JUDGMENT 1. This appeal is against the order of the District Judge of Rungpur, dated the 31st May, 1935, adjudging the Appellant an insolvent under the Provincial Insolvency Act on the application of the Respondents to whom the Appellant was indebted to the extent of Rs. 585-14-3 on the date of the presentation of the application by the Respondents on account of a decree passed in Money Suit No. 622 of 1934 by the Court of the Second Munsif, Rungpur. The acts of insolvency alleged by the Respondents are:- (1) That a jote belonging to the Appellant was sold in execution of a certificate under the provisions of the Public Demands Recovery Act on the 5th January, 1935, that is, within three months from the date of the presentation of the petition. (2) That the Appellant gave notice to the Respondents that he had suspended payments of his debts within three months from the date of the presentation of the petition. The learned District Judge has come to the conclusion that the acts of insolvency alleged by the petitioning creditors have been proved. By sec. 6 of the Provincial Insolvency Act the debtor commits an act of insolvency if any of his property is sold in execution of the decree of any Court for the payment of money. The word "decree" has not been defined in the Provincial Insolvency Act but cl. (2) of sec. 2 of the Act lays down that the words and expressions used in this Act and defined in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and not defined in the Insolvency Act shall have the same meanings as those respectively attributed to them by the said Code. The word " decree " therefore must be taken in the same sense in which it has been used in the Code of Civil Procedure. By sec. 2, cl. (2) of the Code " decree " has been defined as a formal expression of an adjudication which so far as the Court expressing it conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. The decree must therefore be the formal expression of an adjudication in a suit. The decree must therefore be the formal expression of an adjudication in a suit. A certificate filed under the provisions of the Public Demands Recovery Act cannot be said to be the formal expression of an adjudication in a suit. Consequently the sale of the property of the Appellant in execution of the certificate under the Public Demands Recovery Act is not a sale in execution of a decree of any Court for the payment of money. The learned District Judge is of opinion that a certificate has the force or effect of a Civil Court decree. The statute, however, mentions a decree and not an order having the force or effect of a decree. The meaning of the word "decree" used in the Provincial Insolvency Act cannot be extended by analogy: The words ' in execution of the decree of any Court for the payment of money can not be extended by analogy. They must be extended, if at all, by the legislature and we can not hold that there has been an act of insolvency when the definition given by the legislature has not been complied with-See the case of Ramsahai Mull Mare v. Joylall. 32 C. W. N. 308 (1923). We are therefore of opinion that the Appellant committed no act of insolvency when his property was sold in execution of the certificate. 2. As regards the second act of insolvency Kristo Kumar, one of the petitioning creditors, in his evidence stated as follows:- Debi Prosad owes us Rs. 535/- odd on a decree. We sued on a bond. Debi Prosad filed written defe. noe. We got an exparte decree. Debi appealed for rehearing; his application was dismissed. He appealed. His appeal was dismissed. On receiving notice of appeal I went to Debi's house for settlement of our dues as Debi's properties were being sold away. Next on 8th or 9th Kartik I offered to compound the claims.-Debi replied he was not going to pay me at all as all his immovable properties were being sold away. After disposal of appeal in Magh. 1341', I again went to his home. I offered to compromise our dues. Debi refused to pay anything. He said-'you might take my lands'-buc rents are due from them and they will bring me no good. 3. After disposal of appeal in Magh. 1341', I again went to his home. I offered to compromise our dues. Debi refused to pay anything. He said-'you might take my lands'-buc rents are due from them and they will bring me no good. 3. Peary Mohan Barman, who was examined as a witness on behalf of the petitioning creditor stated that on 2nd Magh last when Kristo asked the Appellant to pay his dues, the Appellant stated that he would not pay his debts and that he would not pay any of his creditors. 4. Ananga Mohan Barman, another witness, examined on behalf of the petitioning creditor, says that on 2nd Magh Debi told Kristo in his presence that he would not pay Kristo and that he would not pay anybody. 5. The learned District Judge relying on the evidence of the two witnesses on behalf of the petitioning creditors has come to the conclusion that the Appellant gave notice to his creditors that he had suspended payment of his debts. The learned District Judge, however, has wholly overlooked the fact that Kristo Kumar, one of the petitioning creditors in whose presence the Appellant is alleged to have given notice that he has suspended payment of his debts, does not say that on the 2nd Magh, 1341, the Appellant told him. that he would not pay his debts and that he would not pay any of his creditors. The Appellant in his evidence before the Court stated that he never told the petitioning creditors or any of his creditors that he would not pay their debts and that the application was filed in order to disqualify him for the Presidentship of the Union Board. It is an admitted fact in this case that the Appellant actually paid Rs. 200 to the petitioning creditors on the 26th January, 1935, that is, within a very short period after the alleged conversation between Kristo Kumar and the Appellant in the presence of the petitioning creditor. This amount was paid even before the Appellant received notice of the application for insolvency. If the case of the petitioning creditors were true, it is difficult to understand why the Appellant would pay Rs. 200 within a short time after he had given notice that he would not pay any of his creditors at all. The story of the petitioning creditors is highly improbable. If the case of the petitioning creditors were true, it is difficult to understand why the Appellant would pay Rs. 200 within a short time after he had given notice that he would not pay any of his creditors at all. The story of the petitioning creditors is highly improbable. The evidence of the two witnesses examined on behalf of the petitioning creditors shows that these two witnesses wanted to prove facts which Kristo Kumar in his evidence did not attempt to prove. We therefore place no reliance on the testimony of the witnesses on behalf of the petitioning creditors and we hold that the Appellant did not give notice to any of his creditors to the effect that he had suspended payments of his clues. The acts of insolvency alleged by the petitioning creditors have not therefore been established. 6. The result therefore is that this appeal is allowed, the order of the learned District Judge adjudging the Appellant insolvent is set aside and the application of the Respondents for adjudging the Appellant as insolvent is dismissed. The Appellant will get his costs in this Court as well as in the Lower Court, hearing-fee being assessed at three gold mohurs.