JUDGMENT 1. The case which has given rise to this appeal arose out of the acquisition of certain lands in Mouza Athpur appertaining to Touzi No. 2402 of the 24-Parganas Collectorate. The proprietors of the Touzi were three brothers, Kshirode Kanta, Manada Kanta and Hemada Kanta, each having an l/3rd share. The share of Kshirode Kanta devolved on his wife Rani Kanakprava; that of Manada Kanta on his three sons, Satis, Jatis and Nripatis; and that of Hemada Kanta is now owned by the Appellant. The Touzi having been sold for arrears of revenue, a suit was instituted in 1915 by the first two sets of proprietors representing a 2/3rds share in the Touzi for setting aside the sale. During the pendency of this suit these persons, Kanakprava, Satis, Jyotis and Nripatis, are alleged to have executed an agreement in favour of one Sarat Chandra Goswami on the 27th December, 1916, promising to grant Mm a putni lease in respect of the 2/3rds share of the Touzi for a selami of Rs. 20,000 and at a certain rent, Rs. 5,000 out of the selami having been already receive and the balance to be paid by defraying the costs of the suit up to the appeal in the Privy Council. The suit was successful in so far as the aforesaid 2/3rds share. The decision of the High Court was passed on July 8th, 1919, and the same was confirmed by the Judicial Committee on April 27th, 1923. In 1917, Nripatis died and his share, which was 1/9th, thereupon devolved on his widow Rani Jyotirupa. A series of litigation followed between her and her husband's brothers Satis and Jyotis. At last a compromise was reached which was filed in a suit then pending on appeal, being F. A. No. 208 of 1927; and on the basis of this a consent decree was made in that appeal on the 17th May, 1930. 2. Pursuant to the agreement dated the 27th December, 1916, the 23rds share of the Touzi was settled in putni with Sarat Chandra Goswami. by several documents dated 1921 from April to September; the putni lease in respect of Jyotirupa's 1/9th share being executed on the 12th April, 1921 (=30th Chaitra, 1327, B. S.) by Satis and Jatis, it being said in the document that they had become entitled to that share as the result (of the compromise and consent-decree aforesaid. by several documents dated 1921 from April to September; the putni lease in respect of Jyotirupa's 1/9th share being executed on the 12th April, 1921 (=30th Chaitra, 1327, B. S.) by Satis and Jatis, it being said in the document that they had become entitled to that share as the result (of the compromise and consent-decree aforesaid. It is not disputed that the putni interest which was acquired by Sarat Chandra Goswami has devolved on the Appellant by transfer. 3. The Appellant thus claims to be proprietor of the Touzi to the extent of 1/3rd and to have putni interest in the remaining 2/3rd. The question in controversy in the present appeal is whether the Appellant has acquired putni right in Jyotirupa's l/9th share in the Touzi. The compensation money for the land acquired was awarded by the Collector on the footing that her Zamindari share, viz., 1/9th in the Touzi was unburdened by any putni. There were several cases before the Collector. The Appellant challenged the awards in all the cases on the ground that he had a valid putni in respect of the said. share and prayed for a reference under sec..18 of the Land Acquisition Act. All the cases thereupon were referred to the Judge who dealt with all of them by one judgment. From the decision in one of the cases only the present appeal has been preferred. 4. An objection, in its nature preliminary, has been taken on behalf of the Respondent Jyotirupa Debi. It has been urged that the decision in the cases inter partes from which no appeals have been preferred operate as res judicata. There is a conflict of decisions as to whether if two suits involving common issues are disposed of in one judgment, and an appeal is filed against the decree in one and not from the decree in the other, the matter decided in the latter suit becomes res judicata so that it cannot be re-opened in the appeal. There is a conflict of decisions as to whether if two suits involving common issues are disposed of in one judgment, and an appeal is filed against the decree in one and not from the decree in the other, the matter decided in the latter suit becomes res judicata so that it cannot be re-opened in the appeal. In our opinion, the correct view to take of this question is that the bar does not apply and for three leasons; firstly, because if the phraseology of the entire section is to be taken together, as it must be, the word " suit " in the section cannot be read as including an "appeal" in all parts of it; it certainly cannot be read in that way in Explanation II. Secondly, that being so, neither of the two suits, in such circumstances, can be said to be the " former suit" in relation to the other, in view of Explanation I. And. thirdly, if any principle of res judicata, apart from sec. 11 is to be considered, the decision being one, though it applies to two suits and two decrees are drawn up, and that decision having been appealed from, there has not been that finality which is the essence of a decision which is to have the force of res judicata. We have, therefore, to consider the merits of the appeal. 5. As regards the lease of April 12th, 1921, some arguments were addressed to us on behalf of the Respondent to establish that it was executed in undue hurry and under circumstances indicating that even apart from its invalidity on the ground of absence of authority of the part of Satis and Jatis to confer a title under it, the document should be regarded as of no effect. We do not feel pressed by those arguments. In our judgment, the question of authority is the real question to be considered. So far as this question is concerned the lease itself sets out that the title of the executants was derived from the consent-decree and the compromise on which it was based. 6. The only evidence of the compromise being the consent-decree in which it was embodied, it has been argued on behalf of the Respondent that the decree not having been framed in accordance with the provisions of Or. 6. The only evidence of the compromise being the consent-decree in which it was embodied, it has been argued on behalf of the Respondent that the decree not having been framed in accordance with the provisions of Or. 23, r. 3 of the Code, and it having " ordered that the suit be dismissed in terms of the solenama filed by both the parties and the parties abide by the terms of the solenama"--the decree, in the absence of registration, did not confer any right in immovable property. Now it is not at all clear that Touzi No. 2402 was not one of the properties which formed the subject-matter of the suit in which the consent decree was passed, whatever may have been the precise reliefs that were claimed therein. So if the Registration Act, as it stands to-day, were to apply we would have held that the decree was not of the excepted kind specified in sec. 17 (2) (vi) and so did not require registration. But the decree having been made before April 1st, 1930, according to Hemanta Kumari's case [Hemanta Kumari Devi v. Midnapur Zemindary Co. L.R. 40 IndAp 240; S.C. 24 C.W.N. 177 (1919)], registration was not necessary even though the consent decree may have included properties not the subject-matter of the suit. The form of the decree not having been in accordance with Or. 23, r. 3 of the Code, the terms of the consent decree way not be enforceable by execution, but that does not, in our judgment, make it any the less a decree which required no registration for its validity. This objection by the Respondent, therefore. cannot prevail. * * * * * 7. [Upon the construction of the relevant terms of the consent decree their Lordships held that the execution of the lease by the two brothers was wholly unauthorised and that the Respondent's title to the 1/9th share of the touzi was not affected by the lease.] * * * * * 8. It has next been contended on behalf of the Appellant that upon the doctrine of part-performance as embodied in sec. It has next been contended on behalf of the Appellant that upon the doctrine of part-performance as embodied in sec. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act inserted by amending Act XX of 1929, he is entitled to enforce his rights as lessee as against the Respondent; in other words, that he has performed his part of the contract in accordance with the agreement of December 27th, 1916 and has, in part-performance of the contract, taken possession of the property and so has acquired, as against the Respondent, the rights of a lessee. 9. To repel this contention a body of arguments has been addressed to us on behalf of the Respondent challenging the factum and bond fides of the agreement in so far as it purports to have been executed by the Respondent's husband Nripatis. We do not regard these arguments of any substance; and in agreement with the Court below we hold that the agreement is binding on the Respondent. But the essence of the doctrine aforesaid is that the possession should have been taken in part performance of the agreement; in other words, that the transferee came into possession on the strength of the bargain. The principle on which the doctrine rests is that if a man has made a bargain with another, and allowed that other to act upon it he will have created an equity against himself which he cannot resist by setting up the want of a formality in the evidence of the contract out of which the equity in part arises. [Chaproneere v. Lambert [1917] 2 Ch. 356]. On this question the facts when examined stand thus. In para. 9 of the statement of claim filed by the Appellant, it was said that his predecessor Sarat came to be in possession in pursuance of the agreement; but no issue was framed to raise the question and have it decided. The evidence that was adduced on behalf of the Appellant was not directed to establish that possession was taken in pursuance of the agreement, and all that was stated was that Sarat possessed the estate after its execution and the Appellant came into possession after Sarat. The evidence that was adduced on behalf of the Appellant was not directed to establish that possession was taken in pursuance of the agreement, and all that was stated was that Sarat possessed the estate after its execution and the Appellant came into possession after Sarat. On the other hand, the agreement said nothing about any possession to be taken under it and only deferred the execution of the lease to a future date, namely, after the final termination of the suit in the Privy Council in favour of the grantors. In the lease also it is not stated that possession had already been taken under the agreement. On the contrary, it is stated that as it had become necessary to take the lease without waiting for the result of the appeal then pending in the Privy Council, it was applied for and so was being granted. The lease was executed on the 30th Chaitra, 1327 (12th April, 1921) and the kists for payment of rent were fixed as Ashar, Aswin, Pous and Chaitra, and not a word is stated which would suggest that any rent had been previously paid, or if unpaid, how that was to be realised. In these circumstances, we cannot hold that the Appellant's predecessor Sarat's possession when he came to have it was referable to the agreement and nothing else. Indeed we are inclined to the view that no case of part performance invoking the operation of sec. 53A was seriously intended to be put for-ward or established. The faint attempt that appears from the judgment of the Court below to have been made by the Appellant to raise a plea of equitable estoppel against the Respondent, does not appear to have beer based upon sec. 53A, but upon the more general plea that as the Respondent's husband received certain benefit under the agreement the Respondent cannot in equity be allowed to retain the benefit and at the same time discard the transfer. That plea has failed and has not been repeated before us. 10. Arguments have been addressed to us on the question whether sec. 53A can apply to this transaction which was completed before Act XX of 1929, by which the section was introduced, came into force. It is unnecessary for us, in view of the findings which we have given above, to pronounce an opinion on this question. 10. Arguments have been addressed to us on the question whether sec. 53A can apply to this transaction which was completed before Act XX of 1929, by which the section was introduced, came into force. It is unnecessary for us, in view of the findings which we have given above, to pronounce an opinion on this question. The appeal is dismissed with costs, 3 gold mohurs.