JUDGMENT D.N. Mitter, J. - This is an appeal by Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 against a preliminary decree in a suit for partition. The properties sought to be partitioned are mentioned in two schedules to the plaint-Schedule Ka and Schedule Una. Schedule Ka consists of immovable properties, that is, of three houses, premises No. 3, Tarak Chatterji Lane, Calcutta, (2) a dwelling house in British Chandannagor, and (3) premises No. 24, Tarak Chatterji Lane, in the town of Calcutta. Schedule Una properties consist of certain movable properties, some of them being ornaments to which Plaintiff claims title under inheritance from her husband of property inherited from his mother. Some of the movables are also claimed as belonging to her husband under inheritance from his father Khetra and the rest of the movables as belonging to the estate of the testator Aghore. Aghore whose estate is sought to be partitioned with regard to the immovable properties and portions of the movables, died in the year 1905. He executed a Will which was registered some time in the year 1902. Plaintiff's title to the immovable properties as also to a portion of the movables is founded on what her husband Atul got under the Will of Aghore, and the question of her title depends on a true construction of the said Will which has been printed at page 9, Part II of the Paper-Book and material portions of which are quoted in original Bengali in the judgment of the Subordinate Judge. The relationship between the parties to the present suit and Aghore whose estate is sought to be partitioned is shown in the following genealogical table which is admitted by both parties. It appears from the said table that Aghore died leaving him surviving a sun, Harinath, three grandsons by a predeceased son, Khetra, namely, Atul, husband of the Plaintiff, Pratul, Defendant No. 1 and Samatul. Defendant No. 2. Defendant No. 3 is Sailabala, a daughter of the testator Aghorenath. At the time of the execution of the Will it is admitted that all the three grandsons, namely, Atul, Pratul and Samatul, were alive. The Plaintiff states in her plaint that, according to the true construction of the Will, she is entitled to one-third share in all the three properties mentioned. At the time of the execution of the Will it is admitted that all the three grandsons, namely, Atul, Pratul and Samatul, were alive. The Plaintiff states in her plaint that, according to the true construction of the Will, she is entitled to one-third share in all the three properties mentioned. It may be mentioned here that with regard to the house in 24, Tarak Chatterji Lane, it appears that under the Will it devolved on Harinath, but by a subsequent deed of sale Harinath sold the said property to the three brothers, Atul, husband of the Plaintiff, Pratul and Samatul. It is said that this property was purchased with certain Government promissory notes which formed a part of the estate of Aghore and in regard to which certain dispositions were made. But it is conceded also before us as it was conceded before the Subordinate Judge that the title of the Plaintiff to the Ka Schedule properties namely, to all the immovable properties depends wholly on the constructions of certain portions of Aghore's Will, namely, paragraphs 2, 4 and 7 and also having regard to the circumstance just referred to, namely, that 24, Tarak Chatterji Lane was purchased with certain paper money bequeathed by Aghore as absolute legacy to his three grandsons. 2. The Plaintiff next recites that by a Will which was executed by Atul, her husband, she had become entitled to all his self-acquired and inherited properties. It is to be mentioned here that Plaintiff's husband was a member of the covenanted Indian Medical Service. He was one of the officers in the German East African War and that he was missing from the battlefield in German East Africa since August, 1917. He was not heard of for more than 7 years and in 1925 probate was obtained by the Plaintiff from the Original Side of the High Court, of her husband's Will. This is the foundation of her title and she says that she has become entitled to the entire movable and immovable properties of her husband and has been in possession thereof. 3. The defence to the suit by Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 so far as the immovable properties in Ka Schedule are concerned is that the Plaintiff being a childless widow, Atul's share as on his death passed under Aghore's Will to Defendants Nos. 3. The defence to the suit by Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 so far as the immovable properties in Ka Schedule are concerned is that the Plaintiff being a childless widow, Atul's share as on his death passed under Aghore's Will to Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and that all that she is entitled to is a maintenance of Rs. 5 per month under the raid Will. With regard to the movable properties in Schedule Una, the Defendants' substantial defence is one of an evasive character. In paragraph 16 of the written statement, page 31. Part I of the Paper-Book, the defence is expressed as follows: The copy of the plaint which has been supplied to these Defendants does not contain the schedule 'una'. So the Defendants are unable to give any answer with regard to the same. 4. Again in paragraph 24 a statement is made to the following effect: The allegations made in the plaint which have not been expressly answered, are denied by these Defendants. 5. The Subordinate Judge after taking evidence in this case and after dealing with the evidence taken on commission of the Plaintiff has negatived both the defences, namely, the defence with regard to the movables as well as the defence taken with regard to the immovable properties and has granted a preliminary decree for partition declaring that the Plaintiff is entitled to an undivided one-third share in the properties comprised in the Ka and Una Schedules to the plaint. 6. It is against this decree that the present appeal has been brought by the Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and it has been contended before us with regard to the immovable properties that the Subordinate Judge has put an erroneous construction on the Will of Aghore in holding that by the said Will Atul got his share in the immovable properties, the subject-matter of the portion. The question, as has been already stated, turns on the construction of certain relevant clauses in the Will, namely, cls. 2, 4 and 7. It becomes necessary, therefore, to consider the effect of these three clauses of the Will in order to decide whether the construction contended for on behalf of the Appellants is a right one or whether it should be held that one-third share of Aghore's interest in these three immovable properties devolved on Atul. The relevant clauses are these: 7. It becomes necessary, therefore, to consider the effect of these three clauses of the Will in order to decide whether the construction contended for on behalf of the Appellants is a right one or whether it should be held that one-third share of Aghore's interest in these three immovable properties devolved on Atul. The relevant clauses are these: 7. Clause (2) is to the following effect. I hereby make a gift in equal shares to the said three minor sons of my eldest son late Kshetra Nath Sinha, that is to Sriman Atul Krishna Sinha, Sriman Pratul Krishna Sinha, and Sriman Samatul Krishna Sinha of the 16 annas of my purchased pucca house at No. 3 Tarak Chatterjee's Lane.... Clause (4): "If any of my grandsons before reaching majority dies childless then the legacy or legacies due to him or them will be obtained in equal shares by the then living grandson or grandsons. 8. Pausing here for a moment, it appears clear to us on the construction of cl. (2) that an absolute gift was made to all the three grandsons-Atul, Pratul and Samatul-of the pucca house at No. 3, Tarak Chatterjee Lane and it has already been stated that the same construction should be adopted with reference to the other two immovable properties. By Cl. (4), which is a clause of defeasance, it appears to us that Atul or any of the other two grandsons would be divested of the absolute estate on the following contingency happening as mentioned in cl. (4), namely, that in the event of the grandsons dying childless before attaining majority. In that case the legacy or legacies due to that particular grandson will be distributed in equal shares to the other surviving grandson or grandsons. This event has not happened, namely, none of the grandsons have died childless before attaining majority, so that cl. (4) of the Will is not attracted to the facts of the present case. But it has been said that having regard to what is stated at the end of cl. (7), to which I will refer presently, namely, the sentence at the end of that clause: If my son or any of my grandsons leave behind a childless widow then she will get Rs. But it has been said that having regard to what is stated at the end of cl. (7), to which I will refer presently, namely, the sentence at the end of that clause: If my son or any of my grandsons leave behind a childless widow then she will get Rs. 5 per month for her maintenance, it must be taken that the intention of the testator was that if a son died childless, it did not matter at what time, after leaving a childless widow behind him, the absolute estate obtained by that particular grandson would become divested, or in other words the defeasance clause would come into operation. 9. Cl. (7) contains the second clause of defeasance, namely, even if the event mentioned in cl. (4) did not happen, as it has not happened in the present case, there would be a subsequent defeasance of the absolute right if the event mentioned in cl. (7) happened. But cl. (7) runs as follows: When all my grandsons will attain majority, the legacies etc., due to them under this will be made over to them by the executors or whoever of them may then survive or by the executor or executors appointed by the said executors, in accordance with the intention expressed in this Will. If up till then none of my grandsons remain alive or if they leave no children, the legacies due to them will revert to the Estate and will go over to my son Sriman Harinath Sinha, and after his death to any heir whatever he may have in accordance with law. 10. Then omitting some immaterial clauses the clause runs as follows: If my son or any of my grandsons leave behind a childless widow then she will get Rs. 5 [per month for her maintenance. 11. Now, the second event mentioned in cl (7), namely, that if at the time of the distribution by the executors after the attainment of majority of all the grandsons, that is, of the youngest of them, all the grandsons are not alive then the estate would go over to his son Harinath Sinha-this clause of defeasance has not also come into operation, for all the grandsons were alive at the material date. It has been contended that although from a literal reading of the clause of defeasance in paragraph 7, that would be the construction, still having regard to what is stated at the end of that clause, namely, If my son or any of my grandsons leave behind a childless widow, then she will get Rs. 5 per month for her maintenance, the testator must have intended that irrespective of the time when a grandson might die leaving behind a childless widow, the absolute estate in favour of the particular grandson must revert apparently to the estate of Aghore. It is not possible to accede to this argument, for it is well established now that a clause of defeasance in order to be operative must contain express words or words of necessary implication of a gift over to a definite person. In this case there is no provision for a gift over in the case of the grandsons dying leaving childless widows after the attainment of majority of all the grandsons, namely, the attainment of majority of the youngest grandson. In order to defeat the absolute right by the previous provisions of the Will, it must be shown that the testator has by clear words expressed the intention of divesting the absolute holder of his rights under the previous dispositions in the Will or, to put it in the language of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of Indira Rani Ghose v. Akhoy Kumar Ghose L.R. 59 IndAp 419 at p. 420: s.c. 37 C.W.N. 153 at p. 168 (1932) that a conscious intention on the part of a testator to dispose of a property in the hands of another person under a gift from himself is not lightly to be imputed. Mr. Amarendra Nath Bose, who appears for the Appellant, asks us to infer this intention from the last part of cl. (7), namely, the disposition that the childless widows were to get only a maintenance of Rs. 5 per month. That intention, in our opinion, is not sufficient to defeat the rights of Atul on whom absolute right was vested and whose rights were not divested by anything which happened as stated in cl. (4) and cl. (7) of the Will in question. It is possible to read the last clause about the maintenance of Rs. 5 per month. That intention, in our opinion, is not sufficient to defeat the rights of Atul on whom absolute right was vested and whose rights were not divested by anything which happened as stated in cl. (4) and cl. (7) of the Will in question. It is possible to read the last clause about the maintenance of Rs. 5 per month as applying to cases of widows who become widows during the minority of their husbands as mentioned in paragraph 4, or become widows at the time when the youngest son attains majority having regard to cl. (7) of the Will. The Subordinate Judge is of opinion that the words: If my Bon or any of my grandsons leave behind a childless widow then she will get Rs. 5 per month for her maintenance, in that clause are intended to mean and does mean that if at the time of the distribution of the estate among the legatees on the attainment of age of majority by the youngest of them, any childless widow of any of these persons be alive, she will be entitled to nothing more than a maintenance allowance of Rs. 5 per month out of the testator's estate. This construction is supported by the circumstance that the Will contains no clause of disposition providing for the distribution of the legacy given to a son or a grandson, should the son or grandson die after the period of distribution of the legacy leaving a childless widow. In the absence of any express intention to that effect, having regard to the general principles which are followed with regard to the provisions of defeasance of rights given by the earlier part of the Will I do not think that we should be justified in inferring any such intention from these words in the last sentence at the end of cl. (7). I agree with the Subordinate Judge in the construction which he has adopted in respect of the Will. I agree with the Subordinate Judge in the construction which he has adopted in respect of this point of the Will. The first point, therefore, with regard to the immovable properties must fail. 12. With regard to the movables, it has been argued first, in particular to the ornaments of the mother-in-law of the Plaintiff which is valued at about Rs. The first point, therefore, with regard to the immovable properties must fail. 12. With regard to the movables, it has been argued first, in particular to the ornaments of the mother-in-law of the Plaintiff which is valued at about Rs. 3,500, that there is no evidence to show that the mother-in-law left ornaments of that value. Under the Hindu Law all the three sons of Monorama, namely, the Plaintiff's husband and Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 would be entitled to the stridhan property of the mother in equal shares. It is true that the evidence in this behalf is not very strong; but the Plaintiff, circumstanced as she was, could not furnish better evidence than what she has given in the present case. It is admitted that at the time of the death of Monorama, she and the sons including Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were living with her. The nature and quality of the ornaments would be better known to the three sons who were near about her. The Plaintiff has herself deposed on this part of the case in this way. She first states the nature of the ornaments which consisted of gold benki churi, thick gold, "guard chain," gold dare, her (chain), a pair of gold toga, one pair of gold tabich, two thick gold churis, one gold necklace (cheek), one pair of silver tora (anklet wearing). Then she states I am unable to", state the individual weight of each ornament but I heard from my aunts-in-law (father-in-law's sisters) and my Debars and my mother-in-law's sister that my mother-in-law's (ornaments were worth about Rs. 3000 or Rs. 3500. 13. It is true a portion of this evidence is hearsay and in so far as it relates to an admission made by the Debars regarding which she makes this statement, the evidence is admissible. But apart from that it seems to us that practically there was no substantial defence to the claim on this head. As has been already pointed out, paragraph 16 of the plaint is altogether evasive. After this written statement was filed, a long time elapsed and it was open to the Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 to ask for particulars with regard to the value of these ornaments from the Plaintiff which they never did. Paragraph 21 on which reliance has been placed by Mr. After this written statement was filed, a long time elapsed and it was open to the Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 to ask for particulars with regard to the value of these ornaments from the Plaintiff which they never did. Paragraph 21 on which reliance has been placed by Mr. Bose before us is a denial of the most evasive character and cannot be regarded as denial, having regard to what is laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. We do not think that a case has been made out for our interference with the finding of the Subordinate Judge on this part of the case having regard to the evasive character of the defence in this suit. The Plaintiff is a helpless lady and it is to be expected that in the matter of these movables she would receive sufficient information from the Defendants who had special knowledge with regard to these movables. In these circumstances, we think that the decision of the Subordinate Judge on the question of movables also is right. The result is that both the grounds fail and the appeal must be dismissed with costs. Patterson, J. I agree.