JUDGMENT Panckridge, J. - This is an application to set aside a report made by the Registrar on May 15th, 1936. The applicant is the purchaser of certain mortgaged premises sold by the Registrar on July 12th, 1935, in pursuance of the final decree for sale made on January 15th, 1934. The mortgaged premises in question are No. 8 and 8/1, Sandel Street. The mortgage was by the deposit of the title deeds of the mortgaged premises, the mortgagor being one Baloram Dey who is now an insolvent. Baloram Dey is a member of a Hindu joint family. The other members interested in the joint family property are Baloram's widowed mother Lilabati, who has succeeded to a one-third share in the family property as heir of Baloram's deceased brother Rajaram and Joyram, Baloram's youngest brother, who is still a minor. Among the title deeds deposited were conveyances of the entirety of the premises No. 8 and 8/1, Sandel Street in favour of Baloram Dey as purchaser. The applicant was furnished with an abstract of title in respect of the mortgaged premises, and in consequence of certain requisitions on title and the answers to them he contended that the Plaintiffs were not in a position to make out a title to the property which he could be compelled to accept and. he submitted that he ought to be relieved of the obligation to take the property. His objections can be shortly stated. He says that he is not satisfied that Baloram is the owner of the entirety of the property, and that if he is made to complete the purchase, he will be exposed to the risk of having suits brought against him by Baloram's mother, and Baloram's minor brother. Joyram to enforce their alleged rights to shares in the mortgaged premises on the ground that the premises are joint family property in which Lilabati and Joyram have a one-third share respectively. 2. Before the mortgage to the Plaintiffs, premises No. 8 and 8/1. Sandel Street were mortgaged to a Mr. Chunder, who is an attorney of the Court. The mortgage to Mr. Chunder was by way of the deposit of the title deeds and. in addition to the title deeds of No. 8 and 8/1, Sandel Street, there was deposited the title deeds of No. 5, Srinath Babu Lane. Sandel Street were mortgaged to a Mr. Chunder, who is an attorney of the Court. The mortgage to Mr. Chunder was by way of the deposit of the title deeds and. in addition to the title deeds of No. 8 and 8/1, Sandel Street, there was deposited the title deeds of No. 5, Srinath Babu Lane. The No. 5, Srinath Babu Lane is admittedly a joint family property in which Baloram is entitled to a share. In the memorandum of deposit the security is described as " my one-third share of the lands and premises mentioned in the schedule." The Schedule consists of two items: (1) No. 5, Srinath Babu Lane, and (2) No. 8 and 8/1, Sandel Street. I think the memorandum of deposit is prima, facie an admission on the part of Baloram that his interest in No. 8 and 8/1, Sandel Street does not extend to the entirety of those premises but only to an undivided one-third share. 3. This difficulty having arisen, it was referred to the Registrar to enquire and report whether a good title could be made out to No. 8 and 8/1, Sandel Street. The Plaintiffs desired to call evidence to prove that the words " my one-third share in the lands and premises mentioned in the schedule " were inserted in the memorandum of deposit through mistake, and that the intention of Baloram in making the deposit of the title deeds was to make the entirety of No. 8 and 8/1, Sandel Street security for Mr. Chunder's advance. The Registrar was of opinion that sec. 92 of the Indian Evidence Act rendered such evidence inadmissible, and at the request of the Plaintiffs the Registrar made a special report to this effect. Mr. Justice Costello upheld the Registrar's contention but decided that the Plaintiffs were not precluded from calling evidence to prove that, in fact, Baloram was the owner of the entirety of No. 8 and 8/1, Sandel Street or, in other words, that it was his self-acquired property, and not joint family property. On this basis the Registrar proceeded with the reference. His finding is that the title which it is sought to make the purchaser accept is not a title that should be forced on an unwilling purchaser. On this basis the Registrar proceeded with the reference. His finding is that the title which it is sought to make the purchaser accept is not a title that should be forced on an unwilling purchaser. In that part of the Registrar's judgment which immediately precedes his formal finding he states that- for the reasons I have given above, I have not taken further evidence as it seemed to mo that my doing BO would not help matters as the auction-purchaser could not. be satisfied that the defect of which ho had complained had been cured. 4. The grievance of the Plaintiffs now is that the Registrar did not permit them to adduce the evidence which in terms of Mr. Justice Costello's decision, they were entitled to adduce. It is true the language used by the Registrar may be construed as tantamount to such a refusal, but having looked at the Registrar's Minutes, I am very doubtful if the Registrar can properly be said to have refused to admit the evidence. It appears from the Minutes that Counsel for the Plaintiffs indicated the evidence which he was in a position to call, and Counsel for the purchaser admitted that the Plaintiffs were entitled to call such evidence, but qualified this admission by a suggestion that even if the evidence were called and accepted, it would not get rid of the purchaser's objections to the title. There is nothing in the Minutes to show that the Plaintiffs formally tendered the evidence or that the Registrar formally ruled it to be inadmissible. It looks to me as though what really happened was that in face of the opinion expressed by the Registrar as to the amount of weight he would attach to the evidence if called, Counsel for the Plaintiffs did not persist in his attempt to put the evidence on record. 5. However, there is, in my opinion, a stronger ground for not interfering with the decision of the Registrar. It may be that the property was not purchased out of the joint family funds but was the self-acquired property of Baloram. Even if this is so, it can hardly be contended that the purchaser, having regard to the admission in the Memorandum of deposit in the case of Mr. Chunder's mortgage, will not run a considerable risk of having suits instituted against him by Lilabati and by Joyram. Even if this is so, it can hardly be contended that the purchaser, having regard to the admission in the Memorandum of deposit in the case of Mr. Chunder's mortgage, will not run a considerable risk of having suits instituted against him by Lilabati and by Joyram. It is said that Baloram, since he purchased the property in June, 1924, has been collecting rents and appropriating them to his own use. The fact that he has done this without objection on Lilabati's part night possibly be held to prevent Lilabati asserting her title on the grounds of acquiescence or estoppel. The fact that there has been no protest by Joyram is of no importance, because, throughout the transactions, Joyram has been and is still a minor. Already the Plaintiffs have received a letter from the. attorney acting for Lilabati, threatening to enforce her alleged rights by instituting a suit. It is suggested that this letter has been written at the instigation of the purchaser. Of course, it is possible that is the reason for the letter, but there is no evidence to support the suggestion, and, even if it is true, I agree with the Registrar that the purchaser, if compelled to take the property, has every reason to apprehend harassing litigation from the other members of the joint family of which Baloram is the senior member. 6. An interesting and picturesquely phrased judgment of Beaman, J., in Ahmedbhoy Habib-bhoy v. Sir Dinshato M. Petit 11 Bom. L. R. 545 (1909), has been cited to me. It appears almost to go as far as to lay down that a purchaser should never be made to accept a conveyance of the entirety of a property said to be his own or self-acquired property by a member of the joint Hindu family, unless the other members of the joint family consent to join in the conveyance. It is not necessary to go to that length to be able to uphold the decision of the Registrar in this case. I agree with him having regard to all circumstances, especially, having regard to Baloram's admission in Mr. Chunder's memorandum of deposit and to the letter from Lilabati's attorney, that it would be inequitable to force the purchaser to complete. In the circumstances, the application is dismissed with costs. The purchaser is entitled to the costs of the reference and reserved costs. Certified for Counsel.