JUDGMENT 1. These two cases give rise to a common question which is of considerable importance. The facts of the two cases, however, are not quite the same, and it would, therefore, be convenient to deal with them separately. P. C. A. No. 22 of 1936. In this case notice of an application for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council had to be served on the Official Trustee of Bengal. The notice was sent to the Sheriff of Calcutta for service. On the 15th June, 1936, it was returned from the Sheriff's office with a report that nobody had attended the office for the purpose of having the notice served upon the said Opposite Party. The Registrar, Appellate Side of this Court, on receipt of this report, came to be of opinion that as the Opposite Party to be served was the Official Trustee of Bengal, no identifier was necessary; and he communicated to that "effect to the Sheriff and asked him to get the notice served. On the 4th July, 1936, the Sheriff wrote to the Registrar, Appellate Side, in reply that although identification was not necessary, someone on behalf of the Petitioner should call at his office and take his officer in a conveyance to serve the notice in question on the Official Trustee of Bengal and bring him back to the Court premises. It should be mentioned here that the office of the Official Trustee of Bengal is within a stone's throw of the Court premises. The question, therefore, arose as to whether the Sheriff was entitled to charge for conveyance for his officer from his office to the place of the person to be served and back from that place to the Court premises. As the Petitioner is unwilling to pay for such charges and asked for a Reference to the Bench, the matter has come before us. 2. It appears that there is a practice in the office of the Sheriff to levy such charges upon persons at whose instance the notices have to be served by him. As the Petitioner is unwilling to pay for such charges and asked for a Reference to the Bench, the matter has come before us. 2. It appears that there is a practice in the office of the Sheriff to levy such charges upon persons at whose instance the notices have to be served by him. But neither in the rules of the Original Side nor in the rules of the Appellate Side nor again in any of the Charters either of the Supreme Court or of this Court is to be found anything justifying the levying of conveyance charges for the service of notices, such as is being asked for by the Sheriff in this case. It appears that so far as the Appellate Side is concerned, the rule that relates to this matter is to be found in Chapter XII, headed "Fees and Costs, A-Process-fees." It is Rule No. 6 of that Chapter and it says: Processes and rules intended for service in the town of Calcutta shall be sent direct to the Sheriff, and parties shall not be required to pay into the High Court process-fees in respect of such processes and rules by stamps, as required by the Rules issued by the High Court under clause (i) of sec. 20 of the Court-fees Act. Such processes and rules shall be prepared and made over to the parties, or to their pleaders, for delivery to the Sheriff for service, and must be delivered to him accompanied by his anthorised fees and charges. 3. It is not necessary to quote the relevant rules of the Original Side, because it seems to be an admitted position that as a matter of fact there is no rule sanctioning the levying of conveyance charges. 4. The question whether in such circumstances the Sheriff is entitled to these charges arose on two previous occasions, on both at the instance of the Government; once in 1923 and again in 1936. In both those cases, however, the question was raised on references which are known as unofficial references made by the Government to this Court and the replies that were sent on those references dealt with the question administratively and not judicially. In both those cases, however, the question was raised on references which are known as unofficial references made by the Government to this Court and the replies that were sent on those references dealt with the question administratively and not judicially. The question has, however, arisen judicially in the present case; and we are faced with the situation that either we shall have to enforce the payment of these charges and, as it follows, in case of failure to make such payment to visit the Petitioner with the consequence which would ordinarily follow, namely, the dismissal of his application or we shall have to adopt some procedure which will enable the Petitioner to have the notice served on the Opposite Party on whom he requires its service. It appears from the papers before us that although it is admitted that there is no rule authorising the Sheriff to levy these charges, he has been allowed to do so under a practice which has obtained ever since, if not for a very long time. And the grounds upon which that practice is sought to be justified, as far as they may be gathered from the papers before us, are (1) what is to be found in a note prepared by the Sheriff's office and in which it is said, " The Process-Server is not expected by any Court to walk ": and (2) that if these charges are not paid and the Sheriff's Officers are compelled to walk in connection with the service of processes, it would be impossible for the Sheriff's Officers to get through their work. As far as we can make out these are the only grounds upon which this practice has been allowed to be justified. We understand also that unlike as in England where there is a scale providing for conveyance charges according to distance, etc., there is no scale of such charges in the rules of this Court, either on the Appellate or on the Original Side. In such circumstances we are unable to see how these charges can be regarded as anything else than unauthorised: no less unauthorised than those unauthorised charges which Mofusil Process Servers realise from persons when notices are to be served by them, a practice which is so much condemned everywhere. 5. In such circumstances we are unable to see how these charges can be regarded as anything else than unauthorised: no less unauthorised than those unauthorised charges which Mofusil Process Servers realise from persons when notices are to be served by them, a practice which is so much condemned everywhere. 5. The proposition that a process-server is not expected by any Court to walk is one which is not correct so far as Mofusil Courts are concerned and is not one which we can endorse. If there is a congestion of work in the Sheriff's office, the staff must be increased. 6. If it be considered desirable that the Sheriff should be allowed to make these charges, the matter will have to be considered by the Court and proper scale of charges either according to distance or on some other basis will have to be fixed. On the situation such as it is at present, it is impossible for us to enforce the payment of these charges by making an order compelling the Petitioner to pay the same. 7. We think in view of the situation that has arisen we should, inasmuch as the Sheriff is insisting upon payment of the charges, order that the service of this notice be made by registered post and we order accordingly. We also make the order that such costs as the Petitioner may have put in the Sheriff s office for the purpose of such service be forthwith refunded to him. Second Appeal No. 205 of 1935. 8. In this case, a notice which had to be served on Messrs. Mackintosh Burn, Ltd., at their registered office in Calcutta, viz., No. 14, Clive Street, Calcutta, was sent to the Sheriff for service. The Sheriff returned the notice in the first instance, saying that since none of the Appellant's party attended his office, the service could not be effected. On receipt of that report the Registrar of the Appellate Side on the 21st May, 1936, made an order that no identifier was necessary and that the notice should be served at the registered office of the Company, No. 14, Clive Street, Calcutta. On receipt of that report the Registrar of the Appellate Side on the 21st May, 1936, made an order that no identifier was necessary and that the notice should be served at the registered office of the Company, No. 14, Clive Street, Calcutta. On the 2nd June, 1936, the Sheriff reported that no one had called at his office to take his officer to the place where the notice had to be served and to bring him back from that place to the Sheriff's office in the High Court. On the 11th June, 1936, the Registrar, Appellate Side, again pointed out to the Sheriff that no identifier was necessary. In the view that he took of the matter, it seems to us that the Registrar was perfectly right. The notice had to be served under the pro-visions of Or. 29, r. 2 (6) of the CPC and that provision of the Code distinctly states that the process may be served by leaving it or sending it by post addressed to the Corporation at the registered office or if there is no registered office, then at the place where the Corporation carries on business. 9. It is somewhat surprising that on the face of this order which v/as made by the Registrar, the Sheriff replied on the 11th July, 1936, thus: In reply I notice you do not require any identifier to accompany me. I must in this case make it clear that without any identifier, I can take no responsibility as to the service being made on the correct person or Company. 10. There was no question in this case of the Sheriff's taking any responsibility with regard to the service; he had been asked to carry out the order which the Registrar, under his authority, delegated to him by the Court, had made. It appears further that in this letter also the Sheriff insisted upon the payment of conveyance charges and the letter proceeded to run in these words: It would facilitate and expedite the service of the notice if the petitioner's Advocate provides the necessary means for conveyance to and from the place of service or deposits the costs thereof with me prior to service on I am entitled to be taken to the place of service or to have the necessary conveyance-hire paid to me for such purpose. 11. 11. Whether in this particular case the levying of conveyance charges which, as we understand from the papers be-fore us, means charges for taxi-hire, would be justified or not is a matter which we are unable to determine in view of the fact that no such charges are provided for anywhere in the rules of the Court. For the reasons which we have already given in connection with the other matter just disposed of, we think that in this case also it is not necessary that the notice should be served through the Sheriff but that it would be enough if this Court sends the notice by registered post in accordance with the pro-visions of Or. 29, r. 2 (o) of the Code. We make that order accordingly. At the same time, we order that such charges for service of notice as may have been already paid by the Petitioner into the Sheriff's office, be refunded to the Petitioner forthwith.