JUDGMENT McNair, J. - This is an application in the matter of the election of Councillors to the General Constituency in Ward No. 5 by Roopnarain Gagar, an unsuccessful candidate, that his name might be substituted as Petitioner in the place and stead of Champalal Gupta who was the original Petitioner and who on the 15th June, 1936, withdrew his petition, having settled with the Respondents. The original petition by Champalal Gupta contained a number of charges against the Respondents Mohanlal Makkar and Shibnath Sen who had been successful in the recent municipal election. On the petition being called on on the 15th of this month, a letter was put in and the Court was informed that the Petitioner did not intend to proceed any further with his application. The Petitioner Champalal Gupta appeared in Court in person and stated that he had definitely settled this matter and decided to withdraw his petition. The petition was thereupon dismissed. 2. Counsel who appealed for Dr. Champalal Gupta, the Petitioner, then informed me that he had been instructed on behalf of some other person to apply for substitution of that person's name as Petitioner. My recollection is that I slated that there was no application before me to that effect but that if such application were made, it would be dealt with according to law. 3. Shortly thereafter the present application was made on behalf of Roopnarain Gagar who, as I have already said, was one of the unsuccessful candidates and had been made a Respondent in the original petition. He had taken no part in those proceedings, he had not entered appearance, nor had he filed any affidavit. 4. In one of the affidavits which had been filed by the Respondent Mohanlal Makkar, one of the successful candidates, the following allegation was made: The applicant Champalal Gupta is a quack and not a doctor, and does not hold a degree of any University. He is an impecunious person and I verily believe has been set up by the defeated candidates Roopnarain Gagar and Ram Chunder Sett. 5. Ramchunder Sett, when the applicalion was withdrawn, appeared in Court and stated that he had no objection to the withdrawal of the petition and he further stated that he had not incurred any costs and that he did not require any costs to be paid to him. 5. Ramchunder Sett, when the applicalion was withdrawn, appeared in Court and stated that he had no objection to the withdrawal of the petition and he further stated that he had not incurred any costs and that he did not require any costs to be paid to him. Roopnarain Gagar was not present at the hearing. 6. The notice with regard to the present application is dated the 16th June, i.e., the day after the petition had been dismissed. And the first objection that is raised to this application by the Respondents is that there is no petition on the record in which this substitution can be made. 7. On behalf of the applicant Mr. Noad contends that the original petition had made certain gravel charges and that the Court should take judicial notice of the fact that these charges have been made and give facilities for their investigation. 8. It is admitted that there is nothing in the provisions of the Calcutta Municipal Act or in the rules which have been framed under that Act which provide for the substitution of one Petitioner for another. Mr. Noad has referred to the English Law upon Parliamentary and Municipal Elections where provision is made for such substitution. 9. Under the English Law a petition, once presented, can only be withdrawn by leave of two Judges upon special application and no such application can be made until notice of the intention to apply, stating the grounds, has been given and been made public. Mr. Noad relies on these provisions and upon his contention that an election petition is a matter of some importance and that it is the duty of the Court to see that there should be no improper alliance between the Petitioner and the Respondent to prevent the charges which have been framed from being duly investigated. 10. It appears that there are similar provisions in the Indian Acts which deal with elections to the various Councils and to the Legislative Assembly. 11. Again under both the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act and the Provincial Insolvency Act there is provision for substitution of one Petitioner in place of another. 12. Under the Companies Act there is no such provision and Mr. Noad relies strongly on a case reported in 31 Cal. at p. 106 [Dacca Loan Office v. Ananda Chandra Roy I. L. R. 31 Cal. 12. Under the Companies Act there is no such provision and Mr. Noad relies strongly on a case reported in 31 Cal. at p. 106 [Dacca Loan Office v. Ananda Chandra Roy I. L. R. 31 Cal. 106 (1903) ], where the Court, although there was no provision in the Indian Companies Act for substituting a Petitioner in a winding-up of a Company, followed the English practice on the ground that it was really a question of practice and the English practice should be followed under which the Court may substitute as Petitioner any creditor or contributory who in its opinion would have the right to present a petition and was desirous of doing so. It is noteworthy that in that case, although there was only one formal Petitioner, other contributories and creditors had applied to join in the petition and were allowed to do so, although no formal order was passed on their petition, and they were on the record informally as joint Petitioners when the original Petitioner withdrew. 13. Again, in the absence of any statutory provision, it is suggested that the Court is thrown back on the Code of Civil Procedure, and reliance is placed on Or. 1, r. 9 and r. 10, which enable the Court to join or substitute a party. 14. Or. 1, r. 9 provides that no suit shall be defeated by reason of mis-joinder or non-joinder of parties, and the Court may in every suit deal with the matter in controversy in so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it. Although the actual words of the Rule refer only to a suit, it is suggested that those words are equally applicable to an application of this kind. But in my view, Or. 1, r. 9 is not applicable, for there was no misjoinder or non-joinder of parties. The original application was correct in form, and there was no reason why the present applicant should not have been joined as a Petitioner. He was in fact a Respondent. He contends that he ha3 the electoral qualification required by sec. 46, and if that were his impression, he could, as co-Petitioner, have made certain that the petition would not be withdrawn against his wishes. 15. Under Or. He was in fact a Respondent. He contends that he ha3 the electoral qualification required by sec. 46, and if that were his impression, he could, as co-Petitioner, have made certain that the petition would not be withdrawn against his wishes. 15. Under Or. 1, r. 10 the Court is entitled to order any person to be substituted or added as Plaintiff upon such terms as the Court thinks just, provided the suit has been instituted in the name of the wrong person as Plaintiff (that is not the present case), or where it is doubtful whether it has been instituted in the name of the right Plaintiff; but there is no such doubt here. Furthermore, the Court must be satisfied that the suit has been instituted through a bond fide mistake. There is not the slightest suggestion that this original petition was instituted through a bond fide mistake. The present applicant, therefore, in my opinion, can get no help from Or. 1, r. 10, sub-r. (1). 16. Sub-r. (2) enables the Court at any stage of the proceedings to order that the name of any party improperly joined be struck out and the name of any person who ought to have been joined be added. It cannot be said that in this instance the name of any party was improperly joined, nor was it essential that the present applicant should be before the Court to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle the questions involved in the application. 17. In my view, no assistance can be obtained from discussing the provisions of other Acts, either in this country or in England. We are concerned solely with the provisions of the Legislature with regard to Calcutta Municipal elections, and those provisions are contained in the Calcutta Municipal Act and the rules which have been framed thereunder. It may be that with regard to questions of procedure we are thrown back on the Code of Civil Procedure. 18. Reference was made to sec. 141 of that Code, which provides that the procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed as far as it can be made applicable in all proceedings in any Court of Civil Jurisdiction. It is contended that the provisions of the CPC therefore will be applicable to procedure under an election petition. 19. 141 of that Code, which provides that the procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed as far as it can be made applicable in all proceedings in any Court of Civil Jurisdiction. It is contended that the provisions of the CPC therefore will be applicable to procedure under an election petition. 19. In the first place, this petition must fail, for the reason that there is no application on the record in which the Petitioner's name can be substituted. The application that was on the record was dismissed on the 15th June, and this application was only brought on the 16th. Furthermore, the present applicant was a Respondent in that petition, and he had every opportunity of knowing what has taken place and of making any application within time. 20. Sec. 46 of the Calcutta Municipal Act provides that if the validity of any election is questioned, any person enrolled in the electoral roll may apply within eight days to the High Court for testing the validity of that election. In an election petition which was before me recently, I held that it was only a person enrolled in the electoral roll of the constituency in which the validity of the election was questioned who was entitled to make that application. 21. The present Petitioner, Rupnarain Gaggar, is not an elector in Ward No. 5, and he therefore has no right to be a Petitioner. Even assuming that he had that right, in my view this application ought to have been made within the time specified by sec. 46. The Legislature have definitely given a short period within which these petitions should be made, and it would be obviously unfair for persons who have been elected to be liable to have the validity of their elections called in question months after the election, if it is possible for a nominee to be put up to bring a petition, and thereafter for applications to be made from time to time for other Petitioners to be substituted in his place. 22. In regard to the English Acts, it has been pointed out by Mr. 22. In regard to the English Acts, it has been pointed out by Mr. N. C. Chatterji, for one of the Respondents, that it is only a person who might have been a Petitioner who may apply for substitution, and it is argued that if the English practice were to be followed out here, the present Petitioner could not be substituted, for he could not have been originally a Petitioner. 23. If reliance is placed on Or. 1, r. 10, this is a matter for the Court's discretion, and I am satisfied that, even if the Petitioner could show that he was a proper person to be substituted, there is no justification for the substitution being made. He has been a party to the original petition, and has made no attempt to take any interest in it. He was a defeated candidate, who remained in the background, which gave him the great advantage of not being liable, if the petition were unsuccessful, in costs. I should certainly not exercise my discretion in his favour. It is also argued that the original Petitioner was suing in a representative capacity, and that in the circumstances some other person should be substituted to carry on the representation. There is nothing to show that the original Petitioner was suing in a representative capacity. He sued as an elector in his individual capacity, and did not purport to sue on behalf of anybody else. In those circumstances, the application must be dismissed with costs as of a hearing.