JUDGMENT Panckridge, J. - This is an application by the Plaintiff asking that the Registrar may be directed to sell the properties mentioned in the order of this Court dated November 26th, 1929, free from the attachment effected by one Ranajit Singh Dhudoria. The history of the proceedings is as follows. The Plaintiff was the mortgagee of certain properties situated in the Mofussil. On December 12th, 1927, he obtained a consent decree for the sum of Rs. 20,552-6 with interest at 12 per cent, per annum with six monthly rests. By his plaint he has reserved his rights in respect of the mortgaged properties. On November 26th, 1929, the parties came to an agreement which was recorded in Court. Under the first clause of that agreement, the decretal amount together with all subsequent interest thereon was made a charge on the properties which had been the subject of the mortgage. Under the second clause, the Plaintiff agreed not to execute the decree for a period of six months. By the third clause, in default of payment of the entire decretal amount with interest within six months the Plaintiff reserved the right to execute the decree by selling the properties charged without having to institute a fresh suit in respect thereof and for such purpose if necessary to have a Receiver appointed by the High Court. The fourth clause is as follows: That the adjustment of the decree as above will be recorded in Court and that the costs of this application will be added to the Plaintiff's claim. 2. On July 15th, 1931, a Receiver was appointed by consent, and also by consent an order was made by Ameer Ali, J., that: if the Plaintiff's claim be not fully satisfied within one year from the date hereof the said property be sold with the approbation of the Registrar of this Court by public auction or by private treaty to the best purchaser or purchasers that can be got for the same, provided the said Registrar shall consider that a sufficient sum has been offered therefor. 3. That order was made on July 15th, 1931. On December 4th, 1931, one Ranajit Singh Dhudoria who had obtained a money decree for Rs. 5,373-5-4 attached the properties covered by the order of July 15th, 1931, in execution of his decree. 4. This application has been made on notice to the attaching creditor. 5. 3. That order was made on July 15th, 1931. On December 4th, 1931, one Ranajit Singh Dhudoria who had obtained a money decree for Rs. 5,373-5-4 attached the properties covered by the order of July 15th, 1931, in execution of his decree. 4. This application has been made on notice to the attaching creditor. 5. Several points have been urged against the application. It is first said that the only thing which can be executed is the decree in its original form as a money decree since the arrangements embodied in the consent orders of November 26th, 1929, and July 15th, 1931, are not adjustments within, the meaning of Or. 21, r. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Reliance is placed on certain cases where it has been laid down that an adjustment must extinguish the decree and that parties have no power to substitute a decree of their own for one that has been made by the Court. Particular importance is attached to Bakshi Ram Varma v. Des Raj 32 P. L. R 365 (1931) and Gobardhan Das v. Dau Dayal I. L. R. 54 All. 573 (1932). I entertain some doubt whether a party other than a party to the suit can object to the execution of a so-called adjustment on the ground that it is not an adjustment within the meaning of the Civil Procedure Code, and whether it lies in the mouth of a third party to insist that the parties to such an arrangement shall not be permitted to have it carried into effect by the Court but must be relegated to a separate suit. Certainly I do not think that in this case it would have been open to the Defendant to argue that the order of November 26th, 1929, was not an adjustment when he had expressly described it as such in the terms of settlement. I do not know of any principle on which a third party can be held to be in a better position than a party to the suit. As Costello, J., observed in Deenendra Mallik v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullik I. L. R. 62 Cal. I do not know of any principle on which a third party can be held to be in a better position than a party to the suit. As Costello, J., observed in Deenendra Mallik v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullik I. L. R. 62 Cal. 28 at p. 44 (1934): it mast be borne in mind, however, that it has been held on several occasion that parties by agreement can arrange their own procedure and give jurisdiction to the Court to adopt that procedure and where the parties have agreed that money due shall be realised by execution, the Court has jurisdiction to proceed by way of execution. 6. In my view when the parties have agreed that a decree should be executed in a certain way and that agreement has been recorded in Court, it is not permissible for a third party to object to execution in the way the parties to the suit have chosen. 7. Another point of substance which is taken by the attaching creditor is based upon Or. 34, r. 14. Under that rule a mortgagee who/has obtained a decree for his claim under the mortgage is not entitled to bring the mortgaged property to sale otherwise than by instituting a suit for sale in enforcement of the mortgage. It is admitted that the restriction which is placed by the rule on the rights of the mortgagee has been devised in the interests of the mortgagor, and that the rule means no more than that if the mortgagor objects to the, sale of the mortgaged property in execution of the money decree for the sum due on the mortgage, he is entitled to insist that the mortgagee be compelled to bring a regular mortgage suit if he wants the property sold. In other words, the protection which is given by the rule can always be waived by the mortgagor. In this case, the mortgagor has undoubtedly waived his rights under the rule, and although such waiver might not affect the position of persons deriving title from him, I do not think that a creditor of the mortgagor who has attached the mortgaged property is in a position to insist upon the provisions of the rule in spite of the waiver of the mortgagor. 8. A certain amount of difficulty is occasioned by the question of limitation. 8. A certain amount of difficulty is occasioned by the question of limitation. On the face of it the application is one under Art. 183 of the Indian Limitation Act. The point that the attaching creditor makes is that in the circumstances two applications are necessary. He rightly points out that before the execution of the decree or the adjustment can be enforced, the Plaintiff must establish that default has been made, and it is submitted that the Plaintiff must establish the existence of default by means of another application, and, as applications of the nature indicated are nowhere expressly provided for in the schedule to the Limitation Act, they must be governed by Art. 181, that is to say, the period of limitation must be three years for this application and must begin to run from June 15th, 1932. If this application is treated as being an application of that nature, it is therefore out of time. 9. As to the necessity for two applications, the attaching creditor relies on S. M. Sudevi v. Sovaram Agarwallah 10 C. W. N. 306 (1906). In that case, an ex parte order had been made for execution on the basis of a default on the part of the Defendants. The Defendants contended that the default had not occurred and the ex parte order was set aside, it being held that the Defendants in the circumstances ought to have had notice of the application, and to have been informed of the fact that it was alleged that they had committed default. The passage relied on is as follows: As it is desirable that the proper practice in cases such as this be known I would state the course which should be followed. When a conditional decree such as this is, is made the Plaintiff on default by the Defendant should apply to the. Court which passed the decree on notice to the Defendant by motion or notice or by rule for an order absolute. Then if and when Bach an order is obtained application may be made in the usual way for execution of that order according to the provisions of the Code. On the Plaintiff's applying on notice for such order the Court will determine the question if necessary directing the issue to be tried on evidence whether a proper lease has been tendered or not. 10. On the Plaintiff's applying on notice for such order the Court will determine the question if necessary directing the issue to be tried on evidence whether a proper lease has been tendered or not. 10. That case does not purport to interpret any order or rule of the CPC or any order or rule of this Court, and in my experience in the case of conditional decrees, the decree-holder invariably does what the Plaintiff has done here. He applies for the execution of the decree on notice to the judgment-debtor and files in support of his application a petition alleging default. If the judgment-debtor does not deny default or if his denial is not believed, the decree-holder obtains the order he seeks. I cannot recall any case in which an application has been made not for any relief but only to establish default as a preliminary to a further application for a substantive order. There is one sentence in Maharaja of Darbhanga v. Homeshvar Singh L. R. 48 I. A. 17 at p. 23; s. c. 25 C. W. N. 337 (1920), which I find very difficult to understand. In that case a decree-holder had the right under his decree to execute against the property of one Janeshvar which was in the hands of one Ekradeshvar. The Privy Council held that until the property reached the hands of Ekradeshvar the decree was not executable and limitation did not begin to run until the decree had become an executable decree through property coming into Ekradeshvar's hands. The sentence to which I refer is this: The decree against Ekradeshvar could not have been executed without a further application. This application could not have been made till Ekradeshvar had come into possession of the property of Janeshvar, and by Art. 181 of Sch. 1 to the Indian Limitation Act, the period of limitation for making an application is three years from the time when the right to apply accrues." 11. The difficulty I have in construing the passage is that I do not appreciate what the application referred to is for. Similarly I cannot see what application other than the application which has been made is required here. It is true that the Plaintiff must establish a default in terms of the order of July 15th, 1931, but why a preliminary application should be necessary to establish this I cannot comprehend. Similarly I cannot see what application other than the application which has been made is required here. It is true that the Plaintiff must establish a default in terms of the order of July 15th, 1931, but why a preliminary application should be necessary to establish this I cannot comprehend. In my opinion, the default is satisfactorily established in the petition supporting the application which alleges such default. There is no evidence contradicting the statements in the petition and they must therefore be taken to be correct. 12. The other points which have been urged, in my opinion, do not require detailed consideration. It is suggested that if the order is made the parties will have succeeded in getting round the provisions of the Letters Patent. It is pointed out that if a suit for sale of the mortgaged properties had been instituted in this Court it would have been dismissed on the ground of want of jurisdiction, inasmuch as no part of the mortgaged properties is situated within the local limits of the jurisdiction, and there could be no question of obtaining leave under cl. 12. That is perfectly true, but it is no ground for refusing to make the order. If the parties have succeeded in this way in getting the assistance of the Court which they would not have been able to obtain by proceeding in another way, I cannot see that any harm has been done. In my opinion, the somewhat artificial rules as to jurisdiction prevailing in India should only be applied within the limits that the law lays down, and should not be extended by analogy. 13. Another point made is that the charge created by the adjustment of November 26th, 1929, should, have been registered. The Registration Act as it stood at the time of that order does not help the attaching creditor. Reliance is placed on sec. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act as it stood before the amendment of 1929 which provides that all the provisions contained in the preceding part of the Act as to a mortgagor shall, so far as may be, apply to the owner of the property charged. By this means it is sought to bring in the provisions of sec. 59 which require registration of a mortgage for securing Rs. 100 or more. By this means it is sought to bring in the provisions of sec. 59 which require registration of a mortgage for securing Rs. 100 or more. That, in my opinion, is a provision with regard to a mortgage and not a provision with regard to a mortgagor within the meaning of the section. I have now dealt with the questions raised. In the circumstances, in my opinion, the Plaintiff is entitled to the order asked for and I make it in terms of the summons, except that the costs of this application will not be included in the charge. I certify for Counsel.