JUDGMENT R.C. Mitter, J. - The heirs and legal representatives of the original Defendant No. 31 is the Appellant before me. The appeal arises out of a suit instituted by the Plaintiffs for recovery of 1 anna G pies share of rent and cesses of a holding recorded in settlement Khatian No. 617 of Mouzah Chhagaldi, bearing a rental of Rs. 9-12-0 a year. The period in claim is Baisakh, 1337, B.S. to Pous, 1340, B.S. The Plaintiffs say that they are entitled to that share of the rent inasmuch as they have that interest in the tenure under which the said holding is held. The Plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for that share if they at the date of the suit and during the period in claim had a subsisting interest in the tenure. This question depends upon the question whether the said tenure had been sold in execution of a rent decree under the provisions of XIV of the Bengal Tenancy Act in a suit instituted in the year 1929. The number of that suit is 928 of 1929. This position is admitted that this tenure in which the Plaintiffs claim 1 anna 6 pies share is held tinder the patnidar Mohendra Narain Roy Choudhury. The original owner of this tenure was Sadaraddi Molla who is admittedly the ancestor of the Plaintiffs. Mohendra Narain Roy Choudhury instituted the suit,-Suit No. 928 of 1929-against a large number of persons but to that suit the present Plaintiffs who are some of the descendants of Sadaraddi were not impleaded as parties. The other descendants of Sadaraddi Molla were parties and they were a large number. Mohendra Narain got a decree in that suit and in execution of that decree put up the tenure to sale and at the sale which was held in the year 1933, Defendant No. 31 purchased. The question is whether the entire tenure passed to Defendant No. 31 or only the right, title and interest of the persons who were made parties Defendants in that suit, namely suit No. 928 of 1929, passed to him. If only the right, title and interest of the Defendants in that suit had passed at that sale to Defendant No. 31, the Plaintiffs have still a subsisting interest in the tenure and they are entitled to claim 1 anna 6 pies share of the rent in claim. If only the right, title and interest of the Defendants in that suit had passed at that sale to Defendant No. 31, the Plaintiffs have still a subsisting interest in the tenure and they are entitled to claim 1 anna 6 pies share of the rent in claim. If however the entire tenure passed, then the Plaintiffs have no subsisting interest in the tenure,-the tenure being vested in Defendant No. 31 who would be the only person to sue for rent and recover rent from the principal Defendants, namely, the tenants of the holding who are Defendants Nos. 1 to 9. The question therefore is whether the decree in suit No. 928 of 1929 had the effect of a rent decree. This question depends upon the fact whether the Defendants in that suit or anyone or group of them represented the whole body of tenure-holders. This depends upon the construction of sec. 146 (A) of the Bengal Tenancy Act which was introduced by the amendment of the year 1929. The Court of first instance came to the conclusion that the whole body of tenure-holders was represented in that suit by the Defendants in that suit with the result that Defendant No. 31 has acquired the whole tenure at the sale in which he purchased. In this view of the matter he dismissed the Plaintiff's suit. 2. There was an appeal to the lower Appellate Court but that Court has held otherwise. The lower Appellate Court has held that for the purposes of considering the question of representation, the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 146 (A) have to be looked into and the lower Appellate Court proceeds upon the footing as if the conditions enumerated in that sub-section are exhaustive and that all the four conditions mentioned in cls. 1, 2, 3 and 4 of that sub-section must concur in order to give to the Defendants in a rent suit a representative character. On both these points I do not agree with the lower Appellate Court. In my judgment the word "and" occurring in between cls. 3 and 4 of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 146 (A) is to be read in a disjunctive way, i.e., if the Defendants in a rent suit fulfil any of the conditions enumerated in cls. On both these points I do not agree with the lower Appellate Court. In my judgment the word "and" occurring in between cls. 3 and 4 of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 146 (A) is to be read in a disjunctive way, i.e., if the Defendants in a rent suit fulfil any of the conditions enumerated in cls. 1, 2, 3, 4 of that sub-section, they need not fulfil all the condition: then in that suit they would be deemed to have represented the tenure. This is the view that I have taken in the case of Makaraja Sashi Kanta Acharjce Bahadur v. Lechoo Sheikh 61 C. L. J. 518 (1935). My further view is that the conditions laid down in sub-sec. (3) of that section are not the only conditions which would give to the Defendants in rent suit a representative character. There may be other circumstances from which a Court would be entitled to come to decide as a question of fact that the Defendants in the rent suit represented their co-sharers not made parties to the rent suit. To take an illustration, if all the co-sharer tenure-holders agree that some of them should be their representatives in their dealings with the landlord and if that fact is communicated to the landlord, the landlord would be entitled to institute a suit against those persons who have been held out to him as representing the tenure, and if he gets a decree in a rent suit against such persons, the consequences mentioned in sub-sec. 2 of sec 146 (A) would attach to that decree and (if he?), sells the defaulting tenure in execution of that decree, the entire tenure would pass, not only right, title and interest in the tenure of the persons actually sued by him. Having regard to these fundamental mistakes which the learned Subordinate Judge has committed on the question of law, it is quite apparent that he did not examine the evidence on the record from a proper point of view, and for this ground alone I should remand the case to the lower Appellate Court in order that the appeal may be heard afresh. 3. But in passing I may remark that the learned Subordinate Judge is not right in saying that the word " homestead " in clause 1 of sub-sec. 3. But in passing I may remark that the learned Subordinate Judge is not right in saying that the word " homestead " in clause 1 of sub-sec. 3 means and includes a bare piece of land With no structures thereon but which had been used as a dwelling house years before by the tenure-holder or some of the tenure-holders. The word " homestead " in that sub-section to my mind means the actual habitation of the tenure-holder. In considering whether the persons who had been made parties Defendants in Suit No. 928 of 1929 or any of them or a group of them represented their co-sharer tenants, namely, the Plaintiffs, the Court would take into consideration the fact that the interest of Mofizuddin, the father of Kadri and his brothers, had been sold in the year 1307 as is admitted by Kadri in his deposition. 4. In considering the question whether the case comes within clause 1 of sub-sec. 3 it will also consider the effect of the evidence of one of the sons of Pijaruddin where he had stated that his father always lived in Calcutta and after the death of his father he and his brothers lived in Calcutta and that they never lived in their village home and that the huts in which their ancestor used to live were in an uninhabitable condition in the year 1929. In considering clause 3 of the said section the Court of appeal would also notice the evidence, if there be credible evidence on the point, as to whether the decree for rent for the period immediately preceding the period in suit in the year 1929 had been satisfied or not. The lower Appellate Court would also bear in mind that apart from the conditions laid down in the different clauses in sub-sec. 3 of sec. 146 (A) there can be representation by some of the tenure holders of the entire tenure in their dealings with the landlord. This point the lower Appellate Court will bear in mind in sifting the evidence which is on the record. The result is that I allow this appeal, remand the case to the lower Appellate Court in order that the case may be decided in the light of the principles which I have formulated above,-Costs will abide the result.