JUDGMENT D.N. Mitter, J. - This is an appeal against the judgment of the Additional District Judge of Sylhet, dated the 28th of March, 1935, by which he revoked the grant of probate of the Will of one Ram Sundar Pal on the ground that the proceedings were defective in substance as there was non-service of notice on the creditor of the son of the deceased, Ram Sundar. It appears that Ram Sundar died sometime before the 9th June, 1922. He died, it is stated, on the 24th April, 1922, having executed, as alleged, a Will about 5 days before his death, on the 19th April, 1922. Ram Sundar had certain shares in a Tea Company and after his death on the 9th June, 1922, his son Rajani Kanta Pal applied for transfer of these shares to himself-of 90 shares of the Cachar Native Joint Stock Company, Limited, which were held by his father Ram Sundar. This transfer was made. On the 1st September, 1926; Rajani Kanta Pal mortgaged his shares to the Sylhet Loan Company who obtained a preliminary decree on the mortgage on the 6th January, 1933. Then followed a final decree on the 1st June, 1933, as is evidenced by the two exhibits (Exts. 2 and 3) which have been proved in this case. The Company purchased these shares in execution of the mortgage decree. In the meantime, it appears that on the 25th August, 1932, one Gopes Chandra Dutt applied for probate of a Will alleged to have been executed by the deceased Ram Sundar Pal. He obtained an order by which probate was granted of the Will on the 12th November, 1932 and probate was actually issued to him on the 26th October, 1933. The present application out of which this appeal arises was by the Secretary of the Sylhet Loan Company for revocation of the grant of the probate. 2. Two grounds have been mentioned as constituting " just cause " for the revocation of probate within the meaning of sec. 263 of the Indian Succession Act of 1925. The first ground is that the proceeding to obtain the grant is defective in substance, as no special citation was issued on the creditor, the Sylhet Loan Co., the Respondents before us; and the second ground on which revocation was sought for was that the Will of which probate was obtained was forged. The first ground is that the proceeding to obtain the grant is defective in substance, as no special citation was issued on the creditor, the Sylhet Loan Co., the Respondents before us; and the second ground on which revocation was sought for was that the Will of which probate was obtained was forged. The learned District Judge revoked the probate on the ground that no notice was issued on the creditor and he directed that it will now be necessary for the applicant for probate to prove the Will again in solemn form. It appears that the matter was heard ex parte, the Appellant before us not being able to be present with all his witnesses and the pleader having withdrawn from the conduct of the suit or proceeding. 3. It is against this order that the present appeal has been brought. Before the learned District Judge a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the application for revocation was taken, namely, that such application did not lie at the instance of the creditor. As this contention was contrary to the authorities which were cited before him, Mr. Hemendra Kumar Das who appears for the Appellant did not and could not successfully press this point about the incompetency of the creditor to maintain this application. That such an application for revocation of a grant can lie at the instance of the Respondents who have acquired an interest by way of mortgage in the shares which belonged to the deceased estate, is amply supported by authority. We may refer in this connection to the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of Rajah Nilmoni Singh Deo Bahadoor v. Umanath Mookerjee L. R. 10 I. A. 80: s. c. I. L.J B, 10 CaL 19 (1883). where it was doubted where a creditor of one of the testator's heirs who has attached a portion of the testator's estate in respect of his debtor's right, title and interest therein can oppose the grant of probate or apply to have it revoked at least in a case which is not founded on the ground that the probate has been obtained in fraud of creditors. The question was not really decided by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council for the simple reason that it was not necessary for their Lordships to decide that question. The question was not really decided by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council for the simple reason that it was not necessary for their Lordships to decide that question. Sir Richard Couch in delivering judgment in that case made the following observations which might be usefully quoted here. At page 87 of the report last paragraph Sir Richard Couch stated as follows: The case in which this judgment was given was that of a purchaser from the heir, but no distinction is made between a purchaser and an attaching creditor. Assuming that a purchaser can oppose the grant of a probate, or apply to have it revoked (which their Lordships do not decide), they enter, taint grave doubts whether an attaching creditor can do so, at least in a case which is not founded on the ground that the 'probate has been obtained in fraud of creditors. But as, after hearing the Appellant's counsel upon the question of the execution of the will, their Lordships did not consider it necessary to hear the counsel for the Respondents, the question whether the Rajesh could apply for the revocation of the "probate has not been argued before them, and therefore they give no final opinion upon it. 4. The matter has been considered, however in subsequent decisions in this Court and we have been referred to the decision in the case of Mokshadayini Dassi v. Karnadhar Mandal 19 C. W.N. 1108(1914)., which was also cited before the learned District Judge, which lays down the proposition that a purchaser who had acquired by purchase an interest in the properties left by the deceased, was entitled to be heard in the proceedings for grant of probate and that he was also entitled to make an application for revocation of the grant on the ground of just cause. In support of this decision Mr. Justice Mookerjee and Mr. Justice Beachcroft referred to an English case, namely, the case of Lindsay v. Lindsay 42 L. J. (Prob.) 32 (1872). which we have examined where it was ruled that the person entitled to intervene in a proceeding for revocation of letters of administration or probate need not prove that he had an interest in the estate of the deceased at the time of his death. An interest acquired subsequently by purchase of a part of the estate of the deceased is sufficient. 5. An interest acquired subsequently by purchase of a part of the estate of the deceased is sufficient. 5. In the present case there is no question that the Respondents, The Sylhet Loan Co., Ltd., had a mortgage executed in their favour by Rajani Kanta Pal, the son of the testator, in respect of the 90 shares in the joint stock company and as such he was entitled, as alleged, to maintain an application for revocation. We affirm the finding of the Subordinate Judge on this point. 6. The next ground upon which the judgment of the learned Judge is attacked is that the learned Judge is wrong in revoking the grant on the mere ground that there was non-service of notice on the creditor in the probate case and that this was a just cause, Under sec. 283 of the Indian Succession Act all that the creditor can expect is that there should be a general citation as he is one of the creditors tow whom a portion of the estate has been pledged. He is not entitled to any special citation which is provided for in secs. 228 and 235 of the Indian Suction Act. It has not been established in this case that no such general citation as is required by sec. 283 was issued. On the other hand, there is a presumption with regard to the regularity of the proceedings before the probate Court, having regard to the provisions of sec. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. No one has deposed in the present case that general citations were not issued. It seems, therefore, that the learned Judge was not right in revoking the probate on the ground that there was non-service of notice on the creditor, non-service meaning apparently that there was no special citation issued. The order, therefore,' revoking the probate must be set aside. 7. At the same time, as has already been stated, as the revocation was applied for on the other ground, namely, that the Will was a forgery, the learned Judge will proceed to determine this question and take evidence which may be furnished on both sides on the issue as to whether the Will was a genuine Will and was duly executed in accordance with law. If he is satisfied that the Will was a forgery he will revoke the probate proceedings. If he is satisfied that the Will was a forgery he will revoke the probate proceedings. On the other hand if it is proved that the Will was duly executed, and attested by the deceased Ramsundar, the probate will stand. There will be no order as to costs. Patterson, J. I agree.