JUDGMENT D.N. Mitter, J. - This is an appeal by the Plaintiffs who are wards of Court, through their manager, Babu Satya Ranjan Majumdar, from a decision of the Subordinate Judge, 1st Court, Bakargunj, dated the 24th September, 1934, by which their suit was dismissed on the preliminary ground that the provisions of sec. 80 of the CPC have not been complied with. It appears that the defendant No. 1, Ram chandra Banerjee 144 (150) was appointed a Receiver to the properties of a gentleman of the name of Kadha Charan Roy Chowdhury and after his death which took place on the 1st of Chaitra, 1334, B. S. to the properties of the Plaintiffs by the Subordinate Judge in Title Suit No. 40 of 1927 and the said Receiver acted as such from the 3rd September, 1927, to the 20th January, 1929. The suit in which this appeal arises was brought by the Plaintiff for account against Defendant No. 1 as well as for recovery of certain sum lost to Plaintiff's estate by his negligence. To the suit were impleaded a large number of other Defendants some of whom acted as Tehsildars and others who acted as pleaders in connection with the estate. On an examination of the accounts which the manager was directed to submit it appears that certain sums had been lost to the estate by reason of the negligence of the Defendant No. 1 and the Plaintiff alleges that on examination of the accounts and other papers submitted by Defendant No. 1 and Defendants Nos. 2 to 14 and 34 to the manager under the orders of the 1st Subordinate Judge, it appeared that they had taken advances from the estate fund, overdrawn salaries, did not pay cash balances in their hands, incurred expenses for Punyaha and Bastu Puja, repairs, etc., without the sanction of the Court, overdrawn travelling expenses, did not credit amounts realised by granting formal receipts and also allowed the recovery of some amounts due to the estate to be barred by limitation, and in these and various ways, so the plaint alleges in paragraph 7, the Receiver and his subordinates caused immense loss to the estate by negligence and misconduct. 2. The plaint in this case appends a Schedule (Sch. A) in which were given the dates on which the papers; were submitted by these different Defendants. 2. The plaint in this case appends a Schedule (Sch. A) in which were given the dates on which the papers; were submitted by these different Defendants. It is further alleged in the plaint that the manager submitted two reports to the Court on the 7th February, 1930 and the 2nd May, 1930, in which all the particulars of the negligence and misconduct and loss caused in other ways were given and prayed that the Receiver might be made liable for the sum of Rs. 13,333-11-11 and Rs. 742-3-2 pies. It appears that as a result of the examination of the accounts of the subordinate officers of Defendant No. 1, exceptions were also taken on behalf of the Plaintiffs to the accounts of the Receiver which were submitted to the Court. Notices were issued to Defendant No. 1 to state the objections to the report submitted by the manager. The Defendant No. 1 filed his objection and the Court, after hearing both sides, passed an order on the 5th January, 1931, making the Receiver liable for an amount of Rs. 822-0-3 pies and as regards the other items observed that the proper course for the Plaintiff was to sue the Receiver for the purpose of establishing his liability and that the same was foreign in considering the passing of accounts and also observed that the Receiver could not be liable at that stage for the negligence or inaction of the Tehsildars or for the advances to the employees of the estate. (See paragraph 10 of the plaint). The plaint proceeds to state that on a further examination of the accounts of the Receiver in the light of the observations made by the Subordinte Judge appeared that the Defendant No. 1 was liable for the sum of Rs. 3,937-3-9 as detailed in Schedule B for sums not accounted for and for loss to the estate due to his negligence and misconduct of the subordinates appointed by him and who acted under him and the unauthorised advances made by Defendant No. 1 to the other Defendants. On this head the Defendant No. 1 was sought to be made liable for the further sum of Rs. 1,770-2-1 which were detailed in Schedule C of the plaint. 3. On this head the Defendant No. 1 was sought to be made liable for the further sum of Rs. 1,770-2-1 which were detailed in Schedule C of the plaint. 3. The plaint prayed for a declaration that the Receiver was liable for accounts for the period between the 3rd September, 1927, to the 20th January, 1929, and it asked for a decree for the two sums which have already been mentioned, namely, Rs. 1,744-4-11 and Rs. 3,937-3-9 p. 4. In the written statement of the Defendant No. 1, amongst other defences to the suit, the plea was taken that the suit could not be maintained as there was no proper notice under sec. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On this defence the issue which was framed was issue No. 3 which is in these terms: Has notice under sec. 80 C.P. Code been duly served upon Defendant No. 1 ? If so, is the notice legal, valid and sufficient '? Is the suit barred under sec. 80 C.P. Code ? 5. The Subordinate Judge came to the conclusion that notice had been properly served, but he held that the notice was not valid, legal and sufficient and he dismissed the suit. 6. It is against this decree dismissing the suit that the present appeal has been brought and the only question which emerges for determination in this appeal is whether the Subordinate Judge's conclusion as to the invalidity of the notice is right or not. The Subordinate Judge rested his conclusion that the notice was not legal and valid on two grounds. In the first place, he held that there was not a sufficient description of the Plaintiffs, nor was their place of residence stated in the notice and that, therefore, the notice was bad and he relied upon several decisions of this Court, in particular, on the decision of Sir George Rankin, C. J. (as he then was) in the case of Prasaddas Sen v. K.S. Bonnerjee I. L. R. 57 Cal. 1127 (1929). 7. The second ground on which he rested his conclusion in this behalf is that the Plaintiff's claim in the notice was for an amount of Rs. 11,687 odd, whereas their claim in the plaint was Rs. 5,707-5-10 and in the opinion of the Subordinate Judge this was a substantial variation between the notice and the plaint. He accordingly dismissed the suit. 8. 11,687 odd, whereas their claim in the plaint was Rs. 5,707-5-10 and in the opinion of the Subordinate Judge this was a substantial variation between the notice and the plaint. He accordingly dismissed the suit. 8. Dr. Mukherji who appears for the Appellant has attacked these grounds on which the Subordinate Judge held that the notice under sec. 80 was bad. With regard to the first point, namely, whether there has been a sufficient compliance with the statute where the place of residence and the description of the Plaintiff is not given, it is contended on behalf of the Appellants, that in the circumstances of the present case, the notice had complied with this part of the statute. The notice is printed at page 1, Part II of the paper-book. It is addressed to the ex-Receiver of the Madhabpasha Estate, Defendant No. 1, and it is sent by Babu Upendra Nath Banerjee who is the manager of the Court of Wards as the next friend of Baidyanath Rai Chowdhury, Tinkori Rai Chowdhury and Bholanath Rai Chowdhury. This notice was sent by registered post and in the postal acknowledgment which has been marked as Ex. 3, (see page 14, Part II) the sender's name and address is given as manager, Court of Wards, M. L. Group, Barisal. Having regard to the fact that the Defendant was a previous Receiver in respect of the estate of Radha Charan Rai Chowdhury in Madhabpasha in Mortgage Suit No. 40 of 1927, we think that the description which was given in this notice was a sufficient description of the Plaintiffs who were described as wards of Court and the notice was sent in the name of the next friend Upendra Nath Banerjee who was the manager of the Court of Wards. The postal acknowledgment which was sent along with the notice gave a sufficient description of the address of the manager of the Court of Wards, M. L. Group, Barisal. We are satisfied, therefore, that there has been a substantial compliance with the statute. 9. The case which has been relied on, namely, the case of Prasaddas Sen v. K. S. Bonnerjee I. L. R. 57 Cal. 1127 (1929). is obviously distinguishable on facts. An examination of that case will show that there, the name of the Plaintiff was not given as would appear from the judgment of Mr. 9. The case which has been relied on, namely, the case of Prasaddas Sen v. K. S. Bonnerjee I. L. R. 57 Cal. 1127 (1929). is obviously distinguishable on facts. An examination of that case will show that there, the name of the Plaintiff was not given as would appear from the judgment of Mr. Justice Lort-Williams who tried the case in the first instance; Moreover, I do not think that they amount to any notice at all, that the Plaintiffs intend or have made up their minds to bring an action against the Official Receiver. Moreover, it is clear that the notice does not contain the name", description and place of residence of the Plaintiff and these particulars have been held to be essential. 10. Turning to the judgment of Sir George Rankin, C. J., as he then was it would appear that the learned Chief Justice held that where the name, description and place of residence are not given and could not be ascertained from the notice itself there was no compliance with the section. Before the learned Chief Justice reliance was placed on an English case of Jones v. Nicholls (1814) 13 M.&W 361 (363): 153 E. R. 149 (150). where it was stated that in cases of this kind it is necessary to import a little commonsense into notices of this kind and in a case in which it is reasonably clear that the Defendant would have no real difficulty in approaching the Plaintiff for the purpose of making a tender of amends or otherwise negotiating with him, it is open to the Court, where a name, or description, or place of residence is given, to take a broad rather than a meticulous view as to the sufficiency of the particulars given under any of these heads. 11. After quoting the case of Jones v. Nicholls (1814)13M.&W 361 (363): 153 E. R. 149 (150) the learned Chief Justice proceeded to observe I trust, however, that I shall not depart altogether from commonsense in holding that a notice which contains no description and no statement of place of residence, is not a compliance with the section. 12. An examination of that case will show that the fact as to who the Plaintiff was could not be ascertained from the Solicitor's letter. 12. An examination of that case will show that the fact as to who the Plaintiff was could not be ascertained from the Solicitor's letter. It had to be ascertained from another letter to which reference had to be made and with reference to this state of facts the learned Chief Justice observed: In my opinion, such a notice cannot be held to, be sufficient upon the strength of evidence or suggestions that the Defendant would have had little or no difficulty in finding out these matters for, himself whether by reference to documents in his possession or by independent research. 13. The position before us is very different. This postal acknowledgment accompanied the notice. The Respondent in the present case, Defendant No. 1, was a previous Receiver in respect of the estate in Barisal and the notice was sent by the manager of the Court of Wards Estate in which he acted as a Receiver for a short time before the issue of this notice and there was the postal acknowledgment which gave him a clear indication as to where the reply was to be sent. In these circumstances, we think that the case of Prasaddas Sen v. K. S. Bonnerjee I.L.R, 57 Cal. 1127 (1929)., cited above is of no assistance to the Respondent in the present case. The Subordinate Judge, in our view, has taken a too rigid view of the provisions of the section. He should have examined the circumstances in which the notice was issued, the circumstances of the parties who were before him and should have imported a little common-sense into the matter. We, therefore, set aside this finding of the Subordinate Judge and hold that the notice is not defective by reason of there having been no precise description and on the ground that there has been no statement or description of the places of residence of the Plaintiffs. 14. Turning now to the other ground on which the Subordinate Judge has founded his decision, it appears to us" that the fact that the claim has been reduced by about Rs. 6,000 does not change the cause of action for the suit. All that the notice should contain is a statement of the cause of action. The reduction in the claim has operated to the benefit of Defendant No. 1 and the other Defendants also. 6,000 does not change the cause of action for the suit. All that the notice should contain is a statement of the cause of action. The reduction in the claim has operated to the benefit of Defendant No. 1 and the other Defendants also. It does not constitute a change in the cause of action, because the cause of action really means a bundle of facts on which the claim of the Plaintiff or Plaintiffs is founded. In this case the real basis of the claim was negligence, and as far as one can gather from the notice, it stated in paragraph 2, page 2 that the suit was for the sum of Rs. 14,125 odd for negligence and other accounts as per list submitted therewith. If the notice had stood alone and had not been accompanied by the details of the loss which the Plaintiff had sustained, it is conceded by Dr. Mukherji that the notice would not have been sufficient within the meaning? of sec. 80. But knowing as we do that the notice recited the circumstances under which the action for negligence was sought to be brought, we do not think that there has been any defect in the notice. It is important to cite the opening words of the notice in this connection. The words are Whereas you were appointed a Receiver, by the first Subordinate Judge's Court at Barisal on 3rd September, 1927 to the Estate of late Babu Radha Charan Rai Chowdhury of Madhabpasha in Mortgage Suit No. 40 of 1927 and whereas I took charge of the estate from you on the 19th January, 1979, as Manager of the Court of Wards and whereas after examining your accounts for the period you acted as Receiver I submitted a report on 7th February, 1930, to the first Subordinate Judge's Court with a prayer that you should be made liable to the extent of Rs. 14125-15-1 for negligence etc. 15. It is not material to quote the rest. (See pages 1 and 2, Part II of the paper-book). 16. The Defendant No. 1 knew perfectly well that there had been a previous investigation in this matter when his accounts were being passed by the Subordinate Judge, and it was at the suggestion of the Subordinate Judge, that the present suit had to be brought for a portion of the claim. 16. The Defendant No. 1 knew perfectly well that there had been a previous investigation in this matter when his accounts were being passed by the Subordinate Judge, and it was at the suggestion of the Subordinate Judge, that the present suit had to be brought for a portion of the claim. The fact that the claim had been reduced from Rs. 11,000 to Rs. 5,000 has not operated to the prejudice of the Defendant No. 1 or the other Defendants. It has been to their advantage. Under these circumstances, we think that there is no defect in the notice under sec. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 17. While making these observations we have no desire to whittle down the effect of the provisions of sec. 80 and we desire to state that in every case the notice should state with precision the cause of action and the description of the Plaintiff. But while keeping this in mind we have no hesitation in stating that in the present case, having regard to the circumstances, there has been no defect in the notice. 18. It remains to notice one argument which was advanced on behalf of the miner Defendants by Mr. Amiruddin Ahmed who appeared for the Deputy Registrar in the case. His argument was that a previous suit having been dismissed on the ground of the insufficiency of the notice, the present suit is not maintainable on the same notice. It appears, however, that that suit to which Mr. Ahmed referred was filed within two months from the date of the notice. That does not prevent the present Plaintiffs from bringing a suit after the expiry of the two months. We do not think that any fresh notice is needed for that purpose. 19. The result is that this appeal is allowed, the decree of the Subordinate Judge dismissing the suit is set aside and we direct that he should proceed to determine the other questions which have been raised in this case in accordance with the observations made in this judgment. 20. We make no order as to costs in this appeal. We direct that a certificate be granted to the Appellants for refund of the court-fees filed with the memorandum of appeal. Patterson, J. I agree.