Judgement Appeal (No. 14 of 1936) in forma pauperis, by special leave, from a decree of the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction (December 19, 1933) affirming a decree of the High Court in its original jurisdiction (October 17, 1930). The appellant, R. T. Rangachari, was a Sub-Inspector of Police. In 1927 charges of irregular and improper conduct in the exercise of his duties were made against him. After an official inquiry the responsible official was of opinion that the charges should be dropped, and the appellant, after a medical certificate had been granted in respect of illness, was retired from the service with am invalid pension. Three months later the matter was reopened by the successors in office of the officials, and an order was made purporting to remove the appellant from the service from the date upon which he was invalided, and his pension was stopped. The appellant instituted proceedings against the respondent, the Secretary of State for India in Council, seeking a declaration that he was not liable to be removed from the service subsequent to his retirement, and he also claimed damages. The facts and the relevant statutory provisions appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The trial judge (Waller J.) and the Appellate Court (Beasley C.J. and Bardswell J.) were both of opinion that in substance the claim was for a declaration that the appellant was entitled to his pension, and both Courts held that the action was one which, by virtue of the provisions of The Pensions Act (XXIII. of 1871), a Civil Court was prohibited from entertaining. The appeal is reported at ( 1934) I. L. R. 57 M. 857. 1936. Nov. 5, 6, 9 and 10. J. M. Parikh and Abdul Majid for the appellant. When the Government of India Act was passed all the rules made thereunder became part of the contract of service. Art. 351 of the Civil Service Regulations, which provides that " future good conduct is an implied condition of every grant of a pension," was, under s. 96B., sub-s. 4, confirmed, and there has therefore been introduced into the contract of service a term which includes the grant of a pension. The terms of the contract of employment are those stated in the rules, and if, therefore, there has been a breach of the rules it would be against the terms of the contract. The terms of the contract of employment are those stated in the rules, and if, therefore, there has been a breach of the rules it would be against the terms of the contract. [Reference was made to Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Secretary of State for India (( 1861) 5 Bom. H. C. R. (Appx.) 1.), and Secretary of State for India in Council v. Shreegobinda Chaudhuri. (( 1932) I- L. R. 59 C. 1289.)] Wherever there is a contract and a breach of it, an action lies against the Secretary of State for India in Council. [Lord Roche. I should think that that is right if the word contract is confined to meaning a contract which is enforceable.] R. T. Rangachari V. Secretary of State for India in Council 213 A breach of such a contract by an officer of the Government in his executive capacity is not an act of State, or a Sovereign act, as the Court below has held see per Lord Atkin in Eshugbayi Eleko v. Government of Nigeria (Officer Administering). ([ 1931] A. C. 662, 671.) In Ram Das Hazra v. Secretary of State for India in Council (( 1912) 18 C. W. N. 106.), is given a list of cases decided before 1919; they are cases where it was decided that the plaintiffs held their offices during pleasure or at pleasure. It was stated in Shenton v. Smith ([ 1895] A. C. 229.), that " A Colonial Government is on the same footing as the Home Government as to the employment and dismissal of servants of the Crown ; and in the absence of special contract they hold their offices during the pleasure of the Crown and the Board were of opinion that the regulations in that case were mere directions and had no legal effect. In Gould v. Stuart ([ 1896] A. C. 575.) the position was different, the Board being of opinion that it was inconsistent with the Act under the provisions of which the plaintiff held his appointment to conclude that the office was held at pleasure, because it provided elaborately under what circumstances he might be dismissed. In Gould v. Stuart ([ 1896] A. C. 575.) the position was different, the Board being of opinion that it was inconsistent with the Act under the provisions of which the plaintiff held his appointment to conclude that the office was held at pleasure, because it provided elaborately under what circumstances he might be dismissed. " These provisions," it was said, " which are manifestly intended for the protection and benefit of the officer, are inconsistent with importing into the contract of service the term that the Crown may put an end to it at its pleasure." (Ibid. 578.) [Reference was also made to Young v. Waller ([ 1898] A. C. 661.) and Young v. Adams ([ 1898] A. C. 469.), and to the Government of India Act/ 1915—an Act to consolidate all the preceding Acts on the Government of India—the Government of India Act, 1910, and the Government of India Act as reprinted in 1929, s. 96B.] Sect. 96B. did not authorize the making of rules with regard to the jurisdiction of the Court. The effect of sub-s. 4 of s. 96B. was that as the old rules were confirmed they became rules having legal effect. [Lord Roche. What is meant by legal effect ?] Under this sub-section the rules will be part of the statutory law, and should be given full effect. As regard pensions, the effect is that the whole of the rules having become part of the statute, the statute law for the time being becomes as if it were incorporated in the contract, and the rules are all terms of the contract. If there be any rule which may be repugnant to the provisions of the Act that rule will be void in so far as it is so repugnant, but all the rules which are in consonance with the Act became part of the contract, and sub-s. 4 of s. 96B. therefore brings in, amongst others, art. 351 of the Civil Service Regulations, and makes it part of the contract, and makes the right to pension on those terms part of the contract so as to introduce the jurisdiction of the Court over the contract. With regard to s. 96B., sub-s. 1, being a pensioner and having retired, the appellant was not on service, and " service during pleasure " in that sub-section would not apply to him. With regard to s. 96B., sub-s. 1, being a pensioner and having retired, the appellant was not on service, and " service during pleasure " in that sub-section would not apply to him. " At pleasure " has such limitation or qualification as may be put upon it by the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder. With regard to the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, it is submitted that it has a limited application and does not apply to all civil servants. It did not apply in this case, because the appellant could not ask for any inquiry under that Act. The appellant was appointed by the Inspector-General of Police and was dismissed by the Deputy Inspector-General s. 96B., sub-s. 1, says that " no person .... may be dismissed by any authority subordinate to that by which he ws appointed." Both Courts below said that the appellants dismissal was wrongful, but they would not give him the declaration asked for because under s. 6 of The Pensions Act, 1871, if they were to make such a declaration it would affect the liability of the Government to pay the pension. It is submitted that a declaration that the appellant was wrongfully dismissed does not in any way affect the liability of the Government to pay the pension. A declaration that his dismissal was wrongful does not fall under The Pensions Act, because he is making no claim to a pension in any shape or form, he only wants a declaration. [Reference was made to ss. 4, 5 and 6 of The Pensions Act (XXIII. of 1871), and to Fischer v. Secretary of State for India in Council. (( 1898) L. R. 26 I. A. 16.)] The Court below R. T. Rangachari V. Secretary of State for India in Council 214 had also refused to make a declaration on the ground that the order dismissing the appellant was appealable and he had not appealed. of 1871), and to Fischer v. Secretary of State for India in Council. (( 1898) L. R. 26 I. A. 16.)] The Court below R. T. Rangachari V. Secretary of State for India in Council 214 had also refused to make a declaration on the ground that the order dismissing the appellant was appealable and he had not appealed. The fact that there is no appeal to the higher authority would not preclude the appellant from going to the Courts, and even if there is an appeal, and after it has been dismissed, that would not preclude the party from going to Court, unless the jurisdiction is taken away Gould v. Stuart ([ 1896] A. C. 575.) ; Satish Chandra Das v. Secretary of State for India (( 1926) I. L. R. 54 C. 44.); J. R. Baroni v. Secretary of State for India in Council (( 1929) I. L, R. 8 R. 215.); Secretary of State for India in Council v. DAttaides (( 1934) I-L. R. 12 R. 556.) ; Bimalacharan Batabyalv. Trustees for the Indian Museum (( 1929) I. L. R. 57 C. 231.). All the judges below have held that the pleasure is not qualified in any way, and they have followed Shenton v. Smith. ([ 1895] A. C. 229.) In this case, however, there is an authority authorized by Parliament which makes the Rules. They are not mere directions, as was the position in Shenton v. Smith. ([ 1895] A. C. 229.) [Lord Roche. The real point is whether this is a Gould (2) or a Shenton (8) case.] Abdul Majid followed. At the time when the appellant was dismissed there existed no charge against him that having been concurrently found he would be entitled to some relief Allen v. Flood, ([ 1898] A. C. I. 72.) Subba Row and Ralph Parikh for the appellant in R. Venkata Rao v. Secretary of State for India in Council ( 1937) L. R. 64 I. A. 55, which was heard together with the present appeal, followed. In this case all the judges below have found that there was no inquiry as required by r. XIV. of the Civil Services Classification Rules, and the appellants dismissal is therefore wrongful, because if there had been an inquiry under the Rules it is quite possible that he would not have been dismissed. With regard to the construction of s. 96B. of the Civil Services Classification Rules, and the appellants dismissal is therefore wrongful, because if there had been an inquiry under the Rules it is quite possible that he would not have been dismissed. With regard to the construction of s. 96B. of the Government of India Act the section begins with the words " Subject to the provisions of this Act and of rules made thereunder," and what follows is qualified by those words. In other words, a civil servant holds his office during His Majestys pleasure, but the pleasure is subject to certain provisions in this Act the particular rules having been framed in accordance with sub-s. 2 of s. 96B. of the Act would have statutory force, and they should have the same force as the section itself. If the procedure which is thereby laid down is not followed, as in the present case, then the person aggrieved has a cause of action against the Government, especially in the case of dismissal. [Reference was made to Ram Das Hazra v. Secretary of State for India in Council. (18 C. W. N. 106.)] Most of the cases on the submission that the rules should have the same effect as if they had been incorporated in the Act itself have been cited by Mr. Parikh. Shenton v. Smith ([ 1895] A. C. 229.) is quite different from the present one. In that case there was no question of any statutory rules there were merely regulations. I rely upon Gould v. Stuart ([ 1896] A. C. 575.) to this extent, that if there is a statute, or rules having statutory powers laying down that a certain procedure is to be followed before an officer is dismissed, they must be observed, and a breach of them would give the officer a right of action against the Secretary of State or the Crown. Merely because an aggrieved officer is given a right of appeal to the Government it does not mean that that exhausts the whole of the remedies. [Reference was made to Coker v. The Queen, (( 1896) 16 N. Z. I. R. 193.)] That was a case parallel to Goulds case. ([ 1896] A. C. 575.) Shentons case ([ 1895] A.C. 229.) was one of mere regulations, whereas the present being statutory rules the Government is bound to observe them.rely on Fischer v. Secretary of State for India in Council. ([ 1896] A. C. 575.) Shentons case ([ 1895] A.C. 229.) was one of mere regulations, whereas the present being statutory rules the Government is bound to observe them.rely on Fischer v. Secretary of State for India in Council. (( 1898) L. R. 26 I. A. 16, 28.) Dunne K.C. and Wallach for the respondent in each appeal. First, with regard to the Rangachari case, there has been a proper inquiry in accordance with the rules. Law. Rep. 64 Ind. App. 40 ( 1936- 1937) R. T. Rangachari V. Secretary of State for India in Council 215 [LORD ROCHE. There are two questions Could he under the rules be dismissed after he was invalided out, and secondly, whether he had any right of action if he could not be.] If it is held that he has perfectly properly gone out of the service it is difficult to understand how he can be dismissed if he is not in the service. It must in such circumstances be conceded that the dismissal was a mere nullity. The question then arises, What really is his cause of action ? The judges below have said that his cause of action is that he has had his pension stopped. Sect. 6 of The Pensions Act must surely mean that the Government reserve to themselves in their executive capacity the whole jurisdiction over the question of pensions. Here is a specific provision in a Pensions Act which carries with it on its face a prohibition against any Court making any declaration whatever which affects directly or indirectly the liability of the Government to pay a pension. It has been accepted in India that the Courts have no jurisdiction to deal with any question of pensions at all. The words are very express "in any suit whatever” Sect. 4 clearly excludes the jurisdiction of the Courts. All that s. 32 of the Government of India Act says is that an action can be brought as against the Government of India which could have been brought against the East India Company. The appellant alleges that this is an action which could have been brought against the East India Company. It could not, for the reason that the East India Companys tenure was exactly the same as is laid down in this Act under s. 96B., and his action is certainly not permissible under that section. The appellant alleges that this is an action which could have been brought against the East India Company. It could not, for the reason that the East India Companys tenure was exactly the same as is laid down in this Act under s. 96B., and his action is certainly not permissible under that section. Lastly, the rules made under the section are quite clear as merely prefatory procedure antecedent to His Majestys exercise of his pleasure. With regard to the appellant in the second appeal, R. Venkata Rao, the sole question is really whether or not the tenure is subject to decision according to His Majestys pleasure, or whether adherence to the particular procedure provided by the rules is a condition precedent. If he is liable to be dismissed at the pleasure of the Crown there is no wrongful dismissal. The question here simply turns on whether his dismissal is permissible under the tenure under which he served. Where there is the power to dismiss without giving any reasons for doing so, it is difficult to lay down that the right of the Government to dismiss is affected because of the breach of a rule. The suit was rightly dismissed by both Courts in India. J. M. Parikh replied. Subba Row replied. Dec. 8. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD ROCHE. This is the appeal of the plaintiff in the action against a decree of the High Court of Madras, in its appellate jurisdiction, dismissing an appeal against a decree of the High Court in its original jurisdiction whereby the action of the plaintiff had been dismissed and judgment had been entered for the defendant. The facts giving rise to the litigation are as follows Prior to and in the month of July, 1927, the appellant was a Sub-Inspector of Police in the Presidency of Madras. Certain charges of irregular and improper conduct in the execution of his duties as a police officer were made against him and were the subject of an official inquiry conducted by a Mr. Charsley, an Assistant Superintendent of Police for the district in which the appellant was serving. This inquiry was held in the manner required by r. XIV. of the statutory rules 1924, Nos. 354 and 355 (the Civil Services Classification Rules), made under s. 96B., sub-s. 2, of the Government of India Act. Mr. Charsley, an Assistant Superintendent of Police for the district in which the appellant was serving. This inquiry was held in the manner required by r. XIV. of the statutory rules 1924, Nos. 354 and 355 (the Civil Services Classification Rules), made under s. 96B., sub-s. 2, of the Government of India Act. Mr. Charsley had concluded his inquiry on September 7. At that date the Acting District Superintendent of Police was R. T. Rangachari V. Secretary of State for India in Council 216 a Mr. Kalimullah, who had taken charge of the district in August and continued in charge until the latter part of October, when he was succeeded by a Mr. Loveluck. The appellant had for some time prior to September 7 been in bad health and on that date, when Mr. Charsley. finished the inquiry, the appellant had applied to him in the following terms "I beg to submit that I am growing worse with my hernia and I am unfit for further service. I pray that I may kindly be placed before the District Medical Officer for being invalided." This request was transmitted to Mr. Kalimullah by Mr. Charsley with a statement that " He (the appellant) may be sent before the District Medical Officer with a requisition. It appears to be true that he has a bad rupture. I have completed the inquiry against him." On September 9, there was an important conference between Mr. Charsley and Mr. Kalimullah as to the course to be adopted with regard to the appellant. The result seems to their Lordships to be now quite clear, and their Lordships agree with the findings of both Courts below, which are in substantial agreement in all material respects. Two courses were under consideration disciplinary action such as dismissal on the one hand, and on the other retirement for health reasons on pension. Mr. Charsleys view was adverse to the appellant, and he thought that the charges were established, and so informed Mr. Kalimullah ; but he recognized, as was the fact, that the decision rested with Mr. Kalimullah and not with him. Mr. Kalimullah, after giving the matter careful consideration, and after full discussion with Mr. Mr. Charsleys view was adverse to the appellant, and he thought that the charges were established, and so informed Mr. Kalimullah ; but he recognized, as was the fact, that the decision rested with Mr. Kalimullah and not with him. Mr. Kalimullah, after giving the matter careful consideration, and after full discussion with Mr. Charsley, arrived, in all good faith, as both Courts have found, at the decision that the evidence was doubtful and inconclusive and that the charges should be dropped, and that accordingly the appellant, subject to a medical certificate, which on the known facts it was anticipated would be granted, should be allowed to retire on grounds of health, and that an invalid pension should be awarded to him. There is no dispute that Mr. Kalimullah was fully competent so to drop the charges and to come to the determination to which both Courts have found that he did come with perfect honesty. Mr. Charsley quite properly bowed to the decision though safeguarding himself with a statement that he would send in his report. He did so on October 2, and lke the view he orally expressed on September 9, it was adverse to the appellant. Meanwhile, on September 16, a medical certificate was granted, and on October 13 the pension roll was signed by Mr. Moore, the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, sanctioning the granting of an invalid pension of Rs.41 a month, and on November 4 the appropriate authorization for payment of the pension to date from September 17 was issued from the office of the Accountant-General. Mr. Moore had been told by Mr. Charsley on September 9 about the charges against the appellant and of Mr. Kali-mullahs view that he should nevertheless be invalided out of the service. The appellant in fact retired from the service, and his pension was paid to him for the months of September, October and November. The trouble which arose with regard to it subsequently was due to the following circumstances Mr. Charsleys report had been put aside in the office and not brought before Mr. Kalimullah by his subordinates. The appellant in fact retired from the service, and his pension was paid to him for the months of September, October and November. The trouble which arose with regard to it subsequently was due to the following circumstances Mr. Charsleys report had been put aside in the office and not brought before Mr. Kalimullah by his subordinates. Had it been so brought before him there is no probability that he would have altered the decision or the course of action upon which he had determined upon the same material on September 9, but he might, and apparently ought to, have made a record of his decision in respect of the report, and this he did not do. Accordingly, when he went out of office and Mr. Loveluck succeeded him and saw the report, there was not unnaturally both suspicion and trouble. The adverse view of Mr. Charsley in writing was given more weight than the unrecorded reasons of Mr. Kalimullah for forming a more lenient and more cautious judgment as to the extent to which the charges made could be or were supported by reliable evidence. The view taken was that the report ought to have been put before the pensions authorities or before the Deputy Inspector-General who was asked to authorize the pension. Their Lordships are not in a position to say whether this view is correct as a matter of departmental practice, but it is clear that if there was a neglect of proper procedure it was not due to any want of good faith. As has been already stated the then Deputy Inspector-General, Mr. Moore, was told, according to Mr. Charsley, of his inquiry and of his view of the matter and of his proposed report. This, however, was not so plain at the time as it has now R. T. Rangachari V. Secretary of State for India in Council 217 become and, indeed, was probably unknown to Mr. Loveluck, who succeeded Mr. Kalimullah, and to Mr. Filson who, by this time, had succeeded Mr. Moore. The upshot was that the pension was first suspended for further consideration, and that on February 28, 1928, Mr. Filson issued an order purporting to remove the appellant from the service from the date upon which he was invalided. The grant of pension was also annulled or put an end to. Filson who, by this time, had succeeded Mr. Moore. The upshot was that the pension was first suspended for further consideration, and that on February 28, 1928, Mr. Filson issued an order purporting to remove the appellant from the service from the date upon which he was invalided. The grant of pension was also annulled or put an end to. The appellant memorialized the Government of Madras against this decision, basing his prayer for relief from the cancellation of the order stopping his pension upon the simple ground that the matter had been decided by a competent authority and could not be reopened. There was a discussion at the time whether the appellants proper procedure under the rules should not have been by appeal rather than by memorial, but on the argument before their Lordships no point was made of this, and it was agreed that the substantial matter was brought before Government by the appellants memorial and that relief was refused, and that a further memorial to the Government of India was withheld by the Madras Government pursuant to a discretion vested in it by the material rules. The present action was then brought. The first question is, Has the appellant suffered a wrong, that is to say, is his complaint well founded in fact? If it is, then a second question arises—namely, is the wrong actionable, and ought the appellant to have succeeded in this action? The answer to the first question seems to their Lordships plainly to be in the affirmative. It is not contended that art. 351 of the pensions rules relating to conduct had any bearing on the matter or justified withdrawal of the pension. But their Lordships appreciate that, for reasons which have already been indicated, irregularity or slackness of procedure may have given rise to suspicions of good faith which the investigation of the subject in this action has, or ought to have, entirely removed. In these circumstances the case becomes a case in which, after Government officials duly competent and duly authorized in that behalf have arrived honestly at one decision, their successors in office, after the decision has been acted upon and is in effective operation, purport to enter upon a reconsideration of the matter and to arrive at another and totally different decision. It seems to require no demonstration that an order purporting to remove the appellant from the service at a time when, as their Lordships hold, he had for some months duly and properly ceased to be in the service, was a mere nullity and cannot be sustained. It follows that in their Lordships view the appellant had, and has, every right to complain of the stoppage of the pension as a breach of the rules relating to pensions. Both Courts below so held, and their Lordships are in entire agreement with their decision on this point. The second point as to the right of action therefore arises. Both Courts below have decided that the Courts cannot give the relief prayed and that the action fails. The main ground of their decision is that the action is one which, by virtue of the provisions of The Pensions Act of 1871, a civil Court is prohibited from entertaining. It is necessary to see precisely what the relief claimed was, and to see what the relevant statutory provisions are. By the plaint the appellant prayed a decree for a declaration that the plaintiff was not liable to be removed from the service subsequent to his retirement, and also claimed damages and other relief. At the trial all claims except that for a declaration were dropped. The trial judge thought he could not and ought not to make such a declaration, and the judges on appeal were of the same opinion. In both Courts the conclusion was reached that in substance the claim was for a declaration that the appellant was entitled to his pension, and so, in their Lordships judgment, it was. Sect. 4 of The Pensions Act (No. XXIII. of 1871) reads as follows " Except as hereinafter provided, no Civil Court shall entertain any suit relating to any pension or grant of money or land-revenue conferred or made by the British or any former Government, whatever may have been the consideration for any such pension or grant, and whatever may have been the nature of the payment, claim or right for which such pension or grant may have been substituted." Sect. 6, which empowers a Civil Court in certain circumstances to take cognizance of certain matters as to pensions, R. T. Rangachari V. Secretary of State for India in Council 218 provides as follows " but [the Court] shall not make any order or decree in any suit whatever by which the liability of Government to pay any such pension or grant as aforesaid is affected directly or indirectly." The Courts below held that having regard to the essential nature of this action it was within the prohibitions above set out. It was hardly disputed before their Lordships that this would be the correct view, but for the enactment of the Government of India Act. The main force of the argument for the appellant was directed to the support of a proposition which may be shortly stated as follows By the terms of s. 96B. of the Government of India Act the pensions rules are made statutory and of the same force as if they were set out in the statute itself also by the terms of the section, persons in the Civil Service of the Crown in India hold office not simply at pleasure but on the terms set out both in the section and in all the rules made thereunder, including the pensions rules further it was said that since a statutory right is thus created between the Crown and the servant it is necessarily to be implied that any provisions in any antecedent statute repugnant to the terms of the statute creating such right are repealed or rendered inapplicable to such a case. With regard to the first part of this argument, namely, as to the effect of the Government of India Act, and in particular as to whether it confers a right of action to enforce the rules made thereunder, their Lordships, in giving their advice to His Majesty in the appeal No. 15 of 1936 (Venkato Rao v. Secretary of State), which was argued at the same time as this appeal, will have to enter more at length into their reasons for rejecting such an argument. It is sufficient to say here that in their Lordships opinion it is untenable. It is sufficient to say here that in their Lordships opinion it is untenable. The next step seems even more difficult for the appellant and their Lordships are quite unable to hold that by reason of any repugnancy and implied repeal the provisions of The Pensions Act are rendered inapplicable to the present action. There is, however, another point raised, and in the Courts below decided adversely to the plaintiff, which has given their Lordships considerable anxiety. Sect. 96B. contains the following proviso " But no person in that service [the Civil Service of the Crown] may be dismissed by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed." The purported dismissal of the appellant on February 28, 1928, emanated from an official lower in rank than the Inspector-General who appointed the appellant to his office. The Courts below held that the power of dismissal was in fact delegated, and was lawfully delegated, to the person who purported to exercise it. Counsel for the respondent candidly expressed a doubt as to the possibility of maintaining this view, and indeed it is manifest that if power to delegate this power could be taken under rules it would wipe out a proviso and destroy a protection contained not in rules but in the section itself. Their Lordships are clearly of opinion that the dismissal purporting to be thus ordered in February was by reason of its origin bad and inoperative. Their Lordships have most anxiously considered whether some relief by way of declaration to this effect should not be granted. It is manifest that the stipulation or proviso as to dismissal is itself of statutory force and stands on a footing quite other than any matters of rule which are of infinite variety and can be changed from time to time. It is plainly necessary that this statutory safeguard should be observed with the utmost care and that a deprivation of pension based upon a dismissal purporting to be made by an official who is prohibited by statute from making it rests upon an illegal and improper foundation. But, although their Lordships differ in this important matter from the reasoning and conclusions of the Courts below, they are not on the whole prepared to direct that a declaration on this point should be made. But, although their Lordships differ in this important matter from the reasoning and conclusions of the Courts below, they are not on the whole prepared to direct that a declaration on this point should be made. The questions of fact and law are now decided, and a declaration could have no greater effect than the decision itself. After this lapse of time, and having regard to his health, no one suggests that the appellant can now be restored to his office, and the matter of pension and the responsibility of doing right in that regard rests with the Government. Accordingly, their Lordships agree in the view of the Courts below that no order or declaration should be made in this action. It was urged that unless the rights of the appellant could be enforced by action the provisions of s. 96B. and of the rules to which force was thereby given would be nugatory and useless. Their Lordships cannot take that view. They cannot doubt that the charter and the pledge contained in the statute and in the consequential rules are generally observed and fulfilled, and though Law. Rep. 64 Ind. App. 40 ( 1936- 1937) R. T. Rangachari V. Secretary of State for India in Council 219 in this instance, for reasons which are comprehensible but as now appears are insufficient, this has so far unfortunately not proved to be the case, there is yet both time and opportunity for the appropriate action to be taken by the executive now that the important questions of principle are disposed of. Their Lordships are dealing with various other and minor points which arose in this case, such as the effect of s. 32 of the Government of India Act, in their judgment in the appeal No. 15 of 1936 (Venkata Rao v. Secretary of State), and it is unnecessary to repeat the observations there made. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal ought to be dismissed. The appeal was in forma pauperis and there will be no order as to costs.