JUDGMENT McNair, J. - The Plaintiff has applied to have the Defendant committed to gaol for contempt of Court in resisting, obstructing and preventing the Receiver appointed by the Court from taking possession of the prints of a film in terms of the Court's decree. The following facts are admitted. 2. By an agreement dated the 1st May, 1935, the Plaintiff sold to the Defendant the exploitation rights for five years in a film called " Rashida " for Rs. 10,000, Rs. 20,000 of which was payable on receipt of the film and the balance by instalments for which hundis were executed. The hundis were dishonoured at maturity and in June, 1935, the Plaintiff filed the suit in which this application is made. 3. On the 12th November. 1935, a consent decree was made providing for payment of the decretal amount by instalments. The Plaintiff was appointed Receiver and in default of payment of any instalment the Defendant was to deliver up to him quiet possession of the film. 4. No instalment has been paid and the Plaintiff, as receiver, on the 19th December instructed his agent Ramadhar Pershad to go to Lahore and obtain possession of the film. 5. Thereafter the facts as related by the Plaintiff are contradicted by the Defendant. 6. The Plaintiff says that he sent Ramadhar to Lahore with a letter of authority dated December 19th, 1935, and an office copy of the consent decree. Ramadhar swears that he went to Lahore and met the Defendant there at 10 A.M., on December 31st, 1935, when the Defendant refused to hand over the film. In support of his story he produces his letter of authority containing endorsements by the Municipal Commissioner of Lahore and the Manager of the Luxmi Hotel who accompanied him, and a postcard dated the 4th January, 1936, in which he informed the Plaintiff that he had been seeing the Defendant twice daily and had received a promise of payment on that day. In this postcard Ramadhar also states that the Defendant had leased the film to a sub-contractor for Rs. 22,000. 7. The Defendant denies this story and says that he was in Patiala on December 31st. In support of his statement his Manager says that no one came to the Defendant's Office at Lahore on December 31st. In this postcard Ramadhar also states that the Defendant had leased the film to a sub-contractor for Rs. 22,000. 7. The Defendant denies this story and says that he was in Patiala on December 31st. In support of his statement his Manager says that no one came to the Defendant's Office at Lahore on December 31st. In the same paragraph of his affidavit he says he attends office from 10-30 A.M., so that he is unable to deny Ramadhar's story that he was there at 10 a.m., when the meeting is said to have taken place. The other deponent who supports the Defendant is Parma Nand Vaid, a contractor. All that he can say is that he went to the Defendant's office on the 30th December and was told that the Defendant was away for two or three days. He does not profess to have any personal knowledge of what happened on December 31st. 8. The Defendant's denial of the meeting at 10 A.M., on December 31st, is incorroborated and in view of the subsequent conduct of the Defendant I have no hesitation in accepting Ramadhar Pershad's story. 9. On February 6th, 1936, the Plaintiff took out the notice of motion in this matter and Ramadhar Pershad and Bholanath Boral have sworn that they served the Defendant personally at Lahore on the 13th February, 1936, when he snatched away the notice of motion. 10. A copy of the notice with an endorsement to that effect was filed in this Court on the 19th February. 11. The Defendant again tries to set up an alibi. His Manager says that he went to Delhi on the 11th February and came back on the 14th. Jaswant Singh, a personal friend, says " to the best of my knowledge " the Defendant left for Delhi " in my presence " on the night of February 11th. That would not prevent the Defendant from being in Lahore on February 13th. Dhani Ram, a pleader, supports the Defendant's story and refers to two interviews with the Defendant at Delhi on February 13th. 12. There is on this occasion a direct conflict of evidence, but I do not think it likely that the Plaintiff's agents would invent the story of the notice being snatched away and I assume that Mr. Dhani Ram must have been mistaken in the date. 13. 12. There is on this occasion a direct conflict of evidence, but I do not think it likely that the Plaintiff's agents would invent the story of the notice being snatched away and I assume that Mr. Dhani Ram must have been mistaken in the date. 13. The Defendant came to Calcutta on March 12th, and on the following day his attorneys wrote to the Plaintiff's attorneys, saying that the Defendant was in Calcutta and that he could now be served with notice of the contempt application. The Plaintiff replied that the notice had already been served and he saw no need to serve it again. These letters confirm my opinion that the Plaintiff's story is true. Had there been in the Plaintiff's mind any doubt as to the efficiency of the service on February 13th, he would surely have taken the opportunity of effecting personal service in Calcutta, as suggested. The motion was adjourned from time to time, but was heard on the 23rd April in the presence of the Defendant. Reference was made to paragraph 8 of the Defendant's affidavit in opposition, in which he stated that the running of the picture was a losing concern and that he would never have refused to give up possession of the films if the Receiver had asked him, and further that he would give the Receiver's representative every facility in recovering the films. 14. The Defendant, who was in Court, then gave his personal undertaking to make over the film to the Receiver's representative within 15 days and on that understanding I adjourned this application and also an application for personal execution of the consent decree. 15. The Defendant left Calcutta the following day. 16. On May 7th and 8th the Plaintiff's representative applied to the Defendant at Lahore for the prints of the films but failed to obtain them. 17. On the 9th May the Defendant wrote that he was unable to obtain the film from his distributors. 18. The matter came before me again on the 18th May when the Defendant's legal advisers informed the Court that they had received no further instructions from their client and no explanation of the reasons why he was unable to carry out his undertaking. 19. 18. The matter came before me again on the 18th May when the Defendant's legal advisers informed the Court that they had received no further instructions from their client and no explanation of the reasons why he was unable to carry out his undertaking. 19. I adjourned the application for 10 days to enable his advisers to get into touch with the Defendant and, after further adjournments, it was finally heard by me on June 12th. 20. The Defendant has even now offered no explanation of his failure to carry out the terms of his agreement or of his undertaking to this Court, and the question arises whether this Court has power to punish for contempt a person who has failed to carry out the orders of the Court and who, in Calcutta, and in facie curiae, has given an undertaking to carry out those orders, and has then removed himself from the territorial jurisdiction and failed to carry out that undertaking or to give any explanation for his failure. 21. Apart from any question which may arise, whether the Defendant has by appearing and giving an undertaking submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court, I am satisfied, and I hold that the Defendant was in fact personally served with notice of the motion for his committal. 22. Mr. Khaitan for the Defendant contends that so long as the Defendant is outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court the Court has no seizin over his person and is powerless to enforce its orders. 23. In order to decide if this contention is well-founded it is necessary to examine the powers of a High Court to punish for contempt. 24. In Belchambers' Practice of the Civil Courts (1885 Ed.), page 241, I find the following:-- Every Superior Court of Record, whether in the United Kingdom or in the Colonial possessions or dependencies of the Crown has inherent power to punish contempts without its precincts as well as in facie curiae and is the sole and exclusive Judge of what amounts to a contempt. This power so necessary for the purpose of securing the better and more secure administration of justice results from the that principles of judicial establishments and must be au inseparable attendant upon every superior tribunal. 25. This power so necessary for the purpose of securing the better and more secure administration of justice results from the that principles of judicial establishments and must be au inseparable attendant upon every superior tribunal. 25. Again in Ambard v. A. G. of Trinidud 40 C.W.N. 801 at p. 833 (1938) Lord Atkin in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council says:-- Everyone will recognise the importance of maintaining the authority of the Courts in restraining and punishing interferences with the administration of justice whether they be interferences in particular Civil or Criminal cases or take the form of attempts to depreciate the authority of the Courts themselves." " The object of the discipline enforced by the Court in cases of contempt of Court" says Bowen L. J. in Helmore v. Smith L.R. 35 Ch. Div. 449 (1886), " is not to vindicate the dignity of the Court or the person of the Judge but to prevent undue interference with the administration of justice. 26. The statement in Belchambers that the High Court as a Court of Record is inherently empowered to punish for contempt is based on a number of decisions including a decision of the Privy Council on appeal from this Court. 27. In Surendranath Banerjea's case L.R. 10 IndAp 171, 179: S.C. ILR 10 Cal. 109 (1888), where the application was to commit the Respondent for contempt for publishing a libel, Sir Barnes Peacock, in delivering the judgment of the Board, gays at page 179 of the report:-- It is an offence which by the Common Law of England is punishable by the High Court in a summary manner by line or imprisonment or both. " That part of the Common Law of England was introduced into the Presidency Towns when the late Supreme Courts were respectively established by the Charters of Justice. The High Courts in the Presidencies are superior Courts of Record and the offence of contempt, and the powers of the High Court for punishing it are the same there as in this country, not by virtue of the Penal Code for British India and the Code of Criminal Procedure but by virtue of the Common Law of England. 28. As the learned Judge says, that part of the Common Law was introduced into the Supreme Court by the Charters. 29. The Charter establishing the Supreme Court in Bengal in 1774, provided by cl. 28. As the learned Judge says, that part of the Common Law was introduced into the Supreme Court by the Charters. 29. The Charter establishing the Supreme Court in Bengal in 1774, provided by cl. 4 that the Judges should have the same jurisdiction and authority as the Judges of the King's Bench in England; and by cl. 21 expressly provided that the Court is empowered to punish for contempt. 30. The High Courts Act of 1861, which abolished the Supreme Court and set up the High Court, provided by sec. 9 that the High Court shall have and exercise all jurisdiction and every power and authority whatsoever in any manner vested in any of the Courts in the same Presidency abolished under this Act at the time of the abolition of such last-mentioned Courts, and sec. 11 provided that the existing provisions applicable to the Supreme Courts should apply to the High Court. The Letters Patent, 1865, provided (cl. 2) that the High Court should continue a Court of Record, and (by cl. 11) defined the local limits of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. 31. Finally the Government of India Act, 1919, (sec. 106) continued to the High Courts "all such jurisdictions, powers, and authority as were vested in them at the commencement of the Act." 32. We find then that the power to commit for Contempt was conferred on this Court by its Charter and has been retained in the Court by subsequent legislation. 33. In Martin v. Lawrence ILR 4 Cal 655 (1879) the Defendant in an administration suit was ordered to pay to her attorney a sum of money admittedly in her hands. She refused to obey the order and was imprisoned. 34. The Court held that the order for imprisonment was made in contempt proceedings and not in execution of the decree and that the Defendant who had suffered imprisonment for six months was not entitled to be discharged until she had purged her contempt. 35. She refused to obey the order and was imprisoned. 34. The Court held that the order for imprisonment was made in contempt proceedings and not in execution of the decree and that the Defendant who had suffered imprisonment for six months was not entitled to be discharged until she had purged her contempt. 35. The process issued was described by White, J., as the peculiar process which the Court employs to vindicate its authority and ensure that suitors and and others who are amenable to the process do not by their contumacy make its order nugatory." " The jurisdiction of the Court under which this process issued, says the learned Judge at page 658 of the report, is a jurisdiction that it has inherited from the old Supreme Court, and was conferred upon that Court by the Charters of the Crown, which invested it with all the process and authority of the then Court of King's Bench and of the High Court of Chancery in Great Britain. I am unable to see that this jurisdiction, in the particular instance in which it has been exercised in the case before us, has been removed or affected, or was intended to be removed or affected, by the new Code of Civil Procedure. If Mr. Hill's contention were right, the High Court would, in a measure, be disarmed. It would be deprived of the best and most effectual, and, in some cases, the only effectual, means of securing obedience to its orders. 36. This takes me directly to Mr. Khaitan's contention that this jurisdiction of the Court, if existing, has been curtailed by the Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure. 37. The learned Judge states definitely in the passage to which I have referred that in his opinion it was in no way affected by the Code of Civil Procedure. It has also been held that the jurisdiction is not a criminal but a quasi-criminal jurisdiction and, in my opinion, it is in no way affected by the Code of Criminal Procedure. 38. This is the view taken by Belchambers (see Belchambers' Practice of the Civil Courts, page 246) and it is supported by the words of Sir Barnes Peacock in Surendra Nath Banerjee's case L.R. 10 IndAp 171, 179: S.C. ILR 10 Cal. 38. This is the view taken by Belchambers (see Belchambers' Practice of the Civil Courts, page 246) and it is supported by the words of Sir Barnes Peacock in Surendra Nath Banerjee's case L.R. 10 IndAp 171, 179: S.C. ILR 10 Cal. 109 (1883) where the learned Judge expressly states that the powers of the High Court to punish for contempt do not arise by virtue of the Civil or Criminal Procedure Codes and I can find nothing in those Codes which purports to limit those powers. 39. In Ambard's case 40 C.W.N. 801 at p. 803 (1936) Lord Atkin refers to such interferences with the administration of justice as amount to contempt of Court as being " quasi-criminal acts," and held that leave to appeal to the Privy Council from orders punishing them should be granted on the same principles as leave in criminal cases is given--and in Martin v. Lawrence ILR 4 Cal. 655 (1879) Sir R. Garth, C. J., lays stress on the difference between the powers of the Court where parties have been imprisoned under process of execution in satisfaction of a decree, and which are governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, and the powers of the Court when imprisoning for contempt where the provisions of the Code do not apply. 40. The effect of the Codes on the powers of the High Court to commit for contempt are discussed by West, J., in Hassanbhoy v. Cowasji Jehangir ILR 7 Bom. 1 (1881). An application was made in that case to commit the Respondent for contempt for disobeying an order to give inspection. 41. It was argued on his behalf that the former jurisdiction of the High Court to punish for contempt has, since the passing of the Code of Civil Procedure, become restricted to the powers provided under sec. 136 of the CPC of 1877 (corresponding with Or. 11, r. 21 of the Code of 1908) which in effect deprived the High Court of its former jurisdiction. 42. West, J. rejects this contention. He points out that sec. 136 was embodied in the Code from the English Judicature Act. The English Act expressly confers the power of committal for contempt, and it is contained in Or. 31, r. 21 of the Rules of the Supreme Court in England, but that power is not incorporated in the Indian Act. West, J. rejects this contention. He points out that sec. 136 was embodied in the Code from the English Judicature Act. The English Act expressly confers the power of committal for contempt, and it is contained in Or. 31, r. 21 of the Rules of the Supreme Court in England, but that power is not incorporated in the Indian Act. The learned Judge holds that this omission was deliberate; because the CPC was to apply nor only to High Courts but to all the Courts of the mofussil where it was undesirable that the wider powers allotted to the High Courts should be exercised. The High Courts already had the power to commit for contempt and that power could not be presumed to have been withdrawn without the explicit expression of such an intention. 43. The authority of the inferior Courts is derived from the Codes, but a different conclusion must prevail in the case of the Chief Courts of Record, already armed with powers to vindicate their authority. The learned Judge then makes the following quotation from 4 Stephen's Blackstone, 428 :---- The process of attachments for contempt," it is said, "must necessarily be as ancient as the. laws themselves. For laws without a competent authority to secure their administration from disobedience and contempts would be vain and nugutory. A power, therefore, in the Supreme Courts of Justice to suppress such contempts by an immediate attachment of the offender, results from the first principles of judicial establishments and must be an inseparable, attendant upon every superior tribunal, and concludes:-- As regards the High Courts therefore the remedies provided by sec. 136 (of the Code) may be regarded as cumulative. They subject the offender to particular liabilities for his contumacy but do not extinguish the Court's power of constraining him to obedience. 44. In Navivahoo v. Narotamdas Candas ILR 7 Bom. 5 (1882) there was a simpler application for committal for failure to obey an order to give inspection, and a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court adopted the reasoning of West, J., in the previous case and arrived at the same conclusion. 45. The Respondent contends that the order for committal for contempt is made in the ordinary original civil jurisdiction, but the above cases show conclusively that this contention is erroneous. The difference is stressed in Rojah of Ramnad v. Setharam Chetty ILR 26 Mad. 45. The Respondent contends that the order for committal for contempt is made in the ordinary original civil jurisdiction, but the above cases show conclusively that this contention is erroneous. The difference is stressed in Rojah of Ramnad v. Setharam Chetty ILR 26 Mad. 120 (1902), on which the Respondent relies. There it was held that an order directing a warrant to issue against the person of a judgment-debtor and appointing a special bailiff to arrest him wherever he might be found in the Presidency of Madras was without justification. That order was made in execution of a decree, and was undoubtedly an order made in the exercise of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction. The Appellate Court, in setting it aside, was at pains to distinguish it from the orders passed in the Bombay Cases to which I have referred, and to point out that the High Court in making an order for attachment for contempt is not acting in exercise of its civil jurisdiction. 46. The case on which the Respondent relies most strongly for his contention, that a warrant for committal cannot be transmitted outside the local limits of the Court, is Salamchand Rannyram v. Jugal Kissore Ramdeo ILR 55 Cal. 777 : S.C. 32 C.W.N. 114 (1927). 47. The Respondent was directed to make over certain books to the Receiver. He failed to carry out the order and an order was made for his committal for contempt. On that the Respondent left Calcutta and the Plaintiff applied for an order for transmitting the Writ of warrant to the District Co. 48. The Judge of first instance discussed the application and the Court of Appeal affirmed his decision. 49. At first sight it would appear that this decision is conclusive of the present question, but on reading the judgment certain facts emerge. First, the order in that case was ex hypothesi made under the Code. "Mr. S. N. Banerji," says the learned Chief Justice at page 780 of the report, " has argued upon this appeal that secs. 36 and 136 (of the Civil Procedure Code) must between them cover this case." 50. First, the order in that case was ex hypothesi made under the Code. "Mr. S. N. Banerji," says the learned Chief Justice at page 780 of the report, " has argued upon this appeal that secs. 36 and 136 (of the Civil Procedure Code) must between them cover this case." 50. It appears from the report of the argument that the learned Counsel had referred to the inherent powers of the Court, but that that was not the basis of the Court's decision is clear from the following words in the judgment: -- The questions of the Court's power derived from the old Supreme Court to arrest for contempt of Court a person in the mofussil have not been argued before us and I make no pronouncement with regard to them. 51. Again the learned Chief Justice says: Any mofussil Court may appoint a Receiver and if a person residing outside its jurisdiction interferes with the Receiver then the same problem arises as arises here. 52. With the greatest deference I suggest that the problem would not be the same, for if the judgment of West, J., in Hassanbhoy v. Cowasji Jehangir ILR 7 Bom. 1 (1881) is correct, the power to commit for contempt is retained by High Courts but is not conferred on subordinate Courts in the mofussil as it is expressly excluded from Or. 11, r. 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 53. It must be remembered that the CPC has restricted the territorial limits of the Courts, and has also refrained from including in Or. 11, r. 21, the liability to personal attachment which is contained in Or. 31, r. 21 of the Rules of the Supreme Court in England to which I have referred earlier in this judgment. 54. The learned Judges in the decisions in Hassanbhoy v. Cowasji Jehangir ILR 7 Bom. 1 (1861) and Navivahoo v. Narotamdas ILR 7 Bom. 5 (1882) lay stress on the wider powers of the High Court which were not entrusted to the mofussil Courts. 55. I can find nothing in the judgment in Salamchand Rannyran v. Jugal Kishore Ramdeo ILR 55 Cal. 1 (1861) and Navivahoo v. Narotamdas ILR 7 Bom. 5 (1882) lay stress on the wider powers of the High Court which were not entrusted to the mofussil Courts. 55. I can find nothing in the judgment in Salamchand Rannyran v. Jugal Kishore Ramdeo ILR 55 Cal. 777: S.C. 32 C.W.N. 114 (1927) to suggest that the inherent powers which the Court is now called on to exercise are non-existent, and I hold that the Court has an inherent power to punish for contempt and that that power is in no way restricted or diminished by the Codes of Civil or Criminal Procedure. 56. Assuming that I am right in this conclusion, the question remains how far this jurisdiction extends and what machinery survives for carrying it into effect. 57. Mr. Roy argues that no bounds are set to this jurisdiction and that it extends throughout British India. In Belchambers' Practicle, page 247, we find the following:-- The High Court may send a special bailiff beyond the local limits of its jurisdiction to any place within its general jurisdiction but not to any place outside British territory to arrest a person for contempt of Court. 58. The authorities on which this proposition is based are for the most part unreported cases of this Court, but there are two cases in Bombay which suggest that the territorial boundary should be that of the Presidency. 59. In the first case, Harivallabhdas Kalliandas v. Uttamchand Manickchand 7 Bom. H. C. R. O. C. J. 172 (1870), a rule was issued for attachment against the Defendants for contempt in not obeying an order to make over to a receiver partnership assets in their hands. 60. The rule was served on the Defendants in Baroda with the Gaekwar's consent. On a motion to set aside the rule on the ground that service was effected in foreign territory, the Court (Westropp, C. J. and Melville, J.), held that service in the Gaekwar's territories with the consent of the Gaekwar was valid service. It is noteworthy that, although the application was for attachment for contempt of Court, the Court did not suggest executing the attachment in the Gaekwar's territory, it was only the validity of the service of the rule for attachment which was called in question. It is noteworthy that, although the application was for attachment for contempt of Court, the Court did not suggest executing the attachment in the Gaekwar's territory, it was only the validity of the service of the rule for attachment which was called in question. The Court upheld the validity of the service and ordered an attachment but intimated that in making the order it did not direct its execution beyond British territory. The railway station at Baroda " says Westropp C. J. " being in British territory annexed to and forming part of the Presidency of Bombay, I see no objection to the Sheriff sending a special bailiff or bailiff if necessary to Baroda station to take these persons into custody. The special bailiff must be cautious not to act as such outside British territory. I only authorise him to take these persons into custody if he finds them within British territory forming part of this Presidency; I make no direction as to how they are to be brought to the Baroda station. 61. The second case, Maharani of Baroda v. Kasturbhai ILR 58 Bom. 729 (Spl. B.) (1934) was a decision of the majority of a special bench of the Bombay High Court which held (Beaumont, C. J. and Ranganakar, J.. Mirza, J., dissenting) that the High Court on its original side had itself the power to execute a decree passed in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction against a person residing outside the the limits of that jurisdiction provided he was within the Presidency. The application was not in a contempt matter and the decision was based largely on the rules of the Bombay High Court, which. enabled the Court to appoint a special bailiff to arrest the judgment-debtor wherever he might be found in the Bombay Presidency. 62. Those rules, however, were held not to be ultra vires of the Letters Patent, and by implication the jurisdiction even to execute decrees throughout the Presidency is implied--unless curtailed by legislation. 63. The form of commitment order made by Broughton, J., on April 4th, 1879, referred to in Belchambers' Practice, p. 247, has been produced before me. It orders the Sheriff to forward the writ to the District Judge of Burdwan who is to cause the Defendant to be arrested and delivered over to the Sheriff to be brought before this Court to be dealt with according to law. It orders the Sheriff to forward the writ to the District Judge of Burdwan who is to cause the Defendant to be arrested and delivered over to the Sheriff to be brought before this Court to be dealt with according to law. No case has been quoted before me and I can find no case, where an order has been made for the arrest of a person outside the boundaries of the Presidency. In a case of contempt, I am of opinion, that this Court may acting under its inherent powers, send a special bailiff to arrest a person at a place within its general jurisdiction which would appear to be within the confines of the Bengal Presidency. 64. In coming to this conclusion I do not wish to be considered in any way to detract from the force of the remarks made by many learned Judges both in England and in India that the powers of the Court in such matters should be jealously and carefully watched and exercised. Such an order ought only to be made in the rarest cases; but where, as in the case before me, the Respondent has failed to comply with the orders of the Court, has refused to honour his undertaking, and has treated with scant courtesy the persons who have been sent to Lahore to receive the films under the orders of the Court and in terms of the decree to which he was a consenting party, it is the duty of the Court to exercise the powers with which it has been invested for the enforcement of its orders. It does not appear to me to be necessary, even if it is within the powers of the Court, which I doubt, to send a special bailiff to Lahore to arrest the Defendant and convey him to the jail in Calcutta. As was said by Lort-Williams, J., in A Milton & Co. v. Ojha Automobile Engineering Co. ILR 57 Cal. 1280 at p. 1284 (1930), in discussing the right of one Indian Court to issue an injunction against a person within the jurisdiction of another Indian Court:-- The spirit of co-operation existing between the Courts in India will often be sufficient alone to make such orders effectual where otherwise they might not be, apart from reciprocatory rules such as those relating to the transfer of decrees for execution. 65. 65. I have little doubt in this matter that the learned Judge at Lahore will assist in making the order of this Court effectual when it is brought to his notice. 66. In the case in Harivallabhdas Kalliandas v. Uttamchand Manickchand 7 Bom. H. C. R. O. C. J. 172 (1870) the learned Judges considered it doubtful whether the Respondent could be arrested in the territories of Gaekwar. Those territories were not, as is Lahore a part of British India, but I cannot accept Mr. Roy's contention that this Court can order the arrest for contempt of a person in any part of British India. 67. The jurisdiction must in any event be confined, so far as this Court is concerned, to the Province of Bengal. There will be an order in terms of prayer 4 * in the notice of motion. The Respondent will pay the costs of this application as of a hearing.