JUDGMENT D.N. Mitter, J. - These; two appeals arise out of two applications made under the Provincial Insolvency Act for annulment of an alleged collusive revenue sale and a transfer made by the insolvent. In appeal No. 201, the facts are that the property of the insolvent was put up to sale, for default in the payment of Government revenue, on 26th June, 1933, and was purchased by a lady of the name of Ushangini Debi, who happened to be the mother-in-law of the insolvent, for Rs. 1,800. The application for adjudication as an insolvent was made by Sudhir Krishna Banerjee on 12th March, 1934, and he was adjudicated as such in July, 1934. So obviously the sale took place within two years both from the date of the application to be adjudicated an insolvent as well as the adjudication. 2. In appeal No. 202, the facts are that a nishkar tank which was situate within the touzi, was sold for arrears of Government revenue, but it was not a part of the Mehal, so it was transferred by the insolvent by a conveyance which was executed on 16th August, 1933, for a sum of Rs. 200. On 15th January, 1935, the receiver in insolvency applied for annulment of the sale for arrears of Government revenue of the touzi, under sec. 53 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. This application is printed at page 21, Part I, of the Paper-Book. On 13th September, 1934, the said receiver applied for annulment of the transfer of the tank. This application is printed at page 7, Part I, of the printed Paper-Book. The receiver, however, on whom, according to the authorities which we shall discuss presently, the burden of proof lay of showing that the transactions were not bond fide, offered no evidence whatever to show that either the purchase at the sale for arrears of Government revenue by Ushangini, or the private treaty of transfer by Ushangini of the tank, was not made in good faith or for valuable consideration. This is the case as will appear from an order in the Order Sheet at page 4, Order 11, Part I, of the Paper-Book. The learned Judge records this: Case is taken up and opened. Petitioner adduces no evidence On that date the Opposite Party, namely, the Appellant before us, adduced evidence and a number of witnesses were examined. This is the case as will appear from an order in the Order Sheet at page 4, Order 11, Part I, of the Paper-Book. The learned Judge records this: Case is taken up and opened. Petitioner adduces no evidence On that date the Opposite Party, namely, the Appellant before us, adduced evidence and a number of witnesses were examined. The learned Judge after taking this evidence came to the conclusion that there was a suspicious circumstance, both with regard to the transfer by a private treaty of the tank, which forms the subject-matter of appeal No. 202, as also with regard to the sale for arrears of Government revenue. The two orders are printed separately. The order from which appeal No. 202 arises is printed at page 4, Part I, of the Paper-Book, and the other order, which refers to the sale for arrears of Government revenue, at page 16, Part I, of the Paper-Book. The learned Judge has referred to certain circumstances with regard to both these sales which, even according to him, merely raise grounds of suspicion, and do not carry the matter any further. But notwithstanding that the learned Judge has come to conclusion that the transfer of the Mehal was not made in good faith and that it was bought at the revenue sale with the insolvent's money in order to defraud the mortgagee and the whole body of creditors. On a somewhat similar line of reasoning the learned Judge has annulled the sale of the tank and refers to circumstances of suspicion in his order. And he comes to the same conclusion with regard to the want of good faith. 3. Against these orders, both the appeals, which are practically based substantially on the same evidence, have been preferred on behalf of the Appellant, and it has been contended by Dr. Mukherjee, who appears for the Appellant in both these appeals, that the onus of proving the want of good faith being on the receiver in view of the authorities, and that really there being no evidence in the present case on behalf of the receiver, which would show that he has been able to discharge the burden which lay upon him of establishing the want of good faith, the orders of the Court below should be set aside in the absence of such evidence. 4. 4. With regard to appeal No. 201, a special point has been taken, namely, that sec. 53 of the Provincial Insolvency Act is not intended to cover the case of compulsory sales, like sales for arrears of Government revenue. As this is a point which is special to appeal No. 202, it is better to say what we feel about it before we proceed to deal with the general questions with regard to both the burden of proof, and the evidence which has been led in the two appeals. 5. At the first blush it would appear that sec. 53 of the Provincial Insolvency Act can only refer to voluntary transfers, and the word "transfer" is to be taken in the same sense as defined in the Transfer of Property Act. The language of sec. 53 is this: Any transfer of property not being 'a transfer made before and in consideration of marriage or made in favour of a purchaser or incumbrancer in good faith and for valuable consideration shall, if the transferor is adjudged insolvent on a petition presented within two years after the date of the transfer, be voidable as against the receiver and may be annulled by the Court. Coming to the word "transfer" and its meaning under the Transfer of Property Act, and having regard to the definition as given in the Provincial Insolvency Act itself, namely, that it includes a transfer of any interest in property and the creation of any charge upon property, (see sec. 2, cl. f), it would seem that it was intended to cover a case of voluntary transfer of property or any interest in such property. But our attention has been drawn by Mr. Bireswar Bagchi, who appears on behalf of the Respondents in these two appeals, a decision of the High Court of Madras in a case which is not reported in the authorised reports where it has been held that, a sale in execution of a collusive decree would be covered by the provisions of sec. 53. We have been referred to the case of Ramabrahman v. Gudimalla Andalamma [1931] Mad. W.N. 287 (1930). 53. We have been referred to the case of Ramabrahman v. Gudimalla Andalamma [1931] Mad. W.N. 287 (1930). It has also been argued that a revenue sale would, in the event of fraud, operate as a private sale and one should not look to the form of the sale as to whether it was compulsory or a sale by private treaty, but to the real substance in the matter of the sale, and if the revenue sale was by a fraudulent arrangement, it would have the same effect as a sale by private treaty. It is not necessary in the view that we take, with regard to the merits of these two appeals, to express any final opinion on the question as to whether sec. 53 refers to any transfers other than transfers voluntarily made, or other than transfers as defined in the Transfer of Property Act. We have however indicated what strikes us on an examination of sec. 53, as at present ad-vised and the matter when occasion arises will have to be reconsidered. 6. Turning now to the merits of the case, an argument was advanced before us on the question of burden of proof and it was sought to be argued by Mr. Bireswar Bagchi, in an able argument, that the last decision of the Privy Council in the case of Pope v. Official Assignee, Rangoon L.R. 60 IndAp 362: s.c. 38 C.W.N. 117 (1933) has, to some extent, engrafted exceptions on the general rule laid down by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in two earlier decisions that the burden of proof showing want of good faith in the transaction sought to be annulled, lies on the receiver. We are unable to accept this contention. A reading of the case, to which reference will be made presently, shows that their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the. Privy Council rather re-affirmed the rule of burden of proof, laid down in the two earlier cases namely the case of Official Assignee v. Khoo Saw Cheow [1931] A.C. 67 and Official Receiver v. P.L.K.M.R.M. Chettyar Firm L.R. 58 IndAp 115: S.c. ILR 9 Rang, 170: 35 C.W.N. 577 (1930). Pope's case L.R. 60 IndAp 362: s.c. 38 C.W.N. 117 (1933) re-affirms the rule laid down in the two earlier cases on the question of the burden of proof. Pope's case L.R. 60 IndAp 362: s.c. 38 C.W.N. 117 (1933) re-affirms the rule laid down in the two earlier cases on the question of the burden of proof. At page 364 of the report Lord Thankerton who delivered the judgment of the Judicial Committee observed thus: The sole question in the case is whether the deed of sale was a transfer 'in good faith and for valuable consideration' within the meaning of sec. 55, and it is clearly for the Respondent to establish the contrary in order to succeed in his application. Official Receiver v. P.L.K.M.R.M. Chettyar Firm L.R. 58 IndAp 115: s.c. ILR 9 Rang, 170: 35 C.W.N. 577(1930). 8. This was a case under sec. 55 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act which corresponds, in substance, to sec. 53 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. The passage which was referred to by the learned Advocate for the Respondents as showing a departure from the rule laid down in the two earlier cases, is at page 365 of the report. It was argued that the passage which we shall quote presently engrafts an exception on the general rule laid down in the two earlier cases by the Judicial Committee. The passage runs thus: The transaction admittedly was a real one, which takes it out of the class of case found in Ex parte Chaplin L.R. 26 Ch. Div. 819 (1884). In that case and in Tomkins v. Saffery L.R. 3 A.C. 213 (1877), there was knowledge of insolvency. And it is argued on the basis of this passage that the rule with regard to the burden of proof being on the receiver to show want of good faith in the transaction, would not apply where the transferee had knowledge of the insolvency. A reading of this decision does not show that their Lordships intended to lay down a different rule with regard to the burden of proof. They were examining the facts of these two English cases and in so doing their Lordships referred to the circumstance that in those cases there was a knowledge of the insolvency, and that made the transfer open to attack by the receiver in bankruptcy, and shifted the burden of proof from the receiver. They were examining the facts of these two English cases and in so doing their Lordships referred to the circumstance that in those cases there was a knowledge of the insolvency, and that made the transfer open to attack by the receiver in bankruptcy, and shifted the burden of proof from the receiver. Besides in the present case the two English cases which are referred to by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Pope's case L.R. 60 IndAp 362: s.c. 38 C.W.N. 117 (1933), do not apply, for it has not been established in this ease, on the evidence, that the lady Ushangini had any knowledge of the intention of Sudhir to apply to be adjudicated an insolvent, within a short time after her purchase in the revenue pale or by sale by private treaty. 9. The receiver in this case has produced no evidence to establish his case that the two transfers, namely, the compulsory sale and the voluntary transfer were tainted because there was bad faith in the transaction and it was not for valuable consideration. It is no doubt upon the receiver to discharge the burden of proof which initially lay on him, of establishing want of good faith in the two transactions by eliciting in cross-examination from the witnesses examined on behalf of the lady any circumstance which would show that the transactions were not made in good faith. 10. We have been taken through the evidence both by the learned Advocate for the Appellant as well as on behalf of the Respondents. We do not think that the evidence carries the matter beyond the stage of mere suspicion. The suspicious circumstance on which great emphasis has been laid on behalf of the Respondents is that the purchase was made by the mother-in-law of the insolvent shortly after the marriage of her daughter with Sudhir, but that circumstance alone is not sufficient to raise a suspicion. It may be that this lady wanted to save the property of her son-in-law in order that her daughter might not be in straitened circumstances hereafter and for that purpose since default was made in the payment of Government revenue, she made the purchase in question in perfect good faith. It may be that this lady wanted to save the property of her son-in-law in order that her daughter might not be in straitened circumstances hereafter and for that purpose since default was made in the payment of Government revenue, she made the purchase in question in perfect good faith. Ushangini, the lady, has been examined on commission and no endeavour has been made in the whole of the evidence in cross-examination to show that she knew of the intended application for insolvency by Sudhir. Her husband, she states gets a salary of Rs. 500 a month and she purchased this Mehal Nandigram for Rs. 1,800 with her own money, and that she, after the purchase, took possession of the said Mehal. A great deal of cross-examination was directed to the question as to how she obtained this purchase money, and we have been asked to discredit her testimony that she obtained the sum of Rs. 4,000 from her father. She states at page 12, Part I, of the Paper-Book, lines 1 to 4, that she purchased another house out of Rs. 4,000, and in order to support her case she put in Exhibit B, dated 26th July, 1927, which is printed in the Paper-Book, page 1 (P. II). The sale there was for Rs. 2,500. This shows, at any rate, that there is a truth in her statement that this sum of Rs. 4,000 she received from her father and, as a matter of fact, she spent a substantial portion, some two thousand five hundred rupees, for the purchase of some other properly, in the year 1927. Nothing has been elicited from the cross-examination which would throw any doubt on the question as to the source of the purchase money. 11. We have been asked by the learned Advocate for the Respondent to discredit this testimony because this witness showed very great anxiety to conceal the fact from her husband who, as we have said before, is drawing a salary of Rs. 500 and stated that he knew nothing about the two transactions, and that these transactions ware being dealt with on her behalf by one Bijoy, who is her sister's son, who has been examined in this case. We do not think there is anything improbable in these circumstances. 500 and stated that he knew nothing about the two transactions, and that these transactions ware being dealt with on her behalf by one Bijoy, who is her sister's son, who has been examined in this case. We do not think there is anything improbable in these circumstances. Her husband was a busy man; he was Superintendent in charge of the Special Jail at Dum Dum and might have had very little time to look after the two transactions in which his wife was concerned. Besides, there was another relation of hers who was looking after the same. He kept the accounts which have been produced in this case. Another circumstance which has been adverted to both by the learned Judge and on behalf of the Respondents is that or, the date of the sale which Was in June, 1933, the books of Sudhir showed an amount of Rs. 1,088-10 to his credit and, therefore, it was sought to be argued that this money went to the purchase of the estate by Ushangini and that a part of this money having been used for the purchase by Ushangini, the revenue sale must be held to be a benami transaction and that default was intentionally and deliberately made in the payment of Governments revenue in order that the insolvent might purchase this property and thus escape from the clutches of his numerous creditors. It is to be noticed that the fact that on the 25th June, 1933, the insolvent had to his credit Rs. 1,038 odd would not make any material difference in this case, seeing that the question which matters is whether he had this money on the last date for the payment of Government revenue which was on 28th March, 1933. That indeed is the material date with reference to the question as to whether Sudhir was able to pay the Government revenue. It is said that at any rate this sum of Rs. 1,038 might have made it possible for him to purchase the property by paying down one fourth of the price which was required to be paid, but no one would venture to purchase at a revenue sale unless he was sure that he had the entire money in his possession. Besides, we see no reason from this account to disbelieve the testimony of Ushangini that she paid the money for the two purchases. Besides, we see no reason from this account to disbelieve the testimony of Ushangini that she paid the money for the two purchases. The learned Judge should not have, from this fact of Rs. 1,038 being to the insolvent's credit in June, drawn the inference that the default in the payment of Government revenue on the 28th March was intentional. 12. We were asked on behalf of the Respondents to discredit the statement by the lady that the source of the purchase money was hers and from that to draw the conclusion that the purchase must have been made with the money of the insolvent. Even if we were to discredit the testimony of Ushangini, we do not think the fact that she has not been able to give her explanation as to the source of the purchase money does necessarily lead to the inference that the purchase money must have proceeded from the insolvent. There is no direct evidence to that; effect; the books do not show that, nor are the circumstances such as to lead to the inevitable inference that the purchase money must have been paid by the insolvent. 13. Having regard to these considerations, we are of opinion that the learned Judge in annulling these two transfers has really proceeded on mere suspicion and as has been pointed out in a recent case under sec. 53 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, to which I was a party that it may raise suspicion but as has been pointed out in the decisions of the Judicial Committee, mere suspicion is no ground on which to rest a judicial decision and in fact it has been held to be a treacherous ground for legal decision. [See the case of Susarmoy Sen v. Ribhuti Bhusan 37 C.W.N. 675 at p. 678 (1933)]. As has been pointed out by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in another case that "suspicion though a ground for scrutiny could not be made a foundation of a decision." [See the case of Muhammad Mehdi Hasan Khan v. Mandir Das ILR 34 All. 511: s.c. 17 C.W.N. 49 (P.C.) (1912)]. 14. For the above reasons, and having regard to all the circumstances, we think that the receiver has failed to discharge the burden, which lay upon him, of showing that these two transactions were not made in good faith and were not for valuable consideration. 15. 511: s.c. 17 C.W.N. 49 (P.C.) (1912)]. 14. For the above reasons, and having regard to all the circumstances, we think that the receiver has failed to discharge the burden, which lay upon him, of showing that these two transactions were not made in good faith and were not for valuable consideration. 15. The result is that these two appeals must be allowed, and the applications of the receiver for annulling the revenue sale and the sale of the tank must be dismissed. 16. There will be no order as to costs. As the Appellants have succeeded they will remain in possession, as we understand that delivery of possession has been stayed. S.K. Ghose, J. I agree.