JUDGMENT Drake Brockman S.M., J. - The case as regards Kallu, Jauhri and Chiranji in this revision is as follows. Kallu, Jauhri and Chiranji along with Murli, whose case will be considered presently, put in an application for insolvency on the 6th September, .1934. The usual notices were issued, that published in the Gazette being published on the 6th October, 1934. An order adjudicating the Petitioners insolvent was passed on the 30th November, 1934. 2. The landholder Applicant instituted a suit for arrears of rent against Kallu, etc., on the 23rd October, 1934. It was decreed on the 28th January, 1935. It is contended that after the application to be adjudicated an insolvent was made no suit could be instituted without the leave of the Insolvency Court. 3. I am unable to see how this contention is valid. Section 28 (2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, lays down that only after making an order of adjudication shall a creditor have no remedy against the property of the insolvent or commence any suit or other legal proceeding except with the leave of the Court. The mere application for insolvency therefore was not a bar to the commencement of a suit or legal proceedings. 4. Section 29 of the Act, says that any Court in which a suit or other proceeding is pending against a debtor shall on proof that an order of adjudication has been made either stay the proceeding or allow it to continue on such terms as such Court may impose. 5. The suit for arrears of rent was pending at the time the order of adjudication was made and the insolvents brought it to the notice of the Court. There is no specific order on the record but the Court continued the proceedings. It must be deemed to have allowed them to continue without specifying any terms. I can see no bar to the passing of a decree for arrears of rent. The arrears were in fact notified as part of their liabilities by the opposite-party in their application for insolvency. The decree merely re-affirms the amount due to this particular landholder. The decree-holder cannot now execute this decree so far as I can see in the ordinary way by attachment and sale of the judgment-debtor's moveable property. What the opposite-party is evidently thinking of is the possibility of the decree-holder proceeding to execute his decree by ejectment. The decree merely re-affirms the amount due to this particular landholder. The decree-holder cannot now execute this decree so far as I can see in the ordinary way by attachment and sale of the judgment-debtor's moveable property. What the opposite-party is evidently thinking of is the possibility of the decree-holder proceeding to execute his decree by ejectment. He would do well, in my opinion, if he waited until the decree-holder did try and execute his decree u/s 79. At present it is not necessary to consider what the position then would be. 6. As regards Murli the case is that the suit for arrears was instituted against him on the 12th December, 1934, that he was signatory to the application for insolvency, dated 6th September, 1931, and that he was adjudicated an insolvent with Kallu and others on the 30th November, 1934. Therefore the suit J could not be brought without the leave of the Insolvency Court and this being so, any order passed was ultra vires and of no effect. 7. The answer given by the Applicant to this is that Murli, against whom the suit was brought, is not the same Murli whose name is in the application for adjudication. The ground for this contention is apparently that no notice was received by the Applicant of the application by Murli or indeed by Kallu, etc. There does not seem much to support this contention. There is a curious statement in the application filed by Murli to the Court of the Tahsildar saying that he had filed an application to be adjudicated insolvent on the 6th December, 1934, but this must be a mistake for 6th September, 134, because the application mentions that the adjudication is dated the 30th November, 1934, and a man cannot be adjudicated an insolvent before he even applies. 8. The case for Murli appears to be made out. A suit against him was brought after his adjudication as an insolvent and without the leave of the Insolvency Court 9. The Collector in appeal set aside the order the Tahsildar decreeing the Plaintiff's suit as against both Murli and Kallu, etc. 10. In the case of Murli or Mullu I would reject the recommendation of the learned Commissioner and uphold the order of the Collector. 11. The Collector in appeal set aside the order the Tahsildar decreeing the Plaintiff's suit as against both Murli and Kallu, etc. 10. In the case of Murli or Mullu I would reject the recommendation of the learned Commissioner and uphold the order of the Collector. 11. In respect of the decree against Kallu, Jauhri and Chiranji I would accept the recommendation of the learned Commissioner, set aside the order of the Collector and restore the order of the Tahsildar decreeing the suit for arrears. Parties may bear their own costs in this Court. Knox J.M. 12. I concur.