said order granting the Plaintiff leave was passed. I hold accordingly that this suit is not maintainable and ought to have been dismissed on the preliminary point. 8. To get over this difficulty the learned Advocate for the Respondent has argued before me that no question of abatement of the Suit No. 8 of 1930 arises at all as one of the legal representatives of Soshi Sundari, namely, Romesh, had been substituted in time. In support of his view some decisions of the Madras, Bombay and Patna High Courts have been placed before me. They are to be found noted at pages 857 and 868 of Sir Dinshaw Mulla's Commentary (10th Edition). I am, however, unable to accept the broad proposition laid down in these cases. I am bound by the decision of Page and Mullick, JJ., in the case of Fazor Banu v. Rohim Bux 32 C.W.N. 1020 (1928). If I had been free to decide the point for myself, I would have still followed the views expressed by Page and Mullick, JJ., which accord with the views expressed in the decision of the Lahore High Court in the case of Chunilal v. Amin Chand ILR 14 Lah. 513 (1932). The result is that this appeal is allowed and the Plaintiff's suit dismissed with costs throughout.