JUDGMENT Panckridge, J. - This is rather a troublesome matter. The Defendant Rajendra Prasad Shah, in his capacity as sole heir and legal representative of his father Sital Prasad Shah deceased, applies that an order and decree made by the Presidency Small Causes Court should be vacated and set aside. The Plaintiffs sued three persons, Purshottam Shah, Mahadeo Shah and Sital Prasad Shah who has since died. Originally, in their plaint they described Sital Prasad Shah as a pro forma Defendant and only asked for substantive reliefs against Purshottam and Mahadeo. Subsequently they obtained leave to amend their plaint and asked for a rent decree against Sital Prasad as well as against Purshottam and Mahadeo, stating that he was a tenant by holding out. As the Chief Judge of the Small Causes Court observes, it is very difficult to understand what was intended by the allegation as to holding out. 2. The position therefore was that the parties went to trial without on the Plaintiffs' side any plea of an agreement between Sital Prasad and the Plaintiffs. 3. Inspite of the absence of any allegation to that effect, the learned trial Judge permitted the Plaintiffs to call oral and documentary evidence to prove that when Sital Prasad had purchased the stock-in-trade and goodwill of Purshottam and Mahadeo, who admittedly had been the original tenants of the premises in question, Sital Prasad approached the landlords, and although they were at first unwilling to accept him as a tenant in the place of Purshottam and Mahadeo, he eventually prevailed upon them to do so. On this basis the learned Judge made a rent decree against Sital Prasad and dismissed the suit as against Purshottam and Mahadeo without costs. 4. There was a new trial application, and the learned Chief Judge of the Small Causes Court has come to a conclusion on the facts, which is not in accordance with the findings arrived at by the learned trial Judge. 5. 4. There was a new trial application, and the learned Chief Judge of the Small Causes Court has come to a conclusion on the facts, which is not in accordance with the findings arrived at by the learned trial Judge. 5. The notes of the judgment by the learned Chief Judge are not altogether easy to understand, but he undoubtedly comes to the conclusion that there was no concluded agreement and that the relation of landlord and tenant subsisted throughout as between the Plaintiffs and Purshottam and Mahadeo and that if there was a relationship of landlord and tenant between Sital Prasad and any other person, that relationship was with Purshottam and Mahadeo and not with the Plaintiffs. Having come to this conclusion, the learned Chief Judge, in my judgment, ought to have found that as there was no contractual relationship between the Plaintiffs and Sital Prasad, and as the tenants holding under the Plaintiffs were Purshottam and Mahadeo and not Sital Prasad, the suit as against him must fail. However, what the learned Chief Judge has done is to find that as there was an agreement whereby Sital Prasad agreed not with the Plaintiffs but with Purshottam and Mahadeo to pay rent to the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover. 6. With all respect I cannot see how the Plaintiffs can recover under a contract to which they were not parties. There was no alternative claim for damages based on use and occupation, and even if there had been such alternative claim, it appears to me that must have failed, having regard to the findings of the learned Chief Judge that Purshottam and Mahadeo were throughout the Plaintiffs' tenants. 7. I therefore have to consider whether the Chief Judge of the Small Causes Court being clearly in error, the case is one in which I ought to take action under sec. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. 7. I therefore have to consider whether the Chief Judge of the Small Causes Court being clearly in error, the case is one in which I ought to take action under sec. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. I should have been in considerable difficulty if the learned Chief Judge had adopted the findings of the learned trial Judge, because although in my opinion the learned trial Judge should not have allowed the Plaintiffs to have proved an agreement which was at variance with their pleadings, it is not the practice with this Court in dealing with Small Cause Court proceedings to be over-particular in technical matters, but the fact that the learned trial Judge's judgment is not beyond criticism, it appears to me to be a material matter. Though it has been laid down more than once that a Judge has jurisdiction to come to a wrong decision as well as to a right one, there must be some limit to the latitude to be given to this principle. I do not find it possible to stretch the principle to the extent of holding that it precludes the Court from interfering in a case where a Judge has given a litigant the benefits of a contract to which he has found that litigant was not a party. That seems to me to be an illegal exercise of jurisdiction or at any rate a material irregularity. In my opinion, the decree of the Small Cause Court must be set aside. 8. I have considered whether or not I should direct a new trial, because I think that the Plaintiffs have been a little unfortunate in the advice which they have followed in the Small Cause Court. I have made up my mind not to direct a new trial, one reason being that I do not think it would be fair on the infant Defendant to impose upon him the burden of defending these proceedings since his father, the original Defendant who is a material witness, is no longer in a position to place his evidence before the Court. Moreover, the fact that the other Defendants, Purshottam and Mahadeo, are not parties to the proceedings under sec. 115, might cause difficulties if the case was heard again. In the circumstances, I make an order in terms of the notice of motion, and I dismiss the suit with costs.