JUDGMENT McNair, J. - In 1935, Kartick Prosad Khettry brought a partition suit in which the Defendants were Amar Nath Khettry and his two sons. A consent decree was passed in that suit on the 16th March, 1936, declaring the Plaintiff entitled to one moiety of the estate and the Defendants to the other moiety. The decree further provided for the appointment of two persons as arbitrators and commissioners of partition. They were also appointed receivers of the joint estate and were directed to take possession of the estate immediately and collect the rents, issues and profits of the immovable property. On the same day Lakshminarain Khettry, the present applicant and a stranger to the family, obtained a decree against Amar Nath for about Rs. 18,000. 2. On the 30th June, 1936, Lakshmi, in execution of his decree, attached Rs. 8500 out of Rs. 17000 payable, as he alleged, by Sushil Kumar Mukherjee to Amar Nath for arrears of royalty. 3. On the 15th Jury, 193C, Mukherjee was served with a copy of the attachment and Amar Nath was served on July 28th. 4. On July 30th the Receivers wrote to Amar Nath that they would take possession of the properties on the 1st August and on the 2nd October the Receivers for the first time demanded payment of the arrears of royalty from Mukherjee. 5. The present application is by the decree-holder Lakshmi for payment to him by Mukherjee, the garnishee, of the money attached in his hands. The garnishee contests the quantum of his liability. 6. He next contends that the money, if payable, is payable to his superior landlords as a unit and that he cannot be called upon to pay a portion to one of the landlords separately. 7. He contends, in the third place, that the money, if due, is payable to the Receivers whose appointment was prior to the attachment. 8. It is noteworthy that the garnishee admits some liability but he pleads, like many other debtors, that on the taking of accounts his liability will be found to be negligible. If necessary an issue as to liability can be framed and tried as provided by r. 3 of Ch. XVIII of the Original Side Rules and Orders. 9. 8. It is noteworthy that the garnishee admits some liability but he pleads, like many other debtors, that on the taking of accounts his liability will be found to be negligible. If necessary an issue as to liability can be framed and tried as provided by r. 3 of Ch. XVIII of the Original Side Rules and Orders. 9. Assuming then that the liability can be determined the next question is whether that liability is divisible so as to entitle the applicant to recover his share alone. 10. Mr. Sen, for the garnishee, argues that this is a joint debt due to the members of the family, that there is no debt to the judgment-debtor alone, and that garnishee proceedings cannot be had in respect of a joint debt. The debt is in respect of royalty payable under a mining lease. That lease is not before me, but from the tabular statement on which the order for attachment was made it is apparent that the royalty is payable to both Amar Nath and Kartick Prosad. 11. Mr. Sen relies on Macdonald v. The Tacquah Gold Mines Co. L. R. 13 Q. B. D. 535 (1884). There the judgment-debtor Fitzgerald jointly with one Horton sold their interest in certain gold mines for 10,000. Of this amount 2,500 was paid in cash and the purchasers covenanted to pay the balance to Horton and Fitzgerald who were declared in the deed to be entitled to the money on joint account. Fitzgerald's share was said to be two-thirds of the unpaid purchase money and the Plaintiff, his creditor, obtained a garnishee order attaching such share. A garnishee issue was tried and Fitzgerald's share was ascertained and attached. 12. The Defendants, the purchasers, appealed and successfully contended that there was no debt due to the judgment-debtor alone and therefore no sum capable of being attached. Bowen, L. J., on p. 537 of the report, says: Where money is due on a covenant made with two persons jointly by which it is to be paid to such two jointly, no one of those two has a right to that money without the other of them. 13. Mr. Bowen, L. J., on p. 537 of the report, says: Where money is due on a covenant made with two persons jointly by which it is to be paid to such two jointly, no one of those two has a right to that money without the other of them. 13. Mr. Sen relied also on Baraboni Coal Concern, Ltd. v. Gokulanunda Mohanta Thakur L. R. 61 I. A. 35: s. c. 38 C. W. N. 325 (1933) where it was held that one only out of four shebaits who had executed a mining lease, could not sue the lessee for a fourth share in the royalties reserved. 14. The Board were of opinion that the lease disclosed a joint demise or contract and that no one of the four lessors could sue for an aliquot part of the whole. They held that the acceptance of separate payment by each of the lessors could not operate so as to vary the terms of the lease and in conclusion Lord Alness who delivered the judgment of the Board said (p. 39): Their Lordships desire to add that the view which they have expressed, in their opinion, accords with commonsense and equity. If the first Respondent's contention be sound, then each one of the four lessors under the lease might successively or simultaneously harass the Appellants by separate suits. In the present case, there has already been a second suit. Such a result, in their Lordship's view, is oppressive, and it is not sound in law. 15. It is argued that although the lease may have contained a covenant to pay to the lessors jointly, yet on the 16th March, 1936, when the preliminary partition decree was made the status of the parties was reduced from that of joint tenants to tenants in common and there was immediately a "debt" which became attachable within the meaning of sec. 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 16. The creditor cannot, in my opinion, take advantage of the preliminary decree in this way. The provisions of the lease still remain and the lessee is still bound to pay his royalties to the lessors in terms of his covenant The disadvantages that might accrue to him, were it to be held otherwise, are obvious. 17. It frequently happens that there are a dozen or more members of the family amongst whom the assets are being partitioned. 17. It frequently happens that there are a dozen or more members of the family amongst whom the assets are being partitioned. Can it be said that each member, on the passing of a preliminary decree for partition, obtains a separate right to a fractional share of the royalty so as to entitle him to sue for an aliquot part of the whole? That seems to be the very proposition which Lord Alness describes as not merely oppressive but unsound in law. 18. Any change in the rights of the Khettrys, inter se, by reason of the partition, cannot affect their lessee. The latter is entitled to rely on his lease which apparently contemplates a joint debt. Amar Nath Khettry could not have compelled payment of a portion of the royalty to himself and his judgment-creditor can be in no better position. Moreover although the preliminary decree declared each party entitled to a moiety the arbitrators are given unfettered discretion in allocating the assets to the respective shares. 19. I hold, therefore, that the share of royalty which it is sought to attach is not a valid subject of attachment, at the instance of the present applicant. 20. This disposes of the application, but in case this matter goes further I record my views on the third question which was argued, viz., that the money, if payable, is payable to the Receivers and not to the judgment-debtor. 21. The Receivers were appointed by the consent decree in the partition suit on 16th March, 1936. They were to take charge of the estate immediately and collect the rents and profits. In fact they did not take possession until August, at the earliest. 22. The writ of attachment was issued on the 30th June and was served, on the garnishee, on the 15th July. 23. Mr. S. N. Banerjee (Jr.), for the applicant, contends that the Receivers had no rights, which could override those of an attaching creditor, until they had actually taken possession. 24. It cannot be contested that the Receivers did not take possession until after the order for attachment had been made. Mr. Banerjee relies on the case of Kanailal v. Manoo Bibi 29. C.L. J. 424 (1919) in support of his contention that a creditor is not debarred from proceeding to execution until the appointment of the receiver has been perfected and he is actually in possession. Mr. Banerjee relies on the case of Kanailal v. Manoo Bibi 29. C.L. J. 424 (1919) in support of his contention that a creditor is not debarred from proceeding to execution until the appointment of the receiver has been perfected and he is actually in possession. The Receiver, it is argued, never has title, he only has possession and it is his possession which the Court protects. 25. Mr. Sen for the garnishee contends that this doctrine only refers to immovable property and that it cannot be applicable to a debt, of which possession cannot be taken. The distinction in my opinion is erroneous. A Receiver can take possession of a debt by writing to a tenant and by serving him with notice of the order appointing him Receiver, and that in fact was the method ultimately employed by the Receivers in the present case. Had they been diligent there seems to be no reason why they should not have taken possession before the attachment on the 30th June. They were empowered by the order appointing them to take possession immediately, yet they refrained from doing so for several months. Neither the garnishee nor the attaching creditor had notice of the order of appointment and the laches of the Receivers in perfecting their title would debar them from postponing the claims of the applicant to any right that they may have acquired. 26. The attachment was, in my opinion, a valid attachment which would have priority over the claims of the Receivers, were the debt one which was capable of attachment. I have already stated my reasons for holding that this debt could not be attached. The application must be dismissed with costs. Certified for Counsel. The attachment will be removed.