JUDGEMENT Consolidated Appeals (No. 73 of 1935) from three decrees of the High Court (one of April 10, 1934, and two of July 19, 1934) affirming three decrees of the High Court in its original civil jurisdiction (April 18, 1932). On August 30, 1916, four persons, including the appellant, Sarat Chandra Basu, executed a kabuliyat in favour of the respondent, the Maharajadhiraj Bahadur of Burdwan, by which they obtained the lease of underground coal rights in certain villages belonging to the respondent, and agreed to pay him certain royalties and commission on the coal extracted. The signature of the appellant to the kabuliyat was " Sri Sarat Chandra Basu, by the pen of Sri Natobar . Mukhopadhya " so signed pursuant to a power of attorney given by the appellant to Natobar. The actions were brought by the respondent for money alleged to be due to him under the contract. The appellant pleaded that the kabuliyat was neither executed nor registered by him or by any person authorized by him to act on his behalf, and that he was not therefore bound by the covenants contained therein. He alleged that the power of attorney was not authenticated as required by law; and that it did not authorize Natobar to execute the kabuliyat, but only authorized him to execute another document—namely, an agreement between the four lessees defining their rights and liabilities inter se arising out of the projected lease. The power of attorney, dated August 8, 1916, was executed by the appellant before, and authenticated by, the sub-Registrar of Hazaribagh " under s. 33, Act XVI. of 1908 M (the Indian Registration Act), which provides that " the following powers of attorney shall alone be recognised .... (a) if the principal at the time of executing the power-of-attorney resides in any part of British India .... a power-of-attorney executed before and authenticated by the Registrar or sub-Registrar within whose district or sub-district the principal resides." One of the questions in this appeal was whether the principal was " residing " in the district where the power was authenticated, as contended by the respondent. a power-of-attorney executed before and authenticated by the Registrar or sub-Registrar within whose district or sub-district the principal resides." One of the questions in this appeal was whether the principal was " residing " in the district where the power was authenticated, as contended by the respondent. The kabuliyat of August 30, 1916, was presented for registration on September 18, 1916, by one Fakir Chandra Sarkar, agent of Devendra Nath Mitra Mazumdar, one of the four executants of the kabuliyat, under a general power of attorney, and a further question arose in this appeal whether Fakir Chandra Sarkar had authority, under his general power of attorney, to represent his principal in connection with a document executed by the principal jointly with other persons. The main question in the appeal was as to the meaning of the material words in the power of attorney authorizing Natobar to execute the kabuliyat, there being a difference between the official and unofficial translations. The relevant provisions of the power of attorney are set out in the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The trial judge (Buckland J.) gave judgment in favour of the respondent. An appeal to the Appellate Court (Costello and Lort-Williams JJ.) was dismissed. The Court held that Natobars power of attorney had been properly authenticated and that that power sufficiently authorized him to execute the kabuliyat. 1936. Oct. 26, 27. Dunne K.C., L. P. E. Pugh, J. M. Pringle, S. N. Banerjee, and P. C. Basu for the appellant. The suits were brought against the appellant and three other persons as lessees under a mining lease, described as a kabuliyat, for rents and royalties arising out of the lands and the price of coal, which had been raised under the lease. The defence raised the question of the validity of the execution and of the registration of the kabuliyat. The appellant is the only defendant now before the Board. The respondent alleges that the translation of the power of attorney given by the appellant to Natobar, the document on the construction of which it is submitted that this case must be decided, is not the correct one, and he desires to put in a fresh translation. The question with regard to accepting the official translation is dealt with in Sasiman Chowdhurain v. Shib Narayan Chowdhury (( 1921) L. R. 49 I. A. 25, 31.) and Rajendra Prasad Bose v. Gopal Prasad Sen. The question with regard to accepting the official translation is dealt with in Sasiman Chowdhurain v. Shib Narayan Chowdhury (( 1921) L. R. 49 I. A. 25, 31.) and Rajendra Prasad Bose v. Gopal Prasad Sen. (( 1930) L. R. 57 I. A. 296, 301.) [Lord Maugham. At the moment we will proceed with the official translation.] On the construction of the power of attorney as here translated it is submitted that it did not authorize Natobar to execute the kabuliyat. It is referring to an agreement amongst " four persons "—the lessees—which has first to be come to to settle their own interests, and does not authorize Natobar to sign a kabuliyat from the Burdwan Raj. The points which arise on the power of attorney are, first, whether the Registrar of Hazaribagh had jurisdiction to authenticate and register the document which was executed by Sarat Chandra Basu, who was resident at Burdwan ; and whether it was necessary to prove the actual residence of the person or not secondly, did the power of attorney authorize the execution of the kabuliyat ? The first issue is whether the kabuliyat was duly registered under the provisions of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, and the second, whether Natobar had authority from the appellant to execute the kabuliyat. A further point that arises is whether the power of attorney executed by D. N. Mitra Mazumdar, one of the executants of the kabuliyat, gave to Fakir Chandra Sarkar as his agent authority on his behalf to present for registration a document which was executed not by D. N. Mitra Mazumdar alone, but by him jointly with a number of other persons. If he had no power, to present it would be a bad presentation so far as the appellant is concerned. It is submitted that this was a bad registration because it was not presented under a power of attorney which enabled the presentor to represent all the people Dottie Karan v. Lachmi Prasad Sinha. (( 1930) L. R. 58 I. A. 58, 66.) It is submitted that all the registration proceedings have failed in regard to all the provisions required to be fulfilled by ss. 32, 34 and 35 of the Act. There was no appearance under s. 34 by the appellant, or on his behalf, before the Registrar. (( 1930) L. R. 58 I. A. 58, 66.) It is submitted that all the registration proceedings have failed in regard to all the provisions required to be fulfilled by ss. 32, 34 and 35 of the Act. There was no appearance under s. 34 by the appellant, or on his behalf, before the Registrar. There had been no presentation under s. 32 on behalf of the appellant; and under s. 34 there was no admission of execution at all by him or on his behalf. A number of authorities have laid down that the provisions of the Registration Act must be strictly complied with, and if there is an error on the part of the Registration Officer the registration is not good. A document can undoubtedly be presented by one of various executants, and if the others come in and admit, it would be a proper registration. But here there is no admission. It is part of the Registrars duty to have the proof before him that the man who is admitting execution has got authority to do so, and there is nothing here to show that he ever had. [Reference was made to Jambu Parshad v. Muhammad Aftab AH Khan, (( 1914) L. R. 42 I. A. 22.)] Pugh followed. Puran Chand Nahatta v. Monmotho Nath Mukherjee (( 1927) L. R. 55 I. A. 81, 84.) shows that, when there is a pen ignature, the executant is the person whom it is intended to bind by the document, and not the pen writer. That being so, the executant of the kabuliyat was the appellant. The next question is, Did the appellant appear before the Registrar at the time of the registration of the kabuliyat, and the answer is " No." Secondly, Did the appellant admit execution ? again the answer must be " No." But Natobar admitted that he signed the document, and he admitted execution for self. But the appellant has got to admit, or have somebody there who produces a power of attorney and on its production admits execution of the document for the appellant. That never happened. The substantial question is, Had Natobar authority to execute the kabuliyat? [Reference was made to Dowson and Jenkinss Contract, In re. ([ 1904] 2 Ch. But the appellant has got to admit, or have somebody there who produces a power of attorney and on its production admits execution of the document for the appellant. That never happened. The substantial question is, Had Natobar authority to execute the kabuliyat? [Reference was made to Dowson and Jenkinss Contract, In re. ([ 1904] 2 Ch. 219.)] Dottie Kararis case (( 1930) L. R. 58 I. A. 58, 66.) says that a general power of attorney to execute deeds on behalf of one person for a principal will not entitle you to execute deeds signed by that person and two or three other persons. That is a sound principle. On the question of what is residence, s. 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure speaks of residence as founding jurisdiction, but there is an express explanation of the section which states that temporary residence will suffice. It is suggested that that explanation to the Code of Civil Procedure ought to be taken into account in construing the Registration Act. It is submitted that a reference to the Code of Civil Procedure rather helps the construction that " permanent " residence is intended and not " temporary” residence. With regard to the matter of the translation of the power of attorney, there is the rule that a document in the vernacular cannot be put in the first Court unless an official translation is put in with it, by a sworn interpreter of the Court. That translation is used if the case goes to the Court of Appeal, and it is put in the Record if the matter comes to the Privy Council, and no notice is taken of anything else. The appellant would be prejudiced by a change in the translation at this stage. [Lord Maugham. We think that we are entitled judicially to look at the unofficial translation which was used in the High Court.] Monckton K.C. and Wallach for the respondent, were not required to argue the residence point. It is clear that, on the unofficial translation of the power of attorney, Natobar was authorized to execute the kabuliyat. The only document between the Burdwan Raj and the appellant was the kabuliyat. It is clear that, on the unofficial translation of the power of attorney, Natobar was authorized to execute the kabuliyat. The only document between the Burdwan Raj and the appellant was the kabuliyat. With regard to the allegation that the kabuliyat was not properly registered because Fakir Chandra Sarkar presented it under his general power of attorney for Devendra N. Mitra Mazumdar, it has been admitted that it only requires one of the parties to present the document for registration, although you have to have them all for appearance and admission. But one person executing is sufficient, so that if D. N. Mitra Mazumdar himself had presented the document it is admitted that it would have been enough. It is submitted that the position is exactly the same when he presents by his attorney, so long as there is nothing in the power which limits the authority. On its true construction this power of attorney was amply sufficient to enable Fakir Chandra Sarkar to do what it is admitted that the donor of the power could have done himself. It is a complete answer to the point taken by the appellant under ss. 34 and 35 of the Registration Act if the Board are satisfied that Natobar was the person executing, and that the person executing did not necessarily refer to the party on whose behalf Natobar appeared and admitted. The person executing would be some one in the position of Natobar Mohammed Ewaz v. Birj Loll (( 1877) L. R. 4 I. A. 166.) ; Sitaram Laxmanrao v. Dharmasukhram Tanrukhram (( 1927) I. L. R. 51 B. 971) ; and Jambu Parshad v. Muhammad Aftab Ali Khan. ( 1914) L. R. 42 I. A. 22.) According to those authorities the attorney is the executor. The whole object of these sections is to make the Registrar identify—to avoid fraud. What has to be admitted is the signature of the attorney, and he comes and does it himself; he is the proper person. In all these points which have been raised the respondent desires to rely on s. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act (I. of 1872) as indicating that there is a presumption that the work of such an official as the sub-Registrar has been properly done, and that the facts are there which give rise to his right to append his signature to an endorsement. There are authorities which presume from an endorsement of such a document as this that the necessary steps have been taken which give him authority to do it Chhotey Lal v. Collector of Moradabad. (( 1922) L. R. 49 I. A. 375.) Reliance is also placed on s. 87 as indicating that there is all the world of difference between a mistake due to an error of the Registrar in carrying out his duties in endorsing correctly the document, and a failure of the person desiring to admit that document to do the necessary thing. There is nothing here on the part of the person who admitted showing any failure to do any necessary thing. Dunne K.C. replied. With regard to the power of attorney to Fakir Chandra Sarkar the whole point turns on the applicability of Dottie Karans case. (( 1930) L.R. 58 I.A. 58.) Next, it is said for the respondent that it is permissible under s. 35 of the Registration Act to consider an admission by the attorney as being sufficient admission of execution. That would be putting an unnecessarily wide construction on the section Kandukuri Balasurya Row v. Secretary of State for India. (( 1917) L. R. 44 I. A. 166.) The admission which has to be made must be an admission on behalf of the person who is represented as the executant Puran Chand Nahatta v. Monmotho Nath Mukherjee. (( 1927) L. R. 55 I. A. 81, 84.) [Reference was also made to Monmotho Nath Mukerjee v. Puran Chand Nahatta (( 1925) 29 Cal. W. N. 539, 552.) ; and Satish Chandra v. Harendra Kumar. (( 1936) 40 Cal. W. N. 1051.)] 1937- Jan. 22. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Sir Shadi Lal. This consolidated appeal raises the question of the validity of the execution and the registration of a kabuliyat, under which the appellant, Sarat Chandra Basu, with other persons, obtained a lease of the coal-mines in certain villages belonging to the respondent, the Maharaja of Burdwan. The suits which have led to the appeal were originally instituted by the lessor against the appellant and his co-lessees, but they were subsequently withdrawn as against the co-lessees, and proceeded to trial as against the appellant only. The claim was resisted by him on various pleas, mainly of a technical character; but he was defeated in both the Courts in India. The claim was resisted by him on various pleas, mainly of a technical character; but he was defeated in both the Courts in India. He has now appealed to His Majesty in Council, and their Lordships have, after examining the arguments presented on behalf of the parties, reached the conclusion that there is no valid ground for dissenting from the view taken by the Courts below. The kabuliyat, upon which the claim was founded, was executed on August 30,, 1916, in favour of the plaintiff on behalf of four persons including Sarat Chandra Basu. It contained various stipulations for the payment of royalties and commission on the coal extracted from the mines, and the suits were brought for the recovery of the money due to the plaintiff on the contract. The defendant pleaded that the kabuliyat was neither executed nor registered by him or by any person authorized by him to act on his behalf; and that he was not, therefore, bound by the covenants contained therein. The document purports to have been executed by one Natobar Mukerjee, who had a power of attorney from the defendant. His power to execute the kabuliyat is, however, challenged on two grounds (i.) That the power of attorney was not authenticated as required by law (2.) that it did not authorize him to execute the kabuliyat. There can be no doubt that, if Natobar Mukerjee had no authority in law to act on behalf of the defendant, the latter cannot be held liable for the breach of the contract embodied in the kabuliyat. It is, therefore, necessary to determine whether these objections are well-founded. With reference to the first objection, reliance is placed upon s. 32 of the Indian Registration Act (XVI. of 1908), which enacts the law relating to the presentation of a document for registration. It provides that the presentation may be made by the person executing the document, or by the person in whose favour it is executed, or "by the agent of such person, .... duly authorised by power-of-attorney executed and authenticated in manner hereinafter mentioned” The manner in which a power of attorney is to be executed and authenticated is prescribed by s. 33 of the statute. It is enacted by cl. duly authorised by power-of-attorney executed and authenticated in manner hereinafter mentioned” The manner in which a power of attorney is to be executed and authenticated is prescribed by s. 33 of the statute. It is enacted by cl. (a) of sub-s. 1 of that section that if the principal, at the time of executing the power of attorney, resides in British India, the power of attorney shall be executed before, and authenticated by, the Registrar or sub-Registrar within whose district or sub-district the principal resides. Does the power of attorney in question satisfy this requirement? The defendant contends that it does not comply with the law because it was executed before, and authenticated by, the sub-Registrar of Hazaribagh, while the principal was a resident of Burdwan. It is true that he ordinarily resided at Burdwan, but the endorsement of the sub-Registrar on the document expressly states that he was living, at that time, at Hazaribagh. The endorsement also shows that he was personally known to the sub-Registrar, and it is not likely that a mistake would be made about his place of residence. Indeed, no attempt has been made to prove that he was not then residing at Hazaribagh, and that the statement in the" endorsement is incorrect. The expression " resides," as used in s. 33, is not defined in the statute, but there is no reason for assuming that it contemplates only permanent residence and excludes temporary residence. The Courts in India are agreed that at the time in question Sarat Chandra Basu was residing at Hazaribagh, and their Lordships concur in the conclusion that the power of attorney was duly executed and authenticated. Nor do they think that the power of attorney authorized Natobar Mukerjee to execute and register another document, and not the kabuliyat. It is common ground that four persons had agreed to work coal-mines in certain villages by taking a lease of them from the plaintiff; and they had to execute a document called a kabuliyat in his favour containing the terms of the contract entered into between the lessees and the lessor. The plaintiff maintains that it was in connection with the execution of the kabuliyat in question that Sarat Chandra Basu gave the power of attorney to Natobar Mukerjee in order to authorize the latter to act on his behalf. The plaintiff maintains that it was in connection with the execution of the kabuliyat in question that Sarat Chandra Basu gave the power of attorney to Natobar Mukerjee in order to authorize the latter to act on his behalf. The defendant, on the other hand, argues that the pwer was given to the attorney for the purpose of executing and registering another document—namely, the agreement between the lessees denning their rights and liabilities inter se arising out of the projected lease. The determination of the dispute depends upon the meaning of the relevant passage of the power of attorney. The document is written in the Bengali language, and it is only its translation in English which is before their Lordships. The parties are, however, at variance as to the correctness of the translation printed in the Record. It is urged by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that this translation is incorrect, and he invites their Lordships attention to another translation, which appears to have been acted upon by the Court of Appeal in India. The history of these two rival translations may be shortly stated. The suits were tried on the original side of the High Court at Calcutta, and in compliance with the rules of that Court an English translation of the power of attorney made by the official translator was filed by the plaintiff in the trial Court. This translation may hereinafter be described as the " official " translation. Before the commencement of the trial, he applied to the Court for leave to administer interrogatories to the defendant and produced with the affidavit in support of his application an English translation of the power of attorney which was made or obtained by his attorneys. This second translation may be called the " unofficial " translation. There is a divergence between the two translations, and it appears that both of them were placed on the Record of the trial Court. When the claim was allowed against the defendant in that Court he preferred appeals to a Division Bench of the High Court ; and it is clear that it was the unofficial translation which was included in the paper-book printed for the appeals. The paper-book was prepared on behalf of the defendant, who was the appellant, and he was responsible for the inclusion of the documents in that book. The paper-book was prepared on behalf of the defendant, who was the appellant, and he was responsible for the inclusion of the documents in that book. He, however, attributes the inclusion of the unofficial translation to inadvertence. Be that as it may, there can be little doubt that the unofficial translation was the only translation which was referred to by the Court which heard and determined the appeals. But in the book printed for the hearing of the present appeal it was the official translation which was included. The plaintiff thereupon made an application to the High Court on February 20, 1936, praying that it should be recorded that the official translation, which had been printed in the paper-book for the Privy Council, was not the correct translation of the original document, but that the translation which he had annexed to his application was the correct translation. He also suggested that the Registrar of the High Court should transmit to the Registrar of the Privy Council the record dealing with the correction and the order to be made by the Court in the matter. This application was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that it should have been made to His Majesty in Council. There is admittedly a material difference between the two translations of the passage describing the document which Natobar Mukerjee was empowered to execute on behalf of his principal. Both the translations contain a recital of the fact that four persons, including Sarat Chandra Basu, had arranged to take a lease for 999 years of certain villages with " underground right " from the Burdwan Raj estate on specified terms. There is no dispute about this recital. It is the passage following the recital which has caused controversy between the parties. According to the official translation the passage in question is in these words " In this connection an agreement has been executed amongst us four persons. There is no dispute about this recital. It is the passage following the recital which has caused controversy between the parties. According to the official translation the passage in question is in these words " In this connection an agreement has been executed amongst us four persons. Now, in order to execute and register the said agreement on my behalf, I appoint Sri Natobar Mukerjee, caste Brahman, occupation service, at present of Raneegunge town in the District of Burdwan, as my special attorney." The unofficial translation of that passage is as follows " And whereas an Agreement Deed has been written up between the parties for the purpose, now I appoint Natobar Mukerjee of Burdwan at present of Ranigunj, son of Ambica Charan Mukhopadhya, deceased, by caste Brahmin, by profession service-holder, my constituted attorney to execute the said agreement deed and register the same on my behalf." It will be observed that, if the official translation is correct, Natobar Mukerjee was empowered to execute and register the agreement entered into " amongst us four persons," and it is suggested by the appellant that the four persons alluded to were the four lessees. It is, therefore, argued that the attorney had no authority to execute and register the kabuliyat which embodied the contract, not between the four lessees, but between the lessees on the one side and the Burdwan Raj on the other side. The respondent, on the other hand, maintains that the original power of attorney mentions, not " four persons," but " the parties " ; and that the phrase 11 the parties " means the parties to the lease—namely, the lessees and the Burdwan Raj. It is said that this description of the document applies to the kabuliyat, which alone was the agreement " written up " between the parties. The difference between the two translations is vital, as it affects the validity of the instrument which is the foundation of the respondents claim. When the accuracy of an English translation of a document written in the vernacular language is challenged, the rule ordinarily followed by this Board is to accept the translation as correct if it was made by a translator appointed by a Court in India and not challenged before the judges who had dealt with the case. When the accuracy of an English translation of a document written in the vernacular language is challenged, the rule ordinarily followed by this Board is to accept the translation as correct if it was made by a translator appointed by a Court in India and not challenged before the judges who had dealt with the case. It is obvious that their Lordships are not in a position to say that such translation should be held to be incorrect. If they are satisfied, however, that there is a genuine doubt about its correctness, they would remit the matter to the High Court in India, from which the appeal has been brought, for an inquiry into it, and direct it, if necessary, to have another translation made under the direction of the Court, and to transmit it to the Registrar of the Privy Council. The question is whether a reference should be made to the High Court at Calcutta in order to settle the dispute between the parties. Now, it is true that the translation relied upon by the respondent was not made by a translator appointed by the Court, but it was not only placed on the Record of the trial Court, but also was included in the Record printed for the Court of Appeal in India and apparently acted upon by that Court. These circumstances, which create a reasonable doubt about the accuracy of the official translation, would justify an inquiry by the High Court as to which of the two translations should be accepted as correct. Their Lordships, however, consider it unnecessary to delay the decision of the appeal by making a reference to India, because it is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that there is no word in the original power of attorney which is equivalent to the word " four" as used in the phrase "amongst us four persons" to be found in the official translation. The original expression can be correctly translated as " between us both parties.1 It is also admitted that the Bengali word, which has been translated in the official translation as " executed/ might properly be translated as "written and read." There are also other considerations which militate against the official translation. The original expression can be correctly translated as " between us both parties.1 It is also admitted that the Bengali word, which has been translated in the official translation as " executed/ might properly be translated as "written and read." There are also other considerations which militate against the official translation. According to this translation, the document embodying the agreement " amongst us four persons" had already been “executed" ; and it would obviously be absurd to empower the attorney to " execute " the same document again. But the rival translation does not lead to any such incongruity. After reciting that the "Agreement Deed” between the parties had been "written up," it authorizes the attorney to execute and register it. Indeed, it is conceded that there was no document to which the lessees alone were parties, which, at that time, required execution and registration; and the power of attorney, if it related to a document of that description, would be wholly in fructuous. But a document containing the terms of the contract between the lessor and the lessees was yet to be executed and registered. Moreover, the lessees obtained possession of the villages leased to them by the plaintiff several years ago, and have since been working the coal-mines ; and there is no document except the kabuliyat which defines their rights and duties vis-a-vis the lessor. It is impossible to assume that they had obtained the right of working the mines, and had been allowed to take away coal therefrom, without any contract in writing. Indeed, they had been paying the rents and royalties as set out in the kabuliyat until the commencement of the dispute which led to this litigation. It is unnecessary to dilate upon the subject, as their Lordships are convinced that it was the kabuliyat, and no other document, which Natobar Mukerjee was authorized by the power of attorney to execute and register on behalf of the appellant. They accordingly hold that the grounds upon which the validity of the execution of the kabuliyat was sought to be impeached cannot be sustained. It must, therefore, operate as an instrument duly executed by the appellant. It is then argued that the document was not validly registered, as it was not presented for registration as required by the Indian Registration Act. It must, therefore, operate as an instrument duly executed by the appellant. It is then argued that the document was not validly registered, as it was not presented for registration as required by the Indian Registration Act. It is undeniable that, if a document is executed by two or more persons, it is not necessary that all of them should present it for registration, and that the presentation thereof by one of them is a sufficient compliance with the law. Now, the endorsement by the sub-Registrar on the instrument shows that it was presented for registration by one Fakir Chandra Sarkar, V agent for the executant Devendra Nath Mitra Mazumdar under a general Power of Attorney No. 41 of 1904, authenticated by the special sub-Registrar of Burdwan." It is beyond dispute that Mazumdar was one of the executants of the kabuliyat, but it is argued that, while Sarkar was authorized to act on behalf of Mazumdar in respect of the documents executed by the latter alone, he had no authority to represent him in connection with a document executed by his principal jointly with any other person or persons. There is no foundation for this contention. The power of attorney in favour of Sarkar is a general power of attorney, and authorizes him to represent his principal in various matters, including the registration of documents. It contains no such restriction as is suggested by the appellant. There was, in their Lordships view, a proper presentation of the kabuliyat for registration ; and it is not argued that its registration was invalid on any other ground. The Courts in India have rightly held that the appellants liability on the kabuliyat has been established, and the appeal preferred by him should be dismissed with costs. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly.