JUDGMENT Harries, J. - These are two connected appeals brought by the Plaintiffs against a decree of the lower appellate Court reversing a decree of the Court of first instance and dismissing the Plaintiffs' suit. 2. The Plaintiffs who were zamindars of 18 biswas in village; Walipur brought this suit against the Defendants cLalming demolition of certain constructions made by the Defendants upon the land of the Plaintiffs and an injunction to restrain the Defendants from making further constructions upon such land or making any encroachments upon it. The Court of first instance decreed the Plaintiffs' cLalm in part but on appeal the lower appellals Court found that the Defendants were in law entitled to make the constructions complained of and dismissed the Plaintiffs' suit in its entirety. 3. The Plaintiffs' case was that the land in question was part of their property and was in fact banjar or waste land and that shortly before the institution of the suit the Defendants had wrongfully taken possession of the land and built a pucca construction upon it. The Defendants on the other hand alleged that they and their father had been in possession of this land with the permission of the zamindars for a period of 30 or 35 years and that with such permission the Plaintiffs' father had long ago built upon the land some kuchha houses or huts. According to the Defendants the construction complained of was merely built in place of two of the old kuchha buildings. 4. The lower appellate Court rejected the Plaintiffs' version and has found that the Defendants were in possession of this property under a, license given by the zamindars and that the constructions complained of were made in pursuance of such license. The precise finding of the learned Civil Judge is in these terms: I am satisfied that the Defendants were holding the land under an irrevocable license and have in pursuance of it constructed the house. 5. In my judgment there was ample evidence to support this finding of the learned Civil Judge and in my view it is clear that the license granted to the Defendants was wide enough to cover the erection of a pucca building. The learned Judge has found that this pucca construction was not erected hurriedly and that it took a matter of 4 or 5 months to complete. The learned Judge has found that this pucca construction was not erected hurriedly and that it took a matter of 4 or 5 months to complete. During that time the Plaintiffs' mukhtar-i-am saw the building being erected and made no complaint of any kind and this is very significant particularly when we have regard to the fact that the parties at this time were on most unfriendly terms. The fact that the mukhtar-i-am did, not complain strongly suggests that he was aware that the Plaintiffs were entitled under the terms of their license to erect the building now in dispute. In my view there was evidence upon which the lower Court could find that the Defendants were licensees and that they were entitled to build this pucca construction under the terms of their license. 6. There can be no question that the original constructions upon this plot were kuchha constructions. Assuming that the learned Judge is wrong in holding that the license was in terms wide enough to cover the erection of a pucca building it was obviously a license which permitted the Defendants to build because it is a fact that they did build upon the plot a number of kuchha houses or huts. It has been argued on behalf of the Defendant-Respondents that even if the license was merely a license to build such would entitle the Defendants to make a pucca construction in place of a kuchha one. 7. Reliance is placed by the Defendants upon the case of Ghorey v. Shib Lal. (1920) 13 ALJ 781 In that case a zamindar brought a suit for demolition of a pucca house built by an agricultural tenant in a village. It was established that the land had been granted to the tenant for building a house and that a kuchha house had been built upon it. The pucca house had been built to replace the kuchha house and it was he d that the tenant was entitled to re-construct his kuchha house and to make it pucca. It appears that no attempt was made to prove the terms in the original grant or license to the tenant and all that was established was that the tenant had the permission of the zamindar to build a house and that in consequence he had built a kuchha construction. 8. It appears that no attempt was made to prove the terms in the original grant or license to the tenant and all that was established was that the tenant had the permission of the zamindar to build a house and that in consequence he had built a kuchha construction. 8. The Bench which decided the case consisting of Tudball and Kanhaiya Lal JJ., were of opinion that if a tenant establishes a license to build upon a plot of land belonging to the zamindar then unless the zamindar establishes that the license is confined to a license to build kuchha constructions the tenant can build a pucca construction. At p. 783 Tudball J. observes: All that we find proved before us is that a grant was made, that is, a license was given for the purposes of building, and there is nothing to show that the licensee was restricted as to the method in which ha was to construct the house. There fact that in the beginning he made the house kuchha is not sufficient reason for holding that the license granted was only one for building a kuchha house. In all probability the quality of the house to be built was never taken into consideration at all and in the ordinary way permission was given to build a dwelling house without any restriction. In any case the burden was upon the Plaintiff to prove that the Defendant was over-stepping the boundaries of the license; and he has completely failed to do so. 9. This case, if still good law, is clear authority for the proposition that if a tenant is granted a license to build and the precise nature of the building is not stipulated such license is wide enough to cover the erection of a pucca constru-cation. Upon the strength of this case it is argued by the Respondents in the present appeal that even if the learned Judge is wrong in holding that the license in the present case actually contemplated a pucca building, yet it was a license permitting the tenant to build and consequently he could build a pucca building unless the zamindar could establish that the license forbade him so to do. 10. 10. On behalf of the Appellants, however, it is contended that the case of Ghorey v. Shib Lal I cannot now be regarded as good law as according to the Appellants' contention it has been impliedly dissented from in two cases deeded by Letters Patent Benches of this Court. The first case relied upon by the Appellants is the case of Rati Singh v. Damodar Lal (1930) ALJ 1608 where it was held that a tenant was not entitled to build a house on the site of a chappar. In may judgment this case is clearly distinguishable from the case of Ghorey v. Shib Lal (Supra) to which I have referred and it is clear from the judgment that the learned Judges who decided Rati Singh v. Damodar Lal (Supra) did not dissent from the decision in that case. It would appear as if the tenant in Rati Singh v. Damodar Lal (Supra) had constructed a building on the ahata or courtyard of a house in place of a temporary structure in the nature of a chappar. That is a very different case from the present one because what has happened in this case is that the Defendants have re-constructed the building by making a pucca construction instead of a kuchcha one. In my view the case of Rati Singh v. Damodar Lal (Supra) does not throw any doubt upon the decision in Ghdrey v. Shib Lal. (Supra) 11.Counsel for the Appellants has relied upon a later case, viz., Faujdar Singh v. Pherai Ahir L.P.A. No. 106 of 1934 decided on the 2nd August, 1935, by SuLalman C.J. and Bennet J. In that case the Plaintiffs as zamindars brought a suit for possession over a certain plot situate in a village and for demolition of certain new constructions alleged to have been made by the Defendants on the plot. It appears that the Defendants built a hut upon the land in question about ten years before the suit and that shortly before the suit was instituted they had raised the walls of this hut, put a tiled roof over it and constructed a permanent verandah in front of the hut. The Letters Patent Bench held that the Defendants were not entitled to convert this kuchcha building into a pucca one. The Letters Patent Bench held that the Defendants were not entitled to convert this kuchcha building into a pucca one. The Court which decided this case appears to emphasize the fact that the previous construction was of a temporary nature and nowhere is it said that the tenant held a license to construct a house either pucca or kuchcha. What is expressly held in the case is that a tenant is not entitled without tie permission of the zamindar to alter a temporary construction and make it one of a permanent character. It does not appear from the judgment that this temporary hut had been built in consequence of a license grunted to build a house. It may well be that if a tenant builds a temporary hut on a vacant piece of land a license to build a house cannot be inferred. All that can be inferred from such a circumstance is a license to build a temporary hut and no more and that being so such cannot be converted into a permanent dwelling house. On the other hand if it is proved that the tenant has been granted a license to build a house without any other qualification, then it appears to me that the case of Faujdar Singh v. Pherai Ahir L.P.A. No. 106 of 1934 is not in point. It is to be observed that in this latter case the case of Ghorey v. Shib Lal is referred to without dissent and the learned Judges point out that the facts of that case were different from the facts of the case which they are considering. In my judgment the case of Faujdar Singh v. Pherai Ahir does not throw any real doubts upon the correctness of the decision in Ghorey v. Shib Lal. Sitting as a single Judge I am bound by the decision in Ghorey v. Shib Lal where the facts are practically identical with the facts in this case and I accordingly hold that even if it has not been affirmatively established that there was a license to build a pucca house, yet as it has been established that there was a license to build a house the Defendants were entitled to build a pucca construction in the absence of any evidence by the zamindars that the license was expressly confined to the erection of kuchcha constructions. 12. 12. In my judgment the learned Civil Judge was right in holding that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to any relief. There was in my view evidence upon which he could find that the license was wide enough to cover any form of building and even if that were not so he was entitled to hold upon the authority of Ghorey v. Shib Lal cited above that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to any relief in this suit. For these reasons the two appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. Leave to appeal under the Letters Patent is granted.