JUDGMENT D.N. Mitter, J. - The question of law which emerges for determination in this appeal from an order in execution of a decree for rent is as to whether the decree to be executed is a rent-decree within the meaning of the Bengal Tenancy Act or a money-decree. Stripped of all details, it appears that the patnidar, who is the landlord in this case, sued the dar-patnidar for his share of the rent. It is common ground that there was a stipulation between the patnidar and dar-patnidar that out of Rs. 1,846-8 as. which was the rent of the dar-patni, Rs. 800 was to be paid by way of Barat (assignment) to the zamindar. The Plaintiff who sued in this case was a co-sharer and it is not necessary to go into details of his title for the purpose of the decision of the question which falls for determination in this appeal as to what the exact extent of his share is. This is not in question. 2. It appears that on the 15th April, 1934, a suit for rent was instituted for the rent due from Defendants Nos. 14 and 15 and in that suit the other co-sharers were made parties. In the plaint, it was stated that the Plaintiff, patnidar, was not able to ascertain his dues. Defendant No. 13, the Raja of Nashipur, who purchased the interest of some of the Defendants was impleaded as a co-sharer. The defence of the tenant Defendants was that the entire rent payable to the Plaintiff had been paid. The suit was decreed on the 31st July, 1931. The Plaintiff applied for execution of the decree and the contention raised in the executing Court was that the decree was not a rent decree and could not be executed as such under chapter 14 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Three grounds were taken before the Subordinate Judge who dealt with the rase in the first instance. It is not necessary to refer to two of the grounds of objection taken on behalf of the judgment-debtor as we had not asked the Respondent for a reply with reference to those two points. 3. The only point which was very strenuously argued before us by Mr. It is not necessary to refer to two of the grounds of objection taken on behalf of the judgment-debtor as we had not asked the Respondent for a reply with reference to those two points. 3. The only point which was very strenuously argued before us by Mr. Bhattacharya is that as the Plaintiff sued for a portion of the arrears of rent due to him the decree could not be executed as a rent decree and our attention has been drawn to the provisions of sec. 148A, cls. 1, 6 and 9 of the Bengal Tenancy Act as amended. Sec. 148A cl. (1) is in these terms: A co-sharer landlord may institute a suit to re. cover the rent due to him in respect of his share in a tenure or holding by making the all remaining co-sharers landlords parties Defendant to the suit, and claiming that a relief be granted to him in respect of his share of the rent against the entire tenure or holding. 4. Cl. 6 of the same section runs as follows: A decree passed by the Court for the rent chimed in a suit brought in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this section shall, so far as may be, specify separately the Amounts payable to each co-sharer and shall as regards the remedies for enforcing the same, be as effectual as a decree obtained by a sole landlord or an entire body of landlords in a suit brought for the rent due to all she co-sharers. 5. It is argued that in order to operate as a rent decree the provisions of the first clause of the section with reference to the claim in the suit must be strictly and fully complied with and it is contended that as the suit is only to recover not the entire rent due to the landlord but a portion of the rent due to him in respect of his share the provisions of sec. 148A cl. (1) have not been complied with. The words "rent due to him" must be construed in a reasonable way. To take one case as a type, it may be that the Plaintiff landlord may not sue for the entire rent due to him by reason of mistake as to what the exact amount due was. 148A cl. (1) have not been complied with. The words "rent due to him" must be construed in a reasonable way. To take one case as a type, it may be that the Plaintiff landlord may not sue for the entire rent due to him by reason of mistake as to what the exact amount due was. To take another case as a type, the Plaintiff landlord may abandon a portion of the arrears of rent due to him. Can it be said in either of the two cases which are taken as types that the decree is not a rent decree? The contention of Mr. Bhattacharya which is very ingenious in our opinion is neither sound nor convincing. 6. In the construction of the statute one will have to import a little common-sense. It could not have been intended that if the co-sharer landlord abandons a portion of his claim he is to suffer the penalty that the decree is not to be treated as a rent decree. In other words, by abandoning a part of his claim he, according to the contention of the Appellant, acts at his peril. We are unable to accede to this contention. It is open to the co-sharer to remit a portion of the arrears due to him and yet he can frame his suit in the manner contemplated by sec. 148A, cl. (1). The consequence of the abandonment of a portion of his claim might be this that he may be met by the provisions of Or. 2, r. 2 of the CPC and may not be able to sue for the balance once again. But the abandonment of a portion of the arrears due to him would not, in our opinion, lead to the consequence contended for, viz., that he would forfeit the privilege of treating the decree passed on such a plaint as a rent decree. Treating this case as one in which it has not been shown that the Barat portion of the rent was paid to the landlord when the suit wa3 instituted, we think that on the grounds stated above the plaint is not open to any exception and that it does substantially conform to the provisions of sec. 148A, cl. (1). But in this case, the dar-patni kabuliyat has not been produced. 148A, cl. (1). But in this case, the dar-patni kabuliyat has not been produced. We do not know as to whether the Barat is to be treated as rent or not. In answer to that it is contended on behalf of the Appellant that the Plaintiff has in his plaint made the case that the Barat portion of the rent which was assignable to the zamindar is really a portion of the rent. At the same time it is pointed out in reply on behalf of the Respondent that the instalments of rent showed that it referred only to a portion of the rent excluding the assigned portion. The question as to whether in the circumstances, it can be contended that the assigned portion is to be treated as rent or not would depend on the construction of the kabuliyat. We may refer in this concretion to the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of Maharajah Bahadur Sir Jotindra Mohun Tagore v. Srimati Bibi Jarao Kumari L.R. 33 IndAp 30: S.C. 10 C.W.N. 201 (1905) where the stipulation in the kabuliyat was this effect on the condition of paying to yon, Maharajah, a patni jumma of Rs. 6000 per year, kist by kist, as government revenue for the said 8 annas share. 7. On the construction of this clause in the kabuliyat it was held by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee that it did not justify the contention chat the money which was payable to the Government was a part of the rent. The question as to what was the stipulation in the kabuliyat cannot be conclusively determined on mere allegations made in the plaint which are capable of two constructions, having regard to the statement in the body of the plaint and having regard to the statement in the schedules. None of the parties had put up the kabuliyat before us and in the circumstances, we are not satisfied that what was assigned is really rent payable to the dar-patnidar. Whether that was so or not, there is no proof in this case that the assigned portion had not been paid to the zamindar. None of the parties had put up the kabuliyat before us and in the circumstances, we are not satisfied that what was assigned is really rent payable to the dar-patnidar. Whether that was so or not, there is no proof in this case that the assigned portion had not been paid to the zamindar. Having regard to the fact that the decree on the face of it was a rent decree the burden certainly lay upon the Appellant to establish in execution proceedings that the Barat portion of the rent was not paid to the zamindar which was payable, according to the case of both parties, to the zamindar. Having regard to the consideration, we think that the Courts below have come to the right conclusion in the matter. This appeal is dismissed with costs. We assess the hearing-fee at three gold mohurs payable to Mr. Das's clients. Let the records be sent down without delay. S.K. Ghose, J. I agree.