JUDGMENT Jack, J. - This appeal has arisen out of a snit for ejectment of an under-raiyat under sec. 48C (c) of the Bengal Tenancy Act inasmuch as the term of us lease has expired. The defence is that the Defendant has been holding the land continuously for much more than 12 years and therefore he is not liable to ejectment by virtue of proviso 2, cl. (i) of the section which states that an under-raiyat shall not be liable to ejectment on the ground that his lease has expired if he has been in possession of his land for 12 years whether partly before or partly after the commencement of the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1928. 2. The Court of appeal below gave effect to this proviso in favour of the Defendant and therefore dismissed the suit. 3. In this appeal it is contended in the first place that in order to bring this clause into operation the under-raiyat must have been in possession as an under-raiyat for more than 12 years and that inasmuch as before his lease in 1924 the Defendant held his land as a service tenure, this proviso has no application in his case. This was the view taken by the trial Court but I agree with the learned District Judge that there being no such restriction in the section it is clear that the Defendant is not liable to ejectment under sec. 48C (c) the ground on which the Plaintiff claims to eject him. This finding really decides the matter but a new point has been raised in this appeal, viz., that the amended Tenancy Act of 1928 is not applicable to the facts of the case, the lease having been executed in 1924 for 8 years expiring in.1932. It is claimed that on the execution of the lease, the landlord acquired a vested right to eject which is not defeated by the enactment of 1928. A reference is made to the case of Jiban Krishna Chakravarty v. Abdul Kader Chowdhury 37 C.W.N. 689 (1933), where Sir George Rankin, C. J., held in a suit for ejectment on notice to quit that the new Act did not apply because the terms of the notice were different under the two Acts. His Lordship stated in that case: " It may well be that. His Lordship stated in that case: " It may well be that. the case of a written lease for a definite term expiring after the commencement. of the new Act, that is, the case contemplated by the old sec. 49 cl. (a) and the new sec. 48C (c) will require to be decided upon other lines." It is clear, therefore, that the question arising in this case was left open. In the case of Joy Kumar Deb v. Jamiraddin 38 C.W.N. 105 (1933)., however, it was held in a suit for ejectment on notice under sec. 49 (b) expiring after the new Act came into force, that the vested right of the land-land to eject could not be defeated by the new Act. It is, therefore, contended that similarly the vested right in this case of the landlord under the contract of 1924 could not be defeated by the terms of sec. 48C (c) proviso I (2) of the new Act. 4. The learned Advocate, however, over-looked the provisions of sec. 178, cl. () of the new Act which states that " nothing in any contract between a landlord and a tenant made before or after the passing of this Act shall take away or limit the rights of an under-raiyat as against his immediate landlord as set forth in Chapter VII of the Act. Sec. 48Cis contained in Chapter VII and this makes sec. 48C proviso I (2) applicable to take away the vested right of the landlord under the contract. 5. This appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. Leave to appeal under sec. 15 of the Letters Patent is refused.