Judgement Appeal (No. 37 of 1935), by special leave, from a judgment and decree of the High Court (February 9, 1934), affirming an order of the Subordinate Judge of Gaya (November 18, 1932). The plaintiffs (respondents Nos. 1 to 3) instituted the present suit to enforce two mortgages on March 24, 1931, in the Court of the Settlement Officer of Dumka, Sonthal Parganas. The suit was filed in the Court of the Settlement Officer under s. 5 of the Sonthal Parganas Settlement Regulation (III. of 1872), as amended in 1908, as the bulk of the properties in suit were situated in the Sonthal Parganas, which was then in re visional settlement. The remainder of the suit properties were situated in the Gaya District, outside the Sonthal Parganas. The plaintiffs, on the basis of two mortgages, dated respectively February 2, 1913, and May 16, 1917, claimed Rs. 10,09,000, and, in the event of non-payment, sale of the mortgaged properties. On the date the suit was instituted, March 24, 1931, the plaintiffs filed a petition praying that the suit might be transferred under s. 5A of the Settlement Regulation, 1872, as amended, to the Court of the District Judge of Gaya, and on the same day the suit was so transferred by the Settlement Officer. On May 19, 1932, the District Judge transferred the suit for trial to the Subordinate Judge of Gaya. The question in this appeal was whether the Subordinate Judge of Gaya had jurisdiction to try the suit. The present appellant (defendant) contended that he had not. The relevant statutory provisions appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The Subordinate Judge held that he had jurisdiction to try the suit. A revision application to the High Court (Wort and Khaja Mohamad Noor JJ.) was dismissed. The judgments are reported at ( 1934) I. L. R. 13 Pat. 486. 1936. March 31; April 2. Dunne K.C. and Wallach for the appellant. The suit was brought by the mortgagees, the respondents, for the recovery of over 10 lakhs of rupees by sale of the mortgaged properties which were partly inside and partly outside the Sonthal Parganas. The area in question in the Sonthal Parganas was at the date of the suit under settlement proceedings, and the consequence of that was that under s. 5 of the Sonthal Parganas Settlement Regulation (III. The area in question in the Sonthal Parganas was at the date of the suit under settlement proceedings, and the consequence of that was that under s. 5 of the Sonthal Parganas Settlement Regulation (III. of 1872), as amended in 1908, the suit had to be filed before the Settlement Officer. Until completion of the settlement no suit of the present nature could under that Act be brought in any Civil Court in the Sonthal Parganas or anywhere else the suit must be filed before the Settlement Officer, but he, under s. 5A of the Regulation of 1872, as amended, has the power, if he thinks it expedient in the interests of justice that it should be dealt with by a Civil Court, to transfer it to such Court. One of the questions in this case is, to what Court can he transfer ? He must transfer the suit to a Court which has been appointed as a Civil Court within the Sonthal Parganas he could not transfer outside, because Regulation III. of 1872, under which he has got this power, is one which has relation only to the Sonthal Parganas. The special legislation dealing with the Sonthal Parganas originated with The Sonthal Parganas Act (XXXVII. of 1855) see The Bihar and Orissa Code, 1st ed. ( 1917), vol. i., p. 373. That was the Act which excluded from the Sonthal Parganas, unless expressly extended thereto, the general laws and regulations. [Reference was made to the Sonthal Parganas Settlement Regulation (III. of 1872), ss. 5, 5A, the amendment made in the Sonthal Parganas Settlement (Amendment) Regulation (III. of 1908), the East India (Laws and Regulations) Act, 1870 (33 Viet. c. 3), s. 1, the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act (XII. of 1887), and the Sonthal Parganas Justice Regulation (V. of 1893).] The High Court held that under the amendment in 1908 of Regulation III. of 1872, the whole of the procedure in the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable proprio vigore in the Sonthal Parganas, and that that being so, any Court outside the Sonthal Parganas has jurisdiction, including the Gaya Court, and that that Court had original jurisdiction apart altogether from the question of the transfer by the Settlement Officer. of 1872, the whole of the procedure in the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable proprio vigore in the Sonthal Parganas, and that that being so, any Court outside the Sonthal Parganas has jurisdiction, including the Gaya Court, and that that Court had original jurisdiction apart altogether from the question of the transfer by the Settlement Officer. There is no such jurisdiction extended to the Courts outside the Sonthal Parganas by the amendment of 1908 ; all that is provided under this Regulation is that the Settlement Officer has a power to transfer the case to a Civil Court which has jurisdiction in the Sonthal Parganas, and in the Sonthal Parganas alone. When it is said that it must be a Court which would have jurisdiction were it not for the special legislation about the settlement going on, that does not apply to a Court outside the Sonthal Parganas having that jurisdiction it can only apply to a Civil Court in the Sonthal Parganas which would have it, but whose jurisdiction is excluded by that provision. From the provision in s. 5 of Regulation III. of 1872, as amended, that " no suit shall lie in any Civil Court established under the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887," it is clear that that must and can only include, relative to the Sonthal Parganas, the Civil Courts established by the Sonthal Parganas Justice Regulation, 1893—namely, the Courts of the District and Subordinate Judges in the Sonthal Parganas. The Sonthal Parganas Act, 1855, cut out the whole of the legislation outside the Sonthal Parganas, unless expressly extended thereto, and therefore the Code of Civil Procedure is not in force in the Sonthal Parganas. [LORD ALNESS. The ultimate question for decision under s. 5a is whether the transfer which has been made has been made to a Court which, apart from special regulation in the Sonthal Parganas, would have had jurisdiction to try the suit ?] That is the point. Setrucherla Ramabhadraraju v. Maharaja of Jeypore (( 1919) L. R. 46 I. A. 151.) has no bearing on this case which must be dealt with on the construction of the Acts and Regulations. Setrucherla Ramabhadraraju v. Maharaja of Jeypore (( 1919) L. R. 46 I. A. 151.) has no bearing on this case which must be dealt with on the construction of the Acts and Regulations. It is clear that both judges in the High Court in the present case agreed that so far as the Court in Gaya is concerned, it had original jurisdiction to entertain the suit had it been filed there originally. The Court in Gaya had not the original jurisdiction at all, but Sourendra Mohan Sinha v. Hart Prasad (( 1925) L. R. 52 I. A. 418.) did assume that a Court in the same position had jrisdiction. The point, however, was never argued or decided. The reasoning in the High Court judgment in the present case is wrong. The proper construction to be put upon s. 5A is that the special area and the special legislation in reference to it, was retained, and intended to be retained, and that what was provided by the Regulation of 1893 and the amending Regulation of 1908, was simply that it was intended to leave it as a special area, but that under the 1893 Regulation certain Courts were provided for the purpose of dealing with litigation in that area. It comes down to whether the Code of Civil Procedure has been extended to the Sonthal Parganas by the amendment in 1908. The only possible construction of s. 5A of the Regulation of 1872, as amended, is that one must see, after 1908, what Court established under the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, would have had jurisdiction to try a suit in relation to this land in the Sonthal Parganas if it had not been for the settlement proceedings continuing. It is idle to say that any Court which was appointed under the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, would have had jurisdiction. Sect. 5A must be read in relation to the legislation which was then being dealt with, and in 1893 there was an express provision that the Courts in the Sonthal Parganas could deal with suits of this kind. There is an appropriate Court under the Regulation of 1893, and that Regulation says that that Court shall have the power of dealing with a case which is filed in it in relation to land, and s. 5 of Regulation III. There is an appropriate Court under the Regulation of 1893, and that Regulation says that that Court shall have the power of dealing with a case which is filed in it in relation to land, and s. 5 of Regulation III. of 1872 says that if there is at the moment a settlement proceeding it has to go to the Settlement Officer and that Court cannot have jurisdiction. The judges of the High Court said that the amendment of Regulation III. of 1872 made in 1908 brought in the whole of the Code of Civil Procedure. It could not and did not do that. [Reference was made to Maha Prasad v. Ramani Mohan Singh. (( 1914) L. R. 41 I. A. 197)] In Sourendra Mohan Sinha v. Hart Prasad (( 1925) L. R. 52 I. A. 418.) the matter was neither raised nor argued ; it was apparently assumed that there was the jurisdiction in the outside Court if there was no settlement going on within the Sonthal Parganas. [Reference was made to Ledgard v. Bull. (( 1886) L. R. 13 I. A. 134.)] The Code of Civil Procedure is mentioned in the Schedule to Regulation III. of 1872 not as an Act applying in whole to the Sonthal Parganas, but only for the trial of a suit by a judge who is trying it under the Regulation of 1872. The Sonthal Parganas Act, 1855, the Regulation III. of 1872, the Sonthal Parganas Justice Regulation, 1893, and the amending Regulation of 1908, only provide Courts and jurisdiction within the Sonthal Parganas, and are not dealing with anything outside, and therefore, unless there is something which showed that the general jurisdiction of the Courts outside the Sonthal Parganas still remained to try such a suit as this, the amendment of 1908, bringing in the Code of Civil Procedure as functioning within the Sonthal Parganas by Courts within the Sonthal Parganas, would not affect the jurisdiction of Courts outside the Sonthal Parganas at all. That would have to come from some general law applying to such Courts as have jurisdiction within the Sonthal Parganas. [LORD ALNESS. I understand you to say that the main question in the case is one of the construction of a line or two in s. 5A—namely, what Court but for the provision in s. 5, would have had jurisdiction to try this suit ? [LORD ALNESS. I understand you to say that the main question in the case is one of the construction of a line or two in s. 5A—namely, what Court but for the provision in s. 5, would have had jurisdiction to try this suit ? You then say, only a Court within the Sonthal Parganas, Gaya is outside, and therefore the transfer is bad ?] Yes. De Gruyther K.C. and Rashid for the respondents. The argument has proceeded on an entirely wrong basis. Sect. 10 of the Sonthal Parganas Justice Regulation, 1893, is the one which now governs the position it says that the trial of the suits in the Courts of the District and Subordinate Judges in the Sonthal Parganas should be regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure as for the time being in force in the Bhagalpur district. Maha Prasad v. Ramani Mohan Singh (1) said that the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882 applied in the Sonthal Parganas to suits involving more than Rs.1000 ; the new Code of Civil Procedure was made in 1908, and that was also applied to the Sonthal Parganas by Regulation III. of 1872 as amended in 1908, but qualified to the following extent " Sects. 38-42, and s. 156, and Ord. xxi., rr. 4 to 9 in the First Sched. " ; and " the rest of the Code (only for the trial of suits referred to in s. 10 of the Sonthal Parganas Justice Regulation, 1893).” It is suggested that the words " and only for the trial of suits " limits the application of the Code of Civil Procedure to certain sections only, but it is difficult to know why. [Reference was made to ss. 16 and 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1908.] My propositions are—(a) Because of Lord Moultons judgment in Maha Prasad v. Ramani Mohan Singh (( 1914) L. R. 41 I. A. 197.) where there is property under settlement the suit is to be instituted in the Court of the Settlement Officer, although some or much of the property in suit is outside the Sonthal Parganas altogether. That is what Lord Moulton decided, (b) When the suit is so instituted the Settlement Officer has the power to transfer it, but he must transfer it to a Court established under the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, and to a Court which would have had jurisdiction to try the suit if there had been no settlement pending in regard to the property, (c) The Court of Gaya is a Court established under the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act—of that there is no doubt whatever—and it is a Court which would have had jurisdiction to try this suit but for the settlement actually pending. Sect. 5 of the amended Regulation III. of 1872 is only limited to settlement proceedings, it has no other limitations of any sort. That Court would have jurisdiction under the Code of Civil Procedure, and the question is, how has it been taken away ? In Sourendra Mohan Sinha v. Hari Prasad (1) the Board rightly or wrongly definitely decided, where there was no settlement, that the Bhagalpur Court did have jurisdiction. The Gaya Court would have had jurisdiction to try the suit if the land had not been under settlement. It was said that the matter was not argued in Sourendra Mohan Sinha v. Hari Prasad (( 1925) L. R. 52 I. A. 418, 429.), but there was not much room for it when one is told that the Code of 1882 does apply, and that from 1893 the Code of Civil Procedure as in force in Bhagalpur is to apply, and all that was done was to supersede the Code of 1882 by the Code of 1908. This is a Court established by the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, and it would have had jurisdiction to try this suit if there had been no settlement. Dunne K.C. replied. Under the Sonthal Parganas Act, 1855, the general laws and regulations outside the Sonthal Parganas, which applied to India generally, were excluded from application in the Sonthal Parganas unless expressly included. Dunne K.C. replied. Under the Sonthal Parganas Act, 1855, the general laws and regulations outside the Sonthal Parganas, which applied to India generally, were excluded from application in the Sonthal Parganas unless expressly included. Lord Moulton held expressly in Maha Prasad v. Ramani Mohan Singh (( 1914) L. R. 41 I. A. 197.) that the proviso to s. 2 of the Act of 1855 did not in regard to suits of over Rs.1000 include as applicable within the Sonthal Parganas general laws and regulations which applied outside so far as procedure and general applicability was concerned, but only related to substantive law as applying to the sort of personal law of the parties. Whether he was right or wrong in that construction, the Legislature for the Sonthal Parganas, legislating as a special Legislature for the Sonthal Parganas, passed the Regulations of 1872, 1893, and 1908 purely in relation to the Sonthal Parganas itself. The introduction of the Code of Civil Procedure for the trial of suits within the Sonthal Parganas does not touch the question in issue at all; it does not enlarge or introduce any jurisdiction in the Sonthal Parganas under the Code of Civil Procedure that must come from some law outside, and therefore the whole question turns upon the construction of the Act of 1855 as to whether the general laws and regulations in India generally were excluded under this Act, and if so, it follows that the Code of Civil Procedure is one. Sect. 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure has no application. Sect. 10 of the Sonthal Parganas Justice Regulation, 1893, and the Schedule annexed to the Sonthal Parganas Regulation III. of 1872, as amended, make the Code of Civil Procedure (except ss. 38 to 42 and s. 156, and Order xxi., rr.4 to 9) only applicable to the procedure during the hearing of a suit instituted in accordance with the regulations. May 4. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR SHADI LAL. The suit out of which this appeal arises was instituted in the Court of the Settlement Officer of the Sonthal Parganas, to enforce two mortgages comprising landed property, the major portion of which was situated in the Sonthal Parganas, and the remainder in the Gaya district. May 4. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR SHADI LAL. The suit out of which this appeal arises was instituted in the Court of the Settlement Officer of the Sonthal Parganas, to enforce two mortgages comprising landed property, the major portion of which was situated in the Sonthal Parganas, and the remainder in the Gaya district. The plaintiffs, who were the mortgagees, submitted with their plaint an application to the Settlement Officer asking him to transfer the suit for trial to the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Gaya ; and on this application he transferred the suit to the District Judge of Gaya, who transferred it to the Subordinate Judge of Gaya. When the case came on for hearing before the Subordinate Judge, the defendants challenged his jurisdiction to entertain the suit; but their objection was overruled, not only by the trial judge, but also by the High Court at Patna to whom the case was taken on revision. From the judgment delivered by the High Court this appeal has, by special leave, been brought by one of the defendants ; and the question of jurisdiction has again been debated by the learned counsel for the parties. The Sonthal Parganas, which originally formed part of the Presidency of Bengal, and are now included in the province of Bihar and Orissa, were considered to be a backward tract; and it was, therefore, deemed expedient that that territory should be governed, not by the general laws and regulations in force in the Presidency, but by such laws as may be specially enacted for, or extended to, it. To carry out this object a statute entitled the Sonthal Parganas Act (XXXVII. of 1855) was passed by the Governor-General of India in Council, providing (inter alia) for the administration of civil and criminal justice by the officer or officers, under whose superintendence and jurisdiction the district of Sonthal Parganas was placed. The law as enacted by that statute was subsequently amended and supplemented by various Acts and Regulations, but their Lordships consider it unnecessary to enter upon an examination of the history of the legislation governing the constitution of the courts established for the administration of civil justice in the district, or of the laws to be followed by them. The law as enacted by that statute was subsequently amended and supplemented by various Acts and Regulations, but their Lordships consider it unnecessary to enter upon an examination of the history of the legislation governing the constitution of the courts established for the administration of civil justice in the district, or of the laws to be followed by them. Their Lordships will deal only with the law which has a direct bearing upon the question of jurisdiction raised by the appeal. It may be mentioned at the outset that at the time of the institution of the suit a settlement was being made of the district of Sonthal Parganas ; and, as the plaintiffs sought to enforce their claim by a sale of the mortgaged property, including the land situated in that district, they filedtheir plaint before the officer making the settlement. This was done in compliance with s. 5 of the Sonthal Parganas Settlement Regulation (III. of 1872), which, as re-enacted in a modified form by the Sonthal Parganas Settlement (Amendment) Regulation (III. of 1908), reads as follows — " 5.—(1.) From the date on which, under s. 9, the Lieutenant-Governor declares, by a notification in the Calcutta Gazette, that a settlement shall be made of the whole or any part of the Sonthal Parganas, until the date on which such settlement is declared, by a like notification, to have been completed, no suit shall lie in any Civil Court established under the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, in regard to— (a) any land or any interest in, or arising out of, land, or (b) the rent or profits of any land, or (c) any village headship or other office connected with any land, in the area covered by such first-mentioned notification ; nor shall any Civil Court proceed with the hearing of any such suit which may be pending before it. " (2.) Between the dates referred to in sub-s. 1, all suits of the nature therein described shall be filed before or transferred to an officer appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor under s. 2 of the Sonthal Parganas Act, 1855, or s-Io of this Regulation, according as the Lieutenant-Governor may from time to time direct; and such officer shall hear and, even though during the hearing the settlement may be declared to have been completed, determine them." It must be observed that the Civil Courts referred to in sub-s. 1 were competent to hear all civil suits in which the matter in dispute exceeded Rs.1000 in value ; but they were deprived of their jurisdiction in respect of the suits relating to lands in the Sonthal Parganas pending the completion of the settlement. Such suits were, as enacted by sub-s. 2, to be heard and determined by an officer appointed under s. 2 of the Sonthal Parganas Act, 1855, or by an officer appointed under s. 10 of the Regulation to make the settlement. The officer thus invested with special jurisdiction may, however, consider it desirable that a suit of the description mentioned in sub-s. 1 should be tried by an ordinary Civil Court; and he has, therefore, been authorized to transfer it to such Court for trial. This authority is conferred by s. 5A, which, so far as is material to the question before their Lordships, is in these terms— " 5A.—(1.) Notwithstanding anything contained in s. 5, whenever it appears to any officer empowered thereby to try any such suit to be just and expedient that the suit or any issue arising therein should be tried by a Civil Court established under the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, which but for that section, would have had jurisdiction to try the suit, he may, either on the prayer of the parties or of his own motion, but subject to the control of the officers to whom he is subordinate, make a certificate to that effect and transfer the record, if any, to such Court. " (2.) On receipt of any such certificate and on payment of such court-fees as would have been payable if the suit had been originally filed in such Court (if the said fees have not already been paid), the Court shall proceed to hear and determine such suit or issue as if the suit had been originally instituted therein.” It was in exercise of the power conferred by sub-s. 1 of s. 5A that the Settlement Officer, before whom this suit was filed, recorded a certificate to the effect that it appeared to him just and expedient that it should be tried by a competent Civil Court in the Gay a District, and sent the record of the case to the District Judge, Gaya, who transferred it to the Subordinate Judge of that district. There can be no doubt, and indeed it is not disputed, that the Settlement Officer was entitled to make an order that the suit should be heard, not by him, but by a competent Civil Court. The rule to determine the Civil Court competent to try it is laid down in the sub-section itself. That Court must satisfy two conditions (1.) it must be a Civil Court established under the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 (which may be conveniently referred to hereinafter as the Civil Courts Act) ; and (2.) it must be a Court which, but for s. 5 of the Regulation, would have had jurisdiction to try the suit. It is argued for the appellant that both these conditions are satisfied by the Court of the Subordinate Judge established under the Civil Courts Act within the Sonthal Parganas, but not by any court established outside that district. The first part of this argument is unassailable, but the second part, which seeks to deny the jurisdiction of the Gaya Court, cannot be accepted. It is beyond dispute that the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Gaya has been established under the Civil Courts Act, and the crucial question is whether that Court fulfils the second condition. Now, the mortgage deeds include, as already stated, lands situated, not only in the Sonthal Parganas, but also in the Gaya District. What is the ordinary rule for determining the court which can take cognizance of a suit for immovable property situated within the local limits of two or more tribunals ? Now, the mortgage deeds include, as already stated, lands situated, not only in the Sonthal Parganas, but also in the Gaya District. What is the ordinary rule for determining the court which can take cognizance of a suit for immovable property situated within the local limits of two or more tribunals ? The answer is furnished by s. 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act V. of 1908), which provides that where a suit is to obtain relief respecting immovable property situate within the jurisdiction of different courts, the suit may be instituted in any court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any portion of the property is situate. The plaintiffs maintain that, as a portion of the mortgaged property was situate in the district of Gaya, they could, in the absence of s. 5 of the Sonthal Parganas Settlement Regulation, institute their suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Gaya, and were not bound to institute it in the Court of the Subordinate Judge in the Sonthal Parganas. But, as laid down in Setrucherla Ramabhadraraju v. Maharaja of Jeypore (( 1919) L. R. 46 I. A. 151.), the choice given by s. 17 can be utilized only if the Code applies to both the Courts. It is incontrovertible that the whole of the Code is applicable to the Gaya Court, but it is urged that the section in question has not been extended to the Court of the Subordinate Judge in the Sonthal Parganas. It is necessary to consider whether there is any justification for this contention. The learned counsel for the appellant argues that the Sonthal Parganas Act (XXXVII. of 1855), which removed the district of the Sonthal Parganas from the operation of the general laws and regulations governing the Presidency of Bengal, specified only certain laws which were extended to that district, and that s. 17 or its predecessor is not to be found in that list. It is true that that statute provided a complete code of the laws which then governed the district, but it did not prevent an addition to that list of other laws specially made applicable to the territory thereafter. Now, the Sonthal Parganas Justice Regulation (V. of 1893) introduced important changes in the law relating to the administration of justice in that district. Now, the Sonthal Parganas Justice Regulation (V. of 1893) introduced important changes in the law relating to the administration of justice in that district. It added to the special courts already existing therein a new class of courts— namely, the Court of the District Judge and the Courts of Subordinate Judges which were established under the Civil Courts Act, and expressly provided by s. 10 that the trial of the suits in those courts should be regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure as for the time being in force in the Bhagalpur District. The Code, including s. 17, is undoubtedly in force in the Bhagalpur District, and consequently its operation extends also to the courts established in the Sonthal Parganas under the Civil Courts Act. It is said, however, that only that portion of the Code which regulates the trial of suits has been extended to the Sonthal Parganas, and that the word " trial" does not include jurisdiction to take cognizance of the suit. There is, in the opinion of their Lordships, no foundation for this argument. In their view, the provision that " trial " of suits is to be " regulated " by the Code includes all the essential matters governing the hearing of a cause, including the preliminary matter of the competence of the court to entertain it. The Code therefore supplies,, not only what may be called procedural rules, but also the rules governing jurisdiction. It follows that s. 17 is applicable to the Court of the Subordinate Judge in the Sonthal Parganas, as well as to the court at Gaya; and, if s. 5 of the Regulation had not been enacted, the plaintiffs could have instituted this suit in the Gaya court, and that court would have been competent to try it. Both the conditions necessary for the exercise of the power of transfer conferred upon the Settlement Officer have, therefore, been satisfied. The argument is then advanced that it was not contemplated by the Legislature that suits relating to lands in the district of Sonthal Parganas, while under settlement, should be heard and determined by a Civil Court established outside that district. The argument is then advanced that it was not contemplated by the Legislature that suits relating to lands in the district of Sonthal Parganas, while under settlement, should be heard and determined by a Civil Court established outside that district. The intention of the Legislature must be gathered from the language used by it, and the expression " a Civil Court established under the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, is wide enough to include a Civil Court established in the district of Gaya. The court in which the suit is now pending was established under that Act, and there is nothing in the language of s. 5A of the Regulation to show that that court was excluded from its operation. Moreover, the phrase " Civil Court established under the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887," is used, not only in sub-s. 1 of s. 5A, but also in sub-s. 1 of s. 5 ; and it should have the same meaning in both the sub-sections. It cannot be disputed that that expression, as used in sub-s. 1 of s. 5, must include a court established under the Civil Courts Act outside the Sonthal Parganas ; as it is the only law which has been invoked to deprive such a court of the jurisdiction which it might have under the Code of Civil Procedure to try a suit relating to land in the Sonthal Parganas during the pendency of the settlement. It follows that a court established outside that district must come within the ambit of the same expression as used in sub-s. 1 of s. 5A. In other words, the latter sub-section is calculated to remove the ban imposed by the former sub-section. Lastly, it is contended that, even if the Settlement Officer had removed the bar to the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge at Gaya by making a certificate under s. 5A, sub-s. 1, he had no authority to make an order binding upon the Subordinate Judge, who was, in no way, subordinate to him. But the language of the statute empowers the Settlement Officer to transfer the case to a competent Civil Court established under the Civil Courts Act, and the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Gaya is certainly such a court. But the language of the statute empowers the Settlement Officer to transfer the case to a competent Civil Court established under the Civil Courts Act, and the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Gaya is certainly such a court. It is true that that court is not subordinate to the Settlement Officer, and may not be bound to obey his order. But this is a mere matter of comity between the two courts, and cannot affect the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge. If the Gaya court had refused to receive the plaint, the plaintiffs could have moved the High Court, to which it was subordinate, to direct it, under s. 22 read with s. 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to entertain the suit. The fact remains, however, that the Subordinate Judge of Gaya has received the plaint, and, in their Lordships opinion, he has jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit. For the foregoing reasons their Lordships concur in the conclusion reached by the High Court. They will, therefore, humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed, with costs.