JUDGMENT Jack, J. - This appeal has arisen out of a suit by the Plaintiff for a declaration that the sale of his patni taluq No. 1989, Hari Banu, held on 17th November, 1930, in the Noakhali collectorate was collusive and fraudulent and was not enforcible against him. His case is that he sent the rent of the September kist of 1930 to the cutchery of the zamindars, Defendants Nos. 1 and 2, through his son Defendant No. 4, but that his other son Defendant No. 3, with the object of getting the property in his life-time, got it put up to sale in collusion with the officers of the zamindars and purchased it himself in the benami of Defendant No. 5, at very low price and that the notices and proclamations of the sale were suppressed and not served according to the rules laid down in the patni Regulation. The Defendants maintain that the processes were all served as required by law and that there was no collusion or fraud in the sale of the taluks and that the suit is not maintainable in the form in which it was brought and without a prayer for setting aside the sale, that ad valorem Court-fees should be paid and the Defendant No. 5 purchased the property for himself and not as a benamdar. 2. Various issues were framed and among them were the issues, " whether the suit was properly stamped," and " whether the suit is maintainable in its present form." The trial Court found these issues against the Plaintiff and dismissed the suit. The lower appellate Court agreed with the findings of the trial Court on these issues and dismissed the appeal. The lower Appellate Court did not enter into the merits of the case but the trial Court found that there was irregularity in the service of notice as required by the patni Regulation and that this was sufficient to vitiate the patni sale. 3. In this appeal it is contended that the learned Judge was wrong in holding that the suit was not in the proper form and secondly, that the Courts below were wrong in not allowing amendment of the plaint. Under sec. 3. In this appeal it is contended that the learned Judge was wrong in holding that the suit was not in the proper form and secondly, that the Courts below were wrong in not allowing amendment of the plaint. Under sec. 14 of the patni sale law it is competent to the party desirous of contesting the right of the zamindar to make the sale whether on the ground of there having been no balance due or any other ground, to sue the zamindar, for the reversal of the same, and upon establishing a sufficient plea to obtain a decree with full costs and damages. This is a special procedure laid down in connection with a patni tenure. The procedure to be adopted and the remedy which can be obtained in cases of irregularity in the sale or on any other ground are laid down in the Regulation and it has been held that in cases of this sort the only remedy for the Plaintiff is to bring a suit under sec. 14 of the patni sale law. In support of this the case of Suresh Chandra Mukhopadhya v. Akkori Singh ILR 20 Cal. 746 (1893) has been referred to. This decision is followed in the case of Nalinakha Sinha v. Ram Taran Pal 46 C.L.J. 51 (1927) where it was held that the sale held under the patni Regulation can only be set aside by a suit under sec. 14 of that Regulation within one year under Sch. (1), Art. 12 (d) of the Limitation Act, and cannot be challenged by proceedings of a different character. This was a suit by a purchaser in a previous patni sale and his assignee against the zamindar for a declaration that the patni sale was illegal and void and for confirmation of possession. No doubt, the circumstances of that case were different from those in the present case, but the principle remains the same. In the case of Lakshmijan v. Nizumia 36 C.W.N. 552 (1931) it was held that non-observance of the formalities required by the Patni Taluk Regulation makes a sale held under that Regulation voidable and not altogether void and that the invalidity of such a sale cannot be raised by way of defence. In this case they followed the decision of the case in Ramsona Chowdhury v. Naba Kumar Sinha Chowdhury 16 C.W.N. 805 (1911). In this case they followed the decision of the case in Ramsona Chowdhury v. Naba Kumar Sinha Chowdhury 16 C.W.N. 805 (1911). This would bring in the applicability of sec. 42 of the Specific Relief Act. Since the Patni Regulation lays down that a suit must be brought for the reversal of the sale under sec. 14 of the Regulation, it follows that a suit like the present for a declaration that the sale was collusive and fraudulent without bringing a suit for setting aside the sale is not maintainable under sec. 42 of the Specific Relief Art. Where a suit is brought merely for declaration that a sale was fraudulent, after the declaration has been obtained the purchaser at the sale will be entitled to bring a suit to establish his title and the fact that the sale had been declared not to be effective on account of irregularity or fraud would not be a defence if the sale was not set aside, since the irregularity or fraudulence of the sale could not be raised by way of defence. In this case, it is clear that there was actually no finding of fraud. The trial Court found that there were irregularities which vitiated the sale. The Appellant maintains that since he was in possession of the property, there was no need for a prayer to set aside the sale. But in view of the wording of the sec. 14 of the Patni Regulation it is clear that he was bound to bring a suit for setting aside the sale. 4. As to the ground raised in this appeal that an amendment of the plaint should have been allowed to make it include an application to set aside the sale, it appears that the amendment was applied for at the very close of the suit. It was argued on the 19th of April, the application for amendment was made on the 21st April and the Plaintiff even then asked for fourteen days' time to pay the additional Court-fees. The plaint was filed on the 15th December, 1930, and in the written statement filed on the 21st March, 1931, it was specifically stated that the suit was not maintainable in its present form, and that the Plaintiff should bring a suit for setting aside the sale after paying additional court-fees. The issues were raised on this point in 1931. The plaint was filed on the 15th December, 1930, and in the written statement filed on the 21st March, 1931, it was specifically stated that the suit was not maintainable in its present form, and that the Plaintiff should bring a suit for setting aside the sale after paying additional court-fees. The issues were raised on this point in 1931. on this ground and also on the ground that two of the Defendants were absent and did not contest the suit, the application for amendment was rejected. Whether an amendment should be allowed or not is a matter for the discretion of the Court which should not ordinarily be interfered with. On behalf of the Appellant the case of Charan Das v. Amir Khan ILR 48 Cal. 110 : S.C. 25 C.W.N. 289 (P. C.) (1920) has been referred to in which their Lordships of the Privy Council allowed such an amendment. There were special circumstances in that case and although the amendment was allowed, Lord Buckmaster said: But for the unfortunate division of judicial opinion upon the point the present appeal would not be entertained, for the power exercised is undoubtedly one within the discretion of the Judge, and all that can be urged is that his discretion was exercised upon a wrong principle and that it ought, therefore, be reversed. So that even in that case their Lordships would not have allowed the amendment, had there not been a difference in opinion in the Courts below. In the present case both the Courts below have agreed in refusing to grant the amendment. In the case of Nalinakha Sinha v. Ram Taran Pal 46 C.L.J. 51 (1927) it was held that the amendment should not have been allowed in a similar case, where the Plaintiff brought a suit in the wrong form without any misapprehension. In that case the learned Judge remarked: Suits for setting aside a patni sale are quite common and it is not explained why the suit was brought in such a form or why no proper amendment was asked for in the trial Court inspite of an objection raised by the Defendants. In that case the learned Judge remarked: Suits for setting aside a patni sale are quite common and it is not explained why the suit was brought in such a form or why no proper amendment was asked for in the trial Court inspite of an objection raised by the Defendants. As a rule we are always willing to allow amendment of pleadings in a proper case and might have allowed it in this case in order to make this a suit under the Patni Regulation, had not the rights of others been prejudicially affected. 5. In the present case also, the rights of the purchaser were prejudicially affected because the period of limitation under the Patni Regulation was one year and the amendment was prayed for after the expiry of that period. So that if the amendment is allowed, it would be interfering with the rights of the purchaser. The fact that the purchaser is a party to the suit does not affect the matter. There seems therefore to be no good reason why we should interfere with the discretion exercised by the Courts below in refusing to amend the plaint. 6. This appeal is, accordingly, dismissed with costs--two sets--herring-fee, two gold mohurs. Edgley, J. 7. I agree that this appeal must be dismissed with costs. 8. The Patni Sale Regulation was drawn up in the interests of the revenue administration of the province and from the language of the Regulation, it is clear that the intention of its framers was very strictly to limit the circumstances in which a patni sale could be set aside. It was therefore provided in sec. 14 of the Regulation that persons who desired on any ground to challenge a sale of this nature and to obtain its reversal should be competent to bring a suit under that particular section. There is no doubt that the expression " for the reversal of the same " includes setting aside of the sale. If, therefore, it is possible for a person who desires to challenge such a sale to bring a suit under sec. 14 of the Patni Regulation, he is not entitled to any relief unless he proceeds in accordance with the provisions of this section. 9. If, therefore, it is possible for a person who desires to challenge such a sale to bring a suit under sec. 14 of the Patni Regulation, he is not entitled to any relief unless he proceeds in accordance with the provisions of this section. 9. In the case out of which this appeal crises, what the Plaintiff, in effect, desired to do was to set aside the patni sale by an indirect method, that is, by obtaining a declaration that the sale was void by reason of collusion and fraud on the part of the Defendants. This the Plaintiff was not entitled to do as it was not only possible, but also incumbent on him if he desired relief in this matter to bring a suit under sec. 14 of Patni Sale Law. In these circumstances, I am of opinion that the Courts below have taken a correct view With regard to this matter. 10. With regard to the question of the amendment of the plaint, in view of the attitude adopted by the Defendants in the first Court, it was the duty of the Plaintiff to apply for the amendment of his plaint, at any rate, as soon as the Defendants' written statements had been filed and I do not think that this is a suitable case for the Court to exercise its discretion in a matter of this sort. The learned District Judge did not apparently, consider it necessary to go into the merits of the case but, in considering the question as to whether or not he should exercise his discretion as regards the amendment of the plaint, it was certainly open to him to consider the peculiar circumstances of the case. In this respect, it is significant that the learned Subordinate Judge's judgment contained no finding to the effect that the sale was in any way vitiated by fraud but he seems to have been of the opinion that there had been certain irregularities with regard to the service of various notices. In this respect, it is significant that the learned Subordinate Judge's judgment contained no finding to the effect that the sale was in any way vitiated by fraud but he seems to have been of the opinion that there had been certain irregularities with regard to the service of various notices. In any case, even if there had been such irregularities, it is difficult to see how the Plaintiff could have been prejudiced thereby in view of the finding at which the learned Subordinate Judge arrived to the effect that the Plaintiff himself was present at the sale and there was reason to believe that he was a party to the bid made at first by his son, the Defendant No. 3, and then by the Defendant No. 5. It is, therefore, in my opinion, perfectly clear that this was not a case in which the Court should have exercised its discretion to allow the amendment of the plaint in the manner desired by the Plaintiff.