ORDER Henderson, J. - The Appellant was convicted by a unanimous verdict of the jury of an offence punishable under sec. 364 of the Indian Penal Code. He was also charged with murder but was found not guilty by a verdict which was also unanimous. The prosecution put forward a reasonably strong case of circumstantial evidence to support the more important charge of murder. But in view of the verdict, it will not be necessary to refer to that evidence in detail. I am, however, bound to say that in my opinion a verdict can only be regarded as perverse, which refuses to accept that evidence and yet convicts on the minor charge on the extremely flimsy materials which the prosecution brought to bear upon it. The learned Judge rightly pointed out to the jury that there was no evidence at all to show that the Appellant took the deceased away by force and that the prosecution could only rely upon the second part of the definition of " abduction " which is inducement by deceitful means. In order to do this, they relied entirely upon certain statements that were made with regard to the purchase of a bicycle. It is said by Prosecution Witness No. 2, for example, that when the Appellant went to the house of the deceased, he said, " Let us go and purchase the bicycle." There was also evidence to show that previously the deceased acquired some money for this purpose from his grandmother and he was well aware of the proposed purchase of a bicycle. Clearly, if the prosecution wanted to make this into a case of abduction, they would have to satisfy the jury that the murder was the result of a plan conceived beforehand. Now, it is not enough for the prosecution merely to prove that when the two boys went away together, they were talking of purchasing a bicycle. They must prove that the Appellant induced the deceased to go away from the house by making a misrepresentation with regard to the purchase of the bicycle. The prosecution never even attempted to produce any evidence to show the existence of any misrepresentation. There was, in fact, no evidence to support this particular charge and the learned Judge should have directed the jury to return a verdict of not guilty. 2. The prosecution never even attempted to produce any evidence to show the existence of any misrepresentation. There was, in fact, no evidence to support this particular charge and the learned Judge should have directed the jury to return a verdict of not guilty. 2. Nor can it be said that when the learned Judge decided to allow this case to go to the jury, he put it before them in a satisfactory manner. I have little doubt that after hearing the charge, they must have been left with the impression that, if they accepted as true what the witnesses said with regard to the bicycle, the charge of abduction would be automatically established. Then again, in putting the two charges before the jury, the learned Judge did not keep them sufficiently distinct. There were several circumstances which were of the utmost importance with regard to the charge of murder, but entirely irrelevant on this subsidiary question whether as a preliminary to murder there was an abduction. If the learned Judge had summed up the evidence separately on both the charges, I very much doubt whether the jury would have brought in this verdict. 3. Finally, it is clearly not enough for the prosecution merely to establish that there was a mis-representation of some kind. They would also have to prove that there was a misrepresentation by which the deceased was himself deceived. Now, we have been through all the evidence and there is certainly something rather mysterious about it. If the boy was anxious to purchase a bicycle as stated therein, it seems to have been an extremely round about way of doing so. What is clear from the depositions is that at the time when the two boys left the house together, the deceased was very anxious that his father should be provided with some explanation of his intended absence from the house that night. Now, it quite possibly may be that the story about the purchase of a bicycle was a complete invention; but that it was invented by the two boys for the purpose of deceiving the father. It is quite impossible for us to say whether that is a fact or not. But it is an interpretation of the evidence which is quite possible and most certainly ought to have been put before the jury before they could be asked to convict. It is quite impossible for us to say whether that is a fact or not. But it is an interpretation of the evidence which is quite possible and most certainly ought to have been put before the jury before they could be asked to convict. We, accordingly, allow this appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence and direct that the Appellant be yet at liberty immediately. S.K. Ghose, J. I agree.