Judgement Consolidated Appeals (No. 75 of 1934) from a common judgment and eleven decrees of the High Court (September 2, 1931) reversing a common judgment and eleven decrees of the Subordinate Judge of Ramnad at Madura (February 25, 1924), who reversed a common judgment and eleven decrees of the District Munsif of Devakottai (December 20, 1920). The suits out of which these consolidated appeals arose were brought on November 25, 1918, by a Receiver on behalf of Sri Subrahmanyaswami temple at Kunnakudi for the possession of various plots of land in a hamlet called Murugan Endal, in the village of Uyyakondan, belonging to the temple, which had been alienated by a permanent cowle, dated April 1, 1865, by the then dharmakarta in favour of the managers of two Chetti temples. The suits were against various defendants who had obtained transfers of their several plots from the managers of the Chetti temples in or about 1897. The main question in the appeal was whether the plaintiffs suits were barred by limitation and adverse possession. The appellants were the present managers and trustees of the temple, and, the Receiver having gone out, they now represented the temple. The respondents (defendants) were persons who had taken title by sub-leases under the cowle of 1865. The facts appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The District Munsif of Devakottai held (inter alia) that the suits were barred by limitation and adverse possession. On appeal by the plaintiff the Subordinate Judge of Ramnad at Madura reversed that decision, and held that they were not so barred. On second appeal the High Court (Waller and Krishnan Pandalai JJ.) held that adverse possession began from before 1902, and that the suits were therefore barred by limitation under art. 144 of the First Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. 1936. Feb. 18, 20 and 21. Upjohn K.C. and Durai for the appellants. The question of limitation is the only issue left in the case. 144 of the First Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. 1936. Feb. 18, 20 and 21. Upjohn K.C. and Durai for the appellants. The question of limitation is the only issue left in the case. The ground on which the actions were brought was that the cowle of 1865 was void in that the manager was not competent to grant such a^ lease ; that it was beyond his powers because it was not for the benefit of the temple, but was in fact injurious thereto as being a perpetual lease at a low fixed rent which was incapable of being raised Palaniappa Chetty v. Deivasikamony Pandara.(( 1917) L. R. 44 I. A. 147.) The question of limitation, which the High Court dealt with under art. 144 of the First Schedule of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 does not turn on the language of any article; no question of limitation can be raised by persons in the position of the managers of the Chetti temples. [LORD THANKERTON The question is whether they were in adverse possession.] That matter is amply covered by decisions of this Board— there are two lines of decisions—and the High Court, according to their own language, have really cut down decisions of this Board. No question of adverse possession arises here, and therefore art.144 does not apply. The defendants claimed throughout that they held, and were entitled to hold, under a permanent lease reserving a rent, which rent was paid. That is the crucial fact with regard to the question of adverse possession and limitation. The decisions of this Board as regards adverse possession come under two heads (1.) That a person claiming a permanent tenancy under a lease at a rent, being in possession and paying the rent, cannot thereby acquire title by adverse possession against the owner; (2.) that a lease granted by the manager of a religious institution, not for the benefit of the institution, followed by entry and possession and payment of rent, is not void ab initio, but is good for the life or during the office of the manager who granted the lease, and also during the life or office of any succeeding manager who, by accepting rent, creates a new tenancy on the terms of the lease, and there is no adverse possession during that time. Madhavrao Waman Saundalgekar v. Raghunath Venkatesh Desphande (( 1923) L. R. 50 I. A. 255.), is a decision precisely in point on the first of the above two heads. Nainapillai Marakayar v. Ramanathan Chettiar (( 1923) L. R. 51 I. A. 83, 99.), stated quite definitely what the decision in Saundalgekars case (1) is. There is no question of a statute here, it is simply a question of a tenant prescribing against his landlord, and a tenant cannot do so. Nainapillai Marakayar v. Ramanathan Chettiar (( 1923) L. R. 51 I. A. 83, 99.) was a case of a lease being void, and is on all fours with the present case the cowle on which the respondents rely is bad. In President and t Governors of Magdalen Hospital v. Knotts (( 1879) 4 App. Cas. 324.) Lord Selborne said (Ibid. 335.) "If any rent had been reserved and received, however small, the legal relation of a tenancy from year to year would have been created, and the Statute of Limitations could not have run." [SIR GEORGE RANKIN Adverse possession in the case of a void deed would begin to run from the date of the deed.] It is a rule of law that a tenant cannot by remaining in possession and paying rent say that he has got a permanent occupation by prescription. Payment of rent down to five years before action brought is proved. In Vidya Varuthi Thirtha v. Balusami Ayyar (( 1921) L. R. 48 I. A. 302.), the Privy Council apparently approved of a distinction putting the manager of a temple as in exactly the same position as the head of a math, andsaying that the time only runs from when the successor becomes entitled to possession. In Ram Charan Das v. Naurangi Lal (( 1933) L. R. 60 I. A. 124.), it has been pointed out by this Board that that right in the mahant is not a life right, but only during the tenure of office. In Ram Charan Das v. Naurangi Lal (( 1933) L. R. 60 I. A. 124.), it has been pointed out by this Board that that right in the mahant is not a life right, but only during the tenure of office. The statement in the High Court judgment that " In the case of a permanent lease also seeing that a temple manager has no beneficial interest which he can lawfully convey, the adverse possession would run from the date of the lease, if as a question of fact it is found that the lessee asserted his rights to the knowledge of the dharmakarta adversely to the temple," is an entire misunderstanding of the principle in Vidyas case (( 1921) L. R. 48 I. A. 302.) ; it is plain from that case that the head of a math is not the owner for life of the math property. The High Court seem to say that the doctrine of Vidyas case (( 1921) L. R. 48 I. A. 302.), as to adverse possession is to be confined to the case of a math. There is in this connection no distinction between the powers of the head of a math and those of the manager of a temple. The present is the case of a temple, not of a math, and when the manager granted the cowle in 1865 he was acting as the manager of the temple. Vidyas case (( 1921) L. R. 48 I. A. 302.) was the case of a math. Mahomed v. Ganapati (( 1889) I. L. R. 13 M. 277.) is the case of a temple, and is referred to in Vidyas case.(( 1921) L. R. 48 I. A. 302.) Sathianama Bharati v. Saravanabagi Ammal (( 1893) I. L. R. 18 M. 266.) is the case of a math, and the Court in that case does couple together cases of temples and maths as being subject to the same rules. [Sir Shadi Lal Is the transaction void or voidable?] Not void, because it is good during the lifetime of the grantor, or during his tenure of office, and it may be made good during the lifetime of the successor by that successor adopting the act of the manager who first granted the lease. The Court will not inquire, during the managers lifetime, into the propriety of isolated acts of management. The Court will not inquire, during the managers lifetime, into the propriety of isolated acts of management. In the case of a math the property is not vested in the head, but in the deity the now well-established rule is that a head of a math is neither a tenant for life nor a trustee Vidyas case.(( 1921) L. R. 48 I. A. 302.) [Reference was made to Greedharee Doss v. Nundokissore Doss, Mohunt (( 1867) 11 Moo. I. A.405.); Kailasam Pillai v. Nataraja Thambiran(( 1909) I. L. R. 33 M. 265.); and Muthusamier v. Sree Sreemethanithi Swamiyar.(( 1913) I. L. R. 38 M. 356.)] The two last were mentioned with approval in Vidyas case.(( 1921) L. R. 48 I. A. 302.) There is no authority to the effect that the manager of a temple is subject to account during his term of office. Abhiram Goswami v. Shyama Charan Nandi (( 1909) L. R. 36 I. A. 148.) puts the sebait of an idol in just the same position, with just the same powers and duties, comparatively, as the manager of a temple or the head of a math. The leases are valid only during the lifetime of the sebait by whom they are granted. No distinction is to be drawn between dispositions by the head of a math, the manager of a temple, or the sebait of an idol that is the plain decision of this Board. [SIR SHADI LAL What is the point of time from which limitation begins?] In all these cases it is from the death of the man who is bound by the lease. If he dies and has a successor then, in accordance with several of the earlier cases approved by this Board, the successor appears to have as part of his power of management on behalf of the institution, a power of accepting the rent and so confirming the lease for his time. It is a new act of management. And so it may go on, time after time, but there is no perpetuity there. Each tenancy is one only for the lifetime or duration of office of the manager who grants it. [LORD THANKERTON On Vidyas case (( 1921) L. R. 48 I. A. 302.) the time begins to run as soon as the grantor dies, and until the new tenancy was created the time was running. Each tenancy is one only for the lifetime or duration of office of the manager who grants it. [LORD THANKERTON On Vidyas case (( 1921) L. R. 48 I. A. 302.) the time begins to run as soon as the grantor dies, and until the new tenancy was created the time was running. The new lease is really an interruption. Payment of rent is the best possible expression of adverse possession. Is payment of rent evidence of adverse possession ? Your answer is that Vidyas case (( 1921) L. R. 48 I. A. 302.) says that that rent was paid under a new tenancy.] That is my case. Dunne K.C., Sidney Smith and v. Ramaswami Iyer for the respondents. It is contended for the appellants that this matter is concluded by Vidyas case (( 1921) L. R. 48 I. A. 302.), and that that decision says that if there is a line of successors it must be taken as a proper inference that the man who held must be granted a new tenancy. It is impossible to apply Vidyas case (( 1921) L. R. 48 I. A. 302.) to the facts of this case as laying down a matter of law. The lease is absolutely void if it is an invalid exercise of the managers power. [LORD THANKERTON You say that the period runs at the latest from the death of the grantor, and that from that moment the payment of rent coupled with the other facts, shows that it was an assertion of a right under the challenged document ?] Yes, and the only way that can be avoided is by this inference in Vidyas case (( 1921) L. R. 48 I. A. 302.), that the manager granted a new tenancy. The appellants are challenging the cowle itself, which is held by the Chettis this land has been held adversely to the appellants for more than twelve years. Can it be said that the rights in this property under this lease changed ?—that the title changed from the cowledars back to the idol or temple ? The appellants are challenging the cowle itself, which is held by the Chettis this land has been held adversely to the appellants for more than twelve years. Can it be said that the rights in this property under this lease changed ?—that the title changed from the cowledars back to the idol or temple ? Every case has dealt with the matter on the footing that in its inception the lease was bad, because it was a permanent lease given to the detriment of the idol, but it was one in which there would be no power in a successor to deal with the matter until the death of the grantor. Vidyas case (( 1921) L. R. 48 I. A. 302.) says that when that state of things is reached the proper inference is that the rent was being paid on the footing of a new tenancy arising on the death of the grantor. What justification has any court for imposing a fiction of that kind on the parties. The facts wont bear it. In this case it is a pure fiction to suggest that anybody has dealt with it on the footing of a fresh lease. At the latest the statute of limitations began to run on the death of the grantor. As distinct from Vidyas case (( 1921) L. R. 48 I. A. 302.), in the present case there has been an acting by the parties which is inconsistent with the idea of a renewed lease for the life time of the successive managers. If time began to run from the death of the grantor, then nothing can stop it unless an interruption can be shown. It has been found by all the Courts that the rent has been paid throughout. The onus is always on the plaintiff to show that his suit is within time. Every case of a math has laid down that time would run from the date of the death of the grantor. Vidyas case (( 1921) L. R. 48 I. A. 302.) had nothing to do with the position of a dharmakarta of a temple, but only with that of a mahant. A mahant is interested in the property and has a right to be there during his lifetime, and has the power of giving a lease during the whole of his lifetime. A mahant is interested in the property and has a right to be there during his lifetime, and has the power of giving a lease during the whole of his lifetime. The trustee has no title in himself qua dharmakarta to give any specific length of time as a lease. In Vidyas case (( 1921) L. R. 48 I. A. 302.) the position of a dharmakarta and a mahant is dealt with only in relation to whether either is a trustee under art. 144. The statute only begins to run against the successor as from the time when he assumed office. Ishwar Shyam Chand Jiu v. Ram Kanai Ghose (( 1910) L. R. 38 I. A. 76.) does not affect the decision in this case. In the case of a mahant it has been held that he having power to grant for his lifetime, and having granted in excess of that, the person who takes in excess of that cannot say that he is holding adversely to the mahant or the math during the mahants lifetime. [LORD THANKERTON Why is that not to apply in the case of a dharmakarta of a temple?] That is the whole point. The matter has never been put on its exact legal footing. I should have thought that if a dharmakarta granted a permanent lease, and if a suit were brought, there would be no answer but that he had no power to grant such a lease. [Reference was made to Nainapillai Marakayar v. Ramanathan Chettiar (( 1923) L.R.51 I. A. 83, 96.) ; Lal Chand Marwari v. Ramrup Gir (( 1925) L. R. 53 I. A. 24, 35.); Vidyapurna Tirtha Swami v. Vidyanidhi Tirtha Swami (( 1903-4) I. L. R. 27 M. 435, 454-455) ; and Srinivasa Chariar v. Evalappa Mudaliar.(( 1922) L. R. 49 I. A.237, 251.)] It is impossible, in the face of those authorities, to say that a difference in character between a dharmakarta of a temple and the mahant of a math, and of their powers, has not been recognised by this Board. A fiction cannot be introduced which destroys my rights under the statute. I am entitled under the statute to a title, and time began to run from the moment of the death of the grantor, and at no later period than that. A fiction cannot be introduced which destroys my rights under the statute. I am entitled under the statute to a title, and time began to run from the moment of the death of the grantor, and at no later period than that. What is the proper inference in one case may not be the proper inference in another. It is impossible to say in this case that there is any proper inference that there was a fresh lease to these respondents. The doctrine of adverse possession turns on the fact that I have been paying rent and holding with no title against persons who had the title and who never challenged it. [SIR GEORGE RANKIN Despite all these authorities, I am not satisfied to lay down that you can prescribe for a limited interest under the Indian Limitation Act.] The following authorities show that a limited interest can be prescribed for Sankaran v. Periasami (( 1890) I. L. R. 13 M.467.) ; Parameswaram Mumbannoo v. Krishnan Tengal (( 1902) I. L. R. 26 M. 535.) ; and Icharan Singh v. Nilmoney Balidar (( 1908) I. L. R. 35 C. 470.). Payment of rent is an assertion of adverse possession. [Reference was also made to Thakore Fatesingji v. Bamanji A Dalai.(( 1903) I. L. R. 27 B. 515.)] There is no ground for the inference that there ever was a new tenancy in the present case Vidyas case (( 1921) L. R. 48 I. A. 302.) cannot possibly be applied in a case such as this. Upjohn K.C. replied. A math and a temple are on the same footing, and the doctrine in Vidyas case (5) applies to both. March 24. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR GEORGE RANKIN. Eleven appeals are before the Board. Twelve ejectment suits were brought on November 25, 1918, by a Receiver appointed to manage certain Hindu temples and their endowments. One of these temples is dedicated to a deity, Sri Subrahmanyaswami, ata village called Kunnakudi, and to this temple belongs the village Uyyakondan, part of which is a hamlet which goes by the name Murugan Endal. Twelve ejectment suits were brought on November 25, 1918, by a Receiver appointed to manage certain Hindu temples and their endowments. One of these temples is dedicated to a deity, Sri Subrahmanyaswami, ata village called Kunnakudi, and to this temple belongs the village Uyyakondan, part of which is a hamlet which goes by the name Murugan Endal. In 1865 the then manager of the temple granted a perpetual lease or cowle of Murugan Endal at a rent of Rs.20 per annum to two Chettis, called Palaniappa and Subrahmanyam, the lessees professing to act with the intention of dividing the profits of the land equally between two Chetti temples. The plaintiff in the present suits claimed (inter alia) that on his becoming entitled by his appointment as Receiver to the management of the Kunnakudi temple, the lease of 1865, even if binding theretofore upon the temple and its managers, ceased to have any validity or effect. Eleven of the suits reached the High Court of Madras on second appeal and were dismissed. The defendants were sued as persons who had taken title by sub-leases under the cowle of 1865, but in none of the suits has the plaintiff impleaded the persons in whom the leasehold interest created in 1865 is vested. It would appear that the persons who direct the affairs of the two Chetti temples have for some years past provided the rent reserved by the cowle and possessed the lands. The manager who granted the cowle is said to have died in 1875, but the history of the Kunnakudi temple and its affairs has not been properly proved. Between him and Arumuga there may have intervened one or more managers. Arumuga died in 1893, and was succeeded by Thandavarya, who died in 1902. From 1902, until he was removed by decree of the High Court of Madras in 1913, one Nataraja was the de facto manager. The plaintiff was appointed Receiver on March 31, 1917. In or about 1897 the managers of the two Chetti temples, who were in possession of Murugan Endal as cowledars, began to alienate portions thereof for building purposes, and since that date a considerable number of buildings have been erected thereon, though not upon the land of the defendants to the present suits. In or about 1897 the managers of the two Chetti temples, who were in possession of Murugan Endal as cowledars, began to alienate portions thereof for building purposes, and since that date a considerable number of buildings have been erected thereon, though not upon the land of the defendants to the present suits. Thandavarya, having come to hear of the building, and having visited the village in 1898, brought seven suits in 1900 against persons claiming to hold portions of Murugan Endal from the cowledars. The present defendants or their predecessors in title were not among the persons then sued. Of the seven suits four were compromised, but in the other three the judgments of Subordinate Judge, District Judge and High Court have been put in evidence in the present case. These documents show that the persons in whom the leasehold interest of 1865 was vested were not impleaded, but only certain grantees from them of portions of the land. Also that Thandavarya had purported on September 1, 1899, to grant to one Raman Chetti (co-plaintiff in the suits) a lease of the whole village of Uyyakondan, and another village as well. The suits were not brought upon the footing that the cowle of 1865 was void or was no longer binding the averment was that the defendants without any right, title or interest, wrongfully entered on the suit land in February, 1900, and began to raise buildings in spite of the plaintiffs objection. The defendants, by their written statements, pleaded (inter alia) the cowle of 1865, and also that the two Chetti temples had acquired the ownership of Murugan Endal by adverse possession and had sold sites for building purposes to the defendants in 1897 ; that the plaintiffs had known of this all along and had consented to the defendants erecting the buildings. From the judgment of the Subordinate Judge it would appear that the plaintiffs objection to this averment of title by the defendants was not that the cowle of 1865 was bad, as being a permanent interest granted for a fixed rent, but (a) that it was granted for agricultural purposes only, and (b) that the defendants had not taken registered documents for their purchases thereunder. It appears from the judgment of the District Judge that there was, or was thought to be, a difficulty in that the cowle of 1865 was not registered the counterpart, however, may be proved, although not registered, under the law obtaining in 1865. The Subordinate Judge, in 1902, considered that under the cowle there was no right to erect buildings, but that, in view of the delay, no injunction could be granted. He gave Rs.2000 in each case as damages, but refused to give the plaintiff possession "because he has let it under permanent cowle to the persons under whom the defendants claim." The District Judge, in 1903, dismissed the suits altogether, holding that even if the defendants were trespassers they could not be ejected by plaintiffs "unless plaintiffs can prove that they are entitled to possession; and this they are not entitled to so long as the lease to Palaniappa Chetty and Subrahmanyan Chetti subsists." Shortly before the judgment of the Subordinate Judge, delivered on April 16, 1902, Thandavarya had died, and Nataraja was brought on the record in his stead, and was a party to the proceedings before the District Judge. Raman Chetti alone, however, appealed to the High Court, and that only in one of the three suits. In March, 1907, this appeal was withdrawn. There is in the evidence in the present case no information whatever whether, during the pendency of these suits of 1900, the rent reserved by the cowle of 1865 was being paid by the persons acting for the Chetti temples, or was being refused by Thandavarya. The cowledars were not parties to the suits. Save for his entry upon the last scenes of this litigation there is no evidence of any actings by Nataraja, save that Periyanan Chetti, the first witness for the defendants in the present case, gives evidence that in 1908-9, and again in 1912-3, when he was acting for one of the two Chetti temples, he caused the rent of Rs.20 under the cowle to be paid. It was paid by the monigar of the Chetti temple to the man who came to collect it—no doubt in ordinary course. It was paid by the monigar of the Chetti temple to the man who came to collect it—no doubt in ordinary course. After the original plaintiff in the suits now before the Board was appointed Receiver in 1917, he issued in January, 1918, a notice or notices stating that " the trustee has no authority to grant a perpetual cowle in respect of trust properties without any necessity, against the interest of the trust for an improper consideration and for an inadequate tirwa. The said cowle will not be binding upon me. Further, ownership right is set up on the cowle lands contrary to the terms of the cowle, buildings, etc., are raised thereon in violation of the agreement for the cultivation thereof. .... Hence I cancel the said cowle through this notice." The notice goes on to demand possession of " the said lands " within one month from the date of receipt of the notice. So far as appears, this is the first intimation of any intention on the part of the Kunnakudi temple or its manager to treat the cowle of 1865 as cancelled or determined. Their Lordships notice that from the reported case of Palaniappa Chetty v. Sreemath Devasikamony Pandara Sannadhi (( 1917) I. L. R. 40 M. 709.), it would appear that Nataraja, in a suit of 1905, as manager of this same temple, succeeded before this Board in March of 1917 in having set aside a permanent cowle in respect of lands not now in suit granted by his predecessor in 1897. Nataraja having been declared by the Board, in June of 1920, to have no right to be manager of the temple, the persons entitled, Annamalai, and, on his death, Ponnambala, were added as plaintiffs in the present cases before they were heard by the High Court. In the present suits, before the Trial Court and the Subordinate Judge, as well as before the High Court on second appeal, the plaintiff claimed relief not only on the ground that the cowle was no longer binding, but also on the ground of forfeiture, by reason that the defendants were erecting buildings on the land contrary to the intention of the cowle. The latter contention was, however, abandoned before the Board, who are concerned only with the claim for possession in respect that the permanent interest granted by the cowle is invalid and not binding upon the plaintiff or the temple. To this claim the sole defence is limitation under art.144 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act (IX. of 1908). The High Court has held that the Limitation Act has to be applied to these suits on the footing that the cowle of 1865 was void from the commencement, not being valid even for the lifetime or tenure of office of the manager who granted it. It is matter of decision that in the case of the head of a math a permanent lease granted, or an alienation by sale made by him, is valid during his tenure of office Vidya Varuthi Thirtha v. Balusami Ayyar (( 1921) L. R. 48 I. A. 302.); Mahantram Charan Das v. Naurangi Lal.(( 1933) L. R. 60 I. A. 124.) But it is contended that the manager or dharmakarta of a temple (which is really the present case) is in a different position, as he has, substantially speaking, no personal interest or right in the income of the temple properties, but only the right or duty to apply them properly for the purposes of the idol. Accordingly, it is said, a permanent lease granted by him is altogether bad, and adverse possession runs from the date of the lease. Their Lordships cannot accept this conclusion. It is clear that a permanent lease or absolute alienation of debutter property is beyond ordinary powers of management, whether in the case of the head of a math, the sebait of a family idol, or the dharmakarta of a temple such alienations can be justified only by proof of necessity for the preservation of the endowment or institution. The principle upon which such transfers have been held good for the period of office of the manager making the transfer has seldom been elaborately considered; though it has at times been suggested that this result is accounted for by a personal bar or estoppel which prevents the manager from taking steps to avoid his own grant. The principle upon which such transfers have been held good for the period of office of the manager making the transfer has seldom been elaborately considered; though it has at times been suggested that this result is accounted for by a personal bar or estoppel which prevents the manager from taking steps to avoid his own grant. Language pointing towards this principle, but in no very certain or considered way, may be found—namely, in Nainapillai Marakayar v. Ramanathan Chettiar.(( 1923) L. R. 51 I. A. 83, 96-7.) As, however, it is now clear that the property is not vested in the manager, by whatever name he be called, but in the idol or institution, it is difficult to accept the notion of personal bar as regulating the validity or invalidity of the transaction. Even if this were accepted, however, it would still remain obscure why personal benefit claimable by the manager in resect of the idols property should be held to decide the existence or non-existence of an estoppel. One can appreciate the view that the extent of a managers authority may depend on the extent of his personal interest; but when once he has exceeded his authority the absence of personal interest seems hardly to determine that his act should be held void altogether. In all classes of religious institution the objection to alienation beyond the lifetime or tenure of office of the manager is equally clear the offence lies entirely in the unnecessarily great interest which has been parted with. To treat the act of the dharmakarta as completely void ab initio would be to go beyond what is required to correct his failure to keep within acts of proper management. Their Lordships do not find that the distinction now taken between the head of a math and the manager of a temple— a distinction valid as regards their personal interest in, or accountability for, the debutter income—has been recognized in previous cases as carrying the consequences now contended for. It was not so considered in Mahomed v. Ganapati (( 1889) I. L. R. 13 M. 277.), which was cited by Mr. It was not so considered in Mahomed v. Ganapati (( 1889) I. L. R. 13 M. 277.), which was cited by Mr. Ameer Ali in delivering the judgment of the Board in Vidya Varuthis case.(( 1921) L. R. 48 I. A. 302, 318.) The cases of Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram (( 1899) L. R. 27 I. A. 69.), and Damodar Das v. Lakhan Das (( 1910) L. R. 37 I. A. 147.), are in a different class they were explained by the Board in Mahantram Char an Das v. Naurangi Lal (( 1933) L. R. 60 I. A. 124.) as depending on the fact that the transfer was not of a mere item of the property of the institution, but of the institution itself and its properties. The illustrations given by Sir John Edge in the case of Nainapillai Marakayar v. Ramanathan Chettiar (( 1923) L. R. 51 I. A. 83.) show that he is recognizing no such distinction as is now maintained. Their Lordships are not of opinion that for the present purpose it is necessary to recognize any difference in the consequences which flow from a permanent lease, or complete alienation of the debutter property, in the case of a math, or temple, or family idol. In all the position is as stated by Lord Buckmaster in Subbaiya Pandaram v. Mohamad Mustapha Maracayar (( 1923) L. R. 50 I. A. 295.), when, referring to Vidya Varuthis case (( 1921) L. R. 48 I. A. 302, 318.) and another, he said (( 1923) L. R. 50 I. A. 299,) " In each case they relate to the effect of an attempt on the part of a trustee to dispose of the property by a permanent mukurrari lease. This he has no power to do, though he is at liberty to dispose of it during the period of his life and a grant made for a longer period is good, but good only to the extent of his own life interest. This he has no power to do, though he is at liberty to dispose of it during the period of his life and a grant made for a longer period is good, but good only to the extent of his own life interest. It follows, therefore, that possession during his life is not adverse, and that upon his death the succeeding trustee would be at liberty to institute proceedings to recover the estate, and the statute would only run against him as from the time when he assumed the office." Save that the period in question is not the period of the managers life, but of his tenure of office, the language of Lord Russell of Killowen in Ram Charan Dass case (( 1933) L. R. 60 I. A. 124.), is to the same effect (Ibid. 124, 132.) " Whatever the intended duration of the r attempted grant may be, it is good, but good only for the limited period indicated." Moreover, the right of each successive manager to authorize, create, or continue a new tenancy for the period of his managership must be taken, in the case of a public temple or a family idol, to be the same as in the case of a math. Accordingly, their Lordships are of opinion that the principles laid down in Vidya Varuthis case (( 1921) L. R. 48 I. A. 302, 318.), are not inapplicable to the present, in so far as art. 144 of the Limitation Act is concerned. That decision was pronounced by the Board on July 5, 1921—that is, after the present case had been heard and decided by the trial judge (District Munsiff) in 1920, and before the hearing of the first appeal by the Subordinate Judge in February, 1924. The conclusion of the High Court upon this aspect of the case was thus expressed " Whether the proper date from which adverse possession generally runs in cases of permanent lease by Dharmakartas be taken as the date of alienation, or some subsequent date, such as the death of the Dharmakarta, or his resignation or removal from office, we have no doubt that on the facts of this case, adverse possession began from before 1902, and that the suits for possession were therefore barred under art. 144." Now, what was laid down in Vidya Varuthis case (( 1921) L. R. 48 I. A. 302, 318.), with reference to art.144, was as follows (Ibid. 302, 327-328,) In view of the argument it is necessary to discover when, according to the plaintiff, his adverse possession began. He was let into possession by mahant No. 1 under a lease which purported to be a permanent lease, but which under the law could endure only for the grantors lifetime. According to the well settled law of India (apart from the question of necessity which does not here arise) a mahant is incompetent to create any interest in respect of the math property to endure beyond his life. With regard to mahant No. 2, he was vested with a power similarly limited. He permitted the plaintiff to continue in possession and received the rent during his life. The receipt of rent was with the knowledge which must be imputed to him that the tenancy created by his predecessor ended with his predecessors life, and can, therefore, only be properly referable to a new tenancy created by himself. It was within his power to continue the tenancy during his life, and in these circumstances the proper inference is that it was so continued and consequently the possession never became adverse until his death." So far as regards the successive dharmakartas down to and including Arumuga, who died in 1893, it is difficult to discover in the evidence anything to take them out of the operation of these principles. It may, perhaps, be noted—if the manager by whom the lease was granted be called manager No. 1, and his successors referred to by numbers—that as time goes on the question whether the lease was originally justified by necessity will become less easy to answer ; and that after a time even if manager No. 4 or 5 knows of the absence of necessity for the lease, it may be necessary to consider whether he also knows of, and can be taken to rely upon, the presumption which imputes such knowledge to all of his predecessors. When Nataraja succeeded in 1902 what was the position? The cowle of 1865 was 37 years old, and three or four managerships had intervened. The Chetti temples, or the cowledars, had, since 1897, been alienating parcels of land for building purposes, and building had been begun. When Nataraja succeeded in 1902 what was the position? The cowle of 1865 was 37 years old, and three or four managerships had intervened. The Chetti temples, or the cowledars, had, since 1897, been alienating parcels of land for building purposes, and building had been begun. Thandavaryas suits of 1900 did not challenge the cowle as being then invalid, though upon the footing that it still subsisted the suits were misconceived. The defendants to those suits were sued as trespassers, and not as persons having taken title under the cowle. It was the defendants who set up the cowle. They set up also that by acts of possession the cowledars had added by prescription to their rights under the cowle—most probably a vain contention, but the case made by Thandavarya was that they had no registered transfers from the cowledars, and that the cowle did not authorize building. The suits were dismissed on the ground that, as the cowle subsisted, the r plaintiff had no locus standi to sue in ejectment whether the defendants were trespassers or not. The cowledars were not impleaded at all. When Nataraja succeeded, in 1902, the first thing that happened was that he was substituted for Thandavarya in the suits shortly before the Trial Court gave judgment dismissing them on the ground that the permanent cowle subsisted—a finding which was repeated in November, 1903, by the District Judge. Nataraja took the case no further. We hear no more of any objection by him, whether on the score of building operations or otherwise. During his tenure of office—or rather his de facto managership—from 1902 to 1913, the cowledars continued to make alienations of sites for building purposes, and buildings were from time to time erected under the cowle, as is proved by the defendants witness Periyanan Chetti. That these events could escape the knowledge or attention of Nataraja cannot reasonably be suggested. The evidence in the case, as contained in the paper book before their Lordships, does not make clear whether the lease of the two villages given by Thandavarya to Raman Chetty continued in the time of Nataraja, nor does the proof of payment of the cowle rent by the Chetti temples in Natarajas time extend backwards beyond 1908. The evidence in the case, as contained in the paper book before their Lordships, does not make clear whether the lease of the two villages given by Thandavarya to Raman Chetty continued in the time of Nataraja, nor does the proof of payment of the cowle rent by the Chetti temples in Natarajas time extend backwards beyond 1908. The plaintiffs are in no stronger position if they try to repudiate Nataraja as not being de jure the manager this indeed would establish the defendants case. The question for decision is as to the proper inference to be drawn from these facts—whether it is that Nataraja, knowing of the infirmity of the cowle, accepted the cowle rent as payable in respect of a new tenancy, which it was in his power either to create for the period of his own managership or to create for a shorter period and to continue from time to time; or whether on the other hand it is that he accepted it as payable in respect of a permanent right which it was no longer in the power of his temple to repudiate. Their Lordships are of opinion that the latter of these alternatives is the only one of which the facts permit. There is no doubt that from 1902 until the original plaintiff in these suits was appointed Receiver in 1917 the position of the cowledars in no way altered their adverse possession under the cowle thus extended over twelve years. The claim to eject the defendants fails in all the suits. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that these appeals should be dismissed. The appellants must pay the costs.