JUDGMENT D.N. Mitter, J. - This is an appeal by Defendants Nos. 1 and 3 from a preliminary decree in a suit for partition of lands on which a bazar or a market stands in the town of Pacca. The market is known as Moulvi Bazar. The Plaintiff asks for partition of the said bazar on the allegations that Defendant No. 1 and Syed Abdulla Hossain Choudhury alias Dolara Mea owned the land on which the bazar stands and the bazar jointly, that Dolara Mea owned 12 as, share of the market and Defendant No. 1 who is the wife of Moulvi Syed Selamatulla Saheb owned the remaining 4 as. share of the said market, that Dolara Mea sold his hare of the market with other properties to Munshi Haji Emded Ali, the Plaintiff, for a sum of Rs. 20,000 on the 8th May, 1928. [See Ext. I, printed at page 7 of the second part of the Paper-book] and that the Plaintiff subsequently executed a wakfnama on the 12th October, 1928, in respect of all the properties including the market, making himself the mutwali of the said wakf. As such mutiwali the Plaintiff has instituted the suit for partition of his 12 as. share, his case being that there has been constant friction and dispute between him and Defendant No. 1 and her husband, and that it is not possible to enjoy the property with convenience and in peace. He has accordingly, as mutwali of the property, sued for the partition of the market. It may be stated here that the market was held under an ijara lease which was granted by the Plaintiff's predecessor and accepted by Defendant No. 1 which expired on the 30th April, 1935, long after the passing of the preliminary decree. 2. The suit was resisted on the ground, amongst others, that the partition of the market is opposed to public policy and is calculated to destroy the property altogether and as such the Plaintiffs suit was not tenable. This defence is indicated in paragraph No. 22 of the written statement where it is stated thus: Having regard to the nature of the property as Bazar, the Bazar lands cannot be partitioned. If that be done, the existence of the Bazar will disappear, and this very valuable Bazar property will be altogether destroyed and will be extinct. This defence is indicated in paragraph No. 22 of the written statement where it is stated thus: Having regard to the nature of the property as Bazar, the Bazar lands cannot be partitioned. If that be done, the existence of the Bazar will disappear, and this very valuable Bazar property will be altogether destroyed and will be extinct. Such a partition of Bazar is not legal or equitable. The partition suit for the partition of the big and valuable property of Schedule (ka) of the plaint is not maintainable. 3. Another defence was also taken, viz.: that the suit for partition was premature during the pendency of the ijara lease which expired some time after the passing of the preliminary decree. Both these defences were negatived by the Subordinate Judge of the Court below who has granted a preliminary decree to the Plaintiff, directing that the Defendant No. 1 would pay full costs to the Plaintiff. 4. It is against this decree that the present appeal has been brought by Defendant No. 1 and the sole contention which has been raised before us by the learned Advocate for the Appellant is that the suit for partition does not lie with regard to the land on which the market is held and having regard to the nature of the property it is not partible and further the effect of partition would be to destroy it. The learned Advocate for the Appellant has not cited any authority in support of the position taken by him and we cannot give effect to his contention, seeing that partition is one of the ordinary incidents of joint properties. It is true that there are certain estates which are impartible by custom, but with regard to a market held as joint property there does not seem to be any reason why the land on which the market is held should not follow the ordinary incident of joint properties. As was observed by Lord Hobhouse in the case of Sanker Baksh v. Hardeo Baksh L.R. 16 IndAp 71: S.C. ILR 16 Cal. 397 at p. 405 (1888), when delivering the judgment of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee, that the ordinary rule is that if persons are entitled beneficially to shares in an estate, they may have a partition. See Sanker Baksh v. Hardeo Baksh L.R. 16 IndAp 71: S.C. ILR 16 Cal. 397 at p. 405 (1888), when delivering the judgment of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee, that the ordinary rule is that if persons are entitled beneficially to shares in an estate, they may have a partition. See Sanker Baksh v. Hardeo Baksh L.R. 16 IndAp 71: S.C. ILR 16 Cal. 397 at p. 405 (1888). That the same rule applies to joint properties would appear from a decision of the Chancery Division in the case of Mayfair Property Company v. Johnston [1894] 1 Ch. 508. A number of authorities is cited in this case to show that it is one of the ordinary incidents of joint properties that they can be partitioned. Mr. Justice North in that case, after reviewing many previous decisions, refers to the observation of Sir Thomas Plumer, V. C., who said this: It is clear, the absolute owner of a tenth part may compel the owners of the other nine to concur with him; and there would be no objection from the minuteness of this interest, the inconvenience or the reluctance of the other tenants in common, if no objection could be taken to the Plaintiff's title : partition being a matter of right: whatever may be the inconvenience and difficulty. 5. That seems to be the rule which is followed in the Courts of equity in England which deal with actions for partition of estates as it lies within their jurisdiction. In view of these authorities we do not think we can give effect to the contention which has been put forward both before us and the lower Court. This contention therefore fails. This being the only contention which has been placed before us and it having failed, the entire appeal fails with it. 6. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. It now remains to notice the objection which has been taken on behalf of the Appellant on the question of costs. It is said that the ordinary rule is that in the case of partition each party should bear its own costs up to the stage of the preliminary decree. There are however exceptions to this rule. One of these exceptions is that where the Plaintiff's suit for partition is resisted on the ground of want of title the successful party is entitled to costs. There are however exceptions to this rule. One of these exceptions is that where the Plaintiff's suit for partition is resisted on the ground of want of title the successful party is entitled to costs. In this case the suit for partition is resisted on two grounds and the Plaintiffs had to incur considerable expenses in meeting the unsubstantial defences. In these circumstances the Court below very properly allowed costs to the Plaintiff. This ground must also fail. Patterson, J. I agree.