Judgement Appeal in forma pauperis (No. 98 of 1936) from a judgment of the High Court (April 27, 1936) which confirmed a judgment of the Sessions Judge of Montgomery (February 13, 1936). The appellant Mangal Singh and one Kartar Singh were tried on a charge of murder. The Sessions Judge convicted Mangal Singh on the charge and sentenced him to death, and convicted Kartar Singh of an offence under s. 201 of the Indian Penal Code, though no charge under that section had been framed, and sentenced him to three years rigorous imprisonment. In doing so, the Sessions Judge relied (inter alia) on a statement made by Kartar Singh which he treated as evidence, not only against him but also against Mangal Singh. On appeal the High Court held that Kartar Singh, in his statement, did not implicate himself in the murder but threw the whole blame on Mangal Singh ; that he implicated himself only in the concealment of the body, and the Sessions Judge was wrong in admitting that part of the statement which related to murder as evidence against Mangal Singh, against whom the statement was admissible only so far as it related to the offence of concealment of the body, and found against Mangal Singh as follows (( 1936) I.L. R. 17 Lah. 554.) " The evidence, therefore, against Mangal Singh shortly put is as follows He buried the body of Narain Singh, who clearly had been murdered, shortly after he had been murdered. The body was buried in the field belonging to the family. The next morning on being questioned as to the whereabouts of Narain Singh, Mangal Singh lied. Quite apart from the evidence that he said that Narain Singh had gone to fetch Matto, he undoubtedly said that he had received a postcard which stated that Narain Singh was ill in the Amritsar hospital. He left the village on the nth October on the pretence of looking for Narain Singh. He knew perfectly well when he went that Narain Singhs body was lying where he had buried it. He did not return to the village and was arrested on the 15th outside the village at a railway station. His loin-cloth was stained with human blood. He failed to give any explanation of the very suspicious circumstances against him. He knew perfectly well when he went that Narain Singhs body was lying where he had buried it. He did not return to the village and was arrested on the 15th outside the village at a railway station. His loin-cloth was stained with human blood. He failed to give any explanation of the very suspicious circumstances against him. On this evidence it has been strenuously and ably argued by counsel for the appellant that it is impossible to find a verdict of murder. He argues that the evidence, if believed, would establish an offence under s. 201, Indian Penal Code, and he argues that it can only establish such an offence. We agree that all the authorities to which he has referred are in his favour on this point. The authorities in India appear to have treated this question as a point of law, that is, that evidence of this nature ought not properly to be left to a jury in a murder case by a judge. With the greatest respect to the decisions to which we have been referred, one of which is a decision of this High Court reported in Rannun v. The Crown (( 1926) I. L. R. 7 Lah. 84.), we cannot hold that this question is a question of law at all. Evidence of this nature would certainly in England be left to a jury by a judge. The question in each case is whether circumstantial evidence of this nature satisfies a jury of the guilt of the accused under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The facts of the case reported in Rannun v. The Crown (( 1926) I. L. R. 7 Lah. 84.) were for that Bench and their findings on those facts cannot bind any other Bench. The evidence that we have detailed above is clearly evidence which ought to be left to a jury and evidence upon which a jury might reasonably find a verdict of murder. This is in our opinion the real test. After very careful consideration of all the facts of this case we are satisfied that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the facts of this case is that Mangal Singh is guilty of the murder of Narain Singh." 1937. Feb. 15 and 16. Rashid for the appellant. This is in our opinion the real test. After very careful consideration of all the facts of this case we are satisfied that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the facts of this case is that Mangal Singh is guilty of the murder of Narain Singh." 1937. Feb. 15 and 16. Rashid for the appellant. The question whether the evidence shows an offence under s. 302 or s. 201 of the Indian Penal Code has always been treated in India as a question of law. The jury decide whether the facts are true or not. Whether the facts make out one offence or another is a question for the judge. The sufficiency of evidence is a question of law. The Sessions Judge relied on a confession by Kartar in convicting Mangal Singh. The High Court held this confession was inadmissible. If the confession is out of the case, the rest of the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction. If there had been a jury, the judge would have had to direct them that there was no evidence on which they could convict. [The evidence was discussed and reference was made to the following cases Directors of the Metropolitan Ry. Co. v, John Julian Jackson (( 1877) 3 App. Cas. 193) ; Rannun v. The Crown (( 1926) I. L. R. 7 Lah. 84) ; Bulaqi v. The Crown (( 1928) I. L. R. 9 Lah. 671.) ; Mata Din v. The King-Emperor (( 1929) I. L. R. 5 Luck . 255.) ; In re Chinna Gangappa (( 1930) I. L. R. 54 M. 68.) ; Emperor v. Sohan (( 1932) I. L. R. 54 A. 792.); Arjan Singh v. The Crown (( 1929) I. L. R. 11 Lah. 100.) ; Begu v. The King-Emperor (( 1925) L. R. 52 I. A. 191.) ; and Knowles v. The King ([ 1930] A. C. 366.).] Wallach for the respondent. The High Court held that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the facts was that Mangal Singh was guilty of the murder charged. The evidence was circumstantial, but the Court was entitled to act on that evidence. There was sufficient evidence to justify the finding. The question is one of fact, whether on the evidence the accused is guilty of the offence charged. The evidence was circumstantial, but the Court was entitled to act on that evidence. There was sufficient evidence to justify the finding. The question is one of fact, whether on the evidence the accused is guilty of the offence charged. In a number of cases it has been held that an accused who was charged with murder should be convicted of a offence under s. 201 of the Penal Code and not murder, but those decisions rested on the facts of the particular cases and not on any principle of law. The appeal here, it is submitted, does not fall within the rules laid down by the Board as regulating its interference with the course of the administration of criminal justice. [Reference was made to Begu v. The King-Emperor (8), Arnold v. The King-Emperor (( 1914) L. R 41 I. A. 149.).] It is erroneous to say that the authorities in India have said that the question of what circumstantial evidence should be left to the jury and what not is a question of law. There is nothing in Rannun v. The Crown (2) to support the interpretation put on it by the High Court. Instructions have been received from India that the following cases were cited in the argument before the High Court Besant Singh v. The Emperor (103 I. C. 97.) ; Nawab Din v. The Emperor (144 I. C. 12.) ; Des Raj v. The Emperor (A. I. R. ( 1928) Lah. 858.) ; Bulaqi v. The Crown (3) ; and Farzand AH v. The Crown. (( 1928) 29 P. L. R. 33.) A different view was taken in The Emperor v. Sheik Neamatulla (( 1913) 17 C. W. N. 1077.) ; and Kallam Narayana v. King-Emperor. (( 1932) I. L. R. 56 M. 231.) Having regard to ss. 3 and 114 of the Evidence Act, the Court must form its own conclusions. The question of the admissibility of the confession of Kantar Singh under s. 30 of the Evidence Act was not pressed. Rashid, in reply, referred to Vaithinatha Pillai v. The King-Emperor. (( 1913) L. R. 40 I. A. 193.). Feb. 19. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD ALNESS. The question of the admissibility of the confession of Kantar Singh under s. 30 of the Evidence Act was not pressed. Rashid, in reply, referred to Vaithinatha Pillai v. The King-Emperor. (( 1913) L. R. 40 I. A. 193.). Feb. 19. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD ALNESS. This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature at Lahore, dated April 27, 1936, which affirmed the conviction of the appellant and the sentence of death passed upon him by the Sessions Judge of Montgomery, dated February 13, 1936. The following is a summary of the relevant facts —One Narain Singh married a widow, Musammat Harnam Kaur, who died in or about the year 1931. The appellant is her son by a previous marriage. By her marriage with Narain Singh she had four sons, the eldest being Kartar Singh. After the death of Musammat Harnam Kaur, Narain Singh indulged in a liaison with his widowed sister-in-law Musammat Basant Kaur. In the early part of October, 1935, Narain Singh disappeared from his home. Following upon a panchayat, searchers, including the appellant, were despatched with a view to finding the missing man. On October 13 the searchers, other than the appellant, returned unsuccessfully from the search. The appellant was not seen again till he was arrested on October 15. Another panchayat was meantime convened. Kartar Singh was questioned as to his fathers whereabouts, and, in consequence of the disclosures made by him, information was lodged with the police. Kartar Singh took the police to a field which belonged to Narain Singh, and there, after digging four feet or thereabouts, the dead body of Narain Singh was found. The appellant and his half-brother, Kartar Singh, were tried, on February 11, 1936, by the Sessions Judge, with the aid of four assessors, on the following charge " That you, on or about the 2-3 night of October, 1935, at 139/9-L did commit murder by intentionally causing the death of Narain Singh and thereby committed an offence punishable under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code, and within Sessions cognizance." Both the accused pleaded not guilty, but led no evidence. At the end of the trial the assessors held that the appellant was guilty of murder, but that Kartar Singh was not, though they were of opinion that, acting under the influence of the appellant, he helped to dispose of the dead body of Narain Singh. On February 13, 1936, the learned Sessions Judge delivered judgment. He found the appellant guilty of murder, and sentenced him to death. He found Kartar Singh guilty of an offence under s. 201 of the Indian Penal Code, and sentenced him to three years rigorous imprisonment. Both the accused appealed to the High Court at Lahore, who, after argument, dismissed the appeal, found the appellant guilty of the murder charged against him, and confirmed the sentence of death passed upon him by the learned Sessions Judge. The High Court, however, reduced the sentence on Kartar Singh to one years rigorous imprisonment, and recommended that the Government should place him in a Borstal or other similar institution to serve his sentence. The appellant thereupon presented a petition to His Majesty in Council asking for special leave to appeal against his conviction and sentence. On September 26, 1936, the special leave sought was granted. The appellant then preferred this appeal, praying that the judgment of the High Court should be set aside, and that his conviction should be quashed. Counsel for the parties have been fully heard, and their Lordships have carefully considered the case in light of the argument submitted. Their Lordships have, in the result, already intimated that they would humbly advise His Majesty to refuse the appeal, and they stated that they would give their reasons for this course at a later stage. This they now propose to do. The case for the prosecution is based on circumstantial evidence. The following are the principal incidents, the cumulative effect of which, it was contended and successfully contended, established the guilt of the appellant — It was proved that the appellant had conceived an enmity against the deceased because he was expending his income upon his paramour, Musammat Basant Kaur. It was further proved that the appellant was seen by two witnesses, on the night of the alleged murder, digging in the rectangle of the field where the body of the deceased was subsequently discovered. Kartar Singh was standing by. It was further proved that the appellant was seen by two witnesses, on the night of the alleged murder, digging in the rectangle of the field where the body of the deceased was subsequently discovered. Kartar Singh was standing by. To the two witnesses who observed them on this occasion the appellant explained that he was digging out the stump of a tree. It was also proved that the appellant, reading from a postcard which he professed to have received, informed Musammat Basant Kaur that Narain Singh was lying ill at the Akali Hospital at Amritsar, and that she and Kartar Singh went there, upon receiving this information, only to find that Narain Singh had never been at the hospital. Musammat Basant Kaur asked the appellant for the postcard, but he stated that he had lost it. It was further proved that there was human blood upon the appellants loin cloth when he was arrested, although it had apparently been washed. Their Lordships are satisfied upon this evidence—unexplained, as it was, and having regard to its cumulative effect—that the Courts in India were well entitled to convict the appellant of murder. As has frequently been stated by this Board, it is no part of their duty to sit in such a case as this as a Court of Criminal Appeal, but only to correct what they regard as a miscarriage of justice, if it has occurred. Reference may again be made, in that connection, to the observations of Viscount Haldane in the case of Begu and Others v. The King-Emperor, (( 1925) L. R. 52 I. A. 191,195.) Their Lordships are satisfied that there has been no miscarriage of justice in this case, and nothing which, in accordance with well settled principles, would warrant their interference with the judgment of the High Court at Lahore. Two further matters fall to be mentioned. The learned Sessions Judge in his judgment proceeded in part upon a confession which was alleged to have been made by Kartar Singh, and which implicated the appellant in the murder. The High Court held that the alleged confession was inadmissible in evidence against the appellant, and arrived at their conclusion of his guilt independently of the confession. The learned Sessions Judge in his judgment proceeded in part upon a confession which was alleged to have been made by Kartar Singh, and which implicated the appellant in the murder. The High Court held that the alleged confession was inadmissible in evidence against the appellant, and arrived at their conclusion of his guilt independently of the confession. Their Lordships have followed the same course, and, being satisfied that the evidence, dehors the alleged confession, was sufficient to warrant the conviction of the appellant, find it unnecessary to pronounce on the admissibility or inadmissibility of the alleged confession, and they abstain from doing so. The second matter is this. The High Court at Lahore appear to have thought that it had been held in India that it was not in law open to a Court or jury to convict the accused of murder in such circumstances as exist here. Their Lordships have had the advantage of examining the Indian cases which were supposed by the High Court to yield this inference, and they are clearly of opinion that it is based on a misapprehension. Having settled the legal criterion applicable to such a case as this—namely, whether the evidence led would satisfy the jury beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused—it is then for the jury, or for the judge if there be no jury, to say whether, applying that criterion to the facts proved, the verdict should or should not be one of guilty, (cf. Wills Circumstantial Evidence, 6th ed., p. 311, r. 4.) That, their Lordships apprehend, is the law of England to-day, and they cannot find, upon examination, that the Courts in India have held or expressed a different view. Their Lordships should perhaps add that they have reached the conclusion stated apart altogether from con sideration of the terms of s. 201 of the Indian Penal Code. It appears to them that the proper avenue of approach in this case—particularly having regard to the structure of the charge—is, first and foremost, to consider whether the case under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code has been made out. If so, that is an end of the matter. It appears to them that the proper avenue of approach in this case—particularly having regard to the structure of the charge—is, first and foremost, to consider whether the case under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code has been made out. If so, that is an end of the matter. If, on the other hand, their Lordships thought that the case under that section was not proved, then, and only then, would it be proper to consider whether an offence under s. 201 of the Indian Penal Code had been established.