JUDGMENT Bomford J.M. 1. The point for decision is whether a sub-lease given by a widow holding as heir to an occupancy tenant u/s 29 of Act III of 1926 subsists after her death for live years as laid down in Section 32(3) of the Act. 2. As pointed out by the Collector the rulings of the Board show some difference of opinion on this point and he feet bound to follow the latest ruling in Kishan Sarup v. Gulsher Khan S.D. 1 of 1933, in which the Board followed the principle laid down under Act II of 1901, that a widow's right terminated with her death or re-marriage and therefore any sub-lease executed by her should not bind either her successors or her landlord. 3. It is to be noted that in this Selected Decision no mention was made of a previous Select Decision Chandrawat Kuer v. Hanuman Prasad S.D. 5 of 1929, which referred to Murli Dhar v. Jhabbu Mal S.D. 5 of 1924 and "a long series of decisions" under the Act of 1901. The Board held that the Act of 1926 contained in Section 32(3) a special provision to deal with the point in issue and interpreted "valid sub-lease" as meaning a lease which was valid at the time of its execution. There can be no real doubt that Section 32(3), and it may be added Section 29(7), do constitute a material alteration in the law. Under the law of 1901 no sub-lease granted before 1902 was affected and landlords were liable to be saddled even with a perpetual sub-lessee, despite a relinquishment of the tenancy by the original tenant, so long as there were persons in existence on whom the occupancy tenancy might, have devolved as laid down in Jagdambika Prasad v. Naubat Rai S.D. 11 of 1922. Again under the Act of 1901 there was a controversy as to the effect u/s 28 of sup-leases granted by females and some attempt was made to distinguish between leases granted by females holding in their own rights and those granted by females holding only in widow's right. 4. Section 32(3) must in my opinion be taken as an attempt to settle by a compromise the difference of opinion expressed in that long drawn controversy and also to give to the landlord control over long Sub-leases. 4. Section 32(3) must in my opinion be taken as an attempt to settle by a compromise the difference of opinion expressed in that long drawn controversy and also to give to the landlord control over long Sub-leases. As amended the law protects the landlord from sub-leases subsisting long after the death of the tenant and protects the sub-lessee from immediate ejectment by the landlord on the extinction of the interest of his tenant-in-chief. I consider that if the law had intended to distinguish between the case of the female mentioned in Section 29(6) and the other classes mentioned therein or between the female holding in her own right and as widow it would have done so. 5. The argument that the lease originally valid becomes invalid on the death of the widow is based on the provisions of civil law. But revenue law is not identical with civil law and I would myself take the view that a lease originally valid under the revenue law remains valid under that law unaffected by any consideration of civil law. 6. I would, therefore, overrule Kishan Sarup v. Gulsher Khan, and restore the ruling of Chandrawat Kuer v. Hanuman Prasad and allow the appeal. The order of the first Court will be restored, though I would make it clear that the period for which the Appellant can hold is only 5 years from the death of Mst. Raju and not 8 as given in the copy of the Assistant Collector's judgment before the Board. In the circumstances costs in this Court and the Commissioner's Court will be on parties. 7. Darling S.M-[December 20, 1936.] -The point for decision is whether the Act of 1926 has modified that of 1901 on the question of the efficacy of a sub-lease by a widow after her death. In Sri Ram v. Mehr Singh (1919) 3 R.D. 440, Sir Duncan Ballie decided that under the Act of 1901, "the grant in the lease by a widow for a period in excess of her life-time was invalid," and that such grant is not binding on the land-holder beyond her death. But I agree with the view taken in Chandrawat Kuer v. Hanuman Prasad, that the law has been altered in the new Act of 1926 by the provisions of Section 32(3) read with Section 29(7). In Kishan Sarup v. Gulsher Khan, this has been overlooked. But I agree with the view taken in Chandrawat Kuer v. Hanuman Prasad, that the law has been altered in the new Act of 1926 by the provisions of Section 32(3) read with Section 29(7). In Kishan Sarup v. Gulsher Khan, this has been overlooked. The appeal should be allowed and the order of the Assistant Collector should be restored. I concur in the order, and entirely agree with the views expressed by my colleague.