JUDGMENT S.K. Ghose, J. - Plaintiffs who are the Appellants before us have brought the suit for re-imbursement on the following allegations. By a patta dated the 26th February, 1915, their predecessor-in-interest got a putni lease in respect of an estate comprising: a separate account namely touzi No. 322/l, Lot Alampur from the predecessors of the Defendants. This separate account comprised a share of 4 as. 18 gds. and odd out of the parent estate and is owned by the Defendants Nos. 1 to 13. According to the stipulation in the putni lease (vide Ex. 1) the zemindars remained liable to pay government revenue. In 1923, there was a reshuffling of the numbers of separate account and separate account 322/1 was changed into 322 R.S. During the period 1925-30, this separate account fell into arrears of revenue and the Collector took proceedings in order to bring the separate account estate to sale. Notice was issued that arrears must be paid by the 12th January, 1930, otherwise the separate account estate would be sold. Thereupon the putnldars applied to the Collector for permission to put in the amount of arrears and upon such permission being granted they put in the amount, namely Rs. 4,964-6-3 p. which the proprietors had failed to pay. Out of the present Defendants, Defendants Nos. 1 to 5 own 5 as. of the separate account estate in question, Defendants Nos. 6 to 9 own another 5 as., Defendants Nos. 10 to 13 own the remaining 6 annas. Defendants Nos. 1 to 5 did not file written statement and did not contest. The remaining Defendants filed written statements and contested. Their substantial defence was that so far as they were concerned they did not default in the payment of their share of the revenue of the separate account estate. Defendants Nos. 6-9 have further pleaded that even if the estate is sold the Plaintiffs' interest would not suffer and their payment of arrears was gratuitous. The learned Subordinate Judge has held that what was advertised for sale was estate 322 R.S. but Plaintiffs were putnidars of estate No. 322/1 and therefore they were not interested in making payments which was a gratuitous one. Secondly, he has found that Defendants Nos. 6 to 13 did pay their share of the revenue in arrears. The learned Subordinate Judge has held that what was advertised for sale was estate 322 R.S. but Plaintiffs were putnidars of estate No. 322/1 and therefore they were not interested in making payments which was a gratuitous one. Secondly, he has found that Defendants Nos. 6 to 13 did pay their share of the revenue in arrears. In this view, the learned Judge has held that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to relief as against Defendants Nos. 6 to 13 and he has made a decree as against Defendants Nos. 1 to 5 for 5/16 of the money deposited calculating that amount upon the 5 annas share owned by those Defendants. The first point taken on behalf of the Plaintiffs is that the learned Judge below was in error in holding that separate account 322/1 was different from separate account 322 R.S. This is conceded by the learned Advocate appearing for the contesting Respondents in this Court. It may also be pointed out that it is quite clear from paragraph 6 of the written statements filed by the Defendants Nos. 6-9 and 10-13 that there was no dispute that the separate account was the same and that at the trial this was admitted to be the case. The learned Judge below was therefore wrong in thinking that the defence was that the Plaintiffs held under their putni under Touzi 322/1 and not under Touzi 322 R.S. 2. It is next argued in behalf of the Appellants that the learned Subordinate Judge was also wrong in holding that Defendants No. 6 to 13 were entitled to pay their share of the revenue separately as if they were holding a separate account within separate account 322 R.S. All that they pleaded was that their estate being under the management of the Court of Wards they had made no default in payment of their share of the revenue. This is the oral evidence and it is supported by challans. But this would not prevent a separate account being put up for sale for arrears of revenue under the Revenue Sale Law and what was Actually advertised for sale was the entire separate account estate 322 R.S. It is therefore contended on behalf of the Appellants that the Plaintiffs were entitled to put in the money and their action is covered by the provisions of sec. 69 of the Contract Act, the illustration to which affords an apposite authority upon the facts of the present case. See the case of Mati Chand v. Bajrang Sahai 16 C.L.J. 148 (1911) and Jograrain Singh v. Badri Das 16 C.L.J. 156 (1911). In this Court the only contesting Respondents are Respondents Nos. 10, 11 and 13. The point urged in their behalf is that sec. 69 would not apply because if the sale of the separate account had taken place, by reason of the provisions of sec. 54 of the Land Revenue Sales Act of 1859, the purchaser would acquire the share subject to all incumbrances and therefore the Plaintiffs' putni would not be affected. This argument however ignores the fact that there was a risk of the sale of the entire estate under sec. 14 of the Land Revenue Sales Act and if the entire estate had been sold, sec. 37 would not apply to save the Plaintiffs' putni For the contesting Respondents reliance has been placed on the case of Gopeswar Banerjee v. Brojo Sundari Devi ILR 49 Cal. 470: s.c. 25 C.W.N. 1029 (1922). But the facts of that case are different. That was a case of a payment made by a Hindu reversioner to stop a sale under the Public Demands Recovery Act of a property in possession of a Hindu widow and upon the facts of that case it was held that the risk to the reversioner was too problematical and hypothetical for the Court to hold that at the time of making the payment he had a lawful interest within the meaning of sec. 70 of the Contract Act which was in question. The present case however is practically on ail fours with that in the case of Smith v. Dinonath Mookerjee ILR 12 Cal. 213 (1885). There a putnidar made payment on account of Government revenue due by the superior landlord although a separate account had been opened and before the estate in arrears was advertised for sale. The defence was that the payment was voluntary. It was there pointed out that: if the entire estate had been put to sale under sec. 14 the Appellant's putni would hare been avoided by such sale. The defence was that the payment was voluntary. It was there pointed out that: if the entire estate had been put to sale under sec. 14 the Appellant's putni would hare been avoided by such sale. Therefore although in consequence of the Respondents' non-payment of the revenue the risk to the Appellant's putni was somewhat remote, still it cannot be denied that ho had some interest in paying it. 3. It was held that the Plaintiff was interested in making the payment and was therefore entitled to be reimbursed under sec. 69 of the Contract Act. We can find no reason for thinking that the position is different in the present case. 4. It is next contended for the Respondents that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to bring the present suit because the patta contained a stipulation which runs as follows: If owing to our default the revenue and cess fall into arrears and if thereby there be an apprehension of loss of your interest, then you yourself shall pay the said sum and deduct the same with interest at 12 per cent, per annum from the rent due by you and if there be any loss or damage to you on account of the non-payment of revenue and cess or if your title be extinguished, then we with our heirs and representatives-in-interest shall be bound to make good the same to you and your heirs and representatives in interest. 5. This provision however does not exclude the Plaintiffs from their right under the law to obtain re-imbursement for the payment which they had made also under the law. There is therefore no substance in this contention and the point in fact was not argued at the trial Court. 6. The next contention for the Respondents is that the Plaintiffs did not make a valid deposit because the Collector's order (vide Ex. 4) was to the effect that if the proprietors do not pay the arrears by the 12th January, 1930, the Petitioners may be allowed to pay the arrears etc, and it is pointed out that as a matter of fact the deposit was made on the 11th January, 1930. 4) was to the effect that if the proprietors do not pay the arrears by the 12th January, 1930, the Petitioners may be allowed to pay the arrears etc, and it is pointed out that as a matter of fact the deposit was made on the 11th January, 1930. Simply because the deposit was made actually one day before the last date of payment does not make the deposit invalid so far as the Plaintiffs are concerned and it cannot be said that for this reason the deposit was gratuitous. 7. The last contention is that the contesting Defendants, namely Defendants Nos. 10 to 13, at least are not liable in this suit because it is found that they, as also Defendants Nos. 6-9, had deposited their shares of the revenue through the Court of Wards. It is pointed out that the putni patta Ex. 1 contained a specification of shares and so it must have been known to the putnidars what was the share of each co-sharer. It is also pointed out that according to the oral evidence the practice was for these Defendants Nos. 6-13 to deposit their share separately in the Collectorate. This, however, does not take away from the liability of the entire separate account estate being put up to sale for arrears of revenue. What is contended may be a matter in dispute as between the different Defendants, but it does not affect the position of the Plaintiffs, who had made the deposit and saved the estate from sale and are therefore entitled to be reimbursed by all the Defendants. We hold therefore that the suit must be decreed in full as against all the Defendants. The Appellants will get their costs in the lower Court from all the Defendants. As regards the costs of this appeal, the hearing-fee of which is ased at three gold mohurs, we order that the Appellants do get their costs from the Defendants Nos. 10, 11 and 13, Respondents, who alone contested the appeal. The costs will bear interest at 6 per cent, per annum till realisation. 8. The appeal is allowed accordingly. No order is necessary on the application. McNair, J. I agree.